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Extimate Technology
This book investigates how we should form ourselves in a world satu-
rated with technologies that are profoundly intruding in the very fabric 
of our selfhood.
New and emerging technologies, such as smart technological environ-
ments, imaging technologies and smart drugs, are increasingly shaping 
who and what we are and influencing who we ought to be. How should 
we adequately understand, evaluate and appreciate this development? 
Tackling this question requires going beyond the persistent and  stubborn 
inside-outside dualism and recognizing that what we consider our “in-
side” self is to a great extent shaped by our “outside” world. Inspired 
by various philosophers – especially Nietzsche, Peirce and Lacan – this 
book shows how the values, goals and ideals that humans encounter in 
their environments not only shape their identities but also can enable 
them to critically relate to their present state. The author argues against 
understanding technological self-formation in terms of making ourselves 
better, stronger and smarter. Rather, we should conceive it in terms of 
technological sublimation, which redefines the very notion of human 
enhancement. In this respect the author introduces an alternative, more 
suitable theory, namely Technological Sublimation Theory (TST).
Extimate Technology will be of interest to scholars and advanced 
 students working in philosophy of technology, philosophy of the self, 
phenomenology, pragmatism and history of philosophy.
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From Inside to Outside and from Outside to Inside
Shelter, clothing, the wheel, stone axes, furnaces, steam engines,  roadways, 
canals, plumbing, clocks, furniture, automobiles, the t elegraph, the tele-
phone, cutlery, water taps, electric kettles,  refrigerators, plains, guns, 
newspapers, computers, mobile phones: a relatively random list of tech-
nologies that have profoundly shaped our world. Characteristic of these 
technologies is that they are aimed toward the outside world. They serve 
as protection from the elements, enable interaction with outside objects 
and allow us to employ, manipulate and regulate the environment. They 
make it possible, directly or indirectly, to control, from an inside realm, 
the outside world.
This movement from inside to outside is also articulated by Ernst 
Kapp (1877), who can be considered the founding father of philosophy 
of technology. Kapp attempts to illustrate that technologies are essen-
tially projections or exteriorizations of bodily organs in order to con-
trol and use the outside world. The movement from inside to outside is 
expressed by the human desire to tame and manipulate the obstinate 
environment. Technological objects extend the human organism by rep-
licating or amplifying bodily and mental abilities: a hammer, for in-
stance, is basically a strengthened version of a human fist, clothing is 
a duplication of the skin, telegraph cables are an extension of human 
nerves and railway systems are a copy of the vascular system. One hun-
dred years later, Marshall McLuhan (1966) interprets technologies as 
amplifications or accelerations of functions originally performed by the 
unaided human organism; technologies, he claims, take over or supple-
ment these functions. McLuhan has focused on media as extensions of 
the senses, particularly those of sight and sound; radio and telephone 
are seen as extensions of ears, while visual media, including writing and 
print, are understood as extensions of eyes (see also Brey 2000).
Over the past decades, we witnessed the emergence of different types 
of technologies: pacemakers, artificial heart valves, artificial hips, EEG, 
fMRI, cochlear implants, retinal chips, Deep Brain Stimulation,  Google 
Glass, smart mirrors, smart bracelets, nanopills, RFID chips, smart 
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drugs, eyeborgs, and movement, health and emotion sensors and actu-
ators. In general, these technologies are small, smart and more person-
alized (Van Est et al. 2014). Characteristic of these technologies is that 
instead of being aimed toward the outside world, they are moving from 
the outside toward the inside, intruding into the human’s body and psy-
chology. Now the human being seems to be the target of control, change 
and modification.
This movement from outside to inside is accelerating and intensify-
ing. Since 1958, artificial cardiac pacemakers aid the functioning of the 
heart, generating electrical impulses delivered by electrodes to  contract 
the heart muscles and regulate the electrical conduction system of the 
heart. Since the 1990s, patients with Parkinson’s disease are being 
treated with Deep Brain Stimulation that reduces severe tremor by send-
ing electrical pulses to an electrode that has been surgically inserted 
in the brain. Some studies show that people with obsessive-compulsive 
disorder or major depression also seem to benefit from Deep Brain Stim-
ulation, instigating ethical debate about the aptness of this technology to 
treat mental illness. At my own university (the University of Twente), an 
electrical pill has been developed that contains sensitive nanowires that 
detect deviant DNA fragments in the intestines that may indicate early 
stages of cancer. If suitable, the patient could receive the measurements 
done by this pill on her smartphone. Other smart pills at nanoscale that 
contain medication have been developed; after being injected in the 
body, these pills, instead of contaminating the whole body, are able to 
find and release the medication near or in the targeted diseased tissue. A 
cochlear implant allows deaf babies to develop significant hearing and 
some adults to improve their hearing. A retinal photovoltaic chip enables 
blind people with a slightly damaged optic nerve to gain some sight. 
fMRI images are potentially tamper-proofing lie detection, providing 
insight into various psychological disorders. Smart mirrors confront 
people with, for example, bad eating habits, and persuade them to live 
healthier.
These are just a few examples of intrusive technologies that are 
 increasingly getting closer to and penetrating our corporeal s urfaces, giv-
ing rise to an intimate interplay between bodies, organs and t echnologies 
 (Lettow 2011; Dalibert 2014; Zwart 2015, 2017).  Technologies that for 
millennia have been developed and used to control our outside world, 
now, as Garreau (2005, 6) puts it, “have started to merge with our 
minds, our memories, our metabolisms, our personalities, our progeny 
and  perhaps our souls.” Techno-optimists, sometimes calling them-
selves transhumanists or posthumanists (or something else), face these 
developments with confidence and great expectations. They p redict that 
 nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technologies, and cognitive 
science (the so-called NBIC technological disciplines and approaches) 
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will evermore intertwine and strengthen one another (known as NBIC 
convergence), which, they believe, will lead to numerous, cross-border 
technological achievements that we currently cannot even imagine. These 
technological developments will enable the engineering of our evolution 
and the radical enhancement of humanity. NBIC- convergence will, they 
predict, reinforce and accelerate technological developments to such a 
 degree that a completely new human will ascend. They  anticipate ex-
traordinary posthumans equipped with smart skins, m eta-brains, X-ray 
and infrared vision, and super intelligence. Upcoming technologies will, 
they believe, optimize cognitive performance, sensory functioning and 
even mood management. Their optimism seems to be limitless: tech-
nological developments will bring us, among other great things, ultra- 
intelligent nanobots that continuously detect, diagnose and cure diseases 
in our bodies, regenerative medicine that prevents biological decline and 
extends lifespan and genetic modification that not only makes us stronger 
and smarter but also limitless creative and permanently happy. Critics of 
these technologies, sometimes characterized as “bio- conservatives,” are 
much less positive. They predict a shift from humans using these inti-
mate technologies to control and regulate their lives to being controlled 
and determined by them. They also believe that these technologies, by 
changing our bodily and cognitive features and capacities, will violate 
our human nature and form a threat to our basic values (Kass 2002; 
Fukuyama 2002; Habermas 2003).
In addition, it can be observed that these new devices do not work 
independently but are increasingly connected and communicate with 
one another. This connectedness enables that the collected data and 
 measurements regarding our behavior can be shared, which makes it 
possible to more successfully monitor and influence our thoughts, actions 
and habits. This development is currently bringing about the so-called 
Internet of Things and Ambient Technology. The influence of these new 
technologies is particularly effective because they are increasingly inter-
woven into the texture of our daily life and embedded in our ecosystem. 
These new networks seamlessly pervade our lifeworld, demand our at-
tention, make us increasingly dependent on what they have to offer, are 
incorporated by us, merge with us and, some authors say, eventually 
become us (Turkle 2004; de Preester 2011). This way, these technologies 
are becoming ubiquitous, that is, everywhere and nowhere. Disappear-
ing from view, not only are they increasingly escaping our control but we 
are also not aware of their influence – making it only more effective. By 
influencing our biology, chemistry and psychology much more directly, 
their influence appears to come from inside, indistinguishable from in-
ner drives (Zizek 2009, 2012). Techno-optimists highlight the advan-
tages of this interconnectedness and seamlessness of devices, whereas 
critics consider it an additional and even more urgent danger.
4 Introduction
Understanding Human-Technology Relations
Different theories and approaches have been developed to understand 
the relation between technology and the world as well as the increas-
ing influence of technologies on humans and their lifeworld. Focusing 
on how these theoretical approaches frame the relation between inside 
and outside allows roughly grouping them into three accounts: an in-
strumentalist, a determinist and an interactionist. Approaches that take 
a movement from inside to outside as a starting point often adopt a 
so-called instrumentalist perspective of human-technology relations, 
which corresponds to common-sense approaches. The instrumentalist 
perspective understands technology merely as a neutral means developed 
by human beings to achieve certain goals. It is human beings who have 
intentions and form interpretations of the world; technologies are al-
ways secondary to those intentions and interpretations. They function 
as instruments and means to control, manipulate and change the outside 
world. A spear is seen as a tool that can be used to fight, defend against 
or hunt animals in order to survive; a house is seen as means that pro-
tect humans from harsh natural elements, preventing them being forced 
to live as nomads; a university is seen as an institute that enables the 
increase of knowledge and skills in order to prosper and live a good life.
Approaches that take a movement from outside to inside as a 
 starting point often adopt a so-called determinist perspective of 
 human- technology relations. They observe an increasing influence of 
technologies on humans. This perspective does not see technology as 
a mere means for achieving purposes set by human beings in order to 
 control, manipulate and change the outside world, but as an  autonomous 
force that cannot be controlled or regulated (anymore) by human beings. 
Jacques Ellul (1977) has argued that the impact of technology has be-
come so great that it is transforming society into a technical system. 
And according to Günther Anders (1956/2002), the products that we 
make immediately escape our control and incite practices that we can-
not predict. We are always behind the technical products that we make. 
He goes so far as to say that at the end of the 20th century, it is not the 
human being but technology that is the actual subject of history, peo-
ple have become the product of the products they have produced. This 
determinist perspective originates in pessimistic views of the effects of 
the industrial revolution; the transition to new manufacturing processes, 
including iron production processes, new chemical manufacturing and 
the large-scale use of steam power, invoked the fear that humans have 
become cogs in giant machines. But the same perspective also manifests 
in other forms of determinism, like the view that it is our environment 
that shapes our behavior and personality (situationism) or that it is our 
biology and in particular our brain that is in control of our actions and 
decisions (brain-determinism).
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These deterministic, outside-to-inside approaches currently have the 
above-mentioned new and emerging technologies in their sights,  including 
things like nanoengineering, genetic modification and  Artificial Intelli-
gence. The direction has reversed suddenly, and technologies are making 
an inward turn; although these new technologies are often  presented as 
aiding devices or as means of communication and interaction, these the-
oretical approaches attempt to reveal that humans are being controlled 
and modified by the technologies. Instead of technologies being means 
to realize goals that humans have set, humans are portrayed as means 
that are used to satisfy their goals, as vehicles that sustain and multiply 
these technologies (Zizek 2010, 132).
The instrumentalist and determinist perspectives should not be seen 
as consecutive, although in particular periods one or the other could 
be more dominant. Their proponents often defend them synchronically 
 dependent on how they understand and value the effects of particular 
technological developments in particular contexts. These perspectives 
are attempts to make sense of the role that technologies play in our world, 
which can be evaluated as more or less sound. From a third perspective, 
which I heuristically call an interactionist perspective, the problem is that 
both poles are too one-sided. From this perspective, the instrumentalist 
approach in neutralizing the role of technology fails to see how tech-
nologies themselves help to shape human goals. The clock is not merely 
a neutral instrument that enables realizing a goal  independently set by 
humans such as getting to work on time: it has synchronized the lives of 
masses of people, optimized the division of labor and ultimately created 
the place where we have to get to “on time” to start with. Without the 
clock, the whole Taylorian production process would be unimaginable 
(McLuhan and Gordon 2003). But from an interactionist approach, 
the determinist perspective is not a satisfactory position either, since it 
 ignores the fact that technologies are always embedded in use contexts, 
and in order to function, they need to be interpreted and appropriated by 
human beings. Mobile phones and algorithms greatly shape our behav-
ior and interactions, but can only do that if they are properly and often 
(but not always) deliberately integrated in our society and entrenched in 
our cognitive processes.
In order to sufficiently appreciate the proposed interactionist 
 perspective, it is important to recognize that it aims to overcome the 
categorical separation of human beings and technology assumed in 
both instrumentalist and determinist approaches. The starting point 
is  neither a movement from inside to outside nor one from outside to 
inside, but rather humans and technology are seen as reciprocally and 
mutually shaping one another. Different approaches could be related or 
even brought under the heading “interactionism”: Technological Medi-
ation Theory (TMT) analyses how technologies help to shape relations 
 between human beings and the world, including how they influence 
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moral actions and decisions (Ihde 1990; Verbeek 2005, 2011). Extended 
mind thesis (EMT) examines how technological objects in the exter-
nal environment could be utilized by the mind in such a way that they 
become extensions of the mind itself (Clark and Chalmers 1998). Ma-
terial Engagement Theory (MET) studies how human constitution has 
always relied on material culture, particularly focusing on how mate-
rial things transform and rearrange the structure of cognitive functions 
(Knappett 2005; Malafouris 2004, 2013). These are certainly not the 
only views that could be characterized as “interactionist,” but I high-
light them  because the approach that I will develop in this book strongly 
concurs with or challenges certain elements contained in them. It must 
be clear that many other approaches that focus on human-technology re-
lations could be regarded “interactionist,” including Callon and Latour’s 
Actor- Network Theory (Callon 1986; Latour 1992, 1993), Feenberg’s 
critical theory of technology (Feenberg 2002), Haraway’s cyborg theory 
(Haraway 1991), Sloterdijk’s immunology thesis (Sloterdijk 1998) and 
Stiegler’s philosophy of originary technicity (Stiegler 1998).
The approach that will be developed in this book falls within the inter-
actionist perspective and will also directly or indirectly critically use and 
incorporate insights derived from the above-mentioned and other theo-
ries. However, it significantly distinguishes itself from those approaches 
by its method and focus. Although it will very seriously take the “prin-
ciple of charity” (Davidson 1984, Chapter 13) as leading in criticizing 
opposing views and developing an alternative, it will also show their 
shortcomings. Existing “interactionist” views in philosophy of technol-
ogy have provided sophisticated accounts of the influence of technology 
on humans from different angles, but have insufficiently examined the 
essentialist and dualist views that they attempt to overcome. The lack of 
thorough insight in these views prevents recognizing the stubbornness of 
the essentialist and dualist view on the relation between human beings 
and the technological world. As a result, current interactionist views 
have proved insufficiently able to uncover relevant presuppositions and 
blind spots in their own positions and end up rehabilitating the very 
framework that they are aiming to defeat. Overcoming the categorical 
separation of human beings and technology requires a comprehensive 
understanding of how that separation came about in the first place.
Successfully seeing beyond the categorical distinction between technol-
ogy and humans requires, first of all, grasping on which grounds humans 
can be distinguished from their (material and technological) environment. 
In a constructive critique of Platonic-Aristotelian essentialism, that is, the 
idea that the real is ultimately invariable, independent and one, modern 
philosophy, guided by Descartes, has appropriated that essentialism and 
developed an inside-outside dualism, a dualism of an inside realm of ideas 
and an outside world of material things, including technologies. In order 
to understand how technologies could radically intrude in the human, it 
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is pivotal to adequately grasp what that essentialism and dualism entail 
as well as how they could be dismantled. Inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche, 
the interactionist view that will be developed will debunk the concept that 
attributes rigid a priori, essential qualities to the human and acknowledge 
that all seemingly steady coordinates for understanding the human can 
be “historicized,” “contextualized” or “deconstructed.” This essentialist 
conception is not only historically situated in the philosophy of Aristotle 
and Descartes but also revealed as a tendency found in contemporary 
approaches to the human, including approaches in philosophy of technol-
ogy. From the proposed perspective, the human cannot be understood as 
an independent and isolated entity. When the social and material environ-
ment of the human changes, the human changes. Taking the interactionist 
perspective all the way, the human is characterized as a relational entity: 
there is no human without and prior to its relations; a human comes to 
be what she is and only exists by virtue of her relations and interactions.
Conceptualizing the view that relations and interactions are not addi-
tional but constitutive – that is, you do not have first relata (human and 
world) that then relate to one another but that rather the relation makes 
the relata – is quite a challenge. This challenge cannot be accomplished if 
at the same time the inside-outside dualism is not sufficiently grasped and 
dismantled. Inspired by the American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce, 
the interactionist view that will be developed is very radical and will 
reject the idea that thoughts can only be attributed to humans and their 
brains while matter can only be ascribed to the outside world. Instead 
of distinguishing inside and outside on the basis of mind and matter, an 
account will be provided in which mind and matter are structural dimen-
sions of reality as such. Again, the distinction between an inside mind 
and outside matter is not only historically situated in the philosophy of 
Descartes but seen as a tendency found also in contemporary approaches 
to the human, including approaches in philosophy of technology.
Dismantling the view that the human contains an a priori given essence 
or core that fixes her nature and enables detaching herself from her material 
and technological environment as well as revealing how this assumption is 
covertly preserved in many contemporary views will enable a more pro-
found understanding of what it means that technologies radically intrude 
in the human. However, initially this insight hardly provides a solution to 
a problem. On the contrary, it only highlights the urgency of the problem 
faced. If the human is shaped in interaction with various mutable and in-
creasingly technological environments, is it at all possible to influence and 
control those interactions, and if so, what form should we impose on them?
Extimate Technology and Self-Formation
Overcoming the inside-outside dualism allows, first of all, acknowledging 
that new and emerging technologies do not unleash a situation without 
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precedent, but rather reveal that the human has never had a closed inner 
realm, detached from the outside world. They cogently disclose that the 
human has always found herself in what Lacan (2005, 2014) calls an 
“extimate” relation with her symbolic and material environment and 
can only discover and develop herself in and through interaction with 
that environment. This does not mean that, with the advent of the latest 
technologies, there is nothing new under the sun. New and emerging 
technologies are enormously expanding the possibilities to “intrude” in 
the human. Although the human has always been “directed outwards,” 
these technologies are immediately intervening in her own bodily and 
mental constitution. Besides tradition, education and culture, now tech-
nology is becoming a dominant force in self-formation processes.
New and emerging technologies increasingly shape who we are and 
how we experience ourselves. They can no longer be identified as exter-
nal technologies that we independently relate to. These technologies, as 
“another within,” cannot be simply externalized, but are increasingly 
becoming something that is and is not us at the same time. They are 
increasingly becoming “extimate”; they are both intimate and external, 
both familiar and strange, both disruptive and lifesaving, both common 
and artificial (see also Zwart 2015, 2017). Their ambiguity also explains 
why they can be experienced as uncanny. Because they can be so deeply 
embodied, they can become an issue of intense and intimate concern in 
their own right; the pacemaker, iPhone, health bracelet and nanopill are 
not just functional tools but increasingly articulate who we are or want 
to be. “Extimate technologies” are actualizing the potential “extimacy” 
that has always been a dimension of the human to such a degree that 
they are becoming a permanent part of her fabric. Since extimate tech-
nologies increasingly make us who we are and, hence, cannot be simply 
controlled by us, the question of whether we can and how we ought 
to form ourselves becomes evermore urgent. Answering this question 
requires investigating if and how the human can critically relate to the 
worldly, increasingly technological influences that are profoundly shap-
ing her actions, decisions and personality.
From a radical interactionist perspective, the human, despite her ex-
timate character, does not necessarily have to completely coincide with 
and be reduced to particular antecedents that shape her conduct. Com-
pletely reducing the human to her particular antecedents and rendering 
her conduct entirely determined by them would reintroduce the in-
side-outside dualism again, making the inside completely dependent on 
the outside. Inspired by various philosophers, and especially Nietzsche, 
Peirce and Lacan, I will demonstrate that the values, goals and ideals 
that humans encounter in their environments not only shape their iden-
tities, but can also enable them to critically relate to their present state. 
Not completely  coinciding with her present state allows the human, at 
least potentially, to make a distinction between who she is and who she 
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wants to be, that  is, a distinction between, on the one hand, biologi-
cal inclinations and short-term decisions and actions, and, on the other 
hand, longer-term goals and ideals.
However, the idea that the human does not completely coincide with 
her present state and is able to form herself by virtue of longer-term goals 
and ideals should not be conceived as a simple “escape route.” Finding 
in societal values, goals and ideals a foothold in order to critically relate 
to our present state and the factors that have shaped it raises many dif-
ferent and additional issues and problems. These difficulties have not 
only been subject to philosophical inquiry but have also been a source of 
inspiration, reflection and entertainment in film and literature. Different 
levels of difficulty can be recognized in the way these issues are depicted.
In mainstream popular Western media, these problems are often still 
portrayed as relatively innocent and bridgeable. For example, coming-
of-age films such as 400 Blows, Rebel Without A Cause and The Break-
fast Club show in different ways the difficulties and resistances that 
young people encounter and the resolutions that they find in their search 
for their true selves. In The Breakfast Club, for example, five high school 
students, all different stereotypes, report for Saturday morning deten-
tion and are assigned to write an essay about who they think they are. At 
the beginning of the day, the “nerd” diligently attempts to get something 
on paper but does not go beyond “who am I? who am I…?” During the 
day, their interactions with each other enable them to discover common 
values, goals and ideals, which help them to come to terms with who, 
what and how they are and want to be.
In more transgressive fiction, writers like Vladimir Nabokov, William 
S. Burroughs and Bret Easton Ellis do not depict generation gaps and 
peer pressure in the quest for a suitable identity, but show in different 
ways the inability or reluctance of certain characters to identify with the 
basic values and norms of society. The idiosyncratic mindsets and be-
haviors of the portrayed protagonists outrage and often violate existing 
morals and sensibilities. In contrast to “coming of age” stories, societal 
confrontations and struggles are not valued as necessary conditions for 
discovering and developing a more mature self, but rather are seen as 
suffocating restrictions and obstacles that prevent the emergence of or 
eradicate the existence of unique, divergent selves. Here not so much the 
importance of developing a socially valued and accomplished identity 
but rather enabling a singular identity is highlighted.
Literature that focuses on the implications of postmodern societies 
that have undergone a collapse of so-called “grand narratives,” including 
Christian morals, shared fundamental values and homogenous cultural 
traditions, poses an additional problem: novelists like Ivan Turgenev, 
Samuel Beckett and Franz Kafka show in different ways how society 
seems to be no longer capable of offering sufficient orientations or “af-
fordances” that could guide or support individuals in their efforts to 
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establish a coherent, stable and accomplished identity. Here the  inability 
to hook into a society, culture or tradition that has paved the road 
(with or without hurdles) for identity formation does not only apply to 
 individuals who have deviant and idiosyncratic preferences and values, 
but also to those who would like to blend in and to form a “mainstream” 
identity, precisely because what is “mainstream” or “a socially valued 
and accomplished life” has become ever less clear and obvious.
While the novels and movies mentioned so far mainly focus on how 
(deviant) ideas and ideals shape or fail to shape certain identities, there 
is also an ever-growing body of popular media and literature that deals 
with the influence of things, and especially emerging technologies on 
what we consider our selfhood, which is of course the main theme of 
this book. From Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein to Philip K. Dick’s Do An-
droids Dream of Electric Sheep? and William Gibson’s Neuromancer 
the question of what makes and goes beyond a human has been explored. 
Movies such as Gattaca, Avatar and Her explore how biomedical tech-
nologies and ICT’s could disrupt and displace established biological, 
social and technological configurations and create completely new life 
forms, such as genetically enhanced or digital selves without material 
bodies. These prospects as envisioned in popular media are echoed, as I 
have indicated earlier, in achievements, developments and predictions in 
science and technology. I have mentioned a number of new and emerging 
technologies as well as the advent of NBIC technological disciplines and 
approaches, which are so intrusive that they are increasingly shaping the 
very fabric of our selfhood.
The question that has to be raised now with regard to these intrusive 
technologies and the appeal to goals and ideals is: if new and emerging 
technologies are increasingly shaping the very fabric of our selfhood, 
will they not also affect and challenge our values, goals and ideals? Put 
differently, if new and emerging technologies are disrupting established 
biological, social and technological configurations, will they not also 
affect and disrupt the very standards, values and ideals that could be 
used to evaluate whether these new identities and life forms are  socially 
admirable and individually desirable? We see here that an appeal to 
 longer-term values, goals and ideals does not immediately provide a 
“way out”; even if it would enable the possibility to impose a particular 
form to our interactions with our environment, it does not yet make 
clear how this form could be considered “good.” In the wake of univocal 
standards being challenged and disrupted by new ideas and ideologies 
as well as by new and emerging intrusive technologies, the question of 
how to form ourselves becomes evermore acute. How is it still possi-
ble against the displayed background to sustain an ideal of “good self- 
formation?” What would “good self-formation” mean, if anything?
The appeal to longer-term goals and ideals does not have to entail 
 reclaiming accessibility to actual a priori and univocal standards by virtue 
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of which we can establish what “good self-formation” is, as I will attempt 
to show in this book. In fact, this would be yet another  (concealed) at-
tempt to rehabilitate the inside-outside distinction and situate a priori 
standards in an independent inner realm, shielded from external influ-
ences and disruptions (which lie at the heart of Cartesian philosophy). The 
most important merit of this study is, as I have indicated in different ways, 
to show how technologies are becoming “extimate” and to  maximally 
recognize that the human, including her value systems, is compromised 
and unsettled: technologies are increasingly becoming both the necessary 
condition for forming a stable social self and an obstacle that prevents 
her from reaching the singularity that she seeks. The longer-term goals 
and ideals that will be put forward in this study aim to recognize the ex-
timacy of the human and still offer direction. Important in this respect is 
that these longer-term goals and ideals are virtual and always situated in 
the future, which, on the one hand, excludes the possibility of reinstating 
invariable, uniform and independent criteria to establish what is “good 
self-formation,” and on the other hand, resists accepting that the self is no 
more than a plaything of contingent influences and forces.
The approach to longer-term goals and ideals developed in this book 
will be characterized not so much as an ethical but rather as an esthetic 
framework, which will be elaborated and ultimately articulated in terms 
of self-formation as “sublimation.” Ethical perspectives that encourage 
understanding technological self-formation as technological enhance-
ment often assume univocal standards for establishing what are “nor-
mal” and “enhanced” capacities. In contrast, the esthetic framework 
that views self-formation in terms of sublimation is motivated by the aim 
to indicate what “good self-formation” is without endorsing essentialist 
and dualist views of the self that consider it an independent and invari-
able unity, disconnected from its dynamic and sometimes even disrup-
tive technological environment. At the end of the book, the developed 
framework, which will be coined Technological Sublimation Theory 
(TST) will be applied to different technological fields.
Research Question
We are witnessing the rise of new and emerging technologies that are 
deeply intrusive, increasingly shaping the very fabric of our selfhood, 
and challenging and disrupting established standards that had hitherto 
guided self-formation processes. Against the backdrop of these unset-
tling developments a fundamental question can be raised, which forms 
the main research question of this book: how can and should we form 
ourselves in a world that is being saturated with technologies that are 
profoundly intruding in the very fabric of our selfhood? Instead of 
 “human” I will use “self” as a concept that is as neutral as possible and 
can be the starting point of an examination of what it entails.
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This research question can be broken apart into three sub-questions 
that also set the outline of this book: first of all: how should the “self” 
in “self-formation” be understood? “Self-formation” seems to require a 
type of self-reference, which in its turn seems to presuppose a self that 
does not completely coincide with itself; I can only form myself if in one 
way or another I am able to refer to myself, which seems to presuppose a 
self that can rise outside itself. But how to conceptualize and understand 
an “I” that forms itself? What kind of entity is this “I” that not only 
can attribute qualities and properties to itself but also can make adjust-
ments and changes in its make-up? And how to understand this self as a 
dynamic relational being without rehabilitating essentialist and dualist 
frameworks (in which, for example, a soul or a spiritual distinct entity 
is forming a body)?
Second sub-question: are we able to form ourselves? If the self that I 
propose is to a great extend shaped by its surroundings, what then se-
cures that this self is not the product of its environment? Put differently, 
is the proposed view of the self not deterministic? Moreover, if our en-
vironment is evermore a technological environment and if technologies 
are becoming ubiquitous, is the self then ultimately not a repository of 
those technological influences? And if the self lacks sufficient control or 
autonomy, does that then not render the very notion of “self-formation” 
unintelligible?
Third sub-question: assuming that self-formation is possible, in which 
direction should we form ourselves? If the self has no fixed essence that 
in one way or another contains or can validate univocal principles or 
guidelines, how do we know what is “good” self-formation? If the self is 
shaped within various and mutable environments that, in addition, offer 
ever less orientation, how can we know that the form that we impose 
on ourselves is a “good” form? Which meaning can “good” in “good 
self-formation” have, if any? And if new and emerging technologies are 
becoming deeply intrusive and “extimate,” shaping our very selfhood, 
as well as challenging and disrupting established standards that hith-
erto guided self-formation processes, and even introducing new norms 
and values, has not establishing what is “good” self-formation become 
impossible?
Outline of the Book
This book contains three parts that attempt to answer the three formu-
lated sub-questions and, subsequently, the main research question: in the 
first part of the book I will show how from an essentialist and dualist 
perspective, on the basis of Aristotle and Descartes respectively, the self 
is conceived as an invariable, unified and independent entity. Then, I will 
explain why in this framework, radical novelty and interaction cannot 
be given a proper place, which ultimately makes it untenable. On the 
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basis of Nietzsche and Peirce, I will provide a radical interactionist per-
spective beyond the inside-outside dualism, which recognizes that the 
self discovers and develops itself in and through dynamic interactions 
with its surroundings. This latter approach offers a non-essentialist and 
non-dualist account of self-reference, which will also map the contours 
of self-formation.
In the second part of the book, I will begin by discussing two oppos-
ing answers to the question of whether self-formation is possible: Kant’s 
view of the self as an autonomous being will be confronted with two 
contemporary representations of a determinist view of the self, namely 
situationism and brain-determinism. Then, I will argue that both oppos-
ing positions assume a false categorical distinction between an “inside” 
and an “outside” realm, and so fall back in or are not able to sufficiently 
overcome an essentialist and dualist view of the self. Overcoming this 
distinction will not only make it possible to do justice to the dynamic 
and relational character of the self, but also to recognize what I will call 
the “artifactual character” of mind and self, which is a view that will be 
elaborated in a constructive critique of EMT: technology inscribes, as I 
will argue, increasingly its “grammar” in the structure of our mind and 
self. Recognizing this mediating role of technology will reframe “free 
will” debates: the self is conceived as something that is neither completely 
determined by neurological processes nor external influences, but rather 
as a relational being that with the help of technologies such as fMRI can 
attempt to critically regulate its behavior by virtue of longer-term goals 
and ideals and form a more attractive self, which is, I believe, a better in-
dex of freedom. At the end of this part, I will also reflect on the question 
of “how critical” the proposed notion of “critical self-identification and 
self-formation” really is and can be.
The third part of the book focuses on the question of how we ought 
to form ourselves. I will show that transhumanists and other techno- 
optimists have a seemingly clear answer to this question: if we are able 
to form ourselves, then why not also boundlessly enhance ourselves? 
 Technological self-formation is, according to them, captured best as 
technological “self-enhancement.” But I will argue that this  conception 
of self-formation as self-enhancement is problematic for two reasons. 
First, transhumanists are confused about their own conception of 
the posthuman: they anticipate radical transformation of the human 
through technology and at the same time assume that the criteria to 
determine what is “normal” and what is “enhanced” are univocal, both 
in our present time and in the future. Inspired by Nietzsche’s notion of 
the Overhuman, I will show that the slightest historical and phenome-
nological sense discloses copious variations of criteria, both diachronic 
and synchronic, of what can be considered “normal” and “enhanced.” 
 Second, I will argue that in our attempts to form ourselves – through 
education or technologically – we come across “something within” that 
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resists complete appropriation, something “uncanny” that we cannot 
simply mold as we please. I will elaborate this notion of the “uncanny 
within” with the help of especially Lacan and show that it renders an 
ethics of enhancement unintelligible. Complementing Lacan’s notion of 
a structurally compromised “extimate” self with Nancy’s view of the 
self as being “closed open” for intrusive technologies will enable recog-
nizing how new and emerging technologies are becoming increasingly 
“extimate” and are shaping the very fabric of the self. I will propose 
that, instead of understanding technological self-formation in terms of 
making ourselves “better,” “stronger” and “smarter,” which, in fact, 
results in rehabilitating an essentialist framework, we should conceive 
it in terms of “technological sublimation,” which could also redefine 
the very notion of “human enhancement.” An esthetic conception of 
self-formation as sublimation will be developed based on insights de-
rived from Peirce, Nietzsche, Freud and Lacan. This elaboration will 
result in an alternative theoretical framework for understanding what 
“good self-formation” in a technological world entails, namely TST. 
Finally, this theory will be applied to three technological fields: smart 
environments, brain imaging technologies and smart drugs. 
Part I
What Is the Self?
Various attempts across a number of disciplines, including philoso-
phy, psychology and neuroscience, have been made to disentangle the 
 multitude of perspectives of the “self.” Sometimes different, more or 
less well-defined terms are reserved to designate different dimensions or 
 aspects of the self, such as “subject,” “agent” and “person,” or the “ma-
terial self,” the “social self,” the “minimal self” and the “narrative self.” 
Some philosophers (including Plato, Descartes and, more recently, Swin-
burne 1984, 21) have argued that we are partless immaterial  substances 
or souls, or compound things made up of an immaterial soul and a ma-
terial body. From a so-called animalist perspective, others have stressed 
that we are all the way biological organisms (Snowdon 1990, 2014; van 
Inwagen 1990; Olson 1997, 2003) or material things constituted by 
 organisms (Baker 2000; Johnston 2007; Shoemaker 2011). Yet others 
have proposed that we are spatial parts of animals, in particular brains 
or parts of brains (Hudson 2001; Campbell and McMahan 2010; Parfit 
2012). There are also philosophers who have argued that we are collec-
tions of mental states or events or bundles of perceptions (Hume 1978, 
252; see also Quinton 1962 and Campbell 2006). Others still have tried 
to illustrate how the self or certain aspects of the self are constituted in 
narratives or actions (Velleman 1992; Schechtman 1996; Menary 2008). 
And still others have attempted to show that we don’t really exist at all 
(Wittgenstein 1922, §5.631; Unger 1979; Russell 1985, 50; Metzinger 
2003). Positions that attempt to establish “what is the self” are particu-
larly, though not exclusively, exchanged in debates concerning “personal 
identity.” This matter often deals both with the question concerning the 
features and traits that characterize a self and the question of how this 
self, despite all the changes that it experiences through time, remains the 
same person. Contributors to that debate have indicated that in order to 
identify the essential traits of a person, we need to know which changes 
she will and will not survive (Shoemaker 1984, 70; Garret 1998, 12).
Often reviewing from a critical perspective the more established 
 positions – some of them touched upon above – fractured and fragmented 
ideas about the formation of self in social interactions have been devel-
oped. From this perspective we are not so much already “something” but 
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our decisions and actions, in particular social contexts, are continuously 
shaping who and what we are as well as what we could be and ought 
to be.  Instead of considering the self as a pre-established entity, the self 
comes to know itself and develop itself only through its interactions with 
 physical and social environments.
In different ways, Nietzsche has attempted to overcome the essentialist 
view that the self has a pre-established essence or nature situated in par-
ticular faculties or parts of its constitution. Instead, the self in his view is 
characterized as a challenge and a mission that needs to be c ontinuously 
developed and regained in an intensive struggle with its social, material 
and especially moral environment. The pragmatist accounts of Peirce, 
Dewey and James explicitly support an externalist conception of the self: 
instead of identifying it with the mind, soul or brain, or being something 
“in the head” or “in the brain,” the self is distributed through embodied 
practices into the social and material environment (see Gallagher 2011, 
2013; Gilihan and Farah 2005).
Within pragmatism, George Herbert Mead is probably the philoso-
pher who comes closest to the Peircean perspective that, in conjunction 
with Nietzsche, I will use to develop a radical interactionist view. The 
Peircean expressions, like “[w]e become aware of ourself in becoming 
aware of the not-self” (CP 1.324) or “the inner world, apparently de-
rived from the outer” (CP 5.493), could have also been uttered by Mead. 
His symbolic-interactionism has had a great influence on many interac-
tionist and constructivist theories regarding the self that were developed 
within the confines of philosophy, sociology and social psychology. We 
can find especially in the discussion regarding the so-called “dialogical 
self,” which has been to a great extent influenced by Mead, interesting 
relations to Peirce’s approach to the self (see also Wiley 2006).
Another influential thinker that could be mentioned in this context 
is the Russian developmental psychologist and founder of cultural- 
historical psychology Lev Vygotsky. Hegel could be an explanation for 
remarkable similarities between Mead and Vygotsky, who both were 
strongly influenced by him (Glock 1986; van der Veer 1987). Many other 
positions that have defended a relationalist or interactionist view of self 
and world could be mentioned, including Simondon’s transindividualism 
(1995), Kaipayil’s ontological relationalism (2009) and Barad’s intra- 
actionism (2007).
It must be clear that the aim of this part of the book is not to provide 
an overview of different accounts of the self or a typology of its most 
important aspects. There are several encyclopedia and handbooks that 
fulfill that need (e.g., Noonan 1989; Gallagher 2011). What is needed 
here is providing the basic building blocks of an interactionist view that 
are required to develop a convincing alternative for an essentialist and 
dualist account of the self. This is a challenge that should not be under-
estimated because an interactionist approach raises many questions and 
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difficulties of its own. There is a lack of consensus about the analytic and 
normative value of relationality, and difficulties regarding the question 
of how to achieve consensus. Foremost the key idea of “relation”  remains 
unclear and is difficult to conceptualize. Not seldomly, in conceptualiz-
ing a “relationalist” or “interactionist” view, essentialist elements are 
recaptured through the backdoor. It is not easy to conceptualize a “rela-
tion” without assuming first “relata” that enter into relations with one 
another, as, for example, is confirmed in Kaipayil’s view:
Relationism is not anti-substantivism. On an anti-substantivist 
view, things are not objects in their own right, but only events de-
pendent on other events for their existence. Even if we grant the 
argument that relations are ontologically more fundamental than 
entities themselves, the question is, if there are no entities with some 
enduring substantivity, how do relations themselves exist? Relation 
is ‘holding’ between two or more things. If entities disappear, rela-
tions will also disappear (Kaipayil 2009, 8)
Unlike this view, I will attempt to show, on the basis of Nietzsche and 
Peirce, how from a more radical  interactionist view, relations and in-
teractions are ontologically primary and entities ontologically deriva-
tive and, at the same time, durability and regularity can be accounted 
for (see also Wildman 2010). Providing a credible interactionist view 
requires accurately elaborating how the essentialist and dualist view is 
reasoned for and justified, which I will do particularly on the basis of 
its most important representatives and founders, namely Aristotle and 
Descartes. An accurate and s ufficient understanding of this account is 
pivotal, also because it is so persistent and stubborn, and is being reha-
bilitated in different views – also in i nteractionist views – that assume 
they have overcome it. In part two and three of this book, I will espe-
cially show that in positions that try to understand and evaluate the 
impact of technologies on our self, essentialist and dualist accounts of 
the self are far from obsolete or overcome.
This part of the book contains two chapters. The first chapter will in-
vestigate essence ontology and show how it was appropriated in  dualist 
conceptions of the self that have strongly shaped Western anthropol-
ogy. After revealing for our thesis relevant problems and flaws in the 
essentialist and dualist approach, I will propose in the second chapter an 
alternative, more adequate grounding of the notion of the self, which I 
will call “event ontology.” On the basis of this ontology, I will develop 
an interactionist view of the self that will display that the “self” must be 
conceived as “self-formation.” In part two of this book, this notion of 
the “self” as “self-formation” will help us to provide an account of how 
technological self-formation is possible without having to rehabilitate an 
essentialist view of the self.
In this chapter, a refined and detailed account of the essentialist and 
dualist approach of the self will be provided. After having touched upon 
Plato’s concept of ousia, I will discuss essence ontology on the basis 
of Aristotle’s notion of ousia because he is the first philosopher who 
 systematically explains in what sense “essence” is the first and most 
 fundamental category and how it relates to other less fundamental 
modes of being – ousia is the Greek word for “essence”; “substantia” 
or “subiectum” is the Latin translation or employment of ousia. Then 
I will show how Descartes adopts the features of Aristotle’s notion of 
“essence,” but attributes them primarily to the self. He also highlights 
“independence” as the most important feature of “essence,” which will 
have, as we will see, far-reaching implications for how the self is cap-
tured in Western thought. After having recaptured the most important 
features of the essentialist and dualist self and pointed out why it so al-
luring, I will show why this view cannot be sustained and indicate what 
is needed to develop an alternative, interactionist view.
1.1 Aristotle’s Grounding of Essentialism
Plato’s Concept of Ousia: Situating the Essence of Things in 
an Imperceptible World
Aristotle develops his notion of “essence” in a critical adaptation of Pla-
to’s view of “essence.” To have a more sharply distinct conception of 
Aristotle’s view, I will briefly discuss Plato’s view of this concept. Plato 
is the first philosopher who attributes to ousia a philosophically signifi-
cant meaning that will take root in our Western culture. His Euthyphro 
clearly shows what is at stake for him. Socrates addresses in this book 
the question of what makes a pious act pious. He believes that this can-
not be individual acts. These are so diverse that they cannot offer, but 
rather require explanation and judgment. What makes a pious act “pi-
ous” must be, according to Socrates, identical in every pious act. Plato 
calls the identity-dimension of pious acts the “eidos as such.” Because 
this “idea as such” is identical and uniform in every pious act, it can 
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function as a norm, standard or paradigm for what is a pious act (ER 
11a; 6e).
Plato is very aware of possible objections against his view. In the 
Cratylus, he gives a voice to Hermogenes who defends the thesis that 
the correctness of words is based on agreement and convention. But at 
the same time, Hermogenes admits that one man is wiser than the other. 
Socrates argues that this would be impossible if “what appears to each 
would be true for each” (CR 386c–d; 384d). Things, therefore, must 
have a fixed ousia, and cannot depend on how they relate to us but must 
rely on their own nature (CR 386d–e). For Protagoras, another oppo-
nent of Socrates (and another view that Plato attempts to debunk), not 
only words but the things themselves are subject to our discretion and 
imagination: the human is the measure of things. In a similar fashion, 
Plato attempts to show how “true and certain” knowledge resists and 
endures different contingent opinions, which, Plato assumes, indicates 
that the essence of things is not dependent on how humans relate to it 
but relies on its own independent nature (TM 37; PB 59c).
Plato repeatedly emphasizes that ousia ensures stability; change and 
decay are responsible for confusion and impurity (CR 411c; SY 184b; 
TM 29b; PD 84b; PB 59c; see also Natorp 1921, 125, 147–150). An 
example that he gives in Cratylus explains why this stability secured by 
ousia not only functions as a standard but also as a standard for perfec-
tion. Plato attempts to show that a carpenter who builds a new shuffle 
will not take the broken shuffle as an example or model. He will “look 
up” to the eidos that also modeled the old shuffle. This invisible eidos is 
considered as the most real and perfect shuffle, which remains identical 
irrespective of the very different but never completely perfect shuffles 
that we see with our senses (CR 389b; see also ED 285–288). These 
kinds of examples clearly illustrate that, according to Plato, percepti-
ble things are always less perfect than imperceptible Ideas. Perceptible 
things are, in contrast to Ideas, never what they ought to be (PD 74d–e). 
Plato goes even further: perceptible things are to such a degree not iden-
tical with themselves that they barely deserve to be considered as “real.” 
They have “being,” in so far as they partake of imperceptible, perfect 
Ideas that contain their essence (PD 101c).
Aristotle’s Concept of Ousia: Situating the Essence of Things 
in the Things Themselves
Aristotle rejects Plato’s degradation of the perceptible world to almost 
nonbeing as well as his doctrine of Ideas. His main argument for this re-
jection is that Plato’s Ideas and his notion of “partaking” neither explain 
the state of affairs in the perceptible world, nor increase our knowledge 
of it (MT 991a19–26; 1003b16–19). In order to understand “how things 
are,” Aristotle claims, we do not need to appeal to entities outside them, 
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but should rather make them and the way we talk about them the subject 
of research (MT 1030a11–14). At first sight, Aristotle seems to radically 
depart from Plato’s ontology, but on reflection, as I will show, he en-
dorses the basic features that Plato attributes to “essence.”
Essence as Unchanging Ground
In the Analytica Posteriora, Aristotle distinguishes two types of judg-
ments that he illustrates with the following examples: “The white is a 
piece of wood” and “This piece of wood is white.” The first proposition 
he considers “improper,” because this type of judgment does not ade-
quately express what is “underlying.” The second example, according 
to him, does not have this deficiency and is considered “proper”: it is 
clear that the piece of wood, and not the white, is the “underlying.” In 
addition, Aristotle discovers that “being” is an “analog concept” and 
that not all modes of being have the same meaning and value (see Seidl 
1989, XXXIVf). Denotations of the “underlying” refer to “what” some-
thing is, which can also be attributed other characteristics, such as “how 
big,” “where” or “when” it (the “what”) is. However, it does not work 
the other way around: the “what” cannot be attributed to those other 
characteristics (AP 83a24–30; 83b22–23). Within proper propositions, 
we therefore need to make a distinction between essential denotations 
that refer to the ousia and less essential predicates that require an ousia. 
Aristotle, hence, understands ousia as “independent ground (hupokei-
menon)” of less essential qualities or properties (MT 1003a33ff). In his 
words: “The things not said of a subject I call things in their own right 
[kath hauta], and that are said of a subject I call coincidentals [sumbebe-
kota]” (AP 73b5–8; PY 185a31–32; MT 1028b36–37).
The ousia has primacy over other modes of being (MT 1004b9; see 
also 1051b22–28; DA 430b26–29): it has primacy in an ontological 
sense because it can exist independently; it has primacy in a conceptual 
sense because defining coincidental or accidental predicates is impossible 
without including what something is; it has primacy in an epistemologi-
cal sense because we know something better if we know what it is more 
than if we know how big or how heavy it is (MT 1028a30–38; V11, 
1019a2–4). If there is no ousia, then there is nothing (MT 1028a18–28; 
1050b19; 1059b30; 1071b5–6).
The ousia as an independent ground is also what remains the same 
and is therefore resistant to the change of coincidentals (see Stegmaier 
1977, 43). Rejecting Parmenides’ qualification of becoming as not-being 
(I will explain this later), Aristotle defends a view of being from the 
perspective of his notion of ousia. He uses the following example to 
illustrate his view. We can say ‘“the human becomes musical,” but also 
“the non-musical becomes musical.” These propositions indicate that in 
becoming, we must make a distinction between what changes and what 
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remains the same: the human that becomes musical remains human but 
the nonmusical does not persist. From this, Aristotle concludes that in 
every type of becoming, there must be something underlying that is per-
sistent and undergoes change (a human), whereas that what does not 
persist (being nonmusical) is being replaced by its opposite (being musi-
cal) (PY 190a35b1). In the transformation from black to white, to give 
another example, there must be something that remains the same and 
that can transform itself from black to white because black as such can-
not become white. Change always presumes “something” that changes. 
The ousia is the invariable ground that makes change possible (MT 
1069b3–7, 1042a32–34; see also König 1967, 16).
Essence as Immanent and General Ground
The ousia as ground must explain something about the perceptible 
things, which Aristotle thinks Plato has not seen. Since nothing can 
emerge from nothing, as Parmenides has shown (Diels and Kranz 1956, 
231–240), all things must, according to Aristotle, have causes. In addi-
tion, Aristotle believes that we really understand something if we know 
its causes. The causes of things are not things themselves, but are respon-
sible for the emergence and development of things and make it possible 
to have knowledge of things (MT 981b30–33; 1013a17; 1070b26; AP 
94a20–23). Aristotle understands ousia as a cause (see MT 1041a6–10; 
1013a16f).
In his search for what kind of cause the ousia is, Aristotle identi-
fies it initially as matter (hyle). Matter appears to be something un-
derlying (hupokeimenon) and a subject or substrate of predicates (see 
MT1029a2; 1042b9; 1070a11; 1033a9f; 1033a24–34; 1016a17–28; 
1055a30). On reflection, matter, according to Aristotle, does not suffice 
because it is completely undetermined in itself and can therefore not lay 
down boundaries, provide unity and separate a thing from other things 
(MT1029a23–27; 1035a8 and 1036a8f.; 1037b26f.; see also Ulmer 
1953, 74). As a result, matter cannot provide knowledge about a thing 
and is as such unintelligible (Stegmaier 1977, 47). Matter relates to ousia 
as bronze relates to a statue. Matter is and is not; it is as potentiality, but 
not as reality. Matter is potential ousia, not actual ousia (MT1069b15f).
Aristotle further explains the insufficiency of matter by showing how 
it addresses our sense organs. Our sense organs, he attempts to illus-
trate, cannot capture unity because they register parts and pieces of 
things without being able to detect in them a common structure. To 
connect a piece or part to another piece or part, sense organs must “re-
member” pieces and parts and connect them to other pieces and parts. 
Sense organs, Aristotle believes, do not have this ability. When our sense 
organs record one part, they have no knowledge anymore of another 
part (MT 1052a24–26, a29; 1016a5f. and 18f; see also Stegmaier 1977, 
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53f). Although matter is a ground or cause, it is only a ground or cause 
of what is particular and individual; it is principium individuationis (see 
MT 1016b31ff; 1034a7f.; 1037a1f).
Sense organs cannot capture unity and distinctness (choriston). This 
ability, Aristotle believes, should be attributed to thinking. Thinking can 
capture a common structure by abstracting from a variable multitude of 
individual parts and pieces. Therefore, thinking is directed at the general 
and not at the particular (MT 981a15f. and 981b10f.; DA 417b22–23). 
Irrespective of something becoming, for example, smaller or bigger, 
thinking can capture its unity and identify it as the same thing and as 
different from other things throughout time and space (MT 1016a35ff).
Aristotle’s distinction between predicates and the subject is analogous 
to the distinction between matter and the general: because sense organs 
are directed at matter, they can only capture coincidentals. What struc-
tures and unites those coincidentals and, hence, gives them definiteness, 
can only be grasped by the mind (MT 1017b35–1018a2; 1029b19f). In 
contrast to Plato, however, the general does not exist (spatial) outside 
things, but is immanent to things. It provides them definiteness by dis-
tinguishing the durable from the variable (MT 1029a27–30).
Essence as Form and Goal
Matter as undetermined potentiality requires something that determines 
it and ensures its unity and distinctness. Aristotle calls this principle of 
determination “form” (eidos).1 However, the form should not be seen 
as a separate entity localized outside the actual thing. It is not separate 
from the thing, but rather is its determinedness. The same applies to 
the relation between matter and form: matter is not spatially distinct 
from form, but can only reveal itself in it (MT 983a26–32, 1013a24–35; 
1032b1f; PY 194b23–35; DA 412b6–8, 413b13–16). Bronze can only 
reveal itself in, for example, a bronze disc.
Form cannot be spatially separated from a particular thing. However, 
it also cannot be completely immersed by it. As something general, Ar-
istotle believes, it exists independent from a particular thing. The form 
of a disc, for example, cannot exist without any materialization (e.g., in 
a bronze, wood or iron disc), but is not dependent on a particular mate-
rialization. According to Aristotle, it can also be conceived independent 
of a particular materialization. Although matter is not superfluous, it is 
clear that for Aristotle, form is more essential than matter. It is ousia in 
the strongest sense of the word because it ensures the identity of a thing, 
irrespective of variable materializations (MT 999a17–19; 1036a26–
1037a5.; see also Stegmaier 1977, 70).
In addition, Aristotle states that matter is responsible for the “dis-
tance” between a thing and its essence, whereas its form coincides with 
its essence. Because there are infinite different ways of being insufficient 
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or deficient, there is an infinite multitude of particular things. Matter 
does not generate these variations positively, but the individual and the 
variable are the result of flaws that are caused by matter. Differences and 
changes are deviations. Matter is (negatively) responsible for variation 
and change, whereas form is (positively) responsible for unity and iden-
tity (MT 1033a20–22; 1037a33–b7 and DC 278a18).
We have seen earlier that matter is conceived as potential being, not 
as actual being. Insofar as matter is not (actual), it is the gap between a 
thing and its essence; insofar as it is (potential), it is directed at bridging 
that gap. The form (eidos) is, therefore, the aim of matter. Movement 
and change are attempts to realize the form of a thing. The form is the 
causa finalis of a thing. If we want to understand a thing, we therefore 
need to understand its purpose (MT 1050a7–10; PY 199a30–31; see also 
Berger 1968, 100–101). This has become known as Aristotle’s teleolog-
ical view of the world.
The epistemological implications of Aristotle’s view on the relation 
between matter and form are far-reaching. Because matter is respon-
sible for differentiation, it is in itself incognizable, which means that 
individual things cannot be defined: “If someone would, for example, 
wants to define you, he would say something like: skimpy or pale living 
being; however, that description might also apply to someone else” (MT 
1040a6–7 and 12–14; see also 1036a8–9). The form makes it possible to 
define a thing, and makes it therefore cognizable, but only as something 
general.
Aristotle takes as a starting point for his investigation things as we 
know them in everyday life, but considers them insofar as they can be 
defined. Since the individual, according to him, cannot be defined, it is 
considered incomprehensible. It relates to the general form as a privation 
that must be overcome.
That the individual is subordinate to the general is also reflected in 
Aristotle’s understanding of the Divine. God is the final ground of unity, 
determinateness and order. Unlike the form of material things, the di-
vine no longer exists in conjunction with the sensory-individual and the 
changeable. The divine is free from all matter. It is without material 
parts and has no extension, so that it is indivisible. And because it is in-
divisible, it is imperishable; only compounded things can fall apart (MT 
1003b17; 1028b27–32; 1071b20f). Aristotle’s view of God as something 
that is completely (spatial) separate from the sensory-material brings him 
very close to Plato’s doctrine of Ideas, which he rejected earlier (Happ 
1971, 765 and 946).
The divine is the final source of all movement. If there was no initial 
“unmoved mover,” there would be no change at all, and things would 
not strive for realizing their essence. Although Aristotle assumes that all 
that moves is moved by something else, he believes that God is not mov-
ing other things mechanically, otherwise it would be part of the world 
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and itself be moved. He argues that God has to move other things by be-
ing an object of desire; his divine stirs and brings other things in motion 
because it is longed for and loved, and is thought or imagined as desir-
able (MT 1071b14–17; 1072a25–26; 1005a35; PY IIX; DA 433b11–12). 
Just like God moves all other things by being a final goal, the form is the 
goal of matter (see Berger 1968, 103).
Essence as Invariable, Uniform and Independent
“Essence” is interpreted by Plato as a paradigm or example from which 
we derive the standard for what something is. Plato situates this example 
toward how our thinking is and should be oriented in an impercepti-
ble reality. However, Aristotle situates this ousia of things in the things 
themselves. Crucial for him is the ontological distinction between ousia 
and coincidentals. He is interested in the difference between what is es-
sential and what is incidental.
Although the differences between Plato and Aristotle are significant, 
there are also striking similarities (PY 192a20–29). Both characterize 
what is essential to a thing as invariable, uniform and independent, and 
what is inessential as variable, multiform and dependent. In addition, 
for both philosophers the essential is general, which can be captured by 
the mind, whereas the inessential is particular and individual, which is 
directed at sense organs. Moreover, they both believe that the individual 
is dependent on and can only be explained by the general. For Aristotle, 
the material is deficient and always strives for the ideal general form – 
something he believes Plato has not seen (PY 192a20–29). However, 
Plato in a quite similar fashion states that the perceivable is always mea-
sured by comparing it to the Idea, which is considered as a paradigmatic 
example (PD 74e; see also Berger 1968, 93–101).
Like Plato, Aristotle believes that the essential and ideal are invari-
able, uniform, independent and general. In contrast to Plato, he believes 
that the essential and Ideal (except God) should not be sought (spatially) 
outside the things, but rather in the things themselves.
1.2  Descartes’ Elevation of the Self to an 
Independent Substance
Aristotle attempts to understand and explain how things are by studying 
how they appear to us and how we talk about them. In this investiga-
tion, he believes, eventually the final principles or causes of all things 
could be discovered. Hence, the first principles will be found last. Des-
cartes’ account has a different starting point and background. Unlike 
Aristotle, for Descartes it is no longer obvious that examining things as 
they appear to us will enable finding the first principles. At the end of 
the Middle Ages, different religious, social and scientific developments 
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had led to skepticism about our most basic theories, beliefs and intu-
itions. Descartes’ philosophy represents a radical attempt to, once and 
for all, make an end to past, current and potential future doubts that 
are generated by the unstable “outside world.” Inspired by the achieve-
ments of the natural sciences, he seeks a method that will enable him 
to find non-doubtable first principles. Everything else could then be de-
rived from those axioms. Therefore, metaphysics should not come after 
“physics,” as Aristotle believed, but it must precede all other sciences. 
Descartes’ aim is not to find the first principles or causes of reality. He 
rather seeks a reliable foundation for the sciences (Reg. II:AT X, 362; 
IV:AT X, 377–378; XIV; see also Disc. II: AT VI, 362).
Descartes attempts to find a first absolutely certain ground on which 
all knowledge can be founded in a more reliable mental “inside world.” 
Instead of worldly observations and investigations, Descartes relies on 
introspection. This change of perspective in the beginning of the modern 
era causes a fundamental shift in thinking about “essence.” The “think-
ing I” discovers itself as first essence, and radically separates itself from 
the material world. Although Aristotle makes a distinction between dif-
ferent forms and levels of being, the idea that the human self is some-
thing independent from or outside of the physical world is foreign to 
him: all reality, including the human being, is explained by the princi-
ples of form and matter; these principles cannot be separated from each 
other, but intrinsically rely on each other. In contrast, Descartes defines 
the self as a thinking substance that can, as I will briefly elaborate, exist 
completely independent of the material world.
The Subjective Turn: Discovering the Self as First Essence
Science, according to Descartes, requires a certain and unshakable foun-
dation which could only be discovered if reason is pure and attentive, 
that is, free from bias and hastiness. We can free ourselves from bias by 
challenging the prejudices that we have inherited in our education and 
upbringing. Hastiness can be prevented by abstaining from judgment 
as long as there is any doubt, and biases are generated by hastiness. 
Abstaining from judgment as long as there is any doubt in a structural 
manner proves to be the method that Descartes has been searching for. 
No other procedure or regulation besides this methodical doubt is al-
lowed. This radical doubt will, Descartes expects, eventually overcome 
itself when it encounters a proposition that resists every possible attempt 
to challenge it (Med. I and II:AT VII, 17–34; Princ. I, 1–7: AT VIII–1, 
5–7; Disc. IV:AT VI, 31–32).
At the peak of his experimental doubt, Descartes comes across some-
thing that by no means can be doubted: the reality of doubt itself. He 
can doubt everything, but cannot doubt the fact that he is doubting, 
and therefore, he needs to infer that he is thinking. And as far as he is 
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thinking, he, as the subject of that thinking, must exist. I think, there-
fore I am (cogito ergo, sum) is Descartes’ first indubitable principle and 
unshakable foundation of all further scientific knowledge (Disc. IV:AT 
VI, 32; Med. II:AT VII, 25; Princ. I, 7:AT VIII–1, 7). Although the re-
lation between, for example, “I walk” and “I am” or “I blow my nose” 
and “I am” is not less inferable, the premises “I walk” or “I blow my 
nose” are not indubitable facts. Those experiences could be easily chal-
lenged: they could be products of a dream or hallucination. However, it 
is impossible to contest that I am thinking, even if I would be dreaming 
or hallucinating. Hence, Descartes’ cogito ergo sum does not rely on 
one but on two pillars, namely on the (indubitable) experience that he 
actually thinks and the (indubitable) insight that precisely because and 
insofar as he thinks it is necessary that he exists (Resp. V:AT VII, 53; 
Princ. I, 9:AT VIII–1, 7).
Descartes justifies his first certainty by claiming that it is based on 
nothing else than the ideas of clarity (claire) and distinctness (distinct). 
Then, he makes clarity and distinctness general criteria of truth: if we 
can see or think x clear and distinct, then x is true (Disc. IV: AT VI, 33; 
Med. III:AT VII, 35). Ideas (mental contents, contents of consciousness, 
images etc.) are “clear” if they are present and accessible to an attentive 
mind, if they are as it were in the center of our attention. An idea is 
“distinct” if it is precisely determined and sharply separated from other 
ideas, if it does not contain any elements that do not belong to it. Des-
cartes calls unclear ideas obscure (obscures); ideas that are not distinct 
he calls confused (confuses) (Princ. I, 45–46: AT VIII–1, 21–22).
Clarity and distinctness can also apply to relations between ideas. That 
whatever thinks, must exist, is an example of a clear and distinct neces-
sary relation between the idea of thought and the idea of existence. The 
validity of such necessary relations or eternal truths (veritates aeternae) 
does not depend on the existence of anything and must be therefore in-
nate. Moreover, it is, says Descartes, obvious that any attempt to clarify 
these eternal truths would lead to embezzlement (see Vennix 1996, 159).
Since the ideas of clarity and distinctness are, according to Descartes, 
innate, it is possible for the human subject to close his eyes and turn in-
ward to his own clear and distinct ideas, which enables him to reconstruct 
reality entirely independently of experience. This is the so-called “subjec-
tive turn” of Descartes’ philosophy. Although we can recognize Aristot-
le’s principle of unity/distinctness (choriston) in Descartes’ principles of 
clarity and distinctness, there is also a great difference: unlike Aristotle, 
Descartes situates the principle of unity/clarity/distinctness not in things 
but in the mind. The criteria for truth are not derived from investigat-
ing objects in the world, but are rather found in the mind of the human 
subject. This “subjective turn” distinguishes Descartes’s philosophy from 
that of Aristotle and all Greek philosophy and has brought about what 
has grown to be called modern Western philosophy (Löwith 1967, 25).
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A Perfect God as a Warranty for True Knowledge
Descartes recognizes that his first certainty and his general criteria for 
truth are not sufficient to ground science. Further certainty is needed 
in order to ensure that the truth that we find in our mind is really true. 
Descartes needs a truthful God that can provide him that certainty. If 
we would not know that our first, fundamental certainty comes from a 
perfect being, then we would not have any guarantee that the ideas that 
we have found in our mind, regardless of how clear and distinct they 
are, are really true (Med. III: AT VII, 36). Although God is not known 
earlier than the cogito ergo sum, the insight in this first certainty only 
comes to full completion in the knowledge that God exists and that he is 
a truthful being (see Vennix 1999, 14).
Because it is the only certainty he has so far, Descartes’ proof that God 
exists can have no other basis than the cogito, that is, the mind and its 
contents or ideas. That explains why he further examines the origin of 
those ideas and asks whether they all have the same status. Is there an idea 
in our mind whose origin cannot lie in the human self? After all, if there 
is an idea that could not have been originated or invented by the human 
subject, then that idea must have been induced by something else and then 
something else must exist besides the human self. According to Descartes, 
it is the idea of a perfect being (God) which cannot be produced by us, be-
cause something imperfect cannot create something perfect. That I doubt 
is already a mark of my imperfection. From this it follows that there must 
be something that has produced the idea of perfection in me. And because 
the idea of perfection has not been produced by me and cannot come from 
nothing, a being must exist that is as perfect as that idea, a perfect being 
that has produced that perfect idea in me (Med. III: AT VII, 40f; Princ. I, 
17–18: AT VIII–1, 11–12; Resp. II: AT VII, 167). In addition, Descartes 
provides a so-called ontological proof of God, which is based on the idea 
that a perfect being would not be perfect if it did not exist; perfection al-
ready involves existence (Med. V: AT VII, 65f; Princ. I, 14–15: AT VIII–1, 
10; Resp. 11: AT VII, 166–167; Disc. IV: AT VI, 36).
According to Descartes, the cause of our errors should not be sought in 
our capabilities, which are created by God, but in the way we use them. 
Errors arise when we fail to keep our will within the limits imposed by 
our mind. Errors are prevented if we refrain from passing judgment on 
ideas from which we have no clear and distinct knowledge. If we do have 
that knowledge, then we can be certain that the truth of those judgments 
is warranted by God’s truthfulness (see Med. IV: AT VII, 59–60; Princ. 
I, 29–44. See also Löwith 1967, 28–29).
The Soul as a Thinking Substance
Descartes’ first certainty is that he is (existence). The next question 
that he investigates is what he is (essence). Descartes states that he is 
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a substance whose whole being is nothing but thinking. To exist, this 
thinking substance does not need place, nor does it depend on something 
material. A substance is for Descartes something that for its existence 
depends on nothing else than itself (Disc. IV: AT VI, 32–33; Princ. I, 
8: AT VIII–1, 7). Strictly speaking, only God is a substance, because 
only God, who is an uncreated substance, is completely independent. 
All other substances, which are created by God, are for their existence 
entirely dependent on God. Descartes, however, generally uses the term 
“substance” in a less strict sense, referring to something that for its ex-
istence depends on nothing besides God. Descartes relates “substance” 
primarily to independence. Unlike substances, properties always exist in 
something else; they are attributes of something else. “Thinking” is for 
Descartes a property or attribute that cannot exist on its own, but that 
necessarily presupposes something that thinks: a thinking substance (res 
cogitans) (Princ. I, 51–52: AT VIII–1, 24–25 and 11:AT VIII–1, 8). Des-
cartes appropriates the Aristotelian argument that a property is always 
dependent on a substance.
However, Descartes does not say that he is a substance, which can 
be attributed to, among other properties, thinking. He considers him-
self a substance whose whole being is thinking. As a pure thinking 
substance (a soul) that can exist on its own, he does not contain any-
thing material. The soul can be clearly and distinctly thought without, 
thereby necessarily including something material or corporeal. There-
fore, the soul can exist completely separate and independent from the 
body. A thinking substance or soul is totally self-sufficient and auton-
omous (Med. VI: AT VII, 78; Princ. I, 60: AT VIII–1, 28–29; see also 
Vennix 1999, 16).
However, “thinking” cannot be thought independent of the idea 
of a substance. Of “thinking,” no distinct idea can be formed inde-
pendently of the idea of a substance. Therefore, thinking cannot exist 
independently of a substance. And this is true for all attributes (Resp. 
I: AT VII, 121, III: AT VII, 175–176 and IV: AT VII, 223). Moreover, 
ideas such as doubt, imagination, volition, sense and feeling cannot be 
thought independently from the idea of thinking. Therefore, they cannot 
exist without that idea. We cannot form an idea of doubting- without-
thinking, while we can form an idea of thinking-without-doubting. Such 
attributes can only exist as modes of a thinking substance (Princ. 1, 53: 
AT VIII–1, 25).
According to Descartes, every substance has a main attribute that 
forms the core of that substance, and which all other attributes as modes 
depend upon. In this case, the soul is the substance of which thinking is 
the main attribute that is involved in all other attributes. Therefore, Des-
cartes can say: “I doubt” (mode), therefore “I think” (main attribute), 
therefore “I am” (substance) (Princ. 1, 53: AT VIII–1, 25).
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The Body as an Extended Substance
Besides the soul, Descartes distinguishes the body, which is part of the 
material world. His famous “ball of wax experiment” makes clear what 
is the essence of the body. The essence of the piece of wax cannot con-
sist of its varying properties, such as shape, size, color, smell, taste and 
density. When the wax is warm, its shape, size, color and so on change. 
Nevertheless, one cannot deny that, says Descartes, it is the same wax. 
The essence of the wax must be something that is maintained through 
all these changes. What is variable and mutable is for Descartes inci-
dental and therefore not essential. Here, Descartes fully endorses the 
 Platonic-Aristotelian idea of being as self-identical and invariable. By 
putting all that is variable as nonessential between brackets, Descartes 
finally comes to the conclusion that the essence of matter can be noth-
ing else than extension in three dimensions, namely length, breadth and 
depth. Extension is the main attribute or essence of the body, which 
Descartes calls “extended substance.” Size, shape, motion, position and 
so forth are modes of extension (Med. II: AT VII, 30; Princ. II, 11:AT 
VIII–1, 46).
According to Descartes, this knowledge of the essence of the piece of 
wax is not provided by our senses because our senses can only register 
the varying qualities of the wax and not what is preserved in the wax. 
Our knowledge of the essence of the piece of beeswax as well as the ma-
terial world in general, rests, according to Descartes, on a clear and dis-
tinct idea. Because extensiveness can be clearly and distinctly thought, 
it can exist completely independent, also independent of the mind. And 
because God is not a deceiver, it is assured that the external world exists 
also outside our mind (Med. VI:AT 7:79–80).
Descartes reduces physical reality to pure geometrical extension, to 
what can be measured and quantified. Sensory qualities as well as qual-
itative changes in the physical world have no objective reality, but must 
be reduced to the clear and distinct ideas of extension and movement. 
All physical changes are mechanical in nature, that is to say, they are, in 
reality, changes of place, local movements of particles extension caused 
by push and pull and can be explained in mathematical terms. Sensory 
experiences and sensations of pain, hunger and thirst, which exist only 
in the mind, merely have a practical function: they are useful for life, 
because they teach us what to do and not to do in order to live healthily 
(Princ. IV, 189: AT VIII–1, 315–316; Le Monde I: AT XI, 4–5).
It must be clear that the idea that in order to grasp the essence of 
things, thinking is more suitable than our senses was strongly influenced 
by Plato and Aristotle. However, here we find also a significant differ-
ence. Sensory qualities such as smell, color, taste, heat, hardness and 
softness exist for Descartes, unlike Aristotle, not in physical reality out-
side the mind, but only in our thinking. These properties are nothing 
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but the purely subjective responses of our mind to the movements, rest-
ing states or configurations of particles extension (Princ. IV, 189: AT 
VIII–1, 315–316; Le Monde I: AT XI, 4–5). These qualitative properties 
cannot be separated from our thinking because they cannot be thought 
independently of it. We see repeatedly how Descartes uses the idea of 
“independence” as the main criterion in his reconstruction and recali-
bration of scientific thinking.
Cartesian Dualism and the Concept of “Freedom”
For Descartes, the human being is an “assembly” of two essentially dif-
ferent substances, which could exist entirely independent of each other. 
The bodily functions of the human being could be explained entirely in 
mechanistic terms, which for Descartes also mean that the human body 
is without any form of consciousness (Disc. V: AT VI, 45–46; Traité de 
I’Homme: AT X1, 201–202). However, the functions of our rational 
life cannot be understood mechanistically and are not bound by natural 
laws; in Descartes’ words: they are mode of a free soul that “renders 
us in a certain way like God by making us masters of ourselves,” (Pas-
sions of the soul, art. 152). The human is a soul that is connected to a 
machine. Because both substances are self-sufficient, their interaction is 
mysterious (Resp. IV: AT VII, 227–228; Disc. V: AT VI, 59; Med. VI: 
AT VII, 81; Med. VI:AT VII, 81; Lettre à Elisabeth: AT III, 693, 695).
Although the human consists of soul and body, Descartes stresses, at 
the same time, we seem to identify ourselves primarily with our minds. 
The idea of the self as a conscious agent is very much dependent on 
his principle of introspection. “Introspection” refers to the capacity to 
access the contents of our thoughts in an authoritative (others cannot 
challenge our belief of being in a particular mental state), privileged (we 
know the contents of our own minds always better than we know the 
contents of the minds of other people) and immediate (knowledge of 
our mental contents is non-inferential and non-evidence based) manner, 
which radically differs from how we encounter the external world of ma-
terial things (Macdonald 2007); because I have this privileged access to 
my mind, but not to my body and the world, I identify myself primarily 
with my conscious thought.
The discovery through introspection that I am a completely indepen-
dent “thinking substance” assures that I have a free will. The correct 
use of free will is dependent on rational judgment and identified as the 
critical factor in the attainment of knowledge. Descartes explains this, 
proving being the father of rationalism:
If (…) I simply refrain from making a judgment in cases where I do 
not perceive the truth with sufficient clarity and distinctness, then 
it is clear that I am behaving correctly and avoiding error. But if in 
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such cases, I either affirm or deny, then am I not using my free will 
correctly. If I go for the alternative which is false, then obviously 
I shall be in error; if I take the other side, then it is by pure chance 
that I arrive at the truth, and I shall be at fault since it is clear by the 
natural light that the perception of the intellect should always pre-
cede the determination of the will (Med. IV (AT VII 59–60))
The human possesses an innate, internal faculty by virtue of which it 
is an independent substance and can direct its will and decisions. I am 
free insofar as I have the ability to refrain from affirming confusion 
and falsehood: “the more I incline in one direction [towards truth and 
goodness] the freer is my choice” (Med. IV (AT VII 57–8)). For Des-
cartes, freedom is self-control guided by pure reason; in cases of clear 
and distinct perception, the will is free, in that it is not confused and 
constrained by influences external to the mind but spontaneously af-
firms that which the inner mind puts forward.
The Essentialist Self as One, Invariable and Independent
Aristotle and Descartes’ views have been pointedly elaborated and pre-
sented as foundational representations of an essentialist and dualist 
approach of world and self, respectively. If we compare how these philos-
ophers depict “essence,” we find significant differences: in a criticism of 
Plato, Aristotle situates the essence of things not outside but in the things 
themselves; Descartes detaches the self as a thinking substance from the 
world and highlights “independence” as the most important mark of the 
real. Obviously, many other philosophers, including Leibniz, Spinoza, 
Kant and more recently Wiggins (1980, 2001), have contributed to the 
development, reception and critique of the notion of “essence” in differ-
ent directions and forms. Although the divergent views, characterizations 
and valuations of this concept should be recognized, throughout its his-
tory recurring features are attributed to it: the “essence” of things is con-
ceived of as “one,” “invariable” and “independent” (see Aydin 2003 for 
a more extensive elaboration of the history of the concept of “essence”).
The essentialist approach is not only an expression of probably one of 
the most deeply rooted convictions in the history of Western thought, 
but it also seems to mirror a common-sense intuition. From this per-
spective, an essence secures that a thing can possess a basic, invariable 
identity, despite being subject to continuous change; it makes it possible 
that a thing can form a unity, despite having different parts and prop-
erties; and it enables that a thing can be separated from other things, 
despite being involved in various interactions. By virtue of these features, 
1.3  Why the Essentialist Approach Is Alluring 
but Untenable
32 What Is the Self?
essences can secure truth, stability and order in the world. They are 
also seen as the ground, substrate or cause of the phenomena that we 
perceive. Essences are the “furniture of the universe:” if there are no 
essences, then there is nothing.
This essentialist view has profoundly shaped how in Western thought the 
self is understood: although I change continuously, have different faculties 
and properties and am deeply intertwined with other people and things, 
I  still assume that there is something in me that secures that what “I” 
think, do and experience can still be attributed to “me.” This essentialist 
view of the self seems to further strengthen the common-sense intuition of 
how we relate to ourselves and others. Descartes’ appropriation of essen-
tialism through highlighting “independence” as the most important ele-
ment also matches the liberalist and individualist view esteemed so highly 
in Western culture. In the modern Cartesian era, the “self,” the “real self” 
or “what makes the self real” is conceived of as one, invariable and inde-
pendent; strongly valuing the element of independence enabled radically 
detaching the self from its instable world and securing its rationality and 
autonomy. The self is primarily identified with an inner realm that is in-
dependent of the outside world. This inner realm contains the criteria for 
truth and secures the possibility to acquire reliable knowledge. The radical 
distinction between “inside” and “outside” has also far- reaching moral 
implications: it safeguards the existence of freedom and responsibility in a 
world that is determined by laws of nature. All these things considered the 
essentialist and dualist view of the self looks appealing.
If essences are the bedrock of the world, and “essence” is character-
ized by “unity,” “invariability” and “independence,” how then does one 
value the opposite qualities “multitude,” “change” and “relationality”? 
From an essentialist perspective, these qualities are considered to be 
less or not real because they cannot exist on their own: “multitude” 
is incognizable and associated with chaos and disorder; “variability” 
has only reality insofar there is something (invariable) that is subject to 
change; “relationality” presupposes things that can enter into relations. 
Nietzsche has stated that all philosophers from Plato until Schopenhauer 
believe: “What is, does not become, what becomes, is not…” (TI, 167).
The most extreme nullification of becoming can be found in a phi-
losopher that has also left his traces in the views of Plato, Aristotle and 
Descartes, namely Parmenides. For Parmenides, change was a logical 
impossibility. He defines change as “becoming something else,” that is 
to say, something that exists cease to exist; something else that did not 
exist comes into existence; and so forth. But something, a being, can-
not become something else, another being, because in order to become 
The Essentialist Account of “Multitude”, “Change” 
and “Relationality”
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something else, it first has not to be. There must be a transition of some-
thing that is in a certain way to the not-being of it. But being cannot 
become not-being, because that is not. And from not-being nothing can 
emerge. There is no middle between being and not-being, something 
is or it is not. And change is not. Parmenides sums up his philosophy 
with the thesis “what is, is.” He argues that all change is an illusion and 
that in reality nothing changes. Our senses make us believe that reality 
changes. But if we think logically, we must conclude that change is not 
a real entity, and that our senses deceive us in believing that there is 
change (Diels and Kranz 1956, 231–240).
In his response to Parmenides (and Plato), Aristotle grandly attempts 
to do justice to change and our experience of change. Without an ex-
planation for movement and change, which we encounter in all facets 
of reality, nature, according to him, could not be understood. Also, be-
ing a biologist, Aristotle argues against Parmenides that change is not a 
transition from not-being to being, which Parmenides took for a logical 
impossibility, but a transition from possible being (dynamis) to actual 
being (energeia) (PY 200b12ff). Aristotle’s introduction of the concept 
of “possibility” is a stroke of genius.
But then his notion of change is greatly relativized and weakened. 
Although Aristotle attempts to secure the variability in the world by 
the introduction of the notion of “possibility,” he firmly holds on to the 
principle that every possibility is based in an actual reality. Change and 
variability are considered in Aristotle’s view of reality, but these are al-
ways relative and additional. As coincidentals, they need something else 
by virtue of which they can exist and be known, they need an invariable, 
unified and independent substance, as we have seen earlier. Aristotle 
does not completely deny the existence of “multitude,” “variability” and 
“relationality,” but he also does not consider them “essential.” Because 
they cannot be positive, persisting constituents of what a thing is, they 
are not a genuine part of its identity. Applied to the human self, Aristotle 
recognizes that we in one way or another change, interact and engage 
in different roles. However, these facets of the self are not constitutive 
for what the self “really” is and should become. What it “really” (poten-
tially) is and should become (“a rational being”) is already inscribed in 
its essence, which is part of the species that it belongs to. The only (neg-
ative) reality that is ascribed to these elements is a transitory one: they 
express that a thing is not yet what it is in essence, which is also what it 
eventually should become. Every type of becoming derives its meaning 
and value from a stable destination that it wants to reach, which is a 
view that lies at the heart of Aristotle’s teleology.
Every object and every being that emerges in the material world is, 
according to the teleological framework of Aristotle, the realization 
of a predisposition that was present in advance. Without that predis-
position, the realization of that object or being would not be possible. 
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A  predisposition or proclivity can only be brought to completion by 
something that is already complete; a predisposition cannot do this by 
itself (AP 73b5–8; PY 185a31–32; MT 1028b36–37). Aristotle finds 
this completed-being in the form of an object, which is also the com-
mon attribute, the eidos, of all the members of a particular species (MT 
983a26–32; PY 194b26–27). The essence of a thing is, at the same time, 
its goal: a thing strives to become what it essentially is (DA 434a31–32). 
Change is, therefore, always a sign of indigence, of the unfinished, of 
life that has not yet matured into a particular shape (MT 1048b28–29; 
DA 417a16–17). Becoming is not an autonomous process, but rather a 
mere transition that can only find completion in something invariable 
and static. It has being as far as it is a transition to invariable being (DC 
279b1–2; 7, 274b13–15). Ultimately, Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover is, as 
indicated earlier, the prototypical account of this point of view.
In short, becoming has by no means the status of the radically novel or 
newly created; nothing emerges which was not already there beforehand. 
Becoming is a movement toward completion of a form that was given to 
it beforehand (MT 999b4–17; Heimsoeth 1958, 182ff). This is also why 
the idea that species are the result of a particular evolution is for Aris-
totle ungraspable. Essence philosophy represents a worldview in which 
being and becoming are oppositions, and becoming is explained and 
valued from fixed, invariable principles, forms or formulas. The Aristo-
telian teleological approach of the self builds on the idea that changing 
qualities presuppose an invariable substrate by virtue of which the self 
can change and still remain the same. The self is capable of changing and 
developing itself into a profoundly rational and virtuous being. How-
ever, the pedagogical development of the self consists of liberating itself 
from deceiving forces so that it can see what was already inscribed in its 
nature and gradually acquire the right attitude; change does not entail a 
radical transformation into a completely different self. This framework 
seems pervasive but raises two fundamental issues.
Two Fundamental Problems: Real Novelty and Causation
The essentialist approach has two fundamental difficulties: first, the 
 assumption that all phenomena can be explained from one or more pre-
given essences, which are not themselves a product of an evolutionary or 
 empirical-historical process, precludes the possibility of real novelty. From 
an essentialist perspective becoming can never be radical: something cannot 
evolve into something of a completely different nature. Deducing becoming 
from being, that is, presupposing pre-given instances that explain and de-
termine all becoming in the world, precludes the possibility of real novelty.
From the second half of the 18th century on, this presupposition has 
become ever more problematic. Observations of factual increase in di-
versity and variety in the world as well as experiences of the difficulty of 
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finding anything that will stand the test of time, indicate that this view is 
unsatisfactory. Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859) has ferociously 
shaken the world awake: the idea of the possibility of the transmutation 
of species undermined the belief that species are unchanging parts of a 
designed hierarchy. As a consequence, the last bedrock that could secure 
the view that, despite the abundant (accidental) changes that we can ob-
serve in the world, there were invariable essences that ascertain a fixed 
order became untenable. Theories that could not account for the possi-
bility of real novelty were rapidly consigned to the wastepaper basket of 
nonscientific beliefs.
The conception that even species are not pre-given but have rather 
emerged radically undermined essentialist views (Hausman 1993, 168–
193), which also have implications for views of the self. Although our 
identity might be fixed to a certain extent, it is at the same time pro-
foundly undetermined. By virtue of this indeterminacy or potentiality, 
we are able to realize possibilities “in ourselves” that we in no way are 
able to anticipate and that, on the basis of our contemporary criteria, 
might be even considered “unnatural” or “inhuman.”
A second, not less fundamental difficulty that is inherent in the essen-
tialist view is that it fails to account for the dynamic connectedness of 
things. If everything that happens is understood in terms of individual 
substances, all of which have their own properties, how then is it possi-
ble to understand that these substances act on other things, let alone that 
they are the cause of something else? If there is nothing that connects the 
effect to the cause, there can be no causal relation. Aristotle sometimes 
seems to want to explain causality on the basis of his concept of efficient 
cause and identifies different efficient causes (the father as the cause of 
the child, hard work as the cause of appropriateness, invasion as the 
cause of war) (MT 1032a12–b22): efficient causality refers to the trans-
fer of the form of the efficient cause to the effect. This is done by a move-
ment that incites the efficient cause (GA 715a4–7; 21–22, 729b–730b31; 
AP 94a20–22; MT 983a30 and 1032a12–b22). However, how the form 
is transferred from the efficient cause to the effect is one of the greatest 
puzzles in Aristotle’s theory of causality. Because of his essence ontology, 
relations in the world, of whatever nature, ultimately only exist by virtue 
of the interaction between substances. How that is possible, however, 
is difficult, if not impossible, to understand from the essentialist per-
spective, since substances are essentially characterized by independence, 
unity and durability. Aristotle presupposes that objects and people en-
gage in relations with one other, but these relationships exist “between” 
them, in an enigmatic manner belonging to none of them as such. Rela-
tionality and interaction have in Aristotle’s conception no actual place 
in the world and consequently no actual significance in human identity 
(Debrock 2003a, b).2 This is difficult to reconcile with our experience 
that we are strongly influenced and shaped by other things and people.
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Overcoming Essentialism: Toward an Interactionist  
View of the Self
From the 19th century on, the view that dynamic relations and inter-
actions are not additional but rather constitutive has gained ever more 
ground. This shift has not only been caused by developments in the sci-
ences, but also various philosophers have proposed a nonessentialist ac-
count of the self, which gives import to the possibility of radical novelty 
and the constitutive character of interactions. The view that there are 
no individual selves prior to their interactions can already be found in 
Hegel, who has influenced many philosophers who advocate a dynamic, 
evolutionist worldview. Also, philosophers before Hegel have, more or 
less, explicitly developed conceptions that could be considered “relation-
alist,” “interactionist” or “processual.” We could even go back as far as 
Heraclitus, who proposes the idea that everything continuously flows 
and that things are what they are by conflict of opposites.
The alternative ontology that I will propose and use to criticize es-
sentialism can be called “event ontology.” From this perspective, not 
essences but events are the “basic constituents” of the world: unless 
something happens, there is nothing at all. This not only means that 
events are ontologically prior to what is, but also that being is derived 
from events rather than the other way around. Whatever is, is an abstrac-
tion derived from what happens. This also implies that nothing happens 
in isolation and unless it involves interaction. On a more particular level, 
I understand events in terms of interactions. From this perspective, it 
is crucial to recognize that interaction does not occur between already 
existing things, but that interacting things come to be what they are by 
virtue of interactions: “chess players do not play chess, but playing chess 
makes ‘chess players’”; “lovers do not make love but love-making makes 
‘lovers’”; “murderers do not murder but murdering makes ‘murderers’”; 
and so on. These examples indicate how the identities that we ascribe to 
both things and humans have only reality and meaning in the light of 
certain events that are generated by particular interactions.
An interactionist approach has been elaborated, as mentioned earlier, 
in many different directions. In the last decades, poststructuralist like 
Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler have conceived the 
self as a result or effect of power structures and/or (textual or institution-
alized) discourses. Paul Ricoeur and Charles Taylor, both in their own 
way, have proposed the notion of “narrative” to understand the self and 
have illustrated how selfhood implies otherness (other humans, tradition, 
values, etc.) to such an extent that selfhood and otherness cannot be sepa-
rated; the self implies a relation between the same and the other (Ricoeur 
1990; Taylor 1992; see also Giddens 1991 and Rasmussen 1995).
Remarkable in the broad and complex discussion on personal iden-
tity is the slight recognition of the constitutive character of relations 
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and interactions. Contemporary philosophers like B. Williams, S. Shoe-
maker and D. Parfit formulated in different ways the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for persevering the same identity. However, in spite of 
all the great differences between the contestants in this debate, the start-
ing point is often that ultimately identity is constituted by something 
(psychological or physical) that, in one way or another, is prior to the 
interactions with the social and material environment. The essentialist 
inclination to disregard interaction and radical novelty, without which 
an adequate account of the self is impossible, seems to be also present 
(if concealed) in current discussions about personal identity. However, 
a critical analysis of these approaches will not be provided in this book 
because that would make the run-up to developing an interactionist view 
on human-technology relations too long.
This essentialist inclination certainly does not only apply to accounts 
of personal identity. It seems to be very difficult to overcome the es-
sentialist approach; explicit and bold attempts to overcome it are often 
diagnosed as “still essentialist” by later, self-proclaimed “more ad-
vanced” critiques of essentialism. Essentialism seems to be engraved in 
our thinking and grammar; thinking in terms of subjects and predicates 
already mirrors, as we have seen in Aristotle’s philosophy, the substance- 
properties structure. The idea that relations precede relata seems to be 
very difficult to conceptualize, as indicated earlier; we seem to necessar-
ily presuppose that there must be first “things” that then relate to one 
another. However, in our practical encounters we experience change and 
exchange everywhere. We find ourselves in different ever-changing webs 
of relations and networks, both physically and virtually. We seem to be 
torn between two ideas: in theory, it seems very difficult, almost impos-
sible, to overcome an essentialist approach to the self, while in practice, 
we are always engaged in relations and interactions. Western thinking 
seems to be schizophrenic with regard to the question of the self.
It is not the first time that we come across the discrepancy between 
theory and practice. This discrepancy, one could say, has been respon-
sible for the birth of phenomenology in the 19th and 20th centuries. In 
order to develop an account of the self that does justice to the elements of 
novelty and relationality, it is, I believe, for that reason important to con-
cur with the phenomenological approach. The view that I will develop 
is aimed to prove itself fruitful for my developing a sound view of self- 
formation and the question of how technologies affect self-formation. 
An important distinctive feature of the view that I will propose in this 
respect is that it accentuates more than Technological Mediation Theory 
(TMT), which has been also strongly influenced by a phenomenological 
perspective, a dynamic and pragmatist view of the self: technologies do 
not only influence and mediate our self-conception and self-experience, 
but they also actively instigate in a dynamic interaction the formation 
of a particular self. It is probably not a coincidence that TMT often 
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goes back to the more hermeneutical phenomenology of Husserl and 
Heidegger, whereas my interactionist perspective is, as I will elaborate, 
more inspired by the anti-essentialism of Nietzsche and the pragmatist 
phenomenology of Peirce (see Aydin 2007b for a comparison between 
Husserl and Peirce). Although both Nietzsche and Peirce are often not 
considered part of the phenomenological canon, there are, as we will 
see, strong affiliations between their thought and phenomenology. In a 
broader sense of the word, I do consider them both phenomenologists 
(Peirce explicitly named himself a phenomenologist), insofar as they at-
tempt to take as much as possible “pre-theoretical” everyday life experi-
ence as a leading method in their analyses.
A question that might arise here is why Foucault’s view, and especially 
his notion of “technologies of the self” that he introduced shortly before 
his death in 1984, is not used to guide the development of the intended 
framework. Foucault discusses different procedures and practices, avail-
able in all civilizations in different forms, through which individuals 
constitute, develop and maintain an identity (Foucault, 1984, 369; 1989, 
134). This mechanism in the constitution of the self – also characterized 
as “subjectivation” – is what he referred to as “technologies of the self.” 
For Foucault (1988, 18), technology does not refer to material matters 
but rather to “a matrix of practical reason,” a kind of applied knowl-
edge that makes self-transformation and subjectivation possible. He de-
voted significant attention to so-called ascetic practices in Greek and 
Greco-Roman philosophy and early Christian spirituality.
I have two reasons not to go for Foucault as a lead guide. The first 
reason is that his philosophy does not explicitly and directly (I do not ex-
clude that it does implicitly) offer an externalist ontology of relations and 
interactions. The second reason, which I must elaborate more extensively, 
is that his focus on the individual and individualism does not fit well with 
my intended externalist view of the self. This particular focus also seems 
to manifest itself in Foucault’s tendency to see an antagonism between 
the individual and society, which explains his particular interest in dom-
ination and repression and on how societal institutions exert power over 
individuals. In this view, I recognize a Nietzschean legacy that I do not 
subscribe either, as I will explain later. Nietzsche’s influence on Foucault’s 
view of power and power technologies does, however, make Foucault 
resonate indirectly in this study. I know that there is discussion about the 
extent to which the social and the community plays a role in Foucault’s 
processes of self-cultivation and care for the self (see, e.g., Myers 2008 
and Wong 2013). Nor do I argue that Foucault does not pay attention to 
the individual’s social surroundings. The point is that I see a prioritization 
of the individual over the social, which does not correspond well with the 
framework I want to develop. As Foucault points out himself: the “care 
for others should not be put before care of oneself. The care of the self is 
ethically prior in that the relationship with oneself is ontologically prior” 
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(Foucault 1997, 287). However, this is not to say that there are no ele-
ments in Foucault’s philosophy that can complement, enrich and nuance 
the framework that I will develop. I think there are.
Another candidate that needs to be mentioned explicitly is Alfred. N. 
Whitehead; why is not he chosen as a guide for the development of the 
proposed ontological perspective? It is clear that Whitehead has greatly 
contributed to the establishment of process philosophy. He, neverthe-
less, does not provide the most suitable framework for developing an 
interactionist account of the self, which becomes clear when his views 
on continuity, discreteness and time are considered. For Whitehead, the 
ultimately real things of the universe, from which all other realities are 
derived, are actual entities or actual occasions. Although the moment 
of becoming of these actual entities is also their moment of perishing, 
as a result of which they become a fully fixed, unchanging past, they 
strangely enough do not change while maintaining an identity. They are, 
as Whitehead puts it, “incurably atomic” (Whitehead 1929/1978, 195). 
The coming to be of time requires for Whitehead a succession of onto-
logically discrete units. These discrete units are not temporal, because 
their atomic succession gives rise to time. Put differently, because they 
are the building blocks of time, they cannot be “in time” (Whitehead 
1925, esp. 10, 126; Whitehead 1929/1978, 112, 363). Whitehead’s focus 
on atomicity and succession of discrete units seems to be in discrepancy 
with the view that interaction and continuity are primary.
From a Peircean perspective, “time itself is”, as Sandra B. Rosenthal 
puts it, “a continuous spreading out in which quasi-discretes, which are 
themselves continuous processes, emerge in the passing present through 
the interaction of dynamic tendencies constitutive of the ongoing tem-
poral/ontological advance” (Rosenthal 1996, 561; see also 542f, 547f). 
Charles Hartshorne believes that the emphasis on radical continuity is 
precisely where Peirce and other “process pragmatists” fail. According 
to him, Whitehead gives us, with respect to this point, a more adequate 
conception (Hartshorne 1964, esp. 460f., 467, 473; see also Hartshorne 
1980, esp. 283). I believe that Whitehead and Hartshorne’s view that 
continuity presupposes atomic units that are subject to change in the end 
embraces an Aristotelian ontology that cannot account for the constitu-
tive character of interactions and the possibility of real novelty.
I will try to show how the anti-essentialism of Nietzsche and the 
pragmatist phenomenology of Peirce offer us a framework that all ows 
doing justice to the elements of interaction and novelty without 
 disregarding the importance of durability and regularity. Insights of 
these  philosophers will be used to provide the basic building blocks of 
an interactionist view of the self, which is needed to overcome an essen-
tialist and  dualist  approach of the self. However, throughout this book, 
this  basic framework will be complemented by ideas taken from various 
other  philosophers and approaches. 
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Notes
 1 It must be clear that Aristotle does not conceive the form of a thing in mod-
ernist terms as a category of reason à la Kant, but rather as a dimension 
of the thing itself; the form is not a property of reason, though it can be 
captured by reason (see De anima II 4, 415a14–22 and 415a14–22; III 4, 
429b21–22, 430a3–5 and 423b26f; Categoriae 7, 6a36f and 6b33–36).
 2 For a more extensive discussion of the problem of “the missing interface” in 
the substantialist view of the world, see Aydin 2003, Section one and two; 
see also Hulswit 2002, Chapter 6.
Unless something happens, there is nothing at all; everything that “is,” 
emerges from and is constituted through interactions. To illustrate this, 
I will lay out the ideas of Nietzsche and Peirce in this chapter. First, 
Nietzsche’s notion of “will to power,” which represents an ontology of 
dynamic interrelatedness, will be interpreted as a radical critique of the 
essentialist approach. This Nietzschean ontology provides fundamen-
tal building blocks for developing a radical anti-essentialist view of the 
human self, which will also be employed later in the book to analyze 
and evaluate what is considered an “enhanced human.” Then, Peirce’s 
“list of categories” will be discussed, which enables developing a more 
systematic and more detailed interactionist account of self and self- 
formation. Nietzsche and Peirce’s fundamental views will complement 
and strengthen one another,1 laying the groundwork for developing a 
perspective that recognizes that the self is formed through dynamic in-
teractions with its changing social and material environment without 
rendering it a mere product of contingent environmental influences.
2.1  Nietzsche’s Will to Power as an 
Anti-Essentialist Ontology
For Nietzsche deducing becoming from being entails negating the pri-
mordial reality of becoming (TI, 176). From an essentialist perspective 
being and becoming are opposites, and becoming is explained from fixed, 
invariable principles. Against this view, Nietzsche postulates that reality 
is a variable multiplicity of wills to power: the world does not consist of 
a collection of durable and independent unities, but of a m ultiplicity of 
variable and relational wills to power.
Nietzsche’s intention is not, as will be argued, to explain reality from a 
new principle that determines its essence (the “will to power”), but rather 
to show from a “new principle” what happens if something is declared 
as the essence of the world or the self, when something is  determined as 
real or unreal, or as true false. Nietzsche repudiates the Aristotelian idea 
that one cannot ask what substance is, because substance is the under-
lying instance of everything that is, that is, because it is in the strongest 
2 From “Self” to 
“Self-Formation”
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meaning of the word. If reality does not consist of pre-established dura-
ble and independent unities, then it has to be clarified what “precedes” 
them, that is, what generates essences and how that generating should 
be understood. The notion of the will to power is Nietzsche’s attempt 
to provide this clarification, which should be also seen as an attempt to 
do justice to the dynamic character of reality without denying that real-
ity is also to a certain extent organized. In the last part of this section, 
 Nietzsche’s framework, which I will call the Organization-Struggle The-
ory (OST), will be applied to the problem of decadence (also known as 
the problem of nihilism). This application will display the first contours 
of the proposed interactionist notion of self-formation.
The Ontological Status of the Will to Power
From the beginning of the second half of the 1880s, Nietzsche proclaims 
explicitly that all reality is will to power: “[t]he world viewed from in-
side, […] it would be simply ‘will to power’ and nothing else” (BG 36; see 
also SZ II, On Self-Overcoming; BG 13). Reality has only one intrinsic 
quality: the will to power. At the same time, the will to power is the only 
principle of interpretation (Deutungsprinzip) for reality.
This claim raises many questions: is the will to power a teleological 
principle or a substantial cause? Does it involve a homogenization of 
reality and, therefore, a negation of diversity and richness? In addition, 
Nietzsche calls his notion of the will to power repeatedly a hypothesis. 
How should we understand all this?
Reflection on Nietzsche’s notion of “power” already provides some 
clarity. “Power” in “will to power” is a peculiar concept. It is character-
ized, and this is a crucial point, by intrinsic relationality: power is only 
power in relation to another power. Nietzsche says: “A power quan-
tum is characterized by its effect and its resistant” (KSA 13:14[79]; see 
also KSA 12:9[151] and KSA 12:2[159]). The concept “power” would be 
meaningless if a power would be detached from an opposite power. That 
power is inherently relational implies further that it is characterized by 
a relation without relata that precede it or that can exist independent of 
it. Nietzsche’s principle of the will to power implies that relation is not 
an additional element of things, but something that constitutes in a fun-
damental way what a thing is. In other words, there are no first things, 
which then have relations with each other; rather, things are what they 
are by virtue of their relations; what constitute things are for Nietzsche 
ultimately power relations.
Furthermore, Nietzsche’s concept of power implies that reality is 
 dynamic in the strongest meaning of the word. Power, in Nietzsche’s 
view, entails a directedness or causation without there being something 
(durable), a fixed cause, which can be separated from that directedness 
or causation; power is in its essence “something” that does not coincide 
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with itself. It is an always-being-on-the-way. Additionally, this struc-
ture implies that power must be understood as a necessary striving for 
more power (KSA 13:14[82]). Power is a necessary striving to expand 
itself. Power is only power insofar as it can maintain itself against other 
 powers, and strives to predominate over them.
There is, in Nietzsche’s worldview, nothing that has existence and 
meaning outside the game of power relations. Because of this, w ithdrawal 
from this “game” is impossible. Even rejecting the claim that reality is 
will to power is an expression of will to power. Making a statement 
about the cause or (pre-given) goal of a thing is nothing else than the 
formulation of a will to power, which always can be challenged by other 
wills to power. This power game also constitutes what we c onsider our 
“inner world” (KSA 11:25[185]). Willing is an outcome or an  expression 
of this game of forces: somebody who wants something commands 
something outside or in himself that obeys, or that he thinks it obeys. 
Every view, action or decision is understood as a power seizure, or as the 
effect of it. Although the necessary striving for more power can be called 
teleological, it is not teleological in the traditional Aristotelian sense. 
What we have here is, in a certain sense, a teleology without telos. The 
crucial point is that the “teleological” character of the will to power not 
only has no pre-given, fixed end, but it precisely precludes such an end.
Such a pre-given end that is precluded, and that Nietzsche frequently 
attacks, is self-preservation. Nietzsche characterizes the notion of 
self-preservation as one of those “superfluous teleological principles” 
(BG 13). At the same time, this conception is exposed as an attempt 
to negate the reality of becoming. The statement that all life strives for 
self-preservation presupposes that there is a substantial self that wants 
to preserve itself. Nietzsche repudiates that there is such a self (KSA 
12:9[98]; see also GS 349).
The notion of the will to power can be conceived as a kind of hypoth-
esis. It is, however, not the kind of hypothesis that can be proved to be 
a true and valid thesis through sufficient verification or lack of falsifica-
tion. Such is not possible because all conditions that have to be fulfilled 
and all the standards that determine when a hypothesis is verified or 
falsified are themselves expressions of will to power (van Tongeren 1989, 
174–177). In the game of power relations, every power tries to impose 
its own conditions and standards on the rest. A proposition never loses 
its conditional character, because it is continuously being questioned by 
other powers. There is no proposition that can ever be determined defin-
itively as being true. The hypothetical character of the notion of the will 
to power expresses this provisional status, this “always-being-at-risk,” 
of every proposition.
For Nietzsche, every actualization, dependent on a particular con-
stellation of power relations, is the realization of only one possibility. 
There is what he sometimes calls a permanent chaos at work, which is 
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a condition for discovering evermore and alternative worlds. The chaos 
is, therefore, not a mere burden that we have to overcome to survive or 
make our life easier; that is only one aspect of it. It also plays a very 
 positive role. It is the basis for all creation and creativity. Without it, 
nothing novel could emerge. The more that chaos breaks into our or-
dered world, the more our creative power is stimulated (KSA 8:5[188] 
and KSA 10:5[1]). In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche puts it in the 
following poetic formulation: “I say to you: one must still have chaos 
in oneself in order to give birth to a dancing star. I say to you: you still 
have chaos in you” (SZ I, 9; see also KSA 9:11[121] and KSA 10:24[5]). 
Nietzsche believes that this element is operative in every aspect of reality. 
Not only is there no final ground or divine order to which ultimately 
everything can be reduced, but there can be also no phase in which there 
is no chaos anymore. For Nietzsche,  “underlying” every order there is 
an element of chaos that is operative: we never can reach a final ground 
or ultimate end, but are always confronted with a multiplicity of possi-
bilities (Aydin 2004, V1).
The principle of the will to power proves to be a special kind of 
 “principle,” one that deprives every principle that serves as the  basis 
of our interpretation of reality of its unconditional character. The 
 homogenizing of reality in this way does not lead to the negation of the 
vitality, diversity and richness of the world. On the contrary, due to it, 
every determination of reality, every interpretation, can be continuously 
questioned by opposing powers; because of this, other interpretations 
always remain possible.
For Nietzsche, all reality is the result of a continuously changing 
hierarchical order of smaller and bigger coups (KSA 13:14[81]; KSA 
13:14[98]). Change can be the symptom of both the establishment of 
a new hierarchical order (“substantializing”) as well as the collapse of 
an old order (“de-substantializing”). Nietzsche’s ontology aims to clar-
ify how the processes of individuation proceed, that is, how a variable 
and relational multiplicity arranges itself, decays and rearranges itself in 
different directions and in multifarious ways, how different functions 
and phenomena form and decay, which is also displayed in Nietzsche’s 
concept of “organization.”
Organization and Form
Nietzsche’s interest in the concept of organization is not surprising: if 
multiplicity, variability and relationality are essential constitutive aspects 
of reality, and if, as a result of that, there are no pre-given forms, then 
a seemingly independent and durable unity, that is, every  perceivable 
form of reality, can only exist as a variable and relational multiplicity 
that is held together in some way. In Nietzsche’s words: “[a]ll unity is 
only as organization and interplay a unity” (KSA 12:2[87]). A variable 
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and relational multiplicity that is kept together is an organization – that 
which keeps it together is, according to Nietzsche, will to power.
Any instance of will to power as such cannot be a durable and 
 independent unity – it is always a variable and relational multiplicity 
held together, and those wills to power exist only as a multiplicity of 
wills to power and so on ad infinitum. There are no last unities that one 
ultimately bumps up against. Speaking about “a will to power” is, there-
fore, always misleading. “All reality is will to power” can be determined 
more accurately as: “all reality is ‘will to power’-organizations.”2 And 
because “interaction” is dynamic in the strongest sense of the word, the 
term “organization” should be understood not as a noun but as a verb; 
organization is an activity. The variable and relational multiplicity has 
to be organized continuously. An important implication of the ontolog-
ical status of the will to power is that reality is always necessarily orga-
nized to some degree. An absolute disorganized reality is a contradictio 
in terminis. Organization is inherent to life (KSA 10:7[174]).
The will to power is the ground of existence of an organization, that 
is, which constitutes and drives an organization. But how does that 
work? Bound up with the concept of “will to power” itself are the facts 
that: (1) “will to power”-organizations act on each other and (2) this act-
ing is directed at gathering more power. “Will to power”-organizations 
assess each other, judge each other with the intention to subdue each 
other. A “will to power”-organization is subdued when it is converted 
into a function or functionary of another “will to power”-organization 
(KSA 12:2[76]). This converting into a function or functionary of the 
suppressed means that certain rules of behavior are imposed on it – that 
it is disciplined. The result of a successful conquest is that the conqueror 
becomes stronger – that she grows.
The suppressing and converting into a function of a “will to 
 power”-organization does not happen without a struggle. The “will to 
power”-organization that is being subdued resists, because every “will 
to power”-organization is inherently directed at subduing. Subduing a 
“will to power”-organization requires making equal what is unequal. 
The “will to power”-organization that has to be subdued must be ar-
ranged and transformed in such a way that it fits in with the organization 
of the ruler (KSA 11:40[7] and 13:14[186]). Elements that can in no way 
be converted into the new unity are removed or at least made harmless. 
However, the ruler must transform its organization in such a way that 
it is able to accommodate the suppressed. How many concessions have 
to be made on each side depends on the strength of the different “will 
to power”-organizations. If the ruling “will to power”-organization is 
not able to organize what it has subdued, decline sets in (KSA 12:2[76] 
and 12:9[151]).
Nietzsche’s view on organization also sheds light on how regularity, 
stability and “truth” can exist. Stability is, says Nietzsche, the result 
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of ordering “will to power”-organizations in different ways according 
to a certain “form and rhythm” (KSA 10:24[14]). If a “will to power”- 
organization is able to maintain a certain hierarchical order for a long 
time, the “illusions” of durability, unity and independence emerge; one 
then believes that a certain form is substantial. If this belief becomes 
so strong that it is no longer questioned, a ground-form is established, 
forming the basis for what we hold to be reality and truth. Ground-
forms are prejudgments (Vor-urtheile) of the mind. Knowing is nothing 
other than organizing a multiplicity of new impulses according to a cer-
tain incorporated ground-form. Ground-forms are a certain type of filter 
that simplifies and equalize the multiplicity of impressions in such a way 
that we think each time that we perceive the same thing (KSA 11:26[94] 
and 11:41[11]).3 Nietzsche emphasizes repeatedly that the oldest incor-
porated forms are the strongest. The reproduction of ground-forms is 
an activity that engenders structure in the multiplicity that organizes it 
according to the longest incorporated ground-forms (KSA 11:26[94]).
Insofar as ground-forms fulfill a pragmatic-naturalistic function and 
stimulate the constitution and growth of new and stronger “will to pow-
er”-organizations, Nietzsche does not value them negatively. On the 
contrary, they are of vital importance. An organization maintains itself 
only insofar as it fixates itself continuously in a certain way, according to 
a certain form and rhythm. Life is possible only by virtue of substantial-
izing, which always means falsifying, that is, making equal what is not 
equal. Truths or incorporated forms are life-ensuring “fictions” (KSA 
11:43[1]). They secure stability, which is needed for self-reservation and 
growth. The problem, however, is that ground-forms remain operative, 
even after they cease to fulfill that function. In a physiological context, 
Nietzsche states: “every drive is bred as a temporary condition for ex-
istence. It is inherited, even long after it has ceased to be that” (KSA 
11:26[72]). The danger Nietzsche is warning against is the preservation 
of ground-forms that no longer stimulate growth and novelty. Ground-
forms can also obstruct the constitution and growth of new and stron-
ger “will to power”-organizations. How exactly they do this and how 
those obstructions can be overcome will be discussed in the next section, 
which deals with the notion of struggle and its relation to organization 
and form.
Organization, Form and Struggle
The will to power is, as we have seen, essentially directed at subduing as 
many other wills to power as possible; the opposing wills to power, how-
ever, are also directed at that (KSA 13:14[186], 11:36[22], 11:40[55], 
and 11:26[276]). Hence, the interaction between wills to power is char-
acterized by “struggle.” That the will to power only exists by virtue of 
its actions and its resistances, as we saw earlier, means that it only is by 
From “Self” to “Self-Formation” 47
virtue of struggle. And since everything that happens is will to power, 
Nietzsche claims: “All happening [Geschehen] is struggle…” (KSA 
12:1[92]; see also 2:9[91]). This is not to say that all reality is based on 
struggle or all reality is determined by struggle. Such interpretations 
already assume that struggle is an additional quality of something that 
distinguishes itself from it. Struggle, however, is a constitutive relation, 
not an additional or secondary element.
I repeatedly stressed that Nietzsche conceives organization as inherent 
in all reality. Reality is such by virtue of both struggle and organization. 
How should we understand the relation between these two concepts? 
Clarifying this relation will also shed light on the salient difference that 
Nietzsche makes between strong or healthy and weak or sick “will to 
power”-organizations.
A “will to power”-organization overpowers another “will to pow-
er”-organization by the force that is released through the “discharge” 
of its internal tension (KSA 12:9[92]).4 In addition to the force that is 
needed to manage its own organization, there has to be enough force 
to incorporate the “will to power”-organization that has to be subdued 
(KSA 10:7[95]). Internal tension is generated by building up the internal 
struggle in an organization. At the same time, this tension can only be 
built up if the opposing parties are related to each other in a certain way; 
if, in other words, the struggle is organized. Moreover, overpowering is 
only possible if the internal struggle is organized in such a way that the 
tension can be discharged at the same time and in the same direction, 
which requires a hierarchical ordering. Thus, on the one hand, the in-
ternal struggle in an organization has to be increased and intensified to 
such a degree that enough internal force is generated. On the other hand, 
this internal struggle has to be organized in such a way that the organi-
zation does not fall apart and that the discharge has a certain direction 
(KSA 12:9[92]).
We can now also take up again the concept of “ground-forms.” Ground-
forms are manifestations of “will to power”-organizations that are 
 hierarchically ordered in such a way that subduing other organizations is 
possible. These are incorporated because they have proven themselves to 
be “means” that can preserve a certain kind of life, on the basis of which 
a “will to power”-organization can become stronger. Ground-forms can, 
however, as indicated earlier, also obstruct the constitution and growth 
of new and stronger “will to power”- organizations. That happens when 
they are given an unconditional status. One then “forgets” that they are 
for the use of the becoming-stronger of “will to power”- organizations. 
The effect of declaring a certain ground-form  unconditional is that the 
struggle between and within “will to  power”-organizations is weak-
ened. Other ground-forms, which are manifestations of other “will to 
power”-organizations, do not get a chance to develop themselves. With-
out struggle, a “will to power”-organization cannot become stronger. 
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That is why Nietzsche campaigns against every type of unconditionality: 
“the world of the unconditional, if it existed, would be the unproduc-
tive. But one must finally understand that existent and unconditional are 
contradictory predicates” (KSA 11:26[203]).
In order to vitalize internal and external struggle, Nietzsche summons 
taking up the fight against dominant ground-forms. Only continuation 
and intensification of the struggle between a multiplicity of “will to pow-
er”-organizations can guard against disintegration. Therefore, he states: 
“[t]here has to be struggle for the sake of struggle” (KSA 11:26[276]); 
“[t]he struggle […] becomes a regulating principle” (KSA 10:7[190]).
However, it is important to recognize here why Nietzsche often 
 emphasizes the importance of struggle: he believes that in his (our?) 
 culture, Platonic metaphysics and Christian morality have organized life 
in a uniform way to such a degree that every possible counteraction is 
destroyed. That does not mean that the element of organization is less 
important. In some of his thoughts on the possibility of a future Europe, 
for example, which is an issue that is relevant today more than ever, he 
emphasizes the element of organization, because in that case he finds 
tremendous struggle and division, but no organizing force (BG 208 and 
256). Moreover, life forms that have declared themselves absolute can 
only be effectively challenged if the opponent is well organized.  Although 
struggle is indispensable for generating continuous growth, it is able to 
do that only if the different struggling parties remain, at the same time, 
related to each other. Only then are “will to power”- organizations able 
to subdue other “will to power”-organizations, to become stronger and 
to guard themselves against disintegration.
OST shows that Nietzsche’s view of “strong” and “weak” is nuanced. 
Only the combination of strong organization and intense struggle is a 
trait of strength and health. If a high degree of organization is achieved 
by excluding all struggles, then that is a sign of weakness. Additionally, 
intense struggle without great organizational force is a sign of weak-
ness. A strong or healthy “will to power”-organization is characterized 
by considerable divergence and struggle that is forced into a unity in a 
structured manner. A kind of discrepancy or instability or chaos (Aydin 
2004), as Nietzsche often calls it, is therefore inherent in the strong type. 
That is why the strongest organisms can be the most vulnerable: the 
more internal struggle an organization contains, the more difficult it is 
to maintain a unity, the bigger the chance that it will fall apart. Weak 
or sick “will to power”-organizations, in contrast, which contain lit-
tle divergence and struggle, can be more easily organized and have less 
chance of falling apart. They are more stable than a strong organization, 
which also explains why Nietzsche can say: “the strongest and most 
happy are weak when they have the organized herd instincts, the fear of 
the weak, the majority, against them” (KSA 13:14[123]; see also GM 3, 
18 and KSA 11:27[40]). That, however, does not alter the fact that the 
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weak type is unfruitful and, in the long run, liable to a process of dis-
integration. This refinement of what Nietzsche conceives as a strong or 
healthy type obviously makes quite untenable the view that the notion of 
the will to power simply implies brutal, bodily force.
Decadence and Nihilism
Nietzsche has examined weak or sick types most prominently in the con-
text of his reflections on “decadence” and “nihilism.” In his influential 
work on Nietzsche, Müller-Lauter defines the decadent, very much in 
line with the above account, as a type of will to power that is unable to 
organize the conflicting variance within itself. He further explains it as 
an “[i]ncapacity for organic formation,” as a physiological deficiency of 
organizing force, which manifests itself as a becoming independent of 
the part with respect to the whole (Müller Lauter 1971, 1999a, 4; Aydin 
2002). Degenerating will to power has, according to Müller-Lauter, still 
enough unity to strive for disintegration in striving for nothingness. 
Avenging its impotence to organize itself, the weak negates itself – and 
with that, reality as will to power – with the help of a fabricated, “true” 
reality. A difficult question that arises with regard to nihilism in relation 
to Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power is how nihilism is possible at 
all. How can the will to power negate itself – and not acknowledge itself? 
How can life, of which the will to power is the principle, turn against 
itself? How can a degenerating will to power will to fall apart? How can 
a part detach itself from the whole? If the will to power is the ultimate 
quality and the only principle of interpretation, then nihilism too must 
be explicable in its terms.
OST could help understand how that is possible. On this view, the 
possibility of nihilism can be explained from two perspectives, which are 
(necessarily) connected. The first explanation is that nihilism is bound 
up with the structure of organization. A “will to power”-organization 
can become stronger only if it is able to organize the multiplicity of wills 
to power in itself according to a certain form. It must impose a certain 
identity on itself. The imposition of a form on itself is necessarily ac-
companied by a weakening or restraining of the internal struggle. That 
internal struggle is however, at the same time, necessary for growth. 
Organization is necessary for gathering more power, but it contains at 
the same time the danger of decadence.
This danger can be elaborated by clarifying how decadence is bound 
up with the structure of a ground-form insofar as it functions as life- 
ensuring and life-enhancing. An important function of a ground-form 
is to regulate the chaos of impressions, that is, the impact of other “will 
to power”-organizations; a ground-form enables a “will to power”- 
organization to defend itself against those influences so that it does not 
fall apart. Regulation occurs by “the arranging of the new material on 
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the old patterns (= Procrustes bed), a making equal of the new” (KSA 
11:41[11]). This type of inertia can be life-ensuring or even life-enhancing 
to a certain degree. However, the power constellations can at a certain 
moment have changed so much that maintaining a certain ground-form 
becomes counterproductive. The inertia inherent in ground-forms can 
inhibit the “perception” of this (in time to do something about it). Thus 
that a “will to power”-organization is not able to reorganize itself on 
time, that is, to impose on itself a different form, is caused by the iner-
tia, the life-ensuring equalizer and negationist of what is new, which is 
inherent in ground-forms.
Decadence can also be the result of the success of a certain ground-
form. A certain ground-form can be so successful in its submission of 
opposing “will to power”-organizations that it destroys all internal and 
external struggle. Since a “will to power”-organization only exists and 
grows by virtue of struggle, excessive success has disintegrating conse-
quences in the long run. The structure of form contains both growth 
and decay.
The second explanation is that decadence is internal to the dynamic 
character of struggle. Internal struggle is a condition for a “will to pow-
er”-organization to become strong. When, however, the internal struggle 
cannot be organized in such a way that a tension is generated that can be 
discharged in a certain direction, decline occurs. Struggle is necessary 
for gathering more power, but it contains at the same time the danger of 
decadence. The greater the struggle, the more difficult it is to organize 
it, the greater the chance of decay.
This explanation of decadence will prove itself useful in shedding 
light on the problem of self-formation. In the last part of this book, 
this  explanation will be used to clarify how a distinction could be made 
 between a “good” or “healthy” type and a “bad” or “unhealthy” type of 
self-formation. In that respect, commanding will be understood as com-
manding oneself, as self-overcoming (Heidegger 1961v2, 37, 651, 265), 
which requires recognizing the internal divergence in the structure of the 
will to power; “self-commanding” and “self-overcoming” mean being 
able to organize the multiplicity of wills to power, such that the strug-
gle is not weakened or destroyed, but intensified. A “willing person” 
does not command herself, but rather commands something in herself 
(Müller-Lauter 2000, 87). The “self” is only a “unity” as organization. 
A decadent or nihilistic type of self-formation that lacks the capacity of 
self-commanding and self-overcoming will be explained as the antonym 
of what I will later in this book will call “sublimation.”
Toward a More Comprehensive Notion of Self-Formation
OST shows that, in contrast to Aristotle’s teleological account, the di-
rection of the development of reality is not a priori established, thereby 
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guaranteeing the possibility of fundamental novelty and radical change; 
the world is, in a sense, continuously pregnant with a measureless va riety 
and multiplicity of possibilities that are still unknown to us. This theory 
also does justice to the dynamic connectedness of the world. The no-
tion of struggle indicates that a thing exists only by virtue of its actions 
and its resistances, which implies that interactions do not occur between 
pre-existing things, but that interacting “things” come to be what they 
are by virtue of interactions. Moreover, that Nietzsche’s worldview is 
dynamic in the strongest sense of the word does not mean that there is 
no regularity operative in the world: if a “will to power”- organization 
is able to maintain a certain hierarchical order for a long time, the “illu-
sions” of durability, unity and independence emerge. A certain ground-
form then is established, which forms the basis for what we hold to be 
“real” and “true.”
The Nietzschean OST gives some grip on how we should understand 
a dynamic and relational worldview. However, a more encompassing 
account is needed of how regularity and form can include multiplicity 
and variability, of how an entity that is regulated in a certain way still 
is able to transform itself in something significantly novel. This requires 
a better understanding of how something like radical change is possi-
ble, how exactly something novel can occur. Adopting a certain kind 
of potentiality seems unavoidable. Although Nietzsche gives us notions 
such as “tensile force,” “chaos” and “chance,” which sheds some light 
on the phenomenon of potentiality, a more systematic analysis of how a 
non-Aristotelian notion of potentiality should be grasped is needed. Only 
then we would also be able to better understand the relation between 
potentiality and actuality, that is, how something that is not present can 
nevertheless actualize itself and emerge in “the world.” Clarification of 
that relation will help us to understand how exactly a self imparts a form 
to itself without completely fixing itself and how it can continuously 
change without falling apart. In short, the relations between the dif-
ferent dimensions of an entity (potentiality, interaction and regularity), 
eventually applied to the self, have to be explained and elaborated more 
systematically.
The second point that needs to be recognized concerns the possibil-
ity of a normative account from an interactionist worldview. Nietzsche 
seems to derive a kind of norm or ethical standard of evaluation from the 
notion of a strong or healthy “will to power”-organization, itself con-
ceived in terms of the only ontological quality that he recognizes: striv-
ing for more power. The criterion for what makes for a strong or healthy 
organization cannot be external, because besides the will to power, there 
is no other quality or principle. A “will to power”-organization is strong 
or healthy insofar as it does justice to its nature or essence, which is the 
directedness at more power. From the degree of internal and external 
struggle and the way it is organized, one can make out to what extent 
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that has been met. So if the characterizations “strong” and “weak” 
can be understood as value judgments (strong is good; weak is bad), 
 Nietzsche seems to have found ethics on ontology (see KSA 10:13[10]): 
something is good, insofar as it coincides with its “essence,” which is 
the will to (over)power. In addition, the tenor throughout Nietzsche’s 
texts is that the strong type is an ideal that should be pursued: you must 
become what you (really) are.
This view raises many questions and difficulties. First, the idea of the 
strong as an ideal that can be pursued sometimes seems to be incompat-
ible with Nietzsche’s notion of reality as will to power. An implication 
of Nietzsche’s “homogenization” of reality as will to power seems to be 
that we cannot ask why a certain “will to power”-organization is strong 
or weak, what causes this. There is, besides the will to power, no other 
quality or (external) cause that could serve as an explanation. Nietzsche 
writes in a note from the late Nachlass: “that something is as it is, so 
strong, so weak, that is not the result of obeying, or of a rule, or of a 
compulsion…” (KSA 13:14[79]; see also KSA 12:2[139]). Something is, 
it appears, simply what it is. But if something is just (necessarily) what it 
is, then every form of self-control, and, hence, self-formation, is in vain 
(see also Moles 1990, 185–222). Nevertheless, throughout Nietzsche’s 
work there are appeals to pursue certain goals and ideals, which assumes 
the possibility of self-control and self-formation.
Second, if the strong type could be considered as an ideal that should 
and could be pursued, then still realizing it seems to be a great challenge. 
How can we strive for, on the one hand, maximum struggle and divided-
ness, and, on the other hand and at the same time, for maximum related-
ness and unity? (Müller-Lauter 1971, Chapters 7–8; Van Tongeren 1989, 
213ff) In the next section, I will turn to Peirce’s list of the categories in 
order to further develop the groundwork for the notion of self- formation. 
I will argue that this difficult and paradoxical appeal to organize the 
multitude without weakening the struggle, which we can find not only 
in Nietzsche’s work but also, as we will see, in Peirce’s, opens up a very 
promising answer to the question of how to form ourselves.
Peirce argues that in our encounters with the world, we always and 
necessarily must adopt or presuppose three phenomenological catego-
ries, which he simply calls the categories of Firstness, Secondness and 
Thirdness. Whatever we describe or experience, regardless of it being a 
thing, a fact, an event, a fantasy or a hallucination, it always necessarily 
contains or presupposes these three categories. Phenomenology is in his 
classification of the sciences the “highest,” that is, most basic discipline 
2.2  Peirce’s Phenomenological and Pragmatist 
Categories as Basis for an Interactionist Account 
of Self-Formation
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within philosophy, being in its turn – after mathematics – the “high-
est”, that is, most general discipline of all sciences. Within philosophy, 
Peirce arranges, after “phenomenology,” a cluster of three disciplines, 
which he calls the normative sciences, namely esthetics, ethics and logic. 
Logic finds its justification in ethics, which in its turn is dependent on 
esthetics. Phenomenology defines the framework in which these three 
disciplines and the other “lower” special sciences can develop their 
analyses,  explanations and judgments in a proper manner. I will show 
that self-formation from a Peircean perspective can only be properly un-
derstood on the basis of these basic categories, but ultimately must be 
 conceived as an esthetic process.
Firstness: Potentiality
Peirce defines Firstness as “the mode of being of that which is such as 
it is, positively and without reference to anything else” (EP II, 328). In 
whatever we experience, we must recognize a “state” that cannot be 
related to anything else. This “mode” or “state” is often regarded as a 
kind of quality (CP 1.418). The following example slightly illustrates the 
peculiar character of what Peirce considers as quality. He writes: 
[i]f a man is blind to the red and the violet elements of light and only 
sees the green element, then all things appear of one colour to him 
[…]. Yet since all things look alike in this respect, it never attracts 
his attention in the least […]. For the very reason that it is his own 
kind of sensation, he will only be the more entirely oblivious of its 
quale. Yet for all that, that is the way things look to him” (CP 6.222)
Although this example may mislead us to think that Firstness refers to 
a subjective psychological state, we need to keep in mind that it, be-
ing part of phenomenology, precedes qualifications in terms of physical 
or psychological, subjective or objective and even real or non-real. In 
contrast, contemporary conceptions of qualia (Lewis 1929, 124f; see 
also Block 1978), Firstness must not be misunderstood as a subjective 
 experience that could not be shared with others, but rather as “a sort 
of consciousness […] with no self,” (CP 2.85; see also EP II, 146f. and 
258f). It represents “nothing but sensation minus the attribution of it to 
any particular subject” (CP 1.332).
Peirce’s understanding of quality must also not be understood in 
an Aristotelian sense. Within Aristotle’s framework, what is given 
in perception is an instantiation of a distinct universal concept (e.g., 
Met.1039a3–7 and DA 427a2). Peirce, however, claims that what is 
given always contains something that we cannot classify or describe; its 
absolutely unrelated and irreducible singular character makes identifi-
cation by comparison or contrast impossible (CP 1.303; see also Gallie 
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1966, 187). What Peirce calls the quale of the color-blind man’s visual 
experience is something he does not and cannot understand as a discern-
able quality or kind in an Aristotelian sense. Nevertheless, it is difficult 
to deny that he experiences a kind of “green,” but this “green” is not the 
green that we could recognize consciously as green. The example at least 
makes plausible that a “state” must be assumed prior to conscious dis-
tinctions, which Peirce sometimes denotes as “presentness” (CP 5.44): a 
“passive consciousness of quality, without recognition or analysis” (CP 
1.377; see also 5.44). What is immediately present is not the product of 
reflection, which means we cannot relate it to something that we have 
in our head and, consequently, cannot derive it from something that we 
already have in our head. Peirce denotes it hyperbolically as: “[w]hat the 
world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had 
drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own experi-
ence” (CP 1.357; see also Gallie 1966, 185).
Peirce emphasizes that quality, as he understands it, has a simple and 
singular character. At the same time, however, he claims that qualities 
show not only a variety, but even “unlimited and uncontrolled variety 
and multiplicity” (CP 1.302; see also 5.44). From his view on quality, 
both indications do not exclude but rather include one another: the ab-
solutely unrelated and irreducible singularity of Firstness implies that 
each phenomenon contains an element characterized by undefinable 
 originality, uniqueness and spontaneity. By virtue of this fundamental 
openness, there can be an unlimited variety and multiplicity of things, 
which refers to the impossibility of completely ordering, identifying, con-
fining and appropriating what presents itself. This boundless variety and 
multiplicity cannot be understood as a plurality of distinct, particular 
and repeatable entities, but only as something that is indistinguishable, 
vague and indefinite. This element can be characterized as “possibility” 
or “potentiality.”
From an Aristotelian perspective, attributing a quality to a subject 
always means attributing something secondary to something primary; 
expressed differently, first there must be something actual, an apple, be-
fore it can have a quality, for example, the quality “red.” Potentiality 
presupposes for Aristotle, as we have seen earlier, actuality. In contrast, 
quality from Peirce’s perspective is something that is not dependent on 
any subject: it is neither dependent on an actual entity that contains it 
nor is it dependent on being perceived or thought by a mind. Firstness 
refers to a phase of experience that “precedes” the recognition of dis-
tinctive sensory qualities (CP 1.422; 1.377) and “precedes” thinking and 
language (Rosenthal 2001). Potential qualities “precede” actual quali-
ties, which secures the possibility of radical spontaneity and novelty. It 
must be clear that distinguishable qualities are not quantitatively dis-
tinguished from the unlimited variety and multiplicity of possible qual-
ities, but a manifestation of that unlimited diversity of possible qualities 
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in a certain direction. Actual qualities are crystallized possibilities (CP 
1.302; Alborn 1989, 6).
The following example might further clarify Peirce’s difficult category 
of Firstness. Imagine a clean blackboard as a kind of diagram of the 
original vague potentiality. Suddenly I draw a white chalk line, with the 
result that something particular or more particular appears on the board 
(CP 6.203). First of all, I have to assume two qualities: the “white” of the 
chalk line and the “black” of the blackboard, which denote Firstness. 
However, the crucial point is that this chalk strip is only an actualization 
of one possibility. The school board occupies an unlimited variety of 
possibilities: the continuous vague indefiniteness of the school board is 
inexhaustible, irrespective of how many types and combinations of lines 
I draw on it. This also means that the continuity of the school board 
has no a priori tendency of any kind to crystallize in one particular 
direction, to crystallize into one particular entity, namely this particular 
line. The school board houses an infinite number of variations of lines 
that can never be predicted completely. Firstness, therefore, does not 
provide any positive basis for predictions in any direction, but precisely 
precludes such a positive basis.
Of course, the comparison of the blackboard with the original vague 
potentiality is not entirely adequate, as Peirce points out: a “blackboard 
is a continuum of two dimensions, while that which it stands for is a con-
tinuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions,” and a “blackboard 
is a continuum of possible points; while that is a continuum of possible 
dimensions of quality, or is a continuum of possible dimensions of a 
continuum of possible dimensions of quality, or something of that sort” 
(CP 6.203). The possibilities of actualization of the blackboard are not 
unlimited: the blackboard cannot actualize itself into a hamburger. The 
original potentiality, however, has no limits. Nevertheless, the example 
of the blackboard illustrates to a certain extent that it is not predeter-
mined in which concrete forms the potential wealth of the world will 
be actualized: “[t]here are no points on this blackboard. There are no 
dimensions in that [original] continuum” (CP 6.203). Peirce stresses that 
“there are doubtless manifold varieties utterly unknown to us,” which 
might never become actualized (CP 1.418).
That does not mean we cannot predict anything. It just means there 
will always be things that we cannot predict. The absolutely unrelated 
singularity of Firsts refers to the impossibility of so ordering the world 
that we can conceive of a limit to it. Put differently, Firstness refers to the 
realm of unactualized possibilities that always “transcend” the domain 
of our world of actual objects and facts. The world contains a dimension 
of potential novelty, which cannot be depleted by existing concepts and 
conceptualizations. This potential novelty implies that identities are not 
a priori established. Identities are the result of a particular actualization 
process and always contain “material” in order to realize other forms. 
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The category of Firstness strongly expresses the radical evolutionary 
character of Peirce’s philosophy: there is an element of absolute sponta-
neity in all reality. The cosmos as such is subject to an element of abso-
lute coincidence, so that the direction in which it develops can never be 
predicted completely. The idea that the world of possibilities is indepen-
dent, that is, unlimited, ensures that an identity can never be captured 
or identified definitely, nor reduced to an essence. Firstness expresses 
the element of indefiniteness that is inherent in any form of identity, and 
thus also in the human self (see Hookway 1985:166; Hausman 1990; 
Rosenthal 1994, 51–62).
Secondness: Interaction
Although the element of Firstness is a condition for every actualization – 
every actualization is a realization of something that was at least par-
tially not yet there – this category cannot sufficiently explain this process 
of actualization: the category of Firstness cannot explain how something 
undetermined is transformed in something more determined. Firstness 
cannot explain how actual identities manifest themselves. To account 
for that transformation, Peirce introduces a second category that he calls 
Secondness.
Peirce defines Secondness as “the conception of being relative to […] 
something else” (CP 6.32; see also 5.66). This element of relationality 
“brings the subjects together, and in doing so imparts a character to each 
of them” (CP 1.326; see also 5.66). The following example Peirce gives 
provides a first indication of his understanding of relation in this regard: 
“God said, Let there be light, and there was light” (CP 1.327). We can 
make a distinction between two subjects, “God” and “light,” which are 
causally related: “God creates light.” However, the two aspects “God 
who commands the existence of light” and “the coming-into-being of 
light” are not a sequence of two distinct facts. They are two aspects of 
the same fact, or formulated differently: two perspectives on the same 
event. The relation, that is, “the act of creation,” or seen from the other 
perspective, “the coming-into-being of light,” determines the identity of 
the relata, “God’s power of creation” and the “existence of light.” The 
event not only precedes in a certain sense the relata, but the relata also 
are derived from the event in a certain way rather than vice versa. The re-
lation does not exist between things that already have a certain identity, 
but that identity is generated by virtue of the relation. This example also 
indicates that Secondness should not be understood as a static relation 
but as an active or dynamic one, as a force that grants things a particular 
existence.
Contrary to the idea of Firstness, which is “is so tender that you cannot 
touch it without spoiling it,” the idea of Secondness is “eminently hard 
and tangible” and “forced upon us daily” (CP 1.358). We experience 
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this element very clearly every time we are confronted with a stubborn 
thing or a hard fact, that is, with “something which is there, and which I 
cannot think away, but am forced to acknowledge as an object or second 
beside myself” (CP 1.358; see also 4.3), though it is also present in the 
“softest” experience. Secondness refers to a pre-conscious experience of 
resistance or confrontation (CP 1.24; 1.323).
Characteristic for actual factuality is for Peirce its spatiotemporality. 
Secondness “consists in its happening then and there” (CP 1.24; see also 
1.532, 1.405, 3.460 and 3.434) and expresses the particular “thisness” 
of an individual thing. This “thisness” of a thing, or its hæcceities, as 
Peirce calls it in line with Duns Scotus, is not something that we recog-
nize from the similarities between its qualities, nor is it something that 
we can conceptually determine or grasp (CP 1.405, 3.460 and 3.434; 
7.266). Initially, an object does not distinguish itself from other objects 
by uniquely recognizable features, but by the compulsion or pressure it 
exerts on our attention. It is by virtue of this compulsion, this antago-
nistic perseverance (CP 6.318, 1.325, 7.551, 1.320 and 1.432) that it has 
existence and individual reality.
According to Peirce, existence, actuality and individuality are funda-
mentally characterized by interaction, that is, by action and counterac-
tion (CP 1.336, 1.320 and 1.322). However, interaction in this regard 
must not be understood as the impact of one object and the response of 
another. “Interaction” in this respect is irreducible and undeductible. 
A further clarifying example: 
[s]uppose I try to exercise my strength in lifting a huge dumb-bell. 
If I strive to lift it, I feel that it is drawing my arm down. If I suffer 
no consciousness of having my arm pulled down, I can have no con-
sciousness of exerting force in lifting the dumb-bell. To be conscious 
of exerting force and to be conscious [of] having force used upon me 
are the same consciousness (CP 7.543)
Of course, we can distinguish between a weight lifter that pushes a hal-
ter upward and a dumbbell that resists being pushed up. But we cannot 
say that first there is a “weight lifter” and a “halter” that then interact 
with each other. Rather, the reverse is the case: weight lifters do not lift 
weights, but weightlifting makes someone a weight lifter. “Halter” and 
“weight lifter” are what they are in and by virtue of the weight-lifting 
activity.
Expressed more generally, there is not a self, on the one hand, and 
a world, on the other, which then interact. It is precisely this essential-
ist view that is challenged here: “the idea of a reaction is not the idea 
of two plus forcefulness” (CP 7.266; Lachs 1980, 12). We do not first 
have actual things that are independent, and then they are connected to 
one another by some external power. Prior to interaction there are only 
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possibilities. Individual objects can only manifest themselves in and by 
virtue of interactions: “as long as things do not act upon one another 
there is no sense or meaning in saying that they have any” (CP 1.25).
The earlier used example of the blackboard can further elucidate this 
view. The clean blackboard represents, as we have seen, the original 
vague potentiality. I draw a line on the blackboard. What is responsible 
for this line? Although we can say that the school board is a contin-
uum of potential points that could form a line, there was nothing in or 
on the blackboard that already possessed these dimensions in an actual 
way. The blackboard was clean. The category of Firstness can in no 
way explain that modification. The chalk line is, in fact, a plane; the 
only line that there is, is the boundary between the white plane and 
the black plane. That boundary between the white plane and the black 
plane is neither an aspect of the white nor of the black, nor of both, and 
neither can it be reduced to the white, nor the black, nor to any other 
quality. At the same time, however, white and black are recognized as 
white and black precisely by virtue of that limit. By virtue of the inter-
action between white and black, two different entities are generated and 
we can recognize the chalk line as a chalk line. Without their contrast 
and interaction the “white” and the “black” are mere abstractions, mere 
possibilities. Individual entities are the result of an activity that generates 
discontinuity in potential qualities: Secondness is “one of those brute 
acts by which alone the original vagueness could have made a step to-
wards definiteness” (CP 6.203).
However, the individual entity that is brought about by a brute act out 
of the continuity of the blackboard is never completely fixed, but always 
displays a certain degree of indeterminateness. I can draw a second line 
diagonally over the first, which results in a cross. Then I can connect 
the end of the lines by drawing four other lines, which brings about 
a kind of square, and so forth. Each actualization is material for fur-
ther actualization. The element of Firstness secures this  inexhaustible 
 potential richness, which is not only contained to the blackboard; each 
individual entity, including the human self, has potential for f urther 
determination.
Thirdness: Regularity
The idea that things and people are to a certain extent indeterminate 
and derive their individuality from brute interactions is insufficient to 
understand how they can have an identity which is more or less fixed, 
and which we can know and anticipate. Firstness and Secondness cannot 
explain how the diverse and varying reactions that a particular phe-
nomenon prompts can be recognized as aspects of a whole. To be able 
to understand this, we must adopt a third element, which Peirce calls 
Thirdness.
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Peirce defines Thirdness as “the mode of being of that which is such 
as it is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other” (CP 
8.328; see also CP 5.66). Thirdness is characterized as something that 
connects, mediates or intervenes. It is the “thread of life” (CP 1.337; see 
also 1.328 and 5.104), the glue that connects time. However, Thirdness 
should not been seen as something that connects two “parts” of time, 
past and future, which have a distinct reality, but it rather challenges the 
idea that past and future must be distinguished in such a way. The world 
does not consist of discrete events that are entirely self-contained, but of 
events that always anticipate future events (CP 1.675, 1.325, 6.142 and 
6.141). Without this element, there would be no order and continuity in 
the things we encounter. Thirdness is a kind of “synthesizing law” (CP 
1.351, 1.343, 1.536, 1.675, 1.325, 6.142 and 6.141), a kind of law that 
dictates how an endless future must be.
When we approach Thirdness not so much from the “outside,” but 
more from the “inside,” we can, according to Peirce, also characterize it 
as “thinking.” A thought has a completely different character than a fact 
in the sense of Secondness: a fact is particular while a thought is general, 
not only because it can be communicated, but also because it not only 
applies to things that exist but also to all possible things (CP 1.420, 
1.477 and 1.478). A thought should also not be confused with Firstness: 
the generality of Firstness refers to an unlimited variety of possibilities 
that do not indicate any direction. However, the generality of Thirdness 
refers to an idea that suggests a tendency toward realization in a certain 
direction, but can never be fully absorbed in a particular realization. 
Thirdness, in a sense, not only does not coincide with itself, but also 
constantly refers to a certain future (CP 1.342).
One of Peirce’s most important but also most controversial views is 
that the tendency of future events to conform to a general rule does 
not have a mere conceptual status. Against what he calls nominalists 
who believe that a “general rule is nothing but a mere word or couple 
of words” (CP 1.26; see also 1.27), Peirce states that the indisputable 
fact that the general is of the nature of thought does not imply that it 
is also a product of our thinking; nominalists confuse “thinking” with 
“thought.” Realists – and Peirce considers himself, especially in his later 
work, “a scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe” (CP 1.27; see 
also Friedman 1997) – do not make that mistake and understand that 
our thinking only apprehends and does not create thought, and that 
thought may and does as much govern outward things as it does our 
thinking. Ideas can have an objective reality, which manifests itself in 
their predictive power.
It is indeed always possible that we encounter future events that falsify 
certain expectations, but that does not mean that all expectations have 
no basis whatsoever. Ascribing the fact that, for example, stones have 
fallen to the ground without verifiable exception for ages to a strange 
60 What Is the Self?
coincidence, and therefore claiming that those experiences of uniformity 
provide not the slightest guarantee that the next stone that shall be let 
go will fall, is, according to Peirce, an absurd hypothesis. The only rea-
sonable hypothesis is acknowledging that these kinds of uniformities are 
generated by some kind of orientation or predisposition, and that they 
are governed by some kind of active general principle or idea (CP 5.97, 
5.98, 5.100 and 5.101).
The capacity of interconnecting requires a kind of intelligence or 
 “synthetic consciousness” (CP 1.377; see also 1.381) that can be neither 
reduced to potential qualities nor to oppositional forces. The following 
analogy we find in Peirce sheds some light: by drawing a diagram, the 
geometrician is able to demonstrate relations between certain things that 
did not seem to be there before (CP 1.383). The (ideal) relations that are 
revealed by the diagram are in no way reducible to something else and 
must be recognized as real.
This element of intelligence can also be illustrated by our example of 
the blackboard: possible quality and contrast are insufficient to make, 
so to say, the white chalk line appear or manifest itself as a white chalk 
line; we also need to compare or relate the “white” to the “black” within 
a certain respect, in this case under the aspect of, among others, “color,” 
which denotes Thirdness. Let’s say we draw a line, and then another, 
and another and so on. After each line we draw, our eye triggers us to 
find a new line, and to recognize that this line is connected in a certain 
way to an earlier line, and that we can expect another line being con-
nected in a certain way to a previous line; this goes on until all lines are 
connected in such a way that we recognize the final product: a square. 
Although the different individual lines that constitute a square have a 
distinct character by virtue of Secondness, Secondness is not sufficient to 
evoke the concept of a square in our mind. All the different lines have to 
be analyzed and synthesized in such a way that a continuous and unified 
whole, a square, is recognized. To relate the different chalk lines to one 
another a certain orientation or general idea is required. Ideas ascribe 
meaning to an object by relating its different parts to one another within 
a certain respect. The distinct lines gradually lose their independent in-
dividuality in this process and become part of a continuous whole (CP 
6.204, 6.206, 1.492, 1.494 and 1.487). This process has no beginning or 
end; rather, each perception begins and ends with this process.
This view does not fit into the essentialist and dualist scheme. There 
is not first an independent object, which then reacts to a subject in a reg-
ulated manner and invokes an image in its mind, and there is also no a 
priori established subject, which then identifies an object by means of a 
special power. Interaction and regulation are not additional, but consti-
tutive aspects of a thing. From Peirce’s perspective, the identity of a thing 
is indistinguishable from its responses. His famous pragmatic maxim is 
based on this idea. In its most cited form: “[c]onsider what effects, that 
From “Self” to “Self-Formation” 61
might conceivably have practical bearings, we consider the object of our 
conception to have, then, our conception of those effects is the whole of 
our conception of the object” (CP 5.402; see also 1.343). What a thing is 
coincides with the way it reacts to us and tends to shape our behavior ac-
cording to a pattern according to which it is itself formed. To determine 
the identity of an object, we must ask what it does and what can be done 
with it (see Rosenthal 1994, 31f, 40f).
However, not anything goes: Peirce’s pragmatism and his realism go 
hand in hand. In our interaction with the things we encounter, eventually 
certain patterns will impose themselves on us. Such patterns or laws we 
then summarize under certain general terms such as “square,” “tea cup” 
and “hard,” which function as hypotheses that enable us to understand 
and anticipate what we encounter. General concepts are collections of 
laws that tell us how a certain thing will react under certain conditions 
(CP 5.403; Hookway 1985, 171f). This does not change the fact that – 
by virtue of Firstness – the identity of a thing is never completely fixed. 
When we encounter findings that do not confirm the general schemes 
that guide our reason, that is, when certain hypotheses that we apply 
produce a persistent incomprehensible sequence of interactions, we are 
forced to adjust them or further specify the conditions under which they 
are still valid. Such decisions result in the formation of other laws or 
habits that guide and regulate our future behavior and determine the 
identity of things. As the identity of an object coincides with its variable 
interactions and habits, not only our knowledge of the object, but the 
object as such must be understood as a dynamic process; and this also 
applies to our own identity (Gallie 1966, 203; Hookway 1985, 171f).
Discovering the “Self” as “Self-Formation” on the Basis of 
Peirce’s Categories
Possibility, interaction and regularity are not only the general consti-
tutive elements of material objects, but also of living beings, including 
the human self – which does not imply that these categories are equally 
dominant in, for example, stones, spiders and human beings (see  Muoio 
1984; Colapietro 1989; Andacht and Michel 2005). The category of 
Firstness indicates that the human self is not an invariable substance, 
but is fundamentally characterized by indeterminateness. By virtue of 
this indeterminateness, we are not necessitated by pre-given structures 
or instincts in the degree that animals are, and this allows for the adjust-
ment and readjustment of our conduct as well as for real novelty.
Peirce’s category of Secondness implies that the subject has only an 
individual identity by virtue of its natural and social interactions: we do 
not have a self before interacting, but can only manifest our-selves by 
virtue of our interactions. One could say that a person is nothing else 
than his or her interactions.
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This seems to result in contrasting views: on the one hand, we are 
characterized by indeterminateness by virtue of Firstness; on the other 
hand, we seem to be necessitated by virtue of Secondness. We are, ac-
cording to Peirce, indeed both undetermined and necessitated.
But there is more: it is not a coincidence that Peirce defines his third 
category as “the Idea of that which is such as it is as being a Third, or 
Medium, between a Second and its First” (CP 5.66). Thirdness medi-
ates between absolute indeterminateness and sheer necessity. By bring-
ing both these aspects together, it imparts, on the one hand, form and 
regularity to the indeterminate multiplicity of interactions that we are 
constituted by, and, on the other hand, it soaks off the rigid constraints 
that the world imparts on us. What we call our self is a never completely 
fixed multiplicity of interactions that is governed and regulated by cer-
tain habits, laws or ideas. By giving our various scattered interactions a 
durable form, which we can adjust continuously, we possess a certain 
degree of freedom.
Understanding the self on the basis of Peirce’s three categories displays 
the self as divided and multifocal. In an article named What Pragmatism 
is (1905), Peirce defines, in the line of Plato, the thinking of a person as 
an inner dialogue (see TH 189e-190a and SO 263e.).5 He writes:
a person is not absolutely an individual. His thoughts are what he 
is “saying to himself,” that is, is saying to that other self that is just 
coming into life in the flow of time. When one reasons, it is that 
critical self that one is trying to persuade; and all thought whatso-
ever is a sign […]. The second thing to remember is that the man’s 
circle of society (however widely or narrowly this phrase may be 
understood), is a sort of loosely compacted person, in some respects 
of higher rank than the person of an individual organism (CP 5.421)
We can first learn from this passage that a person does not completely 
coincide with her actual individuality, with her thisness (hæcceities) at 
this time and in this place, in one word, with her Secondness. By virtue 
of Thirdness, she can transcend her actual state and possess a certain 
degree of self-control; she can govern and regulate her interactions with 
the world, and form and modify her conduct. This capacity enables her 
to anticipate a future critical self that she wants to convince – maybe we 
could call this future critical self a person’s conscience.
Second, Peirce emphasizes in this passage that a man’s social circle 
is a kind of person that is in a certain sense of a higher order. This in-
dicates that the habits or laws that a person must incorporate in order 
to regulate the multiplicity of her interactions cannot be determined 
by sheer individual preferences, but should be discovered in a com-
munal quest for, what Peirce sometimes calls, the summum bonum. 
This summum bonum is a kind of orientation or goal that is situated 
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in the future and enables deliberate and critical self-reflection. The 
future critical self is the critical voice of community (CP 1.588, 5.433 
and 5.566).
Peirce not only claims that we can govern and regulate our inter-
actions with the world, but he also presupposes that one can make a 
 distinction between good ways and bad ways to give ourselves a certain 
form. The fact that (self-)criticism is possible already implies for Peirce 
this distinction. He presupposes that we can make a distinction between 
good reasoning and bad reasoning, and between good conduct and bad 
conduct. In short, he presupposes that there are norms, criteria and goals 
that indicate what is good self-formation.
Peirce believes that in our practical life, these criteria are not  expressed 
by individual reasoning but by sentiments. The sentiments that are 
 expressed by moral rules, however, are not individual feelings, but in 
a certain sense exactly the opposite; for Peirce, a moral code is ideally 
an “instinctive or sentimental induction summarizing the experience of 
all our race” (EP II.32). Individual reasoning is much more susceptible 
for mistakes than social instinct, because it is often influenced by var-
ious particular, contingent circumstances that narrow its scope. Social 
 sentiment, however, is the result of a long process of interaction between 
correction and modification of different perspectives (de Waal 2006). 
That is why Peirce can say: “It is the instincts, the sentiments, that make 
the substance of the soul. Cognition is only its surface, its locus of con-
tact with what is external to it” (CP 1.628). In short, the criterion for 
what is good self-formation should not be situated in individual reason-
ing, but in social sentiment.
Because instincts are the result of beliefs that were incorporated after 
having proved themselves for ages, they deserve to be taken very seri-
ously. Ethical theories (both utilitarian and deontological) that are too 
one-sidedly rational do not take enough into account that the worth of 
rational judgments that are established on the basis of rational calcula-
tions always depend on what is conceived as and has preserved itself as 
admirable in a certain culture. This also explains, as we will see later 
on, why for Peirce the task of ethics is not to establish directly whether a 
decision is morally right or wrong, but rather to investigate under which 
conditions an adequate (sentimental) disposition can be developed and a 
self could form itself in the right way.
Self-formation and Ideals
Self-formation presupposes certain norms and goals. These norms and 
goals however are, as we saw above, not situated in individual reasoning, 
but can only be discovered and embodied through a long process of so-
cial interaction. Because thinking is not an isolated, theoretical process 
but fulfills a certain function in our interaction with the world, there 
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is a direct relation between (correct) thinking and (reasonable) action. 
Peirce writes:
Thinking is a kind of action, and reasoning is a kind of deliberate 
action; and to call an argument illogical, or a proposition false, is a 
special kind of moral judgment (CP 8.191)
Correct thinking is a form of dealing successfully with the resistances 
that we encounter in the world. Within this context, a proposition can in 
principle be understood as an expression of a belief and a belief can be 
understood as an intellectual habit. And because a habit is a willingness 
to act, a proposition can be understood as a formulation of a willingness 
to act. In addition, a willingness to act anticipates on a certain expecta-
tion, on a goal that wants to be realized. The meaning of a proposition 
refers, therefore, in the end to a goal that somebody is attracted to (see 
Debrock 1992, 11f).
The normative sciences, which are arranged under phenomenology in 
Peirce’s classification of the sciences, study the norms that should be re-
spected in critical thinking and action. Logic studies and formulates the 
rules that should be followed in reasoning. Rules, however, must refer to a 
goal that justifies why those rules should be followed (CP 2.198; see also 
Potter 1997, 34). Ethics studies the goals upon which thinking and action 
should be directed. Richard Bernstein claims justly that Peirce gives here 
his “own version of the primacy of practical reason” (Bernstein 1972, 193).
This also means that, for Peirce, the object of ethics is not action, nor 
right action. He writes:
The fundamental problem of ethics is not, […] What is right, but, 
What am I prepared deliberately to accept as the statement of what 
I want to do, what am I to aim at, what am I after? To what is the 
force of my will to be directed? (CP 2.198)
The task of ethics is to discover the goals that can generate certain habits 
by virtue of their attractive power, habits that could increase the chance 
of making morally right decisions, that is, increase the chance to explain 
and overcome the resistances that we encounter in the world. Ethics is 
the quest for goals and ideals that enable desirable self-formation.
We see here that self-formation not only presupposes that we do not 
completely coincide with our actual state, but also that we have a ca-
pacity to guess and predict that can be further developed. This capacity 
confirms for Peirce that there must be a basic affinity between the hu-
man mind and the world. Peirce writes: “retroduction goes upon the 
hope that there is sufficient affinity between the reasoner’s mind and 
nature’s to render guessing not altogether hopeless, provided each guess 
is checked by comparison with observation” (CP 1.21; see also CP 6.417 
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and 6.477). Further cultivating this basic affinity will enable developing 
ever better ideas with a predictive power, anticipating our future con-
duct and increasingly possessing self-control. That is why Peirce says: “A 
rational person […] not merely has habits, but also can exert a measure 
of self-control over his future actions” (CP 5.418; see also Hookway 
2000, 14). Self-control is, according to Peirce, a complex process, which 
roughly involves the following elements:
first, in comparing one’s past deeds with standards, second, in ratio-
nal deliberation concerning how one will act in the future, in itself 
a highly complicated operation, third, in the formation of a resolve, 
fourth, in the creation, on the basis of the resolve, of a strong deter-
mination or modification of habit (CP 8.320)
We can learn from this passage that self-control is a process of self- 
criticism. Self-criticism in this respect means first of all that an actor 
reviews each of his (important) actions, comparing them with certain 
standards or ideals that he values highly and wishes to realize. Peirce 
writes: “His ideal is the kind of conduct which attracts him upon re-
view” (EP II.377). Next, the actor judges how he will act in the future 
and whether he wants his future conduct to be in accord with the ideal 
in which he thoroughly believes. His decision to devote himself to the 
realization of that ideal will influence his disposition so as to modify 
what he is naturally inclined to do and will, in the long run, result in the 
modification or formation of a (new) habit.
Peirce emphasizes that an ideal of conduct should not be confounded 
with a motive to action. Every action has a motive. An ideal, however, 
refers to deliberate conduct. Although a habit may modify future action, 
it is not a moving cause of action. A habit is a kind of mental formula 
that predicts how one will act and wish to act under certain conditions. 
The distinction that Peirce makes between a motive of action and an 
ideal of conduct corresponds to the Aristotelian distinction between ef-
ficient cause and final cause. The great importance that he attaches to 
the development of a reasonable disposition brings Peirce even closer to 
Aristotle’s virtue ethics.
There is a kind of reciprocal reinforcement between ideals and the 
formation of habits: the more we devote ourselves to a certain ideal, the 
more we will be able to form and cultivate certain habits; and the more 
we form and cultivate a certain habit, the more we will be sensitive to 
the attractive power of the ideal that we wish to incorporate. In reality, 
the incorporation of ideals is identical to the formation of habits; we can 
only disconnect the two processes from each other in abstracto.
This account of the process of self-control requires another addendum: 
because reasoning can be understood as a certain form of interacting 
with the world, “self”-criticism cannot be a sheer individual process 
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(Bernstein 1972, 190; Bernstein 1980, 82). Peirce’s notion of Secondness 
and his claim that thinking is a form of internal dialog presuppose a com-
munity with certain norms and ideals. Reasoning is, as we saw earlier, 
an attempt to persuade a critical self: “that other self that is just coming 
into life in the flow of time” (CP 5.421). Because that critical self is princi-
pally situated in the future, the community of critical minds cannot be an 
existing, finite community, but must be a community “without definite 
limits, and capable of a definite increase of knowledge” (CP 5.311).
To sum up: (1) the ideals that we anticipate through critical reasoning 
can only be discovered by virtue of a real and virtual interaction with our 
social and natural world; (2) these ideals can never be completely realized, 
but remain in principle always subject to criticism; and (3) real criticism, 
however, must again presuppose certain ideals that cannot be completely 
dependent on subjective preferences, since those ideals must prove them-
selves in the interaction with our social and natural environment.
And Peirce makes another decisive step: not only does critical conduct 
necessarily presuppose certain ideals, but those ideals must presuppose 
an ultimate ideal that is admirable in itself. Ethics, Peirce says, shows 
how deliberate conduct is governed by certain goals and ideals and how 
these ideals modify our conduct. It, however, cannot tell us what is the 
state of things that is most admirable as such. Ethics is, according to 
Peirce, dependent on another discipline, which he calls “esthetics.”
Self-formation as an Esthetic Ideal: Organized Heterogeneity
What is the ultimate ideal, that is, the “admirable without any reason 
for being admirable beyond its inherent character”? (CP 1.612; see also 
1.191). Peirce’s answer to this question is: reason! This answer is less 
traditional than it appears at first sight. Contrary to the view of many 
traditional and modern philosophers, Peirce does not consider reason 
(which is equivalent to Thirdness) to be a personal or subjective or even a 
specific human faculty. Although human beings to some extent embody 
reason as something manifesting itself in the mind, reason is for Peirce 
at the heart of nature or evolution itself. He writes:
The creation of the universe, which did not take place during a cer-
tain busy week, in the year 4004 B.C., but is going on today and 
never will be done, is this very development of Reason. I do not see 
how one can have a more satisfying ideal of the admirable than the 
development of Reason so understood (CP 1.615)
From this evolutionary point of view, Peirce states that the only entity 
that in its essence always is directed at endlessly improving its results is 
reason itself, although it can never reach complete perfection. Because 
human reason and conduct are part of a larger process, the development 
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of an ever better disposition contributes to the ultimate ideal of making 
the world more reasonable. In Peirce’s words:
Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to execute our lit-
tle function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward 
rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is 
“up to us” to do so (CP 1.615)
In order to understand Peirce’s view on the ultimate ideal within this 
context, we have to take as starting point his conception of the relation 
between thinking and action. The experience of an object coincides, as 
we saw in the above discussion of Peirce’s phenomenological categories, 
with the interactions (Secondness) that it prompts. An object, however, 
can only be given a certain meaning by virtue of linking its individual 
parts to one another in a certain respect (Thirdness). But clearly, this 
function of Thirdness coincides with the function of ends: an orienta-
tion toward an end relates different parts to each other, thus generating 
a unity, which is a necessary condition for the occurrence of meaning. 
Because it is always possible that we are confronted with new, unpre-
dictable events (Firstness), which destabilize our conception of a certain 
object, the quest for the perfect orientation will never come to an end.
That quest for the perfect orientation consists concretely in the de-
velopment of ever better habits. There is, as we saw earlier, a recipro-
cal relation between the pursuit and embodiment of ideals, on the one 
hand, and the formation of habits, on the other hand. We give our world 
meaning by virtue of the orientation toward certain goals. Those goals, 
however, can only generate meaning inasmuch as they are and can be 
embodied in our concrete conduct. Embodied goals and ideals become 
habits of action and thought. Those habits are subject to criticism, but 
that criticism can, as we saw earlier, only be authentic if it presupposes 
certain ideals that are pursued. Those ideals are also subject to criticism, 
but again that is only possible in the light of yet a higher or other ideal 
that we want to realize and so on and so forth.
Peirce believes that this accumulation of criticism can gradually bring 
about a “habit of feeling”:
the ideal must be a habit of feeling which has grown up under the 
influence of a course of self-criticisms and of heterocriticisms; and 
the theory of the deliberate formation of such habits of feeling is 
what ought to be meant by esthetics (CP 1.573f)
The different degrees of self-criticism correspond to different degrees of 
self-control:
When a man trains himself, thus controlling control, he must have 
some moral rule in view, however special and irrational it may be. 
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But next he may undertake to improve this rule; that is, to exercise a 
control over his control of control. To do this he must have in view 
something higher than an irrational rule. He must have some sort of 
moral principle. This, in turn, may be controlled by reference to an 
esthetic ideal of what is fine (CP 5.533)
The ultimate ideal consists of developing an ideal that justifies all other 
particular ideals and relates them to one another in a harmonious way. 
This explains the esthetical character of the ultimate ideal. Peirce writes:
I should say that an object, to be esthetically good, must have a 
multitude of parts so related to one another as to impart a positive 
simple immediate quality to their totality; and whatever does this is, 
in so far, esthetically good, no matter what the particular quality of 
the total may be (EP II, 201)
It is by virtue of the development of “habits of feeling” that we are able 
to become ever better “in tune” with the world, prompting it to give up 
its secrets and to acquire evermore meaning. The development of a sense 
for the esthetic ideal entails the formation of a practical and emotional 
disposition that enables the orientation toward goals by virtue of which 
evermore meaningless, useless and inefficient aspects of the world are re-
lated to one another in such a way that they become meaningful, useful 
and efficient.
We see here that the basic affinity between the human intellect and 
the world, which is a necessary condition for the possibility of acquiring 
knowledge in the first place, is important not only at the relative begin-
ning of the quest for knowledge, but that it is also a structural compo-
nent of knowledge production. The formation of, respectively, “habits of 
thought” and “habits of action” leads to the further development of this 
basic feeling or instinct, that is, to the development of “habits of feel-
ing,” which prompt further developments and so on ad infinitum (see CP 
1.648). The ultimate ideal appeals to a maximally developed disposition, 
which enables us to feel toward which ideals we have to orient ourselves 
with and which particular habits we have to develop with in order to 
discover ever better ideals. Consequently, this ultimate ideal shapes the 
course of our life and our self. That is why Peirce can say: “the good is 
the attractive, – not to everybody, but to the sufficiently matured agent; 
and the evil is the repulsive to the same” (CP 5.552).
This view requires, however, a further refinement: the regulation of 
the multitude of parts by a simple quality, form or idea must not be 
achieved at the expense of the multitude. Peirce warns that self-control 
and self-regulation should not be excessive. In one of his manuscripts, he 
writes: “See that self-government is exercised; but be careful not to do 
violence to any part of the anatomy” (M 675, 15–16; see also Colapietro 
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Peirce understands this cosmic evolution as an expression of the 
principle of “evolutionary love” or “creative love,” which signifies the 
principle of relating things to one another without destroying their inde-
pendence. In doing so, he refers to the belief that “God is love” as set out 
in the gospel of St John, whom Peirce calls the “ontological evangelist” 
(CP 6.287). In an article entitled Evolutionary Love, Peirce writes:
The movement of love is circular, at one and the same impulse 
 projecting creations into independency and drawing them into 
harmony. This seems complicated when stated so; but it is fully 
summed up in the simple formula we call the Golden Rule. (…) It 
is not by dealing out cold justice to the circle of my ideas that I can 
make them grow, but by cherishing and tending them as I would 
the flowers in my garden. (…) Love, recognizing germs of loveliness 
in the hateful, gradually warms it into life, and makes it lovely [my 
italics] (CP 6.288f)
On the one hand, we must pursue and embrace as much multiplicity 
as possible; but on the other hand, we have to relate the different parts 
to one another so as to establish a harmonious unity. For Peirce, this 
is what genuine love does. Harmonious unity cannot be generated by 
exercising brute force (Secondness), but only by conjuring, by evoking, 
arousing, infecting (Thirdness). That is why Peirce sometimes says that 
though ideals do not have force, they do indeed have power. They stim-
ulate the thing evoked to realize its potential to its maximum. Peirce 
somewhere compares this passive reinforcement with the way in which 
the sun prods a flower to realize its potential (see CP 2.274 and 5.520). 
Hard facts, brute interactions are transfigurated into meaningful life by 
imparting on them a form by virtue of a certain ideal.
Consequently, synthesizing a multitude without destroying it is only 
possible by virtue of the orientation toward the incorporation of goals 
and ideals that favor the inclusion of as many parts of the (social) organ-
ism as possible. The realization of a good life and good self-formation 
consists in the continuous incorporation of and devotion to evermore 
inclusive ideals. For, even though ideals may sometimes do harm to cer-
tain aspects of life or even exclude other important ideals, it is our moral 
task to pursue the ultimate ideal, which can be defined in the words of 
Vincent Potter, as the ideal that “can be consistently pursued in any and 
1989, 111f). Although excessive regulation can go at the expense of vari-
ability and multiplicity, diversity can only be preserved and intensified 
by submitting it to a form or idea. The development of concrete rea-
sonableness involves the differentiation of the undifferentiated, the evo-
lution toward what Peirce sometimes calls “‘organized heterogeneity’, 
or, (…) ‘rationalized variety,’” (CP 6.101; see also 6.191). Our moral task 
is to contribute to this evolution.
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all circumstances” (Potter 1997, 49). The failure to pursue an ultimate 
ideal amounts to settling for ideals that do violence to certain aspects of 
life and fail to prompt their development. Peirce writes in this line: “The 
only moral evil is not to have an ultimate aim” (CP 5.133).
Although the ultimate ideal is the final ground of moral judgment, 
it does not represent an a priori principle that is beyond every form of 
critique, but it has, as it were, a post-critical status: it refers to a phase 
that could be reached after an endless process of “self-criticisms and of 
heterocriticisms.” That the ultimate ideal can be “consistently pursued 
in any and all circumstances” means that it does not encounter any re-
sistance within an endless community of critical minds. It means that 
it has generated a perfect emotional disposition that enables us to be 
perfectly in harmony with our surroundings. While the achievement of 
such an ultimate phase is based on “nothing more” than hope, it is a pre-
supposition of crucial importance: on the one hand, real criticism is only 
possible in the light of such an ultimate ideal, and, on the other hand, the 
ultimate ideal prevents absolutist claims that bring further criticism and 
improvement to a halt. The ultimate ideal can be conceived as a regula-
tive principle (CP 1.405, 1.173, 1.121, 6.610 and 4.61).
Self-formation Beyond the Individual Self
It is now clear that self-formation does not involve the development of 
an isolated, subjective, personal disposition, but rather of an orientation 
about which in the long run everybody would agree on. This explains 
Peirce’s often almost hostile attitude toward individualism. In a manu-
script written in 1906, he contends:
Now you and I – what are we? Mere cells of the social organism. Our 
deepest sentiment pronounces the verdict of our own insignificance. 
Psychological analysis shows that there is nothing which distin-
guishes my personal identity except my faults and my li mitations – 
or if you please, my blind will, which it is my highest endeavour to 
annihilate (CP 1.673)
If one reads this passage (and other passages) accurately, one discovers 
that Peirce’s aim is not the destruction of the individual self, but rather 
the situation of the individual (the cell of the organism) within a broader 
whole (the social organism). According to Peirce, we should not con-
cern ourselves too much with questions about what we as individual 
moral actors should do or should not do. We should rather consider our 
thinking and acting as part of a broader development with a common 
history and common future. What is important is not what I think, but 
what eventually should be thought. From that perspective, the very first 
command is that we ought to acknowledge that there is a higher business 
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than our own. For Peirce, this higher, common business is not something 
to be performed after one is finished with all one’s individual tasks. For 
one’s personal duty is part of a more general duty. Only such general-
ization of “duty” can complete one’s personality by “melting it into the 
neighboring parts of the universal cosmos” (CP 1.673; see also CP 1.631 
and 1.639).
So, conceived generalization is inherent to the pursuit of common 
 ideals. Only by embodying ideals that in the long run everybody would 
agree on can we make the world more reasonable. As Peirce sees it, 
true reasoning, far from being synonymous to cold, logical thinking, 
amounts to being welded into the universal continuum. To generalize is 
to embody common ideals in the deepest emotional layers of our life (see 
CP 1.673).
There is some similarity between Peirce’s notion of generalizing and 
Kant’s categorical imperative, inasmuch as both notions involve the idea 
of overcoming an individual-subjective standpoint (see Colapietro 2006, 
182). But there are also great differences between the two philosophers. 
For Kant, the categorical imperative appeals to and coincides with the 
rational part of the human being, which is completely detached from its 
empirical nature. In addition, the a priori status of Kant’s categorical 
imperative is completely autonomous and, therefore, completely beyond 
our control. For Peirce, however, the ultimate aim that ought to govern 
our conduct does not coincide with our actual rational nature, but it is 
something to be attained in the future by an unlimited community (see 
Erny 2005, 134). For him the necessary condition for moral conduct is 
not knowledge of what our duty is, but the adoption of a self-reflexive 
and self-controlled attitude. By the “indefinite replication of self- control 
upon self-control” (CP 5.402 n.3), we can make our very empirical 
world more reasonable.6 The basis of Peirce’s notion of self-formation 
cannot lie in knowing what the good is, for the function of ethics con-
sists precisely in the search for what the good could be. We can never 
know with certainty that the goal we pursue will ultimately turn out to 
be a good goal. The only requirement is that the goal we pursue can be 
continuously pursued as an ultimate aim.
Here again, Peirce’s ethical perspective both resembles and d iffers from 
that of Kant. Peirce agrees with Kant that we can never be c ompletely 
ascertain that our conduct is good. But he has a completely different rea-
son for this claim. Kant connects this claim to the fact that it is always 
possible that our conduct is not exclusively motivated by the categorical 
imperative, but may very well be the result of our natural inclination. 
For Peirce the reason for never being completely certain that our conduct 
is good is not due to an alleged discrepancy between reason and nature, 
but to the fact that the good is not something that is already present; the 
good for Peirce is, as we have seen, something that is the object of a com-
mon quest and has to be developed through a process of embodiment. 
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Moreover, although there are certain similarities between Kant’s King-
dom of Ends and Peirce’s ethical ideals, their divergent notion of ratio-
nality creates an unbridgeable gap between them.
Peirce’s concept of generalizing and its implications for his view on 
the individual and individuality may go against our modern taste. But 
one must take into account that from Peirce’s point of view, we are not 
born as unique, independent and self-sufficient individuals in some kind 
of liberalist meaning of the word. We are what we are by virtue of our 
interactions. And we can only become persons through a process of giv-
ing a general form to our interactions. In other words, we can become 
persons only by virtue of the formation of social habits, that is, by virtue 
of the belief in and embodiment of common ideals, which are no less real 
than concrete, physical events.
Having said this, I don’t want to circumvent Peirce’s anti- 
individualism. Even though Peirce emphasizes that the process of gen-
eralization or habit formation and the incorporation of ideals can only 
be realized in the concrete conduct of individual entities, his concept of 
concrete reasonableness implies that the particular lives of people are 
in a certain sense “mere” means in the completion of a cosmic, evolu-
tionary development. Peirce can be considered an anti- or posthumanist 
philosopher in the sense that he does not take the human being to be the 
final product of evolution. Indeed, what differentiates a human being 
from lower animals is his ability to contribute to something higher, to 
something more developed. For Peirce, becoming a self is possible only 
if we seek beyond our actual, individual lives and become part of a cos-
mic process that transcends us: only by overcoming our disconnected 
and fragmented human individuality can we become genuine persons. 
Maybe this view makes Peirce a humanist in a different and even a 
better sense. 
Notes
 1 Relating Nietzsche to pragmatism might seem odd at first sight, though it is 
less extraordinary as it looks. At the start of the 20th century,  Nietzsche’s 
thinking was frequently related to pragmatism (Berthelot 1908, 1909, 1912; 
Stein 1908; Warbeke 1909; Müller-Freienfels 1912; Kleinpeter 1912; Waibel 
1915, esp. 28, 29, 42f., 48, 66, 71f; Scheler 1926/1977, esp. 44–47; Durkheim 
1993, 10–168), but that relation was never worked out  thoroughly. After a 
long silence, the last decades have seen contemporary scholars pointing out 
similarities between Nietzsche and pragmatism (Granier 1966, esp. 482–
498; Abel 1984, 175f; Hallman 1985; Steilberg 1996, 228–234), but again 
without elaborating fundamental implications (the dense study by Hingst 
1998 forms an exception). There is, however, virtually no research that re-
lates Nietzsche’s thinking to that of Peirce. If Nietzsche’s thinking is associ-
ated with pragmatism, then the focus is often on similarities regarding the 
concept of truth, especially regarding James’ notion of truth (Danto 1964, 
384–401, 567f, 588; Danto 1965/1980, esp. 72, 79f., 98f., 191f; Donadio 
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1978, esp. 15f, 31f., 42f; Wilcox 1980; Rorty 1982, XVIII, XLII, 150–153, 
155–158, 161–166, 205; Wilcox 1986; Rorty 1989, 10, 39, 46; Rorty 1991, 
2f., 117f).
 2 Nevertheless, I keep using, where it is possible, for frugality the term 
“will to power.” “Will to power” however always means “will to 
power”-organizations.
 3 See, for a discussion of epistemological issues related to this view, Stegmaier 
1992, especially 345–351.
 4 In 1867, R. Mayer published a collection with the title Mechanik der Wärme, 
which contained, among others, his groundbreaking book Bemerkungen 
über die Kräfte der unbelebten Natur from 1842 as well as a new article 
Über Auslösung. Nietzsche appropriates Mayer’s notion of “discharge” in 
his view of struggle and organization with regard to the interaction between 
wills to power.
 5 There are intriguing relations between Peirce’s view on the self and the no-
tion of the so-called “dialogical self” that has received growing interest in 
the last decades, especially from scholars who work on the border of psy-
chology, sociology and philosophy. See, for an illuminating overview, Wiley 
2006.
 6 See, for a convincing interpretation of the “flesh and blood”-embodiment 
of habits with respect to the formation of our practical, historical identity, 
elaborated within a critique of Kant’s purely formal identification of the self 
with an utterly abstract law, Colapietro 2006.
In the first chapter of this part of the book, I discussed essence ontology 
on the basis of the views of Plato and mainly Aristotle. Then, I showed 
how appropriating this Aristotelian ontology, Descartes developed an 
essentialist and dualist notion of the self, which has greatly influenced 
the Western view of the self. The human self is conceived as an agent 
that is essentially independent of its social and material environment. 
In addition, the self is primarily identified with a mental, inner realm 
that is capable of detaching itself from the outside world. The Cartesian 
distinction between “inside” and “outside” also safeguards freedom and 
responsibility; although it is recognized that the world influences our 
behavior, the existence of an inner realm secures the possibility of deter-
mining our own actions and decisions and, therefore, also the possibility 
to ascribe those actions and decisions to ourselves.
This essence ontology cannot account, as we have seen, for the con-
stitutive role of interactions and the possibility of real novelty, which 
are, from a phenomenological and practical everyday life point of view, 
necessary dimensions of selfhood. I have argued that Western think-
ing seems to be schizophrenic with regard to the question of the self. 
In theory, it seems very difficult, almost impossible, to overcome the 
essentialist and dualist approach to the self: the idea that first there 
are independent things that then relate and interact with one another 
seems to be  engraved in the very grammar of our language and think-
ing, which makes conceptualizing the primacy of relationality a very 
difficult,  almost impossible task. However, in our practical encounters, 
we experience the constitutive influence of relations and interactions 
 everywhere; we find ourselves, both physically and virtually, in differ-
ent, ever-changing webs of relations and networks, which greatly deter-
mine our actions, decisions and identity.
As I indicated earlier, I am certainly not the first who has challenged 
the essentialist and dualist view of the self. From a certain angle, all phi-
losophy from the second half of the 18th century on, and more explicitly 
and strongly from the 19th (with Nietzsche and the pragmatists) and 
20th centuries on (with the postmodernists), could be seen as an attempt 
to overcome essentialist and dualist views and to provide more suitable 
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alternatives. Many “multiplicity and dividedness” thinkers (often histor-
ically influenced by Nietzsche!) focus primarily on the view that the self 
is fragmented and divided by variable and instable relations, which is 
often valued as a good thing. Although often these approaches do justice 
to the importance of multiplicity and change in self and self-formation, 
they are insufficiently able to account, within a coherent framework, 
for the elements of organization and regularity, without which self and 
self-formation would be incomprehensible. Diana Fuss has argued that 
poststructuralists and postmodernists are inclined to situate difference 
and dissimilarity outside the self, as a result of which the self falls apart 
into radical heterogeneous pieces (Fuss 1989, 103). In contrast, I believe 
the proposed “event ontology” on the basis of Nietzsche and Peirce’s 
views situates variable interactions not outside, but rather within the 
self, in the sense that they structure and constitute it. An adequate non- 
essentialist alternative needs to be radical, but at the same time sufficient 
and balanced: not only does it have to account for change and multitude, 
but also for organization, unity and durability.
Another way of being radical but too one-sided is assuming that repu-
diating the essentialist and dualist view of the self amounts to rejecting 
the existence of the self altogether. A helpful distinction that we can make 
in this regard is that between the anti-realist and the realist position with 
regard to the self (Zahavi 2015). A radical adaptation of the anti-realist 
position we can find in Metzinger’s book, Being No One (2003). Draw-
ing strongly on neuroscientific research, Metzinger denies the existence 
of the self altogether, as he claims: “no such things as selves exist in the 
world. Nobody ever was or had a self” (2003, 1). Very much in line with 
Zahavi (2015, 1), we can ask what exactly it is that Metzinger takes 
himself to be denying. It becomes clear that Metzinger understands the 
self as an ontologically invariable, independent and unified substance 
(2003, 626; 2011, 280). Denying the existence of such a substance, for 
him comes down to rendering the self an illusion. Although Metzinger 
admits that the no-self view comes in different flavors and strengths, he 
fails to see (see also Zahavi 2015, 1) that the same holds true for the “no 
no-self alternative,” since only if the untenable account of the self under-
stood as an unchanging, independent and unified substance or essence 
were the only possible realist account of the self would an anti-realist 
no-self account of the self be the only possible defendable alternative. 
On reflection, Metzinger’s skeptical view seems to be not that contro-
versial, because the essentialist notion that he rejects is already largely 
abandoned not only by most of the empirical researchers who these days 
investigate the development, structure and function of the self, but also 
by most 20th-century continental philosophy, as also Zahavi (2015, 2) 
points out.
Although I agree with Zahavi that most 20th-century (continental) 
philosophies have attempted to overcome the essentialist view, I believe 
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it is much more persistent and stubborn than Zahavi seems to assume. 
Many attempts to overcome it have resulted in rehabilitating and sus-
taining it by other means. This is especially the case within the field of 
philosophy of technology, as I will demonstrate in the rest of this book. 
In order to provide an alternative, more adequate notion of the self, it 
is pivotal to sufficiently understand the arguments that the essentialist 
and dualist approaches provide to justify its outcomes. Not taking those 
carefully into account results in developing approaches that seem radi-
cally different but are not that different, or are radically different but 
too one-sided. The real challenge is not only rejecting the essentialist 
account of the self, but also providing a balanced alternative.
After having given a detailed account of the essentialist and dualist 
view of the self and explained why that approach is alluring but unten-
able, I have discussed an alternative, and I believe a balanced approach, 
on the basis of Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power and Peirce’s catego-
ries and normative conceptions. Because this “event ontology” forms the 
basis for further developing my interactionist account of self- formation 
in a technological world, I will now indicate how the combination of 
 Nietzsche and Peirce’s views provide a firm foundation for the rest of 
this study (see also Aydin 2006).
First, both Nietzsche and Peirce try to do justice to the possibil-
ity of the emergence of real novelty; they believe that the world pos-
sesses the possibility to actualize itself in an unlimited multitude of 
forms that might be completely beyond our current comprehension. 
Although Nietzsche does not elaborate this element of radical novelty 
in a very explicit and systematic manner within his “ontology” of the 
will to power, his conception of reality as a multitude of contesting 
wills to power, both internally and externally, indicates that one can 
never completely predict what will be the outcome of a power struggle 
and, therefore, in what kind of forms reality will actualize itself. In 
his anthropology of the human and Overhuman (Übermensch), this 
dimension of indeterminateness is, as we will see in third part of this 
book, more extensively and explicitly elaborated: the human is defined 
as the “not yet determined animal” as well as a being that is capable 
of continuously overcoming her present state. In Peirce’s philosophy, 
the possibility of radical novelty is systematically elaborated within 
his doctrine of the categories. His category of Firstness indicates that 
things always contain an element of potential novelty, which rules out 
the possibility to predict with certainty in which direction things will 
actualize and develop themselves. From Nietzsche and Peirce’s perspec-
tive on radical novelty, in combination with the idea that interactions 
have a primordial, constitutive influence, a teleological view à la Ar-
istotle is unsustainable; the idea that things contain an a priori given 
essence that determines both their identity and the course of their de-
velopment is precluded.
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This element of indeterminateness is sometimes also elaborated in a 
more epistemic context. For Nietzsche, every proposition is fundamen-
tally hypothetical, in the sense that there is always the possibility that 
it will be undermined or corrected (in his language: subdued) by other 
or future interpretations. Every form of knowledge exists by virtue of a 
power struggle between competing interpretations, which never reaches 
a final end (GM II, 12). For Peirce, every type of knowledge, including 
the laws and mechanisms accepted by scientists, could at any given time 
turn out to be incorrect or insufficient after all. What is true and real is 
dependent on what the open-ended community will accept in the long 
term, but cannot be fixed by what any finite group of believers thinks 
at some given time (CP 5.172, 591; see also Haack 1992, 28f; Meyers 
1999, 642).
Second, for both Nietzsche and Peirce, interactions are not additional 
but constitutive aspects of reality. Struggle is at the heart of Nietzsche’s 
notion of the will to power: power is only power insofar as it can main-
tain itself against other powers and strives to subdue them. Peirce’s no-
tion of Secondness entails that individual entities can only manifest and 
actualize themselves in and by virtue of interactions.
The importance of interactions is also expressed in both Nietzsche and 
Peirce’s conceptions that the meaning of a thing is completely exhausted 
by listing the practical consequences that it implies. For Nietzsche, this 
idea is, as we have seen, contained in the structure of power: “A power 
quantum is characterized by its effect and its resistant” (KSA 13:14[79]). 
In other texts, this view is expressed more explicitly and clearly. Ni-
etzsche states that “a ‘thing’ is a sum of its effects, synthetically bound 
together by a concept” (KSA 14[98]13.275; see also 2[85] 12.104). Along 
similar line, Peirce states that “[f]or as long as things do not act upon 
one another there is no sense or meaning in saying that they have any be-
ing” (CP 1. 25). Peirce’s pragmatism attempts to explain what this view 
entails, as formulated in his famous pragmatic maxim: “Consider what 
effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we consider the 
object of our conception to have, then, our conception of those effects is 
the whole of our conception of the object” (CP 5.402). In a similar way 
Nietzsche states: 
A thing = its qualities; but these equal everything which matters to 
us about that thing: a unity under which we collect the relations 
that may be of some account to us. (…) the “object’ is the sum of the 
obstacles encountered that we have become conscious of (KSA 2.77)
For both Nietzsche and Peirce, things derive their existence as well as 
their meaning from their relations and interactions. It must be clear that 
for Peirce, as also expressed in his pragmatic maxim, interactions are a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for generating meaning.
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Third, organization and regularity are for both Nietzsche and Peirce 
structural elements of reality. At first sight, Nietzsche seems to be pri-
marily concerned with the importance of struggle, which can be ex-
plained by the urgency that he promoted regarding liberating humans 
from (Christian and humanist) conceptions that try to fix their identity 
permanently and deprive them from the possibility of developing other 
and evermore diverse and rich life forms. This also explains why Ni-
etzsche’s philosophy has foremost an antagonistic character. As a con-
sequence, he is suspicious of explanations that provide a more positive 
account of what does constitute the world and self. However, on closer 
examination the notion of organization is, as we have seen, of no less 
significance for him than that of struggle and change: if the ruling will 
to power is not able to organize what has been integrated, decline sets in. 
Although the world is characterized by struggle, variability and multi-
plicity, things have being insofar as struggle, variability and multiplicity 
are organized in a particular way.
In Peirce’s account, organization and habit formation are strongly 
highlighted and structurally elaborated; they provide important direc-
tives for understanding how identities can have a durable form. His cat-
egory of Thirdness expresses that a thing can only have a durable and 
unified reality and meaning if various, scattered interactions are given a 
particular form. The different parts of a thing have to be synthesized in 
such a way that a continuous and unified whole is recognized. To relate 
the different parts of a thing to one another a certain orientation or gen-
eral idea is required. “Ideas” ascribe meaning to an object by relating 
its different parts to one another within a certain respect. The different 
parts gradually lose their independent individuality in this process and 
become part of a continuous whole (CP 6.204, 6.206, 1.492, 1.494 and 
1.487). It should be stressed that for both Nietzsche and Peirce, organi-
zation is not a noun but a verb; it is an activity that does not exclude but 
includes multiplicity, change and novelty.
Despite their anti-essentialism and “fallibilism,” Nietzsche and, to a 
stronger extent, Peirce do not endorse, and this could be considered as 
a fourth similarity, radical relativism. Although Nietzsche often repudi-
ates every type of truth, especially in his radical criticism of metaphys-
ical doctrines, his notion of the will to power indicates that within a 
(temporarily) fixed power configuration certain rules do apply, which 
enable (always provisional and conditional) certain truth claims (see 
Aydin 2003, Chapter 7). It must be noted here that the extent to which 
Nietzsche is or is not a relativist also depends on what exactly is meant 
by “relativism.” In this respect, Peirce is more outspoken. Against what 
he calls “nominalism,” he passionately defends his “scholastic realism,” 
which is the doctrine that reality “though it has no being out of thought, 
yet it is as it is, whether you or I or any group of men think it to be so or 
not” (CP 8.153; see also 8.12). This conception distinguishes him from 
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pragmatists like James and Schiller, and from contemporary pragma-
tists like Rorty (see Rorty 1982, especially 3–18, and 1972, 649–665). 
Peirce’s realism should not be confused with Platonism, which treats 
universals as abstract particulars (CP 8. 10). The pragmatic maxim ex-
plains general terms by means of conditionals expressing “habits,” that 
is, general rules of interaction to which future events conform (CP 5.90, 
107 and 105). This has also implications for the human self: although 
the self is never completely fixed, it is fixed to a certain extent by habit 
formations that are generated by certain deep-rooted and proved beliefs, 
goals and ideals.
Nietzsche and Peirce’s event-ontology provides basic building blocks 
for a normative view of self-formation. A reflection on Nietzsche’s no-
tion of “decadence” in the context of his “ontology” of the will to power 
offered some parameters for understanding an ethics of self-formation. 
On the one hand, a strong “will to power”-organization is character-
ized by a strong internal dividedness; that is why Nietzsche says: “The 
greater the urge to unity, the more weakness we shall encounter; the 
greater the urge to variance, difference, internal decay, the more force we 
find there” (KSA 11:36[21]). A great internal dividedness requires that 
the parts are sufficiently “independent” to keep each other in a certain 
equilibrium. Put differently, a certain balance between parts prevents 
the multiplicity – and with that, the struggle and tension – from being 
destroyed: “If two wants to remain two, an […] equilibrium is needed” 
(KSA 12:5[82]). On the other hand, those “independent” parts must be 
related to one another in such a way that they form a whole. When that 
relatedness is missing, decay and decadence will set in. In Nietzsche’s 
idiom: “[t]he whole no longer lives at all: it is composite, calculated, 
artificial, and artifact” (CW 7). Thus, a well-organized struggle requires 
that a “will to power”-organization is internally strongly divided, and 
at the same time that multiplicity is forced into a synthesis. Only then 
a strong enough tension can be generated that can be discharged on 
another “will to power”-organization. “Good self-formation” seems 
to entail the  paradoxical challenge to allow as much dividedness and 
 multitude as possible and, at the same time, to strongly organize that 
dividedness and multitude into a particular form.
Peirce’s ethical-esthetical expansion on the basis of especially his cat-
egory of Thirdness arrives at a similar but more systematically elabo-
rated account of the ideal of self-formation. Peirce’s realist notion of 
ideas, goals and ideals explicitly displays self-formation as an ethical- 
esthetical challenge: forming ourselves is only possible if we impart a 
form to ourselves by virtue of an orientation toward certain goals and 
ideals. Esthetic good self-formation is characterized by relating a mul-
titude of parts to one another in such a way that their independence is 
recognized, and at the same time, a certain unity and harmony is im-
parted to their totality. This ideal does not exclude (self)criticism, but is 
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a “habit of feeling which has grown up under the influence of a course 
of self- criticisms and of heterocriticisms” (CP 1.573f). Good self-for-
mation consists in the continuous incorporation of and devotion to ever 
more inclusive ideals, which requires cultivation of a disposition that is 
responsive to an infinite (internal and external) community of critical 
minds. As I will show in the rest of this study, this idea of self-formation 
as organizing a multitude by virtue of an esthetic ideal will prove itself 
fruitful with regard to the question of what is meant by “good self-for-
mation” as well as with regard to the question of whether and how we 
can technologically form ourselves.
In order to make the contours of my approach sharper in the context 
of contemporary discussions with regard to the self, I will briefly take 
up again the conversation with Zahavi. Zahavi (2015) proposes an ex-
periential minimalist notion of the self that approaches selfhood as a 
built-in, integral feature of our experiential life: my experiences do not 
only take place “in me,” but they are also “for me,” which amounts, 
he believes, to a primitive and minimal, first-personal and pre-reflective 
form of selfhood. He also argues that this experiential minimalism does 
not exclude social constructivism. For the social constructivist approach, 
being a self is an achievement rather than a given: to be a self is to stand 
in a particular interpretative and evaluative relation to oneself; the self 
is constituted by choices and actions (Korsgaard 2009) or by organizing 
and unifying our experiences and actions according to narrative struc-
tures (Taylor 1989). Not only do both experiential minimalism and con-
structivism reject the essentialist account of self espoused by anti-realists 
like Metzinger, Zahavi argues, but they also complement one another: 
who we are is both found and made, though Zahavi stresses that we can 
only make our-selves if there is a self that we can attribute to ourselves; 
normative commitments and narrative self-interpretations presuppose a 
pre-reflective, experiential ownership (Zahavi 2015, 4).
The notion of the self that I propose also attempts to overcome an 
essentialist and dualist view without embracing a no-self account. In 
addition, the fundamental self-referentiality (ipseity) that Zahavi (2015), 
in agreement with Sarte, endorses is inherent in my conception of self- 
formation: self-formation requires a self that can relate to itself. I am 
also sympathetic to Zahavi’s view that the self is not only a social con-
struction but presupposes a certain real selfhood, although I interpret 
and develop the relation between the two in a different way and direc-
tion. The interactionist view of the self that I propose endorses a realist 
account that attempts to do justice to both the existence of an actual, 
pre-reflective individual self as well as to the possibility of forming that 
self in a certain direction: there must be a “pre-reflective form of self-
hood” (in Peirce’s idiom: Secondness) that precedes deliberate attempts 
to form itself in a certain direction (Thirdness), made possible by a struc-
tural indeterminateness (Firstness); a person can transcend her actual, 
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individual state by orienting herself toward goals and ideals, and in this 
way forming a more preferred self. 
However, I neither adopt nor reject the idea of a “primitive and mini-
mal” self. This notion has raised questions of how primitive and minimal 
that self really is and has solicited accusations of endorsing a metaphys-
ics that is still too thick (see the debates in Durt et al. 2017). Although 
this is an important issue, it cannot be dealt with in this study. The main 
aim of this book is not investigating to what extent the pre-reflective self 
is or is not interpersonal or a (historical) construction, but developing an 
interactionist framework that enables understanding whether and how 
self-formation is possible in an intrusive technological environment. 
 After having developed that framework, one could evaluate whether the 
idea of a minimal self that justifies a distinction between consciousness 
and self-consciousness is inevitable or a symptom of a view that needs to 
be left behind. However, that question I leave for future research.

In the first part of this book, an interactionist notion of the “self” has 
been developed in a critique of essentialist and dualist approaches to 
the self, which has culminated in a view of the self as “self-formation”; 
one could say that the “self” has been deconstructed, on the basis of 
Nietzsche and Peirce’s views, as “self-formation.” “Self-formation” has 
been explained in terms of organizing or regulating multiplicity and 
struggle by virtue of an orientation toward certain goals and ideals.
Now, this basic framework must prove itself fruitful in the context 
of a world that is saturated with technologies and a repository of ever 
increasing technological explanations, technological explanations not 
only for scientific but increasingly also for psychological and philosoph-
ical phenomena. The influence of technologies and technological expla-
nations has in the modern Cartesian worldview always been restricted to 
the realm of the external world. Currently, technologies and technolog-
ical explanations are increasingly extending their reach, intruding also 
in the realm of the human self; the self seems to be greatly influenced by 
its environment, which is  increasingly a technological environment, and 
liable to technological explanations. But if the self is to a great extent 
shaped by its environment and if this environment is evermore a tech-
nological environment that is becoming ubiquitous, what then secures 
that this self is not the product of this technological environment? And 
if technologies are increasingly capable of revealing (necessary) laws and 
mechanisms that explain our actions and decisions, what then is left of 
the autonomy that in everyday life is ascribed to human agents?
The primary question in this part of the book is then how the  proposed 
interactionist framework can explain if it is at all possible to form our-
selves in an intrusive technological environment. In general, theories 
that highlight the dominant influence of external factors on the self tend 
to strongly constrain its possibilities to form itself, whereas views that 
attribute unrestricted autonomy to the self and a capacity to detach it-
self from natural and societal influences often also render self-formation 
possible. But, how to sufficiently acknowledge the influence of the envi-
ronment, which is increasingly a technological environment, and, at the 
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It must be clear that it is not my aim here to provide an overview 
of the sophisticated positions (hard determinism, compatibilism, hard 
incompatibilism, libertarianism, two stage models, non-/agent-/event-
causal frameworks etc.) and fine-grained arguments that are exchanged 
in the debate regarding autonomy, free will and responsibility, which is 
impossible. I will rather briefly touch on a selection of positions pro and 
contra autonomy and attempt to show that, despite relevant differences, 
these views have a common blind spot: they assume a problematic cate-
gorical distinction between an “inside” and an “outside” realm, which 
is both a manifestation of an essentialist and dualist view of the self and 
an obstacle to overcome that view. I will, in both this and the next part 
of this study, “reveal” this blind spot in contemporary views in phi-
losophy of technology and argue that it is greatly responsible for their 
failure to provide a framework that sufficiently accounts for the intrusive 
influence of technologies on the human self. In this part, I will focus on 
the extended mind theory and the view that brain imaging technologies 
could provide functional evidence in free will debates, using primarily 
Peirce’s framework as a filleting knife; in the next part, I will engage 
with other contemporary views in philosophy of technology, using Ni-
etzsche, Peirce and other philosophers as “tuning fork.” The engagement 
with and critique of these approaches will allow me to further develop 
my interactionist notion of self-formation and to make clear in what 
sense self-formation in a technological world is possible (which is the 
topic of this part of the book) and how the self ought to form itself, that 
is, what “good self-formation” entails (which is the topic of the third 
part of this book).
In Chapter 3 of this part of the book, I will set the stage by presenting 
the freedom-determination dichotomy on the basis of Kant’s influential 
deontological ethics, which states that, despite different influences, hu-
man agents possess an ineradicable autonomy. Kant’s attempt to show 
that the human self contains an “inner agent” that can detach itself from 
the outside world and govern its corporeal behavior has prompted  various 
responses. I will briefly engage with contemporary “Kantian” theories 
that revolve around the idea that the human can only be free and respon-
sible if it possesses a real self that secures its mine-ness. Parallel to these 
debates in philosophy, developments in social psychology and neurosci-
ence have flared up the question of whether the self is “master in its own 
house.” Within this context, I will discuss the freedom- determination 
dichotomy in a conversation with situationists, brain-determinists and 
brain-non-determinists. In the last part of this chapter, I will argue that, 
despite many relevant differences, these approaches share that common 
blind spot: the assumption that “inside” and “outside” could be categor-
ically detached from one another.
Chapter 4 will argue that radically overcoming the inside-outside dis-
tinction requires showing that the mind as such, which was for Descartes, 
Is Self-Formation Possible? 85
Kant and other essentialists and dualists the mark of the internal, is 
material and technological; conversely, it will turn out that the mate-
rial world contains a mental dimension. Overcoming the inside-outside 
 distinction will make it possible to do justice to the dynamic, relational 
and interdependent character of the self and hence to recognize its “ar-
tifactual character,” which is a view I will elaborate in a constructive 
critique of the extended mind thesis.
In Chapter 5, I will attempt to go beyond the inside-outside distinc-
tion by challenging the view that the brain is the locus of the self and 
the organic “inner self” that controls the body and utilizes the material 
environment. Analyzing and criticizing how brain imaging technolo-
gies frame the relation between brain, body and world, and sustain and 
strengthen the view of the brain as an isolated agent, I will show how 
from an interactionist view of the self, “self-determination” could be 
reinterpreted and further specified in terms of “self-formation” and how 
brain imaging technologies, instead of proving whether free will exist 
or not exist, could contribute to forming a critical self. Brain imaging 
technologies allow, as I will propose, critically reflecting on whether our 
habits are consistent with the longer-term goals or ideals that we pursue: 
they potentially display to what extent our biological constitution is in 
par with or poses certain limits or constraints to our personal or social 
ambitions. This further illustrates how a seemingly internal, biological 
reality can merge with what is considered the external world.
In the last chapter of this part, I will further sharpen the proposed 
view of critical self-formation by reflecting on the question “how crit-
ical” critical self-formation is; the question is here to what extent both 
longer-term goals and ideals and cognitive and neurological means to 
form ourselves are not again determined by certain external factors, 
namely society and institutions. Self-formation will appear to be not 
only an individual but also a collective process.
3.1 Kantian Notions of Autonomy and Responsibility
Kant’s deontological ethics had and still has a great influence on posi-
tions and arguments regarding autonomy, free will and responsibility. 
After reviewing his approach, I will briefly discuss three contemporary 
views that are influenced by but also struggle with it. These views often 
endorse a compatibilist take and focus on the question of what kind of 
self is required to secure autonomy and responsibility. This discussion 
will make clear that, while Kant’s position might be and is very prob-
lematic, what is at stake in Kantian adaptations of autonomy, free will 
and responsibility is far from obsolete. A brief elaboration of relevant 
social psychologist and neuroscientific approaches to freedom and re-
sponsibility in the next section will make clear that a more empirically 
oriented approach as such is not sufficient to overcome the inside-outside 
distinction. Sufficiently fathoming of what is at stake here is crucial to 
make further progress.
Kant’s Pure Autonomy
In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant sets the tone 
of his ethics with the following famous statement: “It is impossible to 
think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could 
be considered good without limitation except a good will” (Kant 1997, 
7). This assertion is an allusion to many ethical theorists who preceded 
Kant and tried to ground morality on, for example, the law of god or 
a sovereign monarch, a special feeling that we experience when we act 
morally good, or the perfection of natural qualities. Kant admits that 
qualities like wit, courage and perseverance can be good in different 
respects, but these “gifts of nature” may also turn out to be extremely 
bad if the will that makes use of them is not good (Kant 1997, 7). Only 
a good will is good without restrictions.
What Kant has seen sharply is that grounding morality on an exter-
nally imposed law or foreign institute – and we will see later on that also 
our natural inclinations are external to our genuine self – jeopardizes the 
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autonomy of the will. Because we can only be held accountable for our 
autonomous actions, acting under orders of a will that is not our own 
discharges us from being accountable for our deeds. Put yet differently, 
we can only be held responsible for what is within our control. All that 
happens in the external, empirical world is, according to Kant, beyond 
our control (Kant 1997, 8, 28). The only thing that I can control is the 
decision that I make before I physically act, that is, my intention. That is 
why Kant can say that only a good will is intrinsically good. The equa-
tion of will with decision-making implies, as we will see, that the will for 
Kant is not something that is detached from reason, but that it rather is 
a particular modus of reason.
If qualifying an action as good or bad is only justified if the action 
is the result of an autonomous will, then the question that emerges is: 
when do we act autonomously? Distinctive for agents with an auton-
omous will is that they do not simply act, but are able to reflect and 
decide whether they would want to act in a certain way. In other words, 
they have the capacity to act deliberately. Acting under the influence of 
 passions or impulses is, according to Kant, a feature of a heteronomous 
will (Kant 1997, 41, 47f). It is action that is not the result of a deliberate 
and self-legislated choice, but action that is governed by a foreign, exter-
nal faculty. We act autonomously only if we act in accordance with a law 
that is dictated by our own reason.
Acting autonomously and therefore reasonably is thus not the same as 
doing whatever I please. Reason is for Kant not determined by subjective 
preferences or particular circumstances, but has rather its own objective 
laws, which are valid for every rational being. That we, moreover, expe-
rience these laws as imperatives that we ought to follow, as constraints, 
does not imply that we act under the influence of a foreign legislator, but 
rather indicates that we are only partly rational, that is, we also have a 
bodily nature, which is not necessarily in accordance with our reason 
(Kant 1997, 24, 25).
Kant believes that a principle can only be called reasonable if it is 
valid in all situations and circumstances, regardless of subjective incli-
nations or desires; reason is the same at all times and for all people. 
From this, it follows that only categorical, unconditional imperatives (in 
contrast to hypothetical imperatives) can be considered reasonable in a 
genuine sense (Kant 1997, 30f). Consequently, reason becomes not only 
the source for morality but also the criterion for establishing the moral 
value of an action.
Once we recognize that moral law is universal, we can determine the 
“content” of the categorical imperative. If we strip away all empirical 
considerations that are part of a hypothetical and heteronomous point of 
view, we discover that the content of the moral law is in a certain sense 
its form. It says that an action is morally good if it is not dependent on 
arbitrary impulses or preferences, but rather is motivated by a maxim 
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that we could will in all possible circumstances – “arbitrariness” is, we 
could say, the opposite of “rationality” (Kant 1997, 30f).
Kant’s categorical imperative can be characterized more sharply by 
discussing shortly his two most known formulations of it. His first for-
mulation is: “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also 
will that my maxim should become a universal law” (Kant 1997, 15). 
At first sight, this seems to be no more than stating in a more weighty 
way a principle that is used commonly in everyday life, namely “Do not 
do to others what you do not want done to yourself” or “Treat others as 
you would like them to treat you” (St. Luke 6:31). However, Kant in a 
footnote warns us against confusing his categorical imperative with such 
popular sayings (Kant 1997, 38). Those everyday life maxims usually 
appeal to the wants and likings of particular persons and are therefore 
based on self-interest, whereas Kant’s imperative wants to radically ex-
clude self-interest from moral consideration and overcome particularity. 
His categorical imperative does not say that I, for example, may not steal 
because I would not like it if people would steal from me, but rather 
indicates that stealing is morally wrong because I cannot will it to be a 
universal law, irrespective of my personal desires or particular circum-
stances. Actions ought to be performed exclusively for the sake of duty 
(Kant 1997, 11f).
Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative is: “So act 
that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of 
any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” 
(Kant 1997, 38). I may not treat other rational beings as mere means to 
my purposes because in pursuing their goals, they, like myself, never 
consider themselves as mere means to other purposes. Put differently, 
rational beings cannot be treated as mere means because they are si-
multaneously the authors and the subjects of the laws and principles 
they execute through their will. An ideal world would be a kingdom in 
which persons never are treated merely as means but always also as ends. 
Kant’s ethics has laid the foundation for the great importance that we 
ascribe to autonomy today.
The major problem that Kant’s ethics has to contend with from the 
start is that morality for him is only possible if we can really determine 
our own law for ourselves, if, in other words, we are really free. In the 
last chapter of his Grundlegung (Kant 1997, 52–66), he shows that the 
reality of freedom can never be proven by empirical observation because 
the world that we perceive and understand is governed by the principle 
that every event is caused by another, prior event. Kant’s way out of this 
determinism is through his introduction of the distinction between an 
intelligible world and a world of appearances. Kant not only argues that 
we are members of both worlds, but he also states that the first has a 
certain primacy over the latter: appearances are no more than the pic-
ture that reason develops in making sense of the world. Although we can 
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never prove the reality of freedom, he concludes in the Grundlegung, we 
necessarily presuppose it, especially when we engage in practical endeav-
ors. If we do not attribute our judgments and actions to our conscious 
intentions, we cannot understand what we do and what happens around 
us (Kant 1997, 62f).
Real Self View, Autonomy View and Reason View
Kant’s view that a decision or action is mine if and only if it can be 
ascribed to my will has been taken up by different contemporary au-
thors and has been embedded in different ways in various contemporary 
 positions. Pauen (2004, 2007), for example, takes as starting point that 
any action that is said to be free has to meet two minimal conditions: the 
“absence of compulsion” and “the absence of pure chance.” He argues 
that these criteria positively entail that my action is free if (and only if) 
it can be attributed to my (and not to an enforced or a random) will. 
From this perspective, “autonomy” or “freedom” can be translated as 
“self-determination.” Additionally, Pauen (2007, 5) points out that it “is 
completely unclear what it means to act in a self-determined way, as long 
as it remains to be spelled out what the self is.”
Pauen’s approach seems to fit within what sometimes is called the Real 
Self View of free will and moral responsibility, a label coined (and a po-
sition rejected) by Susan Wolf (1990). More recently, different versions 
of this approach, sometimes also calling it the Deep Self View, have been 
proposed and discussed by T.M. Scanlon (1998), Nomy Arpaly (2003), 
Angela Smith (2005, 2008), Sarah Buss (2012) and Chandra Sripada 
(2016), among others. The basic idea in most Real/Deep Self Views is 
that for an action to be my own, it must flow in some way from my real/
deep self: only actions that originate in factors internal to me can be 
morally attributed to me. What is the correct criterion of internal source-
hood (rational judgments, higher-order desires, cares etc.) is a question 
that is subject to different and contesting conceptions. Often real/deep 
self views endorse a compatibilists approach, though what distinguishes 
them from more classical compatibilists views is that they can account 
for cases of internal compulsion (such as addiction), which are consid-
ered unfree, by making a distinction between two (or more) levels or 
motivational systems. The real or deep self is then located at the level or 
in the system that can reflect on and potentially govern the more super-
ficial self (Faraci and Shoemaker 2010, 321). What this often boils down 
to is a distinction between a “superficial or unreal within,” which is in a 
certain sense external, and a more “genuine or real within.”
Susan Wolf introduces the Real Self View by first discussing and con-
trasting it to the so-called Autonomy View. The Autonomy View requires 
that to be responsible, the agent must not only control her behavior via 
her will, but must have “ultimate control”: “her will must be determined 
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by her self, and her self must not, in turn, be determined by anything 
external to itself” (Wolf 1990, 10). This requirement of “ultimate con-
trol” implies that a self can govern her will if and only if it is completely 
unaffected by external forces: not only the environment and our biology, 
but also random occurrences or brute inexplicable facts must not affect 
our will. The Autonomy View requires a prime mover unmoved, whose 
self can endlessly account for itself and its behavior, which “seems in-
coherent or, at any rate, logically impossible” (Wolf 1990, 14). Hurley 
(2003, 39) points out that the Autonomy View is ultimately committed 
to the regression requirement.
By contrast, the Real Self View does not require ultimate control and 
accountability, which seems to be an advantage: 
It is required that an agent have a real self, and that she be able to 
govern her behavior in accordance with it. But it does not matter 
where her real self comes from, whether it comes from somewhere 
else or from nowhere at all (Wolf 1990, 35)
On the first sight, this might seem an attractive position, but it is on 
reflection unacceptable for Wolf, since a fully developed agent could act 
irresponsible even when she acts in a way that is clearly attributable to 
her real self (1990, 37). People with certain mental disorders or a de-
prived childhood illustrate this possibility. Wolf’s famous case of JoJo, 
the favorite son of an evil and sadistic dictator, questions “whether any-
one with a childhood such as his could have developed into anything 
but the twisted and perverse sort of person that he has become” (Wolf 
2003, 379–380). People can be wholly responsible for their actions, even 
though they are not responsible for the real selves from which their ac-
tions result, which Wolf finds incoherent (1990, 38–39). Real/Deep Self 
Views cannot account for situations where the conditions for moral re-
sponsibility are met, but a person still cannot be considered free and 
be taken responsible for her actions. Advocates of the Real Self View 
ultimately confuse, says Wolf (Wolf 1990, 40–43), causal responsibility 
with deep moral responsibility. In sum, for the Real Self View, an indi-
vidual is responsible if and only if she is able to form her actions on the 
basis of her particular values, which is for her an insufficient condition 
for responsibility.
Wolf’s own view, which she calls the “Reason View,” is, according 
to her, not subject to the flaws of the Autonomy View and the Real 
Self View. From this view, responsibility requires something more: “an 
individual is responsible if and only if she is able to form her actions on 
the basis of her values and she is able to form her values on the basis of 
what is True and Good” (Wolf 1990, 75). The difference between the 
Real Self View and the Reason View amounts to, as Hurley (2003, 42) 
has indicated, “the difference between subjective and objective reasons.”
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From this perspective, it also becomes clearer why Wolf rejects the Au-
tonomy View. Besides the commitment to ultimate, regressive control, 
the Autonomy View also is committed to the ability-to-do-otherwise re-
quirement (Wolf 1990, 68). Autonomy requires radical freedom, which 
implies that the autonomous agent who does the right thing could have 
done otherwise, even holding constant all the possible reasons for acting. 
For Wolf, this autonomous ability to act irrational is unacceptable. She 
opts for the Reason View because she believes that praise does not re-
quire an alternate possible sequence: the ability to do the right thing for 
the right reasons “is compatible with the inability to do anything else” 
(1990, 69). Like the Autonomy View, the Reason View also requires that 
the responsible agent has the ability to do otherwise, except in those 
cases in which the agent does the right thing for the right reasons.
3.2  Freedom and Determination in the Context of 
Social Psychology and Neuroscience
Opponents of the existence of autonomy and freedom often find  Kantian 
ethics too formal, that is, they believe that Kantian ethics unjustly 
 evaluates and insufficiently appreciates the concrete, empirical environ-
ment that to a great extent determines our decisions and actions as well 
as our biological nature that strongly influences our behavior. I limit 
myself to two currently influential approaches that challenge the idea 
of an autonomous self: situationists and brain-determinists. I will also 
briefly discuss some arguments in favor of the existence of free will in 
the context of neuroscience. Later, in this part of the book, I will hook 
into free will debates in the context of neuroscience and highlight and 
discuss the increasing role of brain imaging technologies in attempts to 
prove or disprove free will.
Situationists
Situationists believe that autonomy and free will are an illusion because 
our actions are determined by features of the environment of which we 
are not aware, or of whose influence we are not aware (see Darley and 
Latane 1968; Baron 1997; Williams and Bargh 2008). For a situationist, 
external factors rather than internal character and motivations define 
behavior and personality.
Stanley Milgram’s Yale University Study (1960), the Philip  Zimbardo’s 
Stanford Prison Experiment (1971) and the bystanders experiments 
 (Latane and Rodin 1969) are often cited as supporting evidence for 
situationism. In the Milgram experiment (see Milgram 1974), an 
 experimental assistant asked each subject to administer “electric shocks” 
to another subject-accomplice each time the subject-accomplice made a 
mistake on a word-learning exercise. After each mistake, the subject was 
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asked to administer a shock of higher voltage, which resulted in  audibly 
“apparent” increasing distress from the subject-accomplice. Over 60% 
of the subjects were willing to administer the highest voltage to the other 
 subjects-accomplice. Many replications of Milgram’s experiment showed 
similar outcomes to the original study (see Doliński et al. 2017). The 
Zimbardo experiment (1971) was carried out in a mock prison setting. 
Undergraduate volunteers were randomly assigned to be either guards or 
prisoners for a two-week experiment. After less than a week, the exper-
iment was stopped as the subjects were transformed by the situational 
conditions, resulting in behavior that included sadism, brutality, lying 
and extreme stress. In the case of bystander studies, Latane and Ro din 
(1969) and Latane and Darley (1968, 1970) attempted to show that the 
presence or absence of others has the most significant contribution to 
the subjects’ willingness to help or not to help a s ubject-accomplice. 
Situationists use these experiments to illustrate that it is not internal 
intentions and motivations, but situational factors that are the most in-
fluential determining qualities for behavior, morality and personality.
Citing these and other experiments, Harman (1999, 2002, 2003) 
 argues that there is no such thing as “character”: given the right circum-
stances, all people are capable of behaving viciously. In his 2002 work 
Lack of Character, philosopher John Doris stated that robust charac-
ter traits are very rare: it is not character traits but situational factors 
that determine our behavior. Doris (2015), in his latest book, presented 
a large amount of evidence showing humans often act in unreflective 
and downright self-ignorant ways. When “the causes of her cognition 
or behavior would not be recognized by the actor as reasons for that 
cognition or behavior, were she aware of these causes at the time of 
performance,” Doris argues, “these causes are defeaters” (2015, 64f). 
Agency is defeated because reason is “overwhelmed” or “bypassed” (52). 
Along similar lines, Stocker (1979), Brink (1997), Svavarsdóttir (1999) 
and Zangwill (2003), sometimes labeling themselves as “motivational 
externalists,” argue that also our moral judgments have no motivational 
efficacy in themselves, and that when they motivate us, the source of 
motivation lies outside the moral judgment.
Brain-Determinists
In recent years, leading neuroscientists have, partly inspired by older 
studies, argued that the actions that we ascribe to our (real) selves are 
in reality caused by unconscious, automatic operating processes in the 
brain. Since we relate who we are to our mind or certain contents of our 
mind, and our mind cannot control our brain, what we do is not up to 
us. Therefore, autonomy and free will is, for the most radical op ponents 
of free will, impossible. It must be clear that critics of free will come in 
different shades and that attempts to disprove free will come in very 
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different forms and degrees (Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Libet et al. 
1983; Wegner and Wheatley 1999; Hassin et al. 2005; Soon et al. 2008; 
Lamme 2010; Swaab 2010; Fried et al. 2011; Harris 2012).
Benjamin Libet (see Libet et al. 1983) has become famous for his finger 
wagging experiment. This experiment shows that the moment at which 
respondents indicate awareness of their decision to move their finger is 
slightly less than half a second after the so-called “readiness potential” 
is observed in an EEG. On the basis of this observation, the (contentious) 
conclusion is drawn that before respondents are aware of their intention, 
the brain has already made the decision to move the finger, which seems 
to undermine the concept of free will.
Following Libet’s observations, more attempts have been made to 
conduct increasingly sophisticated experiments and confirm that not 
our conscious selves but our brains determine our actions. John-Dylan 
Haynes’ (in Soon et al. 2008) MRI set-up provided improved spatial 
resolution and could be used to survey the whole brain, whereas Libet’s 
EEG technique had only recorded a limited area of brain activity. In this 
study, participants could freely decide if they wanted to press a button 
with their left or right hand, but were also asked to remember exactly 
when they felt they had made up their mind, which was registered by a 
computer. Haynes and his team claimed to be able to predict with 60% 
accuracy which button subjects would choose six seconds before they 
were consciously aware of their decision.
Fried and his team (2011) studied individuals with electrodes i mplanted 
in their brains as part of a surgical procedure to treat epilepsy. This en-
abled them to record the activity in single neurons using  microelectrode 
systems, which provided a more precise picture of brain activity than 
both EEG and fMRI. In their study, they showed that there was activity 
in a small group of neurons in particular brain areas before the subject 
made a conscious decision to press a button. With about 700 millisec-
onds to go, the researchers assert that they could predict which decision 
would follow with 80% accuracy.
Daniel Wegner’s research combines situationism and brain- determinism. 
It can be best framed by describing an experiment that was conducted in 
the 1970s. In a study by Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson (1977), 
people in a department store were asked why they had chosen a particu-
lar type of stockings. The respondents provided various seemingly well-
thought through reasons for their preference: a smoother fabric, nicer 
color and so forth. But what does the experiment show? The stockings 
were exactly the same. The actual reason why respondents chose a certain 
type of stockings seems to be dependent on their place: due to a partic-
ular brain mechanism, stockings that are lying to the right on the shelf 
were chosen more often than stockings that are lying to the left. Inventing 
reasons for our actions after an event has taken place is called “confabu-
lation,” and is confirmed by many experiments.
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Wegner (Wegner and Wheatley, 1999) regenerates this kind of exper-
iments, but also investigates the conditions under which people experi-
ence the feeling of free will. If our intention precedes a particular action 
(the “priority principle”), if there seems to be a substantive relation be-
tween our intention and the action (the “consistency principle”) and if 
our conscious intention is the only apparent cause of the putative effect 
(the “exclusivity principle”), we (often wrongly) tend to think that the 
act is caused by our conscious intention. Wegner’s experiments try to 
show that the sense of free will is a mental construct and not a direct 
representation of the real causes of a particular act.
Wegner’s results are part of a larger set of experiments that has 
 become known as the “New Unconscious” (Hassin et al. 2005). This 
approach attempts to show that the vast majority of the actions that we 
ascribe to our conscious intentions, including those conscious intentions 
themselves, are in reality caused by unconscious, automatically operat-
ing processes in the brains or elsewhere in the body.
Brain-Non-Determinists
Situationists and brain-determinists believe that autonomy is an 
 illusion because our actions and personality are not determined by our 
 consciousness or mind, but by features of respectively the environment 
and our brain, which we cannot control. Various positions have been 
developed to show that autonomy and free will are not or are not en-
tirely an illusion. These positions attempt to illustrate that conscious 
intentions and decisions not only can have causal efficacy, but that they 
also in one way or another can intervene in and control both brain incli-
nations and environmental influences, and are therefore not necessarily 
subject to unconscious and/or external forces (Mele 2006; Libet 2011; 
Baumeister et al. 2011; Slors 2012, 2015). I will again limit myself to a 
couple of examples (see Klemm 2010 for a more extensive overview) that 
illustrate how brain imaging technologies are used to prove the existence 
of free will.
Some advocates of free will refer to another experiment of Libet 
(2011), in which respondents are given a second assignment: when they 
are aware of their intention to move their finger, they should try to go 
against that inclination. On the EEG, one can see again that the readiness 
potential precedes the conscious intention by about half a second. How-
ever, just before the expected action, we see that the readiness  potential 
discontinues. Libet and some contemporary advocates of free will argue 
that it might be true that we mistakenly believe that our  actions are 
caused by conscious intentions, but that does not exclude the ability to 
intervene in an impulse, and consciously veto and stop the action that 
our brain has unconsciously prepared. We do not have a “free will,” but 
a “free won’t.”
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Trevena and Miller (2010) challenge the assumption that evolving 
brain activity prior to conscious awareness of an intention to act is un-
ambiguously associated with preparation for movement. According to 
these authors, there is no evidence that electrophysiological signs before 
“a decision to move” are stronger then electrophysiological signs before 
“a decision not to move,” which would indicate that these signs are not 
specific to preparation of movement.
Koechlin and Hyafil (2007) have pointed out that the brain regions 
most frequently studied in the context of free will debates, namely the 
(pre-)supplementary motor area and the anterior cingulate motor areas 
of the brain, may be only involved in the later stages of motor plan-
ning. However, this does not exclude the possibility that other parts 
of the brain, which are not yet taken into account, are responsible for 
 decision-making and exerting will.
According to Mele (2006), the readiness potential depicted by brain 
imaging technologies does not necessarily exclude the influence of 
 conscious decisions on behavior. Forming certain habits could initially 
be the result of a conscious choice. Once habits are initiated, they may 
be executed with little or no conscious involvement. This explains why 
an intention to act in a certain way can arise without being actively 
formed from a decision process, but does not exclude the possible influ-
ences of consciousness on our decisions and actions. This also does not 
exclude the possibility that, as Libet suggested, a habit may be vetoed 
consciously.
3.3  The Inside-Outside Distinction as a Blind Spot in 
Free Will Debates
With respect to Kant, the inside-outside distinction could be hardly 
called a “blind spot,” since it is at the heart of his ethics. Kant strongly 
adopts, in his own ingenious way, Descartes’ distinction between a 
thinking substance (res cogitans) and a material substance (res extensa), 
highlighting the decisive role of an impartial, autonomous and rational 
self in moral deliberation. Descartes argued, as we have seen, that in 
methodical self-contemplation, the self can clearly and distinctly fathom 
that besides being a body, it is first of all a mind that can exist completely 
independent of the material world, including its body. Since I have this 
privileged access to my mind, but not to my body and the world, I can 
primarily identify myself with my conscious, rational thought. For both 
Descartes and Kant, the distinction between mind and world/body is 
primarily the outcome of an epistemological investigation. However, 
Kant further develops it within a moral context: his radical distinction 
between a rational, inner world and an empirical, external world is a 
necessary condition for securing the possibility of moral autonomy and 
responsibility.
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The idea that the possibility of autonomy and responsibility requires 
a kind of independent inner self continues to appeal to a range of phi-
losophers and philosophical approaches. Pauen engages with and tries 
to debunk different compatibilist and incompatibilist approaches, and 
attempts to show that determination and free will do not contradict 
one another; freedom is, as we have seen, translated in terms of self- 
determination (2004, 2007). The absence of pure chance entails, says 
Pauen, “authorship,” whereas absence of compulsion involves “auton-
omy.” Taken together, these conditions are, he thinks, not only necessary 
but also sufficient (2007, 458). For Pauen, an action is free if (and only if) 
it springs from the inner desires, wants and beliefs of an agent: if action 
A is determined by X’s personal preferences, then A is self- determined 
and hence freely willed (2004, 163). The task of neuroscience is, he 
 believes, to establish if that is really the case: “neuroscientists would 
have to ascertain whether individual actions really are determined by 
central personality traits or whether they are reliant on external factors” 
(Pauen 2004, 47).
Although Pauen’s view reverberates Kant’s idea of an inner self that 
determines human actions and decisions and hence shows traces of the 
inside-outside distinction, it must be clear that he does not want to adopt 
a thick Kantian dualism of a noumenal world where an inner self resides 
and a phenomenal world of sense experience. However, the question 
is whether his notion of “self-determination,” which, as I will discuss 
later on, I do not reject as such, can be preserved and used to develop 
a non-essentialist and non-dualist view of the self with sufficient ex-
planatory power. With his great emphasis on autonomy, authorship and 
personal preferences, Pauen takes a very individualistic view of the self, 
which seems to make it difficult to go beyond thinking in terms of the 
opposition between the individual and the external world. However, I 
fully agree with Pauen’s assertion that it “is completely unclear what it 
means to act in a self-determined way, as long as it remains to be spelled 
out what the self is” (2007, 5). This study attempts to contribute to that 
endeavor, stressing that fundamentally reflecting on and challenging the 
inside-outside distinction is pivotal for developing a non-essentialist and 
non-dualist self.
The Autonomy View, The Real/Deep Self View and the Reason View 
also engage in different ways with the Kantian notion of autonomy as 
self-legislation. They have in common with Kant’s view that a decision or 
action is mine if and only if it can be ascribed to my will. For Kant, this 
condition was secured by his strong epistemological distinction between 
an inside noumenal world and an outside phenomenal world: by identi-
fying itself with its unaffected, pure and rational inside world, the self 
could have ultimate control over its will and overcome the gap between 
subjective and objective reasons, which was for Kant the most important 
ethical imperative. Irrespective of external and biological influences and 
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contingencies throughout its past and present, the self could this way be 
completely taken accountable for its decisions and actions.
The Autonomy View, The Real/Deep Self View and the Reason View 
recognize that both our surroundings and/or our biology influence the 
way we determine ourselves and consequently constrain our autonomy 
and freedom. However, they respond to those influences in different 
ways, articulating which aspects or principles with regard to autonomy 
and responsibility they find nonnegotiable. Their responses also reveal 
what is at stake in the debate about autonomy and responsibility.
For the Autonomy View, it is pivotal that decisions or actions  attributed 
to me are all the way mine, which requires, besides the “absence of com-
pulsion” and the “absence circumstantial chance” (see Pauen above), 
also the ability to even go against what is considered reasonable. The 
Reason View overlaps with the Autonomy View, except that it rejects 
the commitment to the ability to go against reason because that would 
ultimately amount to a kind of willed irrational behavior. The Real Self 
View overlaps with the Autonomy View, except that it does not require 
that the self is endlessly unaffected by external forces. Moreover, it ac-
cords with the Reason View, except that it does require decisions and 
actions being based on subjective reasons that also necessarily coincide 
with objective reasons.
The important question here is to what extent these views can  uphold 
these aspects or principles and render them nonnegotiable in our pres-
ent world without bringing in the categorical inside-outside distinc-
tion through the backdoor. The commitment of the Autonomy View to 
 ultimate control and tamper-proof mine-ness of decisions and actions 
attributed to me seems to only be able to avert regression and incoher-
ency if it embraces a prime mover that is completely independent of the 
outside world. This way, the Autonomy View disregards the fact that our 
agency and autonomy cannot be placed outside particular environments 
but are shaped within them.
The commitment of the Real Self View to the existence of a real self 
that is the basis for and the governing agency of its decisions and ac-
tions, irrespective of where this real self comes from, seems to allow 
for a self that has at least partly formed itself through interaction with 
its social and material environment. However, there still seems to be a 
strong distinction between a self that has been formed in the past and 
the current external environment that it can detach itself from. This 
way, a horizontal or historical inside-outside distinction is introduced, 
disregarding that what we consider our real self cannot be isolated from 
current influences of its environment. In addition, it remains unclear 
how a particular self can improve its real self and develop itself into a 
more (socially) admirable self.
Finally, the commitment of the Reason View to an objective Good 
and True disregards the fact that the qualification of a decision as True, 
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an action as Good and conduct as reasonable is always done within 
a  particular, historical context, and a self is formed and continuously 
influenced by divergent social and material factors. Though, it must be 
noted that recognizing this does not entail that the framework I will 
propose includes no guidelines that enable making a distinction between 
a more and less well-formed self. Hence, all three positions contain, on 
the one hand, remnants of the Cartesian-Kantian inside-outside dual-
ism, and, on the other hand, highlight different elements with regard 
to autonomy, reason and responsibility that they find negotiable or not 
negotiable.
As indicated earlier, this criticism does not entail that I completely 
reject the idea of freedom as self-determination. I will rather argue 
that subscribing to the intuition that understanding autonomy as self- 
determination, as well as to the idea that the orientation toward certain 
values and ideals make up our “real self,” is fruitful. However, develop-
ing this alternative requires overcoming the inside-outside distinction 
more thoroughly and persistently; shaking off this distinction will shed 
a different light on both the notions of “(real) self” and “determination” 
in “self-determination” as well as on the role that technology plays in 
self-formation.
Situationists reject the possibility of autonomy that is either defended 
or assumed in Kantian views, including the view of a real self that can 
determine its conduct. They believe that external factors determine our 
behavior and personality, including what we consider our “real” and 
“deepest” self. However, endorsing this determinist view does not over-
come the inside-outside distinction but only preserves it. Rather than 
defending the idea that an independent, real inside is able to control the 
outside, the determinist proposes that the outside controls the inside or 
renders it into an epiphenomenon. Reverting the importance or power 
dynamic of inside and outside does not overcome the essential relation-
ship of the self to the world. The idea of the self as a passive “agent” 
that is dependent on contingent circumstances is very much dependent 
on the inside-outside distinction. In addition, situationism does not or 
does not want to provide a balanced account of, on the one hand, rec-
ognizing that we are greatly shaped by our environment, and, on the 
other hand, showing how this does not render self-formation impossible, 
which seems to go against our basic intuition that, at least potentially, 
we possess some kind of control with regard to our conduct.
This objection is to a certain extent also applicable to brain- 
determinism. Brain-determinists who consider the brain, instead of con-
sciousness/mind, as the part within the human organism that is really 
in charge – as the “real self” that instigates cognitive processes, moves 
the body and manipulates the external world – do not overcome the 
inside-outside distinction either. Instead of the mind, it is now the brain 
that is envisioned as a kind of causa sui that exerts control over our 
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behavior. Although Descartes would never have situated cognition in or 
reduced it to brain processes, since brain and body are part of the res ex-
tensa, the division between “internal” and “external” that breaks along 
the line of an independent agent that is in control (brain or mind) is, as 
Rouse (1996) has pointed out, a Cartesian legacy.
This Cartesian-Kantian view not only represents a dualist framework, 
but also evokes particular notions of “control” and “freedom,” which 
inform (and, as I will show, also misinform) the debates about auton-
omy, freedom and responsibility. Although advocates and opponents of 
autonomy and free will do not agree on the question of whether and to 
what extent consciousness/mind, the brain or the environment can be 
attributed causal efficacy and control, they often share the views that a 
distinction should be made between opposing realms and that freedom 
can only be attributed to an agent that is not fundamentally affected 
or determined by something else, which is a precondition to be able to 
cause and control actions, make decisions and utilize the outside world.
In the next chapter, I will, building on the intuitions and concerns 
highlighted in the discussed positions regarding autonomy and free will, 
attempt to go beyond the inside-outside distinction more radically. I will 
do that by challenging the elementary idea that mind is an inner realm 
detached from our increasingly technological, external environment, 
which will have bearing on the related assumption that the self primar-
ily identifies itself with this inner, mental realm. From the proposed in-
teractionist perspective, the mind, which was for Descartes, Kant and 
other essentialists and dualists the mark of the internal, will prove to be 
“external,” whereas the material, which was for them the mark of the 
external, will turn out to be intelligible. Because in our current s ociety 
the material environment has become increasingly technological, I will 
elaborate in what sense the mind has become technological and the 
technological has become intelligible. In a constructive criticism of the 
“Extended Mind Thesis,” I will develop what I will call an “Artifactual 
Mind Thesis” that not only argues that the technological environment 
is increasingly becoming part of the mind and body of the self, but also 
that a further radicalization of this view debunks the very idea of an 
inner self that controls and manipulates an external environment. 
The (real) self as an “inner agent” that can detach itself from the  outside 
world and govern its corporeal behavior is one of the most dominant 
and, at the same time, one of the most challenged ideas in Western 
 philosophy. The idea of independent “within” has been criticized on var-
ious fronts, especially by so-called externalists. From their viewpoint, 
our mental contents, including moral judgments, desires and cares, are 
influenced by external factors. However, “externalism” is not a unified 
philosophical “school” but rather represents diverse views that challenge 
in different ways “internalist approaches.” For example, situationism 
could be seen as an externalist theory, but externalists are not necessar-
ily situationists.
Already in the 1940s, Ryle (1949) argued that both self-knowledge 
and knowledge of other people are achieved by drawing inductive con-
clusions on the basis of externally observed behavior. Other authors 
have argued that all knowledge of mental states, whether they are our 
own or other people’s, is dependent on sensory information that requires 
interpretation (Carruthers 2011). As we saw earlier, “motivational exter-
nalists” attempt to show that our moral judgments have no motivational 
efficacy in themselves, and that when they motivate us, the source of 
motivation lies outside the moral judgment (Stocker 1979; Brink 1997; 
Svavarsdóttir 1999, Zangwill 2003). “Extended Mind theorists” go 
one step further than the mentioned positions and argue that external 
objects, and especially technologies, can play such a significant role in 
aiding cognitive processes that they can count as part of the machinery 
of our thought and our “self” as such (Clark 2003, 121; see also Clark 
and Chalmers 1998 and Clark 2008). This view seems to be a good 
candidate for more radically overcoming the inside-outside dualism in 
a technological era: not only does it attempt to integrate the material 
in the mental, but it also recognizes the increasing role that technology 
plays in realizing cognitive processes.
In their seminal essay “The Extended Mind” (1998), Clark and Chalm-
ers challenge the view that the demarcation of skin and skull  determines 
the boundaries of cognition. They object, in other words, to the idea that 
what is outside the body is necessarily outside the mind. The separation 
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of mind, body and environment is, according to them, not evident but 
rather an assumption that requires justification. We cannot simply point 
to the skin and skull boundary as justification for the boundaries of 
cognition or the self, Clark and Chalmers say, since the legitimacy of 
that boundary is precisely what is at issue (see also Clark 2003, 2008).
In this chapter, I want to show that, although the Extended Mind 
Thesis (henceforth: EMT) is a very interesting, fruitful and bold attempt 
to demonstrate how our cognitive system can contain external objects 
and technical artifacts, it is still parasitical on the “inside–outside” du-
alism like the more conventional internalist views and more moderate 
externalist views of cognition, even though this is the very Cartesian 
worldview that EMT wants to overcome. Although cognition can be, 
according to EMT, extended by technical artifacts, Clark and many of 
his friends, including the so-called “second-wave EM theorists,” pre-
serve, as I will show, an inner-outer dualism by ascribing to cognition 
an original starting point in an internal biological core, an inside that 
utilizes the outside world in order to fulfill certain cognitive tasks that 
it has set for itself.
Inspired by Charles S. Peirce’s view of mind and his semiotics, I will 
propose a perspective that offers a more successful way out of this think-
ing in terms of “inside” and “outside.” Peirce’s view of mind and his 
reinterpretation of it in terms of signs is a further specification of his 
category of Thirdness, which I have discussed in part one of the book. In 
that respect we also have seen that for Peirce, thinking only apprehends 
and does not create thought; thought is not an inner, subjective faculty 
but can have an objective reality. From a Peircean perspective, mind is, 
as I will show, not extended by objects and artifacts, but rather unfolds 
through and is shaped by them. In this respect, I introduce the term “ar-
tifactual mind” and what I call the Artifactual Mind Thesis (henceforth, 
AMT). Acknowledging that our thinking has an artifactual character 
means recognizing that external objects and technical artifacts, rather 
than being utilized by an inside world, have shaped and are continu-
ously shaping the very fabric of our thinking, of what we take to be our 
“inside world.” And there is more: not only are thoughts exosomatically 
embodied, but the specific physical characteristics of artifacts also can 
activate new modes of thinking.
The primary goal of this chapter is to explain how the very cogito 
that Descartes rendered independent and pure is shaped by the objects 
and artifacts that surround it. Especially in our current era, technology 
is recognized as a major force that not only is increasingly shaping our 
world, but also is shaping our mind and self. In addition, I will indicate 
how awareness of the artifactual dimension of mind enables a critical 
attitude toward reductionist claims that ascribe to thinking certain orig-
inal and irreducible features. I will show how AMT addresses normative 
questions regarding the profound influence of artifacts and technologies 
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on what we presume to be our deepest “inside,” which will pave the 
road for reflecting on how self-formation is possible and what good self- 
formation could entail.
In the following sections, I will first discuss in more detail Clark’s EMT 
and his parity principle. By debunking the notion of “introspection,” 
I will then explain why I believe Clark’s EMT as well as “second-wave” 
EM theorists still presuppose a fallacious distinction between “inside” 
and “outside.” Next, inspired by Peirce’s view of mind and his semiotics, 
I will elaborate how this “inside–outside” fallacy could be overcome by 
an artifactual account of mind. In the concluding section of this  chapter, 
I will indicate how AMT can make us more aware of the normative 
impact of technology on our mind and self and contribute to the devel-
opment of the notion of critical self-formation.
4.1 The Extended Mind Thesis and the Parity Principle
EMT should not be confused with the more modest view that external 
features of the environment can have a causal influence on cognitive pro-
cessing in the brain. Clark and Chalmers claim that the human organism 
can be “linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, creating 
a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right,” 
which implies that “[c]ognitive processes ain’t (all) in the head” (Clark 
and Chalmers 1998). Certain objects in the external environment are 
utilized by the mind in such a way that the objects can be seen as exten-
sions of the mind itself. External tools can, according to Clark, become 
transparent in use, meaning that our intentions can “flow” in such a way 
through technical tools that we feel as if they are part of us (Clark 2003, 
123). Clark not only holds that cognition is not all in the brain, but he 
also asserts that we have to revise our view of the individual as such: our 
selves do not coincide with our bodies but can be expanded to include 
nonbiological parts and circuits (Clark and Chalmers 1998).
To explain when a coupled system can be conceived as a cognitive sys-
tem, Clark and Chalmers (1998) formulate a so-called “parity principle”:
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a 
 process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation 
in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the 
world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process.
This parity principle has prompted different responses. Some critics of 
EMT (Adams and Aizawa 2001; Rupert 2004; Dartnall 2005) argue 
that the parity principle indicates a similarity relation between external 
and internal processes: if external processes are sufficiently similar to 
internal ones, then they can be considered as cognitive. It is easy to show, 
these critics claim, that external processes are not only very different, 
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but are also not susceptible to the same explanations as internal cogni-
tive processes. Law-like regularities such as “primacy effects, recency 
effects, chunking effects and others” apply, according to Adams and 
Aizawa (2001, 61), only to processes found in the brain. “Primacy ef-
fects” and “recency effects” refer to the mechanism that given a list of 
items to remember, the first items (primacy effects) and the last items 
(recency effects) are remembered better than those things in the middle. 
“Chunking” is a phenomenon whereby individuals group items when 
performing a memory task, for example, by linking them to something 
that they easily can recall. When retrieving information via extensions 
such as notebooks or PDA’s, these characteristics are not displayed, 
which indicates that external processes are very different from inter-
nal processes. External processes should, therefore, not be considered 
as cognitive and the boundaries of cognition could be drawn at the skin 
and skull of a person. EMT’s coupling principle oversteps, according to 
Adams and Aizawa, the “mark of the cognitive,” that is, the fact that 
cognitive content is intrinsic and not based on any sort of social conven-
tion (2010, 73).
Friends of EMT (Menary 2006, 2009; Hurley 2010; Sutton 2009; 
 Sutton et al. 2010) as well as Clark (2010) himself, argue that the parity 
principle does not say that an external process is cognitive if it is suffi-
ciently similar to internal processes. The point of coupling is not to show 
that external objects have the same properties or as such are cognitive, 
but rather that objects can become part of a larger cognitive system, such 
as a human agent. Pivotal for a process to be considered as cognitive is 
not its location or properties but whether it fulfills a certain cognitive 
function.
4.2  Challenging the Notion of Introspection and 
Blurring the Criteria of What it Means to 
Be “Internal”
The opponents of EMT as well as many other advocates of modern 
(neuro)biological approaches, clearly uphold a distinction between an 
inside world of cognition and an outside world of material objects, but 
often claim that this “inside world” is physically realized or constituted. 
The criticism addressed to brain-determinists also applies, as indicated 
earlier, to many opponents of EMT: it must be clear that Descartes did 
not situate cognition in or reduce it to physical processes, since the body 
is also part of the res extensa; however, the division between “inter-
nal” and “external” that breaks along the line of the knowing subject is 
a Cartesian legacy (Rouse 1996). Moreover, this Cartesian inheritance 
cannot only be recognized in the positions of opponents of EMT but 
also the advocates of EMT have, I believe, not sufficiently succeeded 
in escaping it. To demonstrate this and make preparations for my own 
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thesis, I will review how the distinction between “inside” and “outside” 
has been justified and why it is problematic. I will also explicate why in 
the shift from a Cartesian dualism to a (neuro)biological framework, 
which is endorsed by most internalists as well as externalists, a problem-
atic “inside–outside” distinction remains.
I have elaborated in Chapter 2 how the distinction between res cog-
itans and res extensa is strongly based on the assumption that we have 
a direct and privileged access to the contents of our thoughts, which we 
lack toward the external world of material things. Since introspective 
beliefs about our mind are radically different from our beliefs about 
the outside world and our mind can be clearly and distinctively grasped 
independently of anything else, our mind, Descartes claims, must be 
a completely different substance than the outside world, including our 
body. This would prove his dualism true (Descartes 1641/1985).
The debate about introspection, especially in analytic philosophy, is 
complex and the differences in opinion are great. Providing a full ac-
count of the different perspectives is in this context impossible, not 
least because this issue is intertwined with questions concerning self- 
consciousness and the qualitative aspect of our subjective experiences. 
Offering a complete outline is clearly not my intention. I will instead 
briefly discuss a couple of relevant positions that problematize the notion 
of introspection in order to show which necessary steps have to be taken 
to radically challenge the “inside–outside” dualism.
I will begin with a characterization of the term “introspection” in 
the context of contemporary discussions. “Introspection” usually refers 
to special methods or means that enable us to obtain knowledge of our 
own mental states. Different features are, as we have seen in Chapter 2, 
ascribed to this faculty of introspection (see Macdonald 2007): knowl-
edge of our own mental states seems to be authoritative, in the sense 
that if we think we are in a particular mental state that cannot be chal-
lenged. Knowledge of our own mental states seems also to be privileged, 
meaning that we know the contents of our own minds always better 
than we know the contents of the minds of other people. Another im-
portant feature that is related to introspection is immediacy. This notion 
implies that introspective beliefs, as opposed to perceptual beliefs, are 
non- inferential and nonevidence based.
The special, authoritative, privileged and immediate access to the 
contents of my own mind would, according to some authors, ensure 
infallibility, indubitability and/or transparency (see Gordon 2007). Be-
liefs regarding (some of) my own mental states would be, for example, 
immune from error because they are not inferred from any other beliefs 
or based on any other evidence (Russell 1910; Lewis 1946; Burge 1988).
Various philosophers from different perspectives have criticized both 
the features of introspection and the conclusions that are drawn from 
recognizing them. Some authors have attacked the alleged epistemic 
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specialness of our self-knowledge by showing that our introspective 
judgments can be distorted by different confusing factors. Churchland 
(1981), for example, argues against the infallibility thesis by showing 
that we frequently make mistakes in our introspective judgments be-
cause of (false) expectation, method of presentation and memory effects. 
I will briefly discuss a few other positions that, in their critique of the 
idea of authoritative, privileged and immediate self-knowledge, focus on 
how mental contents are determined by environmental factors.
Gilbert Ryle, who has strongly criticized the Cartesian idea of the mind 
as an independent entity, argues that introspective knowledge c onsists 
of applying words that we have derived from observations of behavior 
of others to our own conduct: achieving self-knowledge requires, there-
fore, external cues. Self-knowledge and knowledge of other people are 
achieved in the same way, namely by drawing inductive conclusions on 
the basis of observed behavior. Dretske (1996) extended the externalist 
idea to phenomenal content, arguing that the phenomenal content of 
experiences could depend on external factors, though the experiences 
themselves remain in the head. Ryle’s critique of introspection results in 
rejection of privileged access (Ryle 1949). According to Dennett’s theory 
of consciousness (1991, 2003), introspective expressions are the primary 
data gathered from research into consciousness and not what these ex-
pressions seem to refer to. There is no difference between consciousness 
as such and how we think about consciousness. Even first-person “re-
ports” of conscious episodes are gathered “from the outside.” From Den-
nett’s heterophenomenology, there is no inner perspective from which we 
can compare self-conscious experiences with our judgments about them. 
Along similar lines, Carruthers (2011) argues that the idea of having au-
thoritative and privileged access to our own mental states is untenable. 
Against this idea, he poses his “Interpretive Sensory Access” theory of 
self-knowledge: all knowledge of propositional attitudes, whether those 
thoughts are our own or other people’s, is dependent on sensory infor-
mation that requires interpretation. Knowledge of our own thoughts is 
not different in kind from knowledge of the thoughts of other people.
Although Wittgenstein – the last author I want to discuss a little more 
extensively in this context – should be chronologically mentioned be-
fore Ryle, he represents perhaps the most relevant position regarding 
 introspection for our thesis. Hutchinson and Read (2005) show in a 
fruitful reading of §1 of Philosophical Investigations – in the context of 
a discussion of Christopher Nolan’s movie Memento – that positing an 
inner realm does not provide the necessary conditions for understand-
ing. A conception of mind as an inner realm is precisely that which is 
being represented externally in Memento. The film dissolves our appeal 
to an inner realm by showing how such an appeal does not give us suffi-
cient insight into what is going on; nothing is gained from the move to an 
inner realm, just as we experience in Wittgenstein’s therapeutic exercise 
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in §1 (84). This view is also in line with Gordon Baker’s (1998) thera-
peutic reading of the “private language argument.” Wittgenstein doubts 
if it is possible to develop in isolation a language that refers to one’s 
own sensations (see Wittgenstein 2001, §244–§271). Baker attempts to 
show that the notion of a private language should not be read as intel-
ligible but false, but rather as nonsense masquerading as an important 
possibility. According to Conant, the point of the exercise is not even 
to get us to see that there is something determinate to imagine, which 
we are then supposed to see as a sort of thing that cannot be, but rather 
“to get us to see that there is nothing for us to mean by the locution 
“private language” that corresponds to what we, under the pressure of 
certain philosophical perplexities, want to mean by it” (Conant 2004, 
187). This also indicates that in contrast to Ryle, Wittgenstein’s princi-
pal activity was not the clarification or correction of category mistakes. 
In conceiving thought as an inner mental activity, we already go astray, 
and in our attempt to try to think it all the way through, we ultimately 
discover that thinking and understanding are something different than 
we thought, namely: “To understand, having understanding, is being 
able to fully participate in the world with others” (Hutchinson and Read 
2005, 86). Without certain rules or language games, which regulate so-
cial practices, our own thoughts would neither arise nor have meaning.
If both first-person “reports” of conscious episodes and the knowl-
edge of the thoughts of other people are dependent on external cues 
(Ryle), “the outside” (Dennett) sensory information (Carruthers) or 
rules/ language games that regulate social practices (Wittgenstein), then 
the very distinction between “internal” and “external” becomes opaque 
or the whole notion of “inner” dissolves on us (see also Kirchhoff 2012, 
292). And if what is internal to a cognitive system cannot be secured by 
referring to a special, authoritative, privileged or immediate access, then 
also the individualist assumption of cognitive agency becomes question-
able (see also Hutchins 2011).
Since the very notion of “inside” is justified by the idea of introspec-
tion, challenging this idea will also have bearing on the view of the brain 
as a separate inside world. Taking the brain, instead of as a Cartesian 
spiritual mind, as some kind of inner homunculus (or a multitude of ho-
munculi) that instigates and regulates cognitive processes is difficult to 
justify, not only because the relation between brain processes and m ental 
states is still a confusing enigma for us (this is the so-called “mind-brain 
explanatory gap”), but also because ascribing autonomous agency to 
the brain requires clear criteria that ensure the brain (together with its 
physically realized mental states) is a kind of isolated “inside” that can 
be considered the locus of our self. The lack of clear criteria to estab-
lish what it means to be “internal” to a cognitive system also greatly 
weakens the assumption that an individual’s brain is an inner initiator 
of cognition, a kind of causa sui, that is, independent from and should 
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be categorically detached from external objects and artifacts. In the next 
chapter, I will return to this theme in the context of usage of brain imag-
ing technologies and show how in that context this lack of clear criteria 
is ignored and the assumption that the brain could be depicted as an 
independent agent is sustained and strengthened.
4.3  EMT, Second-Wave EM Theorists and the  
“Inside–Outside” Distinction
EMT and the “Inside–Outside” Distinction
Internalist opponents of EMT not only assume that the mind is  physically 
realized, but also believe that in principle, brain processes can suffi-
ciently explain mental processes. Externalists claim that external obser-
vations are needed to know what we think, and thus attribute a “broad 
content” to mental states. Although in these views the mental contents 
of a subject and his/her access to these mental contents are  dependent on 
aspects of the environment, those aspects are still, many externalists be-
lieve, situated outside his/her cognitive processes. Dretske’s “phenome-
nal externalism” is a clear example of this type of externalism (1995; see 
also 1999). EMT defends an active externalism and states that technical 
artifacts can become a genuine part of a cognitive system.
If there are, as we have seen above, no clear criteria to substantiate 
what it means to be “internal” to a cognitive system, then also grant-
ing an inside status to mental processes becomes highly dubious. This 
argument seems, on first sight, only to pose problems for internalists 
and modest externalists. I will, however, try to show that EMT has not 
sufficiently overcome the inside–outside dualism, which indicates that it 
also does not recognize the bearings of challenging the notion of intro-
spection for the inside–outside dualism.
First of all, Clark’s parity principle models cognition as something 
that goes on in the head. Although the outside world can take part in 
cognitive processes, external processes, in order to qualify as cognitive, 
have to correspond to or image mental processes that would normally 
take place in the brain. This condition is strengthened by the additional 
criteria that Clark and Chalmers formulate. Processes in the external 
world can only be included as part of an individual’s cognitive process, 
if: (1) the resource is reliably available, (2) the retrieved information is 
automatically endorsed and (3) the information contained in the resource 
is easily accessible (Clark 2008, 79; see also Gallagher and Crisafi 2009, 
46). These criteria are reminiscent of the features that are traditionally 
ascribed to introspection: infallibility/indubitability, transparency, im-
mediacy. Although cognition can be extended by an external object or 
process, this external object or process can only be included as part of 
an individual’s cognitive process if it mirrors “unextended” cognition 
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(more about this notion later on), that is, if the external resource or 
retrieved information is infallible/indubitable, transparent and/or imme-
diate. This way the parity principle does not challenge, but rather asserts 
the inside–outside dualism.
Clark further prioritizes the inside brain world by taking what goes 
on in the individual’s brain as the genuine cognitive agent. The idea that 
cognition arises from an inside world of brain processes is explicitly 
stated in Clark’s 2008 book: 
in rejecting the vision of human cognitive processing as o rganism 
bound, we should not feel forced to deny that it is (in most,  perhaps 
all, real-world cases) organism centered. (…) it is the biological 
 human organism that spins, selects, or maintains the webs of cog-
nitive scaffolding that participate in the extended machinery of 
its own thought and reason (Clark 2008, 123); the organism (and 
within the organism, the brain/CNS) remains the core and currently 
the most active element. Cognition is organism centered even when 
it is not organism bound (Clark 2008, 139); Concerning the process 
of recruitment, it is indeed the biological brain (or perhaps some of 
its subsystems) that is in the driver’s seat (2008, 122).
Cognition has an original starting point in an internal biological 
core that then can employ external objects in order to realize certain 
 cognitive tasks. Clark indeed partly decentralizes the cognitive agent by 
allowing external objects and processes to become part of the cognitive 
 machinery. However, his individualist assumption of cognitive agency 
and admiration of the exceptional role of the brain in cognitive and phys-
ical activities largely prevent him from overcoming the  “biochauvinistic 
prejudice” that he has set for himself to overcome (Clark 2008, 77). 
Clark prioritizes the biological brain as the center of coordination and 
control. He isolates its activities from social dynamics and architectures, 
and identifies it as the spider that “spins, selects, or maintains the webs 
of cognitive scaffolding.” Clark even acknowledges that  “conscious 
mental states might well turn out to supervene only on local processes 
inside the head” (Clark 2008, 79), which brings him close to the inter-
nalist perspective that he criticizes.
Clark’s prioritizing of an “internal biological realm” is already 
 expressed in the very notion of “extended mind,” which implies that 
brain processes are a kind of causa sui that utilizes, structures and ma-
nipulates external artifacts in order to fulfill certain cognitive tasks that 
it has set for itself (also Kiran and Verbeek 2010 pose this critique). 
The notion “extended mind” indicates a movement from “inside” to 
 “outside.” “Extended mind” presupposes that there is also something 
like original or primary “unextended mind.” The content of brain pro-
cesses is granted an original, non-inferential, unextended status, an 
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assumption that is parasitical on the idea that we have the capacity of 
introspection, that is, cognition can be localized in an isolated inside 
sphere that we can access immediately and that is not fundamentally 
affected by external influences. This isolated inside sphere is further se-
cured by assuming that the relation between biological brain and world 
is in essence unidirectional. The brain is not substantially affected and 
altered by external material influences (see Clark 1997, 198).
However, there are various studies that indicate that with regard to 
brain and world, there can also be influence in the opposite direction: 
sociocultural practices can reshape certain cortical areas of the brain 
or transform the brain’s representational capacities (see Näätänen et al. 
1997; Dehaene et al. 1999; Wheeler 2004). These empirical results 
 confirm that the idea of an isolated, “initial,” non-derived inside realm 
is difficult to uphold.
In short, EMT commits the “inside–outside” fallacy by unjustifiably 
presuming that our brains are a kind of causa sui, which grants them 
a completely different status than outside processes. This presumption 
also prompts the view that an individual’s brain is an inner initiator 
of cognition and, therefore, can be considered as the locus of our self. 
Since we lack clear criteria for the establishment of what it means to be 
 “internal” to a cognitive system, the very distinction between “internal” 
and “external” becomes opaque. The view of the brain as an isolated, 
inner initiator of cognition is also being disputed by empirical research 
that shows that sociocultural influences can alter certain areas of the 
brain and the way it functions, which seems to prove the challenges 
to introspection right (I will further nuance this inference in the next 
section). By upholding the idea of a separate inside brain world, Clark 
does not overcome but rather rehabilitates and modernizes the Cartesian 
mindset (see also Zahavi 2008).
Second-wave EM Theorists and the “Inside–Outside” 
Distinction
Although some so-called “second-wave EM theorists” have defended a 
more nuanced interpretation of, in particular, Clark’s parity principle, 
often an elementary distinction between inside and outside is main-
tained in their theories. Many of them emphasize that the intention of 
the parity principle is not to eliminate the distinction between the char-
acteristics of internal and external processes, but to signal that internal 
and external processes can complement each other in the fulfillment of a 
certain cognitive task. Under certain conditions, both can become part 
of the same cognitive process.
Menary uses the term “cognitive integration” for his view, which, 
 according to him, expresses that “external vehicles and processes are 
integrated into a whole” (Menary 2006, 329). He problematizes the 
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notion of “intrinsic/non-derived” cognitive content (Menary 2006, 334–
336), and stresses (referring to Peirce’s Continuity Principle) that inside 
and outside cannot be discrete categories (Menary 2009). Menary also 
 recognizes that external processes such as writing transform our cogni-
tive processes (Menary 2007). However, he does not sufficiently explain 
in what sense then one can maintain the notion “inside”; how overcom-
ing the categorical distinction between “inside” and “outside” alters our 
view of mind (and matter); and under which conditions the features that 
today are attributed to this presumed “inside” have emerged.
Sutton, another important representative of the “second-wave EM 
theorists,” speaks of the “complementarity of disparate inner and outer 
resources” and focuses on how both contribute to more or less intelligent 
thinking and acting (Sutton 2008; Sutton et al. 2010, 524). Although 
he also recognizes the influence of external objects on cognition, the 
distinction that he makes still seems to presuppose that it is possible to 
account for an unmediated “within.”
In another paper, Sutton does anticipate a so-called “third wave 
EMT,” which “dissolves individuals into peculiar loci of coordination 
and coalescence among multiple structured media […]. Without assum-
ing distinct inner and outer realms of engrams and exograms, the natu-
ral and the artificial” (Sutton 2010; see also 2009). AMT’s starting point 
is the dismissal of this distinction between inner and outer realms, since 
the criteria for what it means to be “internal” are unclear, and might 
be part of this “third wave EMT.” For this reason, it may be argued 
that AMT, rather than only contesting or refuting EMT, tries to make a 
positive contribution to the EMT debate by showing why taking a step 
further is important and necessary.
Overcoming the idea that cognition cannot be localized in an isolated 
inside brain world that functions as some kind of causa sui does not only 
require recognition that “[c]ognition leaks out into body and world” 
(Clark 2008, xxviii), but it also entails acknowledgment that cognition 
leaks in from the world into the individual’s brain. Although AMT is 
sympathetic to approaches that validate this view and finds in them some 
confirmation, it does not only endorse the reciprocity between brain and 
world, but also argues for their interdependency: the “leaking out into 
the body and world” and “leaking in from the world into the individual’s 
brain” must not be conceived as a cognitive process traveling from one 
autonomous sphere (brains) to another (world) or vice versa. Without cer-
tain external rules or mechanisms, we would, as Gallagher and Crisafi 
(2009) have argued, not be able to accomplish our thoughts. Cognition 
should be understood as a self-organizational process in which brains, 
bodies and world simultaneously participate and depend on one another. 
Take away one of these parts of the cognitive process and “the system’s 
behavioral competence will drop” (Clark and Chalmers 1998, 9).
The neuroarchaeologist Malafouris illustrates this intertwine-
ment of human and world by showing, for example, on the basis of 
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the  practice of pottery, how the categorical distinction between the 
 mental and the physical disappears. Intentionality, according to him, 
is not the  internal quality of the subject. Rather, the intentions of the 
potter are co- determined by the physical properties of the clay and 
the way they react to his actions (Malafouris 2008a, b). A different 
line of thought will bring me, as I will elaborate below, to a similar 
conclusion.
In the next section, I will use Peirce as my guide and positively elab-
orate on his philosophy that overcoming the idea that thoughts emerge 
from an original inside, which then utilizes the outside world, not only 
discloses a radically different view of mind but also makes it possible to 
recognize the fundamental, constitutive influence of technical artifacts 
on mental processes.
4.4 The Artifactual Mind
Peirce on Mind as an Inherent Dimension of the World of 
Objects and Artifacts
Peirce’s characterization of actual conscious states goes with a kind 
of reversal of the Cartesian dictum: introspective impressions are, he 
states, not the most immediate and transparent form of knowledge, but 
rather the most hidden. I quote: “Few things are more completely  hidden 
from my observation than those hypothetical elements of thought which 
the psychologist finds reason to pronounce ‘immediate’” (CP 8.144). By 
depicting immediate introspective impressions as “completely  hidden,” 
Peirce challenges the seemingly self-evident belief that we have a di-
rect and privileged access to a separate “thinking world.” If there are 
no special methods to secure a separate “thinking world,” then the 
 quasi-Cartesian propensity to situate mind somewhere inside our heads, 
in Peirce’s words, the psychological tendency to consider “each of us is 
like the operator at a central telephone office, shut out from the external 
world, of which he is informed only by sense-impressions” (CP 8.144), 
becomes also implausible.
According to Peirce, thinking is not instigated by such internal impres-
sions, but rather everything starts with what he sometimes calls “per-
cepts,” which are “out in the open.” Peirce repudiates the idea that we 
have immediate access to our “inside realm” and a mediated access to 
the “outside world.” That is why he can say: “It is the external world 
that we directly observe” (CP 8.144). Thinking is not instigated by “in-
trospection” but by “extrospection.” Although in this reversal Peirce 
still uses an inside–outside distinction, his argument ultimately culmi-
nates in a kind of collapse of that distinction. By depriving introspective 
knowledge of “immediacy” and “transparency,” the criteria for what 
it means to be “internal” are blurred and, hence, the very distinction 
between “internal” and “external” becomes opaque.
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To further clarify Peirce’s perspective, I quote another passage from 
the same text: 
We first see blue and red things. It is quite a discovery when we 
find the eye has anything to do with them, and a discovery still 
more recondite when we learn that there is an ego behind the eye, to 
which these qualities properly belong. Our logically initial data are 
percepts (CP 8.144)
The (phenomeno) logical sequence is here of great importance. The per-
cepts that instigate the cognitive process precede for Peirce every possible 
distinction, including a distinction between “inside” and “outside.” That 
we attach to percepts a subject with a brain is something that logically 
(Peirce makes a distinction between a psychological and a (phenomeno)
logical perspective) takes place afterwards. We should not reverse this 
sequence and presume that meaning and thought are located in, let alone 
produced by, an inner brain world. Peirce’s repudiation of introspection 
has a phenomenological basis. All other less basic disciplines, including 
ethics, logic, metaphysics and the sciences, are dependent on the elemen-
tary findings that phenomenology offers.1
Building on his category of Thirdness, Peirce stresses that, and this 
is crucial, these percepts have a mental character. This, however, does 
not mean that they are products of individual brain processes. Indeed, 
according to Peirce: 
[t]hought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the 
work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; 
and one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, 
the shapes, etc., of objects are really there (CP 4.551; see also Watts 
2008, 190, 191, 199, 201)
Our world of objects and artifacts does not only consist of matter, but 
also of mind. This is almost hyperbolically expressed in a footnote of a 
text from 1884: “just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that 
motion is in a body, we ought to say that we are in thought, and not that 
thoughts are in us” (Peirce, CP 5.289, n.1; see also Aydin 2007a, b). If we 
are immersed in thoughts and the world is saturated with mind, the very 
distinction between an “inside world of human mind” and an “outside 
world of material objects” becomes obsolete.
A question that could be raised in response to this view: if mind is 
so fully pervasive of the universe, what is the principle of individuation 
that allows us to talk of minds and selves in the plural? It must be clear 
that Peirce’s perspective does not allow, as we saw in Chapter 2, for a 
unique, pre-given inside as the principle of individuation. In his most anti- 
individualist writings, the individual is for Peirce no more than a privation: 
The Artifactual Mind 113
“Psychological analysis shows that there is nothing which distinguishes 
my personal identity except my faults and my limitations” (CP 673). We 
discover ourselves as distinct selves if we are not able to sufficiently con-
nect to our environment. Peirce’s aim is, however, not the destruction of 
the individual, but rather the situation of the individual within a broader 
whole. A self develops a particular identity by virtue of his or her very em-
pirical interactions and continuous attempts to govern and regulate them 
by certain social habits, which enable him to adequately respond to his 
or her environment. Although I cannot further elaborate this argument 
here (see Aydin 2009 for Peirce’s view of individuality), it indicates again 
Peirce’s belief that we are not detached, atomistic egos living in a separate 
inside world but “cells of a social organism” (CP 673), who discover and 
develop themselves in an interaction with their environment.
To get a better grip on Peirce’s not easily accessible view of mind as 
an inherent dimension of the world of objects and artifacts, I will briefly 
discuss another philosopher whose ideas bear an intriguing resemblance 
to Peirce’s view of mind, namely Karl Popper. According to Peter Skages-
tad (1993, 1999), Popper’s account was directly influenced by Peirce’s 
philosophy.
Popper explained the process of human evolution as a development of 
new organs outside our bodies, organs such as tools, weapons, machines 
and houses (also recall what I have said about Erns Kapp in the intro-
duction of this book). He was especially interested in memory enhancing 
artifacts and writes in that context: 
Yet the kind of exosomatic evolution which interests me here is this: 
instead of growing better memories and brains, we grow paper, pens, 
pencils, typewriters, dictaphones, the printing press, and  libraries. 
(…) The latest development (used mainly in support of our argumen-
tative abilities) is the growth of computers (Popper 1972, 238–239)
Popper held knowledge to reside not in mental states but rather exoso-
matically in books, articles and the like. He emphasizes that it is a fun-
damental mistake to understand books and articles as only the outwards 
expressions of knowledge that is “really” residing inside the human mind.
Exosomatic knowledge is for Popper inherently dispositional: material 
objects have the potentiality to bring about certain states of mind. He 
writes: 
It is its possibility or potentiality of being understood, its dispositional 
character of being understood or interpreted, or misunderstood or 
Popper on Exosomatically Held Knowledge in Objects 
and Artifacts
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misinterpreted, which makes a thing a book. And this potentiality 
or disposition may exist without ever being actualized or realized 
(Popper 1972, 116)
Although a book is only a book if it is readable, it would potentially still 
be a book even if it were never to be read.
Objects and artifacts can be, in Popper’s view, potential carriers of 
knowledge and meaning (Popper 1972, 107–108). If this is recognized, 
then it becomes easier to except that objects can shed more light on the 
human mind than the psychological features of mental states. In Pop-
per’s words: “Contrary to first impressions, we can learn more about 
production behavior by studying the products themselves than we can 
learn about the products by studying production behavior” (Popper 
1972, 114). The products of the human mind teach us more about its 
evolution than its psychological features.
Popper stresses, like the proponents of EMT, the importance of the 
mind-expanding function of artifacts. In that context, he writes: 
we use, and build, computers because they can do many things 
which we cannot do; just as I use a pen and pencil when I wish to tot 
up a sum I cannot do in my head. ‘My pencil is more intelligent than 
I,’ Einstein used to say (Popper 1972, 225, n. 39)
Different from EMT, Popper emphasizes that the collective knowledge 
that dwells in objects and artifacts is relatively independent of particular 
individuals. The knowledge that resides in books, libraries and museums 
is not an extension of what goes on in an individual’s brain but rather a 
cultural creation that has become independent of its particular creators. 
This way, Popper is able to situate knowledge in objects and artifacts.
Unfortunately, Popper’s view does not sufficiently overcome the dis-
tinction between an “inside world of human mind” and an “outside 
world of material objects,” as is evident in his Three Worlds Theory. The 
objective, abstract world of knowledge and ideas (third world), which is 
situated in and carried by material objects (first world), is only relatively 
autonomous, meaning that it is independent from separate particular 
human minds. Although the development of scientific theories can lead 
to unintended consequences, it remains the world of the products of a 
collective of human minds (second world). In addition, the human mind 
is a prerequisite for actually interpreting and grasping the third world of 
objective knowledge.
Although the knowledge that resides in material objects can become 
independent of its creators, Popper’s material objects seem to function 
merely as passive knowledge storage. However, if mind would be an 
integral dimension of objects and artifacts in Peirce’s sense they would 
be able to function as genuine epistemological agents. What is not 
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sufficiently accounted for by Popper is the dependence of thought on 
its carriers and their very physical characteristics. Popper’s viewpoint is 
for this reason, as Paul Levinson claims, still “too primarily ideational” 
(Levinson 1988, 79): it is the human mind that generates and is the ulti-
mate source of knowledge, which then can be stored in material objects.
To explain how the knowledge that resides in material objects is not 
the sheer product of a separate world of human minds and how its 
 material carriers can play an active role in the generation of cognitive 
processes, I will in the next subsection, after having explained the re-
lation between percepts and signs, briefly elaborate what signs are and 
how they work. It should be clear that my purpose here is not to provide 
a general description of Peirce’s semiotics – which would be a very com-
plex, maybe impossible enterprise, since Peirce continuously revised his 
thoughts on signs (see Robert Marty’s “76 Definitions of The Sign by C. 
S. Peirce” 1997). In the last subsection, I will finalize my account of the 
artifactual mind.
The “Factual” Mind: Peirce on Percepts and Signs
Earlier we have seen that for Peirce, building on his category of Third-
ness, the cognitive process is initiated by percepts, which are “out in the 
open.” Percepts are “the data of all knowledge” (CP 8.300). As “the first 
premisses of all our reasonings” they prompt a certain reaction, which 
is, according to Peirce, “utterly beyond control” and even “cannot be 
called in question” (CP 5.115f). We see here again a kind of reversal: 
the cognitive process is not generated by what traditionally is called the 
“subject,” but rather what traditionally is called the “object.” If the very 
concept of introspection is unsustainable, Peirce believes, we have to un-
derstand thought as something “factual.” In Peirce’s words: “It appears 
(…) that there is no reason for supposing a power of introspection; and, 
consequently, the only way of investigating a psychological question is 
by inference from external facts” (CP 5.249).
Although percepts are “factual,” our access to them is always lim-
ited and designates a certain provisional stage in our comprehension. 
We only have certain representations of these “facts,” which Peirce calls 
“signs.” Without signs, cognitive processes could not be brought about. 
I quote a longer passage:
If we seek the light of external facts, the only cases of thought which 
we can find are of thought in signs. Plainly, no other thought can be 
evidenced by external facts. But we have seen that only by external 
facts can thought be known at all. The only thought, then, which 
can possibly be cognized is thought in signs. But thought which can-
not be cognized does not exist. All thought, therefore, must neces-
sarily be in signs (CP 5.251)
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Only through signs do we have access to the world. That which cannot 
be represented by signs, does not (yet) exist for us. Although Peirce still 
uses, as mentioned earlier, the distinction between internal and external, 
his concept of “sign” is an attempt to overcome the mind-matter dualism 
and, hence, the Cartesian inner-outer distinction. He sometimes uses in 
this context the notion “objective idealism” for his view (see CP 6.24; 
6.25; 6.163).
It must be clear that percepts and signs are analogue (see also Haus-
man 2007). If we want to understand how percepts generate cognition, 
we have to interpret them in terms of signs. That is why Peirce can say: 
“Percepts are signs for psychology” (CP 8.300). Although Peirce under-
stands cognition, in a similar fashion to Popper, as something potentially 
residing in the “factual” world, he does not conceive it as something that 
is produced by a separate world of human minds and can be stored in 
objects and artifacts. Cognition as “semiosis” is for Peirce a process that 
is brought about in and by virtue of our engagements with the objective 
world around us. To better understand this “bringing about,” we have 
to briefly reflect on what signs are and how they work.
In 1897, Peirce defined a sign as: “something which stands to some-
body for something in some respect or capacity” (CP 2.228). This sign 
has a triadic character: (1) “It addresses somebody, that is, creates in 
the mind of that person an equivalent sign or perhaps a more developed 
sign.” Peirce calls this “the interpretant of the first sign.” (2) “The sign 
stands for something, its object.” (3) “It stands for that object, not in all 
respects, but in reference to a sort of idea” or “quality,” which Peirce 
sometimes calls “the ground” of the sign (CP 2.228; see also 5.283).
To illustrate this triadic character of a sign, I give a simple example: 
one day I discover that one of my suits has holes and infer that there 
are moths in my wardrobe. The holes are a sign that represents the 
moths (the object) and instill a certain idea (an interpretant) in me, for 
example “damn moths.” The set of particular qualities present in the 
sign (the ground of the sign) determine which interpretant is produced. 
They schematize the object so that it can be interpreted by some sign 
agency in a certain way. Signification is, in other words, dependent on 
in this case the very physical elements of the holes: the scattered shape 
and the small size of the holes are primary to the sign’s ability to me-
diate between object and interpretant. The interpretant is, in turn, a 
sign, capable of further sign production in myself (“my 500 euro suit 
is ruined”), or should I want to utter it, in other selves. If I utter it, it 
could, for example, produce in the mind of my wife the interpretant 
“these are not moth holes, you silly fool, but cigarette burns; not moths 
but you have ruined your suit.” This example also shows that each sign 
is what it is by virtue of its possible future “interpretants,” which im-
plies that “the meaning of a thought is altogether something virtual” 
(Peirce, CP 5.289).
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There are two aspects in the sketched semiotic process that are relevant 
for our discussion. The first aspect is that the sign process is not generated 
by an inner realm of a subject but is determined and constrained by an 
object. The term “interpretant” should not be confused with “(human) in-
terpretation.” That a sign has to be suitable for interpretation means that 
the sign itself must have such a shape and structure that it can produce 
a specific interpretant in a certain (in this case a human) context. It does 
not mean that the interpretant is dependent on human consciousness, let 
alone that it is produced by it. Indeed, to prevent this possible misinterpre-
tation, Peirce sometimes uses the term “quasi-mind” to describe the locus 
of the interpretant, and omits any reference to human being and human 
consciousness in his definition of a sign. I quote: 
a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant, the latter being that which 
the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by de-
termining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which 
determination is the Interpretant (CP 4536)
The sign production is instigated by an object, which functions as a kind 
of causa finalis that prompts investigation. This investigation consists 
of properly recognizing and collecting the signs that the object produces 
and disclosing a certain structure or regularity, which enables ever bet-
ter understanding of the object.
The claim that, even without some person interpreting a sign, thoughts 
could be produced is part of Peirce’s non-anthropogenic view of think-
ing and might be too extreme and difficult to prove. It does, however, 
maximally stress the tenable view that the world around us plays an ac-
tive role in instigating thought. We find meaning in the world rather than 
creating it. Thought and meaning are not brought about by a presumed 
private inside but are generated in our engagements with the objects 
around us. Even knowledge of ourselves is not acquired by a presumed 
“introspection” but requires collecting signs and figuring out what they 
represent. The following passage from Wittgenstein, which could have 
been written by Peirce, expresses this very nicely: 
But if you say: ‘How am I to know what he means, when I see noth-
ing but the signs he gives?’ then I say: ‘How is he to know what he 
means, when he has nothing but the signs either?’ (2001, §504)
For both Peirce and Wittgenstein, thinking is the activity of operating 
with signs (Wittgenstein 1958, The Blue Book; see also Baker 1998).
The second aspect that is important for our discussion is that thoughts 
are not only exosomatically embodied, but that the specific physical char-
acteristics of this embodiment also determine to a great extent which 
(type of) thoughts are induced. How a sign is brought into connection 
118 Is Self-Formation Possible?
with its object and which interpretant is being produced as a result of 
that is greatly dependent on its specific physical embeddedness. This 
brings me to the last part of this section.
AMT
The idea that mind is an inherent dimension of the world as such makes 
its specific material embodiment not less but more relevant. In a famous, 
and still very relevant, passage from 1905, Peirce tries to show how 
thoughts are determined by the worldly objects around us:
A psychologist cuts out a lobe of my brain (nihil animale a me alie-
num puto) and then, when I find I cannot express myself, he says, 
‘You see, your faculty of language was localized in that lobe.’ No 
doubt it was; and so, if he had filched my inkstand, I should not have 
been able to continue my discussion until I had got another. Yea, the 
very thoughts would not come to me. So my faculty of discussion is 
equally localized in my inkstand (Peirce, CP 7.366; my italics)
The point that Peirce wants to make here is of course not that ink is the 
only possible means to utter his thoughts. More importantly, Peirce does 
not want to show – contra EMT – that he utilizes ink to reach certain 
goals in a more functional way. Thought is not something that emerges 
from an inside and, by functionally utilizing external objects, extended 
to an outside. Thinking is an activity in which the brain participates 
along with the eyes and the hands and a multitude of devices, including 
in this case ink.
The proposition “the very thoughts would not come to me” in the 
quoted passage indicates that, and this is crucial, ink plays not a passive 
but an active role in inducing certain thoughts. In and through the act 
of writing with ink and by virtue of the specific physical characteristics 
of writing with it, certain thoughts are triggered. Without ink, those 
thoughts would not have emerged. Conceiving thought not as an inter-
nal state of mind but as a process that takes place “out in the open” al-
lows for ascribing to objects a thought generating capacity. In his article 
“Logical Machines,” Peirce claims along this line that “it is no figure of 
speech to say that the alembics and cucurbits of the chemist are instru-
ments of thought, or logical machines” (Peirce 1887, 168). Artifacts such 
as alembics and cooking pots evoke a very specific way of thinking in the 
chemist. The mind itself is evoked through and shaped by the very mate-
rial characteristics of its carriers. The mind has an artifactual character. 
Although from our human perspective thinking would always require 
some engagement between an artifact and an organism, Peirce’s non- 
anthropogenic view that all reality is saturated with mind necessitates 
him to entertain the possibility of semiosis without humans.
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Here again, we find striking similarities with Wittgenstein, who 
writes:
It is misleading then to talk of thinking as of a ‘mental activity’. We 
may say that thinking is essentially the activity of operating with 
signs. This activity is performed by the hand, when we think by 
writing; by the mouth and larynx, when we think by speaking; and 
if we think by imaging signs or pictures, I can give you no agent that 
thinks. If then you say that in such cases the mind thinks, I would 
only draw your attention to the fact that you are using metaphor 
(1958, 6f)
In AMT, the external world does not consist of dead matter that is uti-
lized by thoughts that emerge from an inside world. The repudiation 
of the inside–outside dualism implies that there are no purely physical 
objects that are operated by a separate, purely mental faculty. That is 
why the term “artifactual mind” is, I believe, not only more suitable 
than “extended mind, “but also more appropriate than “external mind”: 
“external” still presupposes “internal,” which is a distinction that the 
proposed perspective wants to overcome. Moreover, I prefer “artifac-
tual” to “artificial” because “artificial” is too strongly connoted with 
“unreal” and does not express the “out in the open” character of mind.
“Artifactual Mind” expresses that our thinking is not pre-given or 
naturally present in a presumed inside world, but that it unfolds itself 
by virtue of and through objects and artifacts (Wittgenstein 2001, §16). 
It is crafted and shaped by physical things. For that reason, mind can 
be an object of archaeological or anthropological research (see Schick 
and Toth 1993, 49; see also Hilpinen 1993, 156f). From an artifactual 
perspective, thought is located in a world of objects, which are no less 
mental for being “out in the open” and no less real for being mental (see 
also Skagestad 1999, 557).
Our thinking is facilitated or impeded by specific physical features of 
objects and artifacts. We do not instrumentally use objects and artifacts 
to express ourselves or reach certain goals. Rather, objects and artifacts 
enable us to induce and develop certain thoughts. Dependent on their 
physical features, objects and artifacts, which are in our current time 
evermore technical artifacts, can “disclose,” to borrow a Heideggerian 
term, the world in a certain way. The physical characteristics of the arti-
facts that we work with also determine to a great extent which goals are 
pursued and how they are pursued.
This view is also neatly expressed by Engelbart:
Brains of power equal to ours could have evolved in an environment 
where the combination of artifact materials and muscle strengths were 
so scaled that the neatest scribing tool (equivalent to a pencil) possible 
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had a shape and mass as manageable as a brick would be to us – 
 assuming that our muscles were not specially conditioned to deal with 
it. We fastened a pencil to a brick and experimented. (…) How would 
our civilization have matured if this had been the only manual means 
for us to use in graphical manipulation of symbols? (…) The concepts 
that would evolve within our culture would (…) be d ifferent, and very 
likely the symbology to represent them would be different (…) It thus 
seems very likely that our thoughts and our language would be rather 
directly affected by the particular means used by our culture for ex-
ternally manipulating symbols (Engelbart 1962, 26).
Technical artifacts, such as pencils, books and computers, are not  neutral 
tools for the more efficient execution of intellectual projects antecedently 
conceived and adopted; rather, technical artifacts inform our choices of 
which intellectual projects to adopt and thereby transform our concep-
tion of what we are doing and even of who we are (see also Ihde 1990; 
McLuhan and Fiore 1996). Artifacts are not neutral tools that are func-
tionally utilized by an internal biological core, as expressed by EMT; 
rather, they shape to a great extent what we consider as our “inner,” 
mental realm of goals, aspirations and ideals.
EMT has contributed a great deal to the view that the external environ-
ment not only can influence cognitive processes but that external  objects 
and artifacts, which are, especially in our modern, Western culture, 
 ever-increasingly technical artifacts, can become a very part of those 
cognitive processes. According to EMT, objects can be utilized by the 
mind in such a way that they become extensions of the mind itself.
Instead of immediately adopting or rejecting EMT, I have tried to 
show that, despite significant differences, both opponents and advocates 
of EMT have in common that they do not sufficiently challenge the piv-
otal distinction between inside and outside. This reflection has led to an 
analysis of the concept of “introspection,” since the distinction between 
inside and outside is often (implicitly or explicitly) justified by the pre-
sumed capacity of introspection and the ability to depict the contents of 
our mind as a separate realm. Different arguments against the epistemic 
validity of introspective judgments ultimately culminated in an overall 
rejection of the idea that thinking should be situated in an inside world – 
whether that is in the res cogitans, a realm beyond the empirical world, 
or, as in more modern materialist approaches, in the brains. Inspired by 
especially the philosophy of Peirce, I have argued that thinking has not 
only an exosomatic character, but rather is instigated by and unfolds 
through external objects and technical artifacts.
4.5  AMT, Normative Technologies and the Question 
of Self-Formation
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AMT evidences that a persistent inside-outside fallacy often lies at the 
heart of the failure to recognize a more fundamental, constitutive influ-
ence of external objects and technologies on cognition. External objects 
and technological artifacts are not dead matter utilized by a separate 
living, inside sphere with the aim to realize certain pre-established goals, 
but rather mind itself is induced and shaped by these artifacts. Mind is 
not extended by an inner biological cognitive core, but rather unfolds 
through objects and artifacts.
This perspective allows maximally recognizing and, henceforth, inves-
tigating how old and new technologies shape and “norm” thinking. Op-
ponents of EMT believe that mental activities are expressions of organic 
brain processes, which display specific and characteristic mechanisms, 
such as primacy effects, recency effects and chunking effects. These typ-
ical features indicate, they believe, that cognitive processes are intrinsic 
and not reducible to external, social processes. The inner world of cog-
nition has, they say, features that are completely different from external 
processes, which indicates that cognition is brain-bound. AMT can re-
veal that this “inside–outside” distinction does not take into account the 
history of the terms attributed to cognition and, hence, reflects a “short-
term memory.” A genealogy of concepts such as “sequence,” “listing” 
and “grouping,” which are presupposed in notions like “primacy effect” 
and “chunking,” can provide insight into how these terms can be traced 
back to technologies, such as reading, writing and calculating, and the 
artifacts employed for those activities, such as pens, calculators and 
computers. Without the development and ubiquity of these technologies, 
today we would not interpret presumed “internal” cognitive processes 
exclusively in terms of processing information and “processing informa-
tion” would not be understood in terms of the above-mentioned con-
cepts. It is also no coincidence that notions like “primacy effect” and 
“chunking” are studied in the context of more or less well-functioning 
memory. The functionalist character of modern technologies determines 
to a great extent our view of memory (see Donald 1991). My goal is not 
to deny that our thinking is subject to particular mechanisms, but to 
illustrate how old and new technologies frame these mechanisms and 
have continuously inscribed their “grammar” into what is considered 
the natural, non-derived mark of cognition.
Not only internalists but also advocates of EMT have this “blind 
spot” with regard to the inside-outside dualism, which prevents them 
from being able to sufficiently recognize the technological dimension 
of cognition. Clark’s insufficient liberation from the “inside–outside” 
dualism prevents him from seeing how much his view of cognition is de-
termined by current technological idiom. Although he partially locates 
cognition outside the brain, he, at the same time, upholds this dualism by 
ascribing to cognition an original starting point in an internal biological 
core, an inside that utilizes the outside world in order to fulfill certain 
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cognitive tasks that it has set for itself. Within this framework, Clark 
interprets the mind in terms of all the way down functionalist terms, 
without taking into account that this characterization is already an ex-
pression of the current technological vocabulary (Selinger and  Engström 
2008).  “Computation,” “processing,” “modularity” and “functional-
ity,” which for him ultimately characterize what cognition is, are not 
neutral, self-evident and irreducible notions but part of the technological 
mindset that we have incorporated in our modern era.
If our “inner self” is shaped by the technologies that we have invented, 
to which we have adapted and that have become a structural part of our 
modern life (see also Tenner 2003), are we then not determined by tech-
nologies? This question allows us to take up again more explicitly our 
leading theme of whether self-formation is possible: if technologies not 
only shape our environment but also our mind (which was for Desc artes 
the faculty that secured independence), to what extent is self-formation 
then still possible? Have we not replaced one determinating force with 
another? Instead of brain-determinism, we now seem to have to en-
dorse technology-determinism, which can be seen as a kind of “invasive 
situationism.”
First, AMT displays that in both internalist views and in EMT, the 
radical influence of technologies is rendered invisible. By locating par-
ticular functionalist features of cognition in an alleged independent 
and irreducible inside brain-world, it becomes possible to understand 
mind-as-such exclusively in terms of instrumental problem solving or 
the enhancement of information processing functions. In this way, the 
technologies that have generated this type of thinking are kept out of 
sight. They become indeed, as Clark states, “transparent.” However, 
this transparency comes with the risk of disregarding their profound 
influence. As a consequence, a fundamental criticism of particular fram-
ing of cognition becomes impossible: for example, it becomes no longer 
possible to criticize the functionalist framework, since all technology as 
well as the thinking that it facilitates is solely evaluated on the basis of 
the greater efficiency with which it enables us to carry out familiar tasks.
Second, by depriving cognition of its original, non-derived and 
 independent features (the “mark of the mental”), situated in a presumed 
inside, it now not only becomes possible to recognize how the mecha-
nisms attributed to it were influenced by certain technologies, but also to 
make visible and evaluate those technologies and the thinking that they 
are generating. It becomes, for example, possible to question whether it 
is adequate to conceive technologies and the thinking that they are gener-
ating exclusively in terms of efficiency. AMT does not exclude normative 
questions, but rather places them at the center of our attention: what is 
the value of particular technologies in terms of the type of thought that 
they evoke for our lives? How should we evaluate the mental realm of 
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goals, aspirations and ideals that those technologies trigger and shape? 
In short, how can technologies contribute to forming a good self?
Third, it must be clear that the question of self-formation is now ad-
dressed within a different, more suitable framework, namely one that 
does not separate an inside-world from an outside-world and attempt 
to establish which realm controls the other. Answering this question 
requires further elaborating how the proposed non-essentialist and 
non-dualist perspective enables not only recognizing the technological 
dimension of the self (AMT), but also reinterpreting what it then still 
can mean for a self to form itself. If technology is increasingly shaping 
my mind and self, how can I then still justify that it is me that forms 
my self? In the next chapter, I will further elaborate how self-formation 
beyond the inside-outside dualism is possible by challenging a particular 
usage of a type of technology that presumes being able to scientifically 
depict the relation between mind, brain and self and potentially explain 
whether the self is free, namely brain imaging technology. In this  respect, 
I will also elaborate the notion of “critical self-formation.” 
Note
 1 Peirce termed, probably independently from Husserl, his overall approach 
as “phenomenology.” Later, he uses the notion “phaneroscopy” for his 
method. See Aydin (2007a) for a comparison between Peirce’s and Husserl’s 
phenomenology.
The Artifactual Mind Thesis (AMT) not only shows that the 
 “inside-outside” fallacy obscures the fact that our cognition and self are 
shaped by particular technologies, but also indicates that overcoming 
this fallacy and recognizing the technological dimension of mind and 
self can reframe and bring about a notion of self-formation that goes 
beyond autonomous-determined twin traditions. Today brain imaging 
technologies such as Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and func-
tional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) are increasingly used not 
only to diagnose diseases and lesions, but also to correlate brain acti-
vation with psychological states and traits. Brain imaging technologies 
are used to find neuronal networks and brain regions that are specific to 
the functional realization of aspects of the self (e.g., Greene et al. 20014; 
Legrand and Ruby 2009; Christoff et al. 2011; Haggard 2017). These 
studies inform debates in philosophy of mind as well as philosophical, 
psychological and legal conceptions of, for example, freedom and re-
sponsibility (e.g., Klemm 2010; Vincent 2013). Neuroscientists, psychol-
ogists and philosophers who draw a direct and causal relation between 
brain states and cognition even claim that through brain research, 
we could gain “immediate” access to our thoughts. These claims and 
 expectations make brain imaging technologies of special importance for 
our current investigation: data and images provided by brain scanners 
are used to draw causal relations between brain processes and cognitive 
functions, and to potentially resolve the question of whether the self is 
free or determinated, and, hence, self-formation is possible.
The relation (type-identification) that is drawn between processes in 
the brain and mental states is, of course, very problematic, as extensively 
discussed in the philosophy of mind. But that problem is not my focus 
here. In the light of AMT, I will rather argue that the interpretation 
and usage of brain imaging technologies as functional evidence strongly 
relies on the disputable idea of the existence of an autonomous self that 
is located in the brain. Although methodological objections have been 
uttered against the view of brain images as valid and reliable represen-
tations, these objections neither sufficiently challenge nor explicate how 
brain imaging technologies are able to instigate a framework that allows 
5 Brain Imaging Technologies 
and Critical Self-Formation
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the brain to be approached as an agent that produces cognition and 
 regulates behavior.
Not only will I show that this framework can be traced back to and 
is implicitly justified by the Cartesian notions of self and freedom, but 
I will also argue that these particular notions were influenced by an 
older technology, namely the camera obscura. It must be clear that I 
neither claim that the camera obscura can exclusively explain nor that 
it is the only source of Descartes’ views of self and freedom. However, 
this reconstruction will illustrate how technologies, which often remain 
virtually unrecognized, co-constitute seminal ideas in the history of 
philosophy, including notions of self and freedom. Arguing that even 
the notion of an internal, pure self that is independent of the material 
world was co-constructed by the metaphor of a particular technology 
can be seen as my most radical attempt to go beyond the inside-outside 
distinction.
Although this comparison suggests a continuity between the camera 
obscura and brain imaging technologies, I will also point out a strong 
discontinuity: in contrast to the Cartesian view, the usage of brain imag-
ing technologies in this regard presupposes that the self and its functions 
can be externally accessed by (neuro)scientific means. Brain imaging 
technologies challenge the idea that privileged access to the self merely 
can be obtained through immediate, subjective access to our ideas. Al-
though I will not endorse the idea that brain images represent the brain 
and can explain psychological functions, I will argue that “extrospective 
knowledge” provided by brain images allows us to explain how brain 
imaging technologies could play a role in the process of self-formation 
from the proposed interactionist perspective.
From the proposed view, the brain is neither regarded as the locus of 
the self nor are brain imaging technologies conceived as offering repre-
sentations or photographs of the brain. Instead, the self will be further 
elaborated as continuously forming itself in the world by pursuing certain 
goals and ideals and developing matching habits. The idea of orientation 
toward goals and ideals, inspired by in particular Peirce’s pragmatism 
and his view of Thirdness, will prove itself fruitful in illustrating how 
the self does not have to be completely determined by its brain, without 
denying the role of the brain, as depicted by brain imaging technolo-
gies, in the process of self-formation. Brain imaging technologies can 
contribute to this process because they could potentially display to what 
extent our biological constitution is on par with or poses limits or con-
straints to our personal or social ambitions. The extrospective relation 
to and interpretation of brain imaging technologies allow critically re-
flecting on whether our habits are consistent with the long-term goals 
or ideals that we pursue. Also taking up again the idea of freedom as 
“self- determination,” self-formation will be further explained as “criti-
cal self- identification.” Building on AMT and Technological Mediation 
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Theory (TMT), the role of artifacts and technologies in self-formation 
processes will be further elaborated.
5.1  Brain Imaging Technologies as Functional 
Evidence in Free Will Debates
In Chapter 3, I briefly discussed brain-determinism and brain-non- 
determinism. We have seen that brain-determinists reject the existence 
of free will because they deny that my actions are caused by conscious 
intentions or decisions, whereas brain-non-determinists argue that con-
scious intentions and decisions can intervene in and influence both brain 
inclinations and environmental influences. What I did not highlight in 
that chapter is that both opponents and advocates of free will often draw 
upon the same brain imaging technologies in supporting their positions. 
Again, it must be clear that my aim here is not to directly contribute 
to the free will debate as such. Engagement with this debate is rather 
yet another steppingstone in the process of developing my view of self- 
formation in a technological world.
Although opponents and advocates provide very different and contest-
ing interpretations of brain images, both groups often assume that data 
and images provided by brain scanners in one way or another depict 
causal relations between brain processes and cognitive functions. This 
usage of brain images raises the question of what exactly brain images 
represent or visualize and how they are supposed to provide functional 
evidence. Brain images are colorized pictures of alleged brain activity, 
which can be measured in different ways. I will focus on fMRI, which 
is a dominant technology in brain mapping research and is increasingly 
used in psychological explanations. fMRI measures the so-called Blood 
Oxygenation Level Dependent (BOLD) response. When a brain area is 
more active it consumes more oxygen, which is delivered by an increase 
in blood flow in the activated area. Oxygenated and deoxygenated 
 hemoglobin in the blood have different magnetic properties. An MRI 
scanner can read changes in magnetization and translate them into a 
computerized image (Matthews and Jezzard 2004).
Neuroscientists and philosophers who draw a direct identity relation 
between brain states and cognition use data and images provided by 
brain scanners to infer something about the role of particular brain 
 areas in cognitive functions. Brain imaging data are also increasingly 
used, in particular in free will debates, to make a so-called “reverse 
 inference”: brain imaging data are taken as evidence that a given brain 
region plays a particular causal role during the performance of a cog-
nitive task. There are “neuro-optimists” who go one step further and 
assert that brain images will permit immediate access to our thoughts. 
They presume that brain images will open up the “black box” of the 
mind to direct observation (Camerer et al. 2005).
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A general objection against these kinds of assumptions is that brain im-
ages are not simple pictures of BOLD signal differences. It is not  possible 
to directly measure quantitative signal magnitudes. General mapping from 
BOLD signal to significant neural activity is lacking (Nair 2005). In addi-
tion, the BOLD differences that are associated to brain activity are small, 
noisy and multifaceted. According to Klein (2010), brain images do not 
provide quantitative information, but rather display statistical significant 
differences in BOLD signal between different task conditions: inferential 
statistics are used to contradict the so-called “null hypothesis” that indi-
cates that an experimental condition had no real effect on the observed 
MR signal. Brain images do not directly display activation in brain areas, 
but are rather maps of places where we can assume with a certain prob-
ability that the presumed correlation (speaking of “causation” is too pre-
mature) between data and a stereotyped pattern of activation is unlikely 
to be the result of chance fluctuations from a true zero signal (Klein 2011).
Roskies (2007) draws a similar conclusion by arguing that brain  images 
should not be conceived as photographs of brain activity. Brain imaging 
does not let us directly see properties carrying visual data of the brain. 
Unlike photography, brain imaging is belief-opaque: the information cru-
cial to its correct interpretation is, Roskies argues, not contained in the 
image itself. The assumed functional decomposition, the tasks involved in 
producing an image and the chosen statistics are necessary for interpret-
ing the image but not recoverable in information inherent in it. Inferences 
are, therefore, dependent upon the beliefs and experience of the research-
ers about how to analyze their results. What further complicates matters 
here is the question of whether “direct representation” as such is possible. 
One can acknowledge that certain conventions or beliefs might always be 
involved in recovering information. However, it still seems to be possible 
to make a distinction between more and less common or accepted con-
ventions and beliefs shared by a cultural community.
No less controversial is reverse inference: because brain regions can 
perform multiple functions and be involved in a variety of different pro-
cesses, a causal relation between activation of a certain brain area and a 
particular cognitive function cannot be drawn (Klein 2010). The many 
conceivable mappings between brain regions and cognitive f unctions 
allow for a combinatorial explosion of possible explanations of ob-
served brain activity (Klein 2011). Discovering more systematicity in the 
 visual field might strengthen certain explanations (see also Klein 2017). 
 However, currently reverse inference provides virtually no evidence and 
is deductively invalid (Poldrack 2006, 2011).
These objections against the validity of brain imaging indicate that 
brain images are not direct representations of brain activity and that 
they provide very weak functional evidence. However, for most critics 
these concerns about validity and reliability do not render brain imag-
ing worthless. According to Roskies (2007), “imaging data is, within 
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its limits, a reliable indicator of brain activity” (2007, 867). Cacioppo 
et al. (2008) believe that brain imaging can help generate hypotheses in 
an exploratory way, which can be tested in future studies. In a similar 
vein, Klein argues: “neuroimages do not confirm functional hypothesis, 
but they do show brain areas in which the imaging data might be further 
used to confirm functional hypotheses” (2010, 275).
These methodological considerations and evaluations have two rel-
evant implications within the scope of our investigation. On the one 
hand, they clearly show that brain images do not directly display neural 
activity but are, in fact, very much dependent on theoretical beliefs and 
statistical suppositions. On the other hand, these methodological assess-
ments regarding validity and reliability neither challenge nor sufficiently 
explicate the particular way brain imaging technologies frame the rela-
tion between brain, cognition and world.
By focusing only on methodological issues concerning functional evi-
dence, the more basic framework that allows the brain to be approached 
as an agent that determines cognitive functions and utilizes the external 
world is neither revealed nor questioned. The objection that brain regions 
can perform multiple functions and be involved in a variety of different 
processes does not challenge the idea of the brain as an agent that causes 
cognitive functions. Although the discussed methodological reflections 
indicate that brain images might not be reliable and valid pictures of 
brain processes, they do reinforce the view of the brain as a causal agent 
by framing the brain as an isolated realm that – if certain methodological 
problems are solved – could provide functional hypotheses. Brain imag-
ing technologies frame in a particular way the relation between brain and 
self, and bring about a particular notion of “free will.”
5.2  Technological Inscription from Camera  
Obscura to fMRI
AMT has been developed in a constructive criticism of Extended Mind 
Thesis (EMT) and highlights the technological dimension of mind. I 
have indicated that technology not only shapes our mind, but also our 
self. In order to further nuance AMT in the context of self-formation, I 
will reflect on a theory that exhibits similarities to AMT, namely TMT. 
Then, I will illustrate how a particular technology, namely the camera 
obscura, has contributed to inscribing the idea of an independent, inner 
inside to the self and how today this idea is both sustained and trans-
formed by brain imaging technologies.
TMT, AMT and Resilient Technological Inscription
The idea that technologies influence how we experience both the world 
and ourselves forms the core of TMT (Ihde 1990; Verbeek 2005). This 
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approach analyzes technologies as “mediators” of the relations between 
humans and world. Rather than seeing technologies as material “ob-
jects” that need to be understood in opposition to human “subjects,” the 
mediation approach understands technologies as constitutive for human 
practices and experiences.
Don Ihde (1990) has provided four different ways in which technolo-
gies can mediate the relation between humans and the world as well as 
human intentionality. The first type of human-technology relations he 
calls “embodiment relations” refers to technologies that become part 
of our bodily constitution; the prime example of this type is a pair of 
glasses that becomes part of our sense organs and that we do not look at 
but through. The second type Ihde calls “hermeneutic relations” refers 
to technologies that we “read” in order to acquire information about 
the world; the prime example here is a thermometer that does not give 
a sensation but a number that represents the temperature. The third 
type he calls “alterity relations,” which includes technologies that we 
interact with as quasi-others; the prime example of this type is an ATM 
that we interact with in order to draw money from our bank account. 
The fourth type Ihde calls “background relations” refers to technologies 
that influence our experience of the world without getting noticed; the 
prime example of this type is an air conditioning system that is not al-
ways perceived as such but still influences how people experience their 
environment.
Verbeek (2008) complemented TMT by illustrating how technologies 
not only mediate the world, but also the way we experience ourselves 
and our intentions to act as well as our ethical decisions and actions 
(Verbeek 2005, 2011). He has illustrated how sonograms mediate the 
intentional relation between expecting parent(s) and the fetus: it con-
stitutes the fetus as a separate person, as gendered and as a potential 
patient; in addition, it transforms expecting parents to parents who have 
to make technologically informed decisions, moving pregnancy from the 
realm of fate to the realm of human responsibility (Verbeek 2008). This 
case clearly shows in what sense technologies are not neutral tools: tech-
nologies disclose the world in particular ways as they organize and reor-
ganize human routines, habits and morality, and channel and re-signify 
social relations (Rosenberger and Verbeek 2015).
AMT shares with TMT that technologies influence the way we expe-
rience the world and ourselves. What makes the scope of AMT different, 
which can also be seen as complementary, is its focus on how technol-
ogies gradually inscribe certain notions or categories in our mind that, 
if becoming dominant, durably shape our mind and self, and resiliently 
structure and regulate how we experience the world and ourselves and 
how we interact with our surroundings. In the previous chapter, I have 
discussed how terms like “computation,” “processing,” “modularity” 
and “functionality,” which were derived from computers, have become 
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so prevalent that they currently predominantly characterize how cog-
nition as such is conceived. Now, I will argue that the conception of 
“freedom” assumed in many contemporary debates about freedom and 
responsibility has been strongly influenced by particular technologies.
It must be clear that my aim is not, as I have stressed repeatedly, to 
disclose a more “original conception” of mind, but rather the opposite, 
namely to recognize and reveal how mind has always been shaped in a 
particular way by external factors and technologies. Recognition of and 
insight into the technological dimension of mind enables in particular 
debunking reductionist claims that ascribe to thinking presumed orig-
inal and irreducible features. Instead of revealing a presumed “original 
content,” AMT enables recognizing and making visible how particular 
technologies have generated a particular conception and form of think-
ing and, as we will see, to evaluating to what extent these particular 
framings foster “good” self-formation.
Technological inscription in and framing of our mind and self can 
have different degrees of solidification. Some inscriptions are changing 
as we speak. An example: although “health” is theoretically defined in 
different ways in dictionaries and medical handbooks, in our everyday 
life encounters and interactions, it greatly derives its meaning from tech-
nologically generated measurements of variables like weight, heart rate, 
blood pressure and insulin level. However, today we witness more and 
more people using apps to “measure” and watch their health: running 
distance trackers, calorie counters, nutrition assessors, sleep cycle ana-
lyzers and so forth. These technologies are not neutral tools that merely 
measure “health”; in fact, “health” is co-determined by what these tools 
measure and by what is left out and not disclosed. They provide new 
norms for what is considered as “healthy” and influence whether people 
consider and experience themselves as healthy. In the long run, these 
new health technologies could gradually become dominant and alter and 
possibly surpass older conceptions of “health.”
There are also framings and inscriptions that have been engraved in 
our mind, self and world as a result of a particular dominant techno-
logical grammar to such a degree that they have become “ontologized,” 
are attributed “originality” and have become part of our cultural and 
ethical canon. This robust solidification often runs parallel with obscur-
ing the historicity and genealogy of the concepts and forms in ques-
tion. One could say that brain imaging technologies frame the relation 
between brain, self and world within the free will debate, in a similar 
vein as health apps frame “health”; they strongly influence how freedom 
and control are approached and understood through what they appar-
ently measure and leave out. However, on closer inspection, framing 
the brain as a kind of a causa sui and attributing to it the capacity to 
control  behavior, determine cognitive functions and utilize the exter-
nal world appears to have a much longer history. Hence, brain imaging 
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technologies have not initiated but have rather rehabilitated this par-
ticular inscription, which took root and germinated to such a degree 
that it durably and resiliently structured our very thinking and became 
“ontological.” Revealing how the idea of freedom has been influenced by 
a much older technology, namely the camera obscura, will contribute to 
understanding the impact of brain imaging technologies on this concept.
The Camera Obscura, the Self and Freedom; or How Even 
the Idea of a Pure, Unmediated Self was Technologically 
Mediated
In previous chapters, Descartes’ notions of self and freedom have been 
explained as outcomes of an epistemological investigation. In methodi-
cal self-contemplation, the self discovers that our access to the contents 
of our thoughts (introspection) radically differs from how we encoun-
ter the external world of material things: we can have an authoritative, 
privileged and immediate access to the contents of our thoughts, which 
we lack toward the external world of material things (Macdonald 2007; 
see also 2001). Because introspective beliefs about my mind are radi-
cally different from my beliefs about the outside world, and I can clearly 
and distinctively conceive both as separate realms, my mind must be 
a completely different substance than the outside world, including my 
body. We have seen that this argument has also another implication: 
since we have this privileged access to our mind and not to our body and 
the world, which makes us doubt their existence, we identify ourselves 
primarily with our conscious thought: I think, therefore I am (Medita-
tions 1641/1985). Moreover, the mind is in one way or another able to 
exert control over brain, body and environment via the pineal gland, 
whereas the body is a machine that is subject to mechanistic laws (Lok-
horst 2008). The sense of being an autonomous agent is derived from the 
cogito, which is ontologically separated from the external world but in 
some way capable of controlling it.
The imperative prejudice that Descartes did not put in brackets in 
his methodical doubt experiment is that it is altogether possible to fun-
damentally detach oneself from the world and evaluate different ideas 
on the basis of clarity and distinctness. Although this presumed ability 
has been extensively challenged throughout the history of philosophy, 
especially from phenomenological perspectives (intentionality, being-in-
the-world, embodied, embedded, extended enactive cognition etc.), not 
much attention has been given to the historical material-technological 
conditions that contributed to the emergence of this view and made it 
appear cogent.
How an idea, view or theory emerges is in traditional philosophy of 
science considered to be part of the “context of discovery” and is not seen 
as important or relevant for its validation. However, from the proposed 
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perspective recognizing the “context of discovery” can help to uncover 
relevant presuppositions of the theory in question and indirectly pro-
vide cues that could be used to challenge its “context of  justification.”1 
 Recovering how the camera obscura played a role in Descartes’ “context 
of discovery” will not only help to uncover how certain notions of self 
and freedom have been preserved and transferred but also illustrates 
how even our most fundamental and theoretical-speculative philosophi-
cal notions have a material-technological grounding.
I am not the first person to highlight the connection between technol-
ogy and Descartes’ view of the self. Lee W. Bailey (1989) has argued that 
the camera obscura is one of the root metaphors that helped generate the 
image of the mind as an inner realm, ontologically separated from the 
external world, an image that is characteristic of our modern supposi-
tions of subjectivity and autonomy. Technological mediation theorists 
Petran Kockelkoren (2003, 2007) and Don Ihde (2007) have explored 
this view along similar lines.
In the 16th century, the camera obscura was widely used for perspec-
tive drawing. Descartes was very familiar with this piece of technology. 
In his Optics, he has described it and used it as a metaphor to explain 
how the world enters our mind through our senses:
The objects we look at do imprint very perfect images on the back of 
our eyes. Some people have very ingeniously explained this already, 
by comparison with the images that appear in a chamber, when 
 having it completely closed except for a single hole, and having put 
in front of this hole a glass in the form of a lens, we stretch behind, 
at a specific distance, a white cloth on which the light that comes 
from the objects outside forms these images. For they say that this 
chamber represents the eye; this hole, the pupil; this lens, the crystal-
line humour, or rather, all those parts of the eye which cause some 
refraction; and this cloth, the interior membrane, which is composed 
of the extremities of the optic nerve (Descartes 1965, 91)
This comparison shows – as also Bailey and others have pointed out – that 
the central perspective of the camera obscura makes the idea of an aloof 
spectator position, as opposed to a geometrical res extensa, a plausible 
starting point for reasoning. It makes it altogether possible and visual to 
fundamentally detach oneself from the world and evaluate different ideas 
on the basis of clarity and distinctness. From this perspective, the camera 
obscura is thus not an innocent and neutral metaphor that Descartes 
used to explain his epistemology but mediated the idea of the mind as 
an internal representation of a world that can be observed (and acted on) 
by a homunculus situated somewhere outside the world; the autonomous 
subject is modeled after a spectator inside a camera obscura.
This particular framing of the relation between mind, world and self 
has also far-reaching consequences for conceptions of freedom. The 
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metaphor of the camera obscura reflects the idea of freedom as a quality 
that is characteristic of an agent that, being sheltered in an impenetrable 
“black box,” is independent of the world and the laws and mechanisms 
that determine it and, at the same time, has control over it on the basis 
of the images that are reflected on the screen of its (the agent’s) internal 
control room.
The Cartesian framework, influenced by the camera obscura, does not 
mark a historical event that we have left behind, but one that has been trans-
ported and rehabilitated by other and different technologies. In the context 
of the medical field, which is increasingly spilling over to the psychological 
and philosophical realm, this continuation is fa cilitated by brain imag-
ing technologies. In the intersection of neuropsychology,  neurophilosophy 
and neuroethics, brain imaging technologies are the dominant mediating 
technologies on the basis of which the self is a ttributed certain psycho-
logical functions and capacities, such as the capability to will, decide and 
act freely. In current brain research, there is a strong tendency to conceive 
the brain as constitutive of the “real self” or as the “control room” of the 
realization of aspects of self-related experiences, as an agent that instigates 
cognitive processes, moves the body and manipulates the external world 
(e.g., Northoff et al. 2006; Legrand and Ruby 2009). Although Descartes 
would never have situated cognition in or reduced it to brain processes, 
since brain and body are also part of the res extensa, the division between 
“internal” and “external” that breaks along the line of an independent 
agent is, as Joseph Rouse has pointed out, a Cartesian legacy (1996). In-
stead of the mind, it is the brain that is envisioned as a kind of causa sui 
that exerts control over the way (aspects of) the self are realized.
What is relevant here is that brain imaging technologies mediate and 
transfer similar Cartesian notions of self, freedom and responsibility. 
By focusing on the inside of the head and (interactions between) certain 
regions of brain activity, an fMRI image depicts the brain as an isolated 
realm and allows approaching it as an independent inner agent (see also 
Doris 2015, 37f). This way, a categorical distinction between “inside” 
and “outside” is preserved. The brain is attributed a privileged status 
because of its presumed capacity to detach itself from the outside world, 
process information that is collected by the senses and determine, as a 
kind of causa sui, our decisions and actions.
Advocates and opponents of free will do not agree on the question 
of whether consciousness can be attributed causal efficacy (see also the 
entry “epiphenomenalism” in Stanford Encyclopedia). However, they 
often share the view that freedom can only be attributed to an agent 
(consciousness or brain) that is detached or has the capacity to detach it-
self from its environment or other external influences. They believe that 
freedom can only exist in a separate, autonomous realm, that is, a realm 
not fundamentally affected or determined by external factors. Only then 
is it possible to process external input by virtue of which behavior can be 
controlled and the external world can be utilized.
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Thus far, the presented analysis has a descriptive and not an evalu-
ative character. If technologies influence and mediate to a great extent 
our conceptions and experiences of the world and ourselves, what then 
is wrong with the conception of self and freedom/control suggested by 
brain imaging technologies in the wake of the camera obscura? Answer-
ing this question enables revealing the ultimate paradox in the Cartesian 
notion of self and autonomy. It must be clear that the problem is not 
that the Cartesian conception is technologically mediated. The problem 
lies in (1) the particular self-identification and self-interpretation that 
brain imaging technologies encourage and (2) the insufficient acknowl-
edgment of and accounting for the mediating role of these technologies 
in self-identification and self-interpretation processes. Both impediments 
are, as I will attempt to show, related.
The particular self-identification and self-interpretation that brain im-
aging technologies generate is problematic for reasons that I discussed 
earlier. Brain researchers and philosophers who identify “our real self” 
with the brain and attribute to the brain causal efficacy and control 
 conceive the brain, relying on fMRI-images, as some kind of causa sui 
that is detached from the outside world and can determine our decisions 
and actions. Clear criteria that ensure the brain (together with its physi-
cally realized mental states) as a kind of isolated “inside” that can be de-
tached from the “outside” world are, as I discussed in Chapter 4, lacking.
The view of the brain as an autonomous agent underlies our second im-
pediment: the effect of insufficiently taking into account the mediating role 
of fMRI technologies in self-identification and self-interpretation processes. 
The idea of the brain as an autonomous agent – a detached causa sui – is 
tenable insofar as the mediating role of the technology that co-instigates 
that idea remains in the background and is disregarded. It validates itself 
insofar as the technical conditions that have generated it remain invisible.
The proposed reconstruction of the genealogy of the Cartesian self 
and the influence of the camera obscura on its emergence shows that 
even the notion of a pure, unaffected self was co-produced by the met-
aphor of a particular technology. This genealogy highlights the impos-
sibility of detaching our self-conceptions and self-identifications from 
influences of our surroundings. These influences, which are increasingly 
technological, are overseen especially when they become part of com-
monly accepted practices. They then become, as Andy Clark (2003, 123) 
(uncritically) states, transparent.
There is continuity between the camera obscura and brain imaging tech-
nologies insofar as they mediate a particular view of self and freedom, 
but there is also an important and relevant difference between them. 
How Brain Imaging Technologies Compete with 
Introspective Knowledge
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In Descartes’ epistemology, the cogito is a “black box” that is only ac-
cessible through subjective introspection, whereas brain imaging tech-
nologies promise objective knowledge of how (aspects of) the self are 
realized. For Descartes, the cogito could not be scientifically objectified 
and investigated (in the modern sense of the word). In contrast, fMRI 
has – given the status attributed to it in contemporary debates about free 
will (e.g., Lamme 2006; Soon et al. 2008) – the potential to eventually 
display the interior of the “dark room” and to disclose not only what 
 really determines the realization of our self and our behavior, but also 
how it is able to do it. From this perspective, knowledge of the “real 
agent” of our actions and decisions, that is, of the brain, is no longer 
based on speculative, subjective assumptions, but can be scientifically 
investigated and validated.
The assumption that fMRI can provide objective knowledge of how 
the brain causes decisions and actions does not weaken the camera 
 obscura framework of freedom, but rather reinforces it and makes it 
more credible. The idea of freedom “not being determined by something 
else but capable of determining behavior and utilizing the world,” which 
is now attributed to the brain – and instead of “free will” often is re-
framed in terms of “control” – appears more credible because it is inves-
tigated in a scientific setting.
However, the credibility of approaching the self as something that can 
be objectified in a scientific setting also breaks with the Cartesian frame-
work of the mind with regard to conceptions of self-experience. In the 
Cartesian framework, the self is located “within,” and privileged, au-
thoritative knowledge of it can only be obtained through introspection. 
By definition then, reliable knowledge of the self is subjective and can-
not be outsourced to processes in the external world. Within a strictly 
 Cartesian perspective, neuroscientific insights based on brain imaging 
technologies cannot be used to make authoritative knowledge claims 
about self-experiences.
This picture changes drastically when the human brain is thought 
to be constitutive of the human self. The self that allegedly is located 
“within” is no longer a private realm. Visualizing (aspects of) the self 
on brain scans supposes the possibility of making inferences about what 
the subject is going through (Davey et al. 2016). In fact, introspective 
knowledge and knowledge that is based on brain scans may contradict 
each other, and studies suggest that no clear factor to determine which 
of the two knowledge claims is correct (e.g., Legrand and Ruby 2009; 
Christoff et al. 2011). For example, attributing an action to oneself is 
no longer something that can (just) be introspectively determined, but 
is (also) something that can be externally inferred on the basis of ob-
served patterns of brain activity (Farrer and Frith 2002). The truth-
value of introspective claims such as “I believe I have executed action X” 
thus might be effectively challenged by inferences made on the basis of 
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brain imaging technologies. These views reminisce older speculations: 
 Armstrong anticipated the idea that a “brain technician” with perfect 
understanding of brain processes would be able to correct the mental 
states that someone ascribes to himself (Armstrong 1968/1993, 109; see 
also Haynes and Reese 2006).
The view of the self as mediated by brain imaging technologies is 
thus not one in which self-knowledge can exclusively be obtained “from 
within.” If brain scans can indeed be used as means to settle debates 
about (in)voluntary action and free will, the privilege of accessing expe-
rience is no longer limited to the experiencing subject, but the self and 
its actions become potentially accessible for external informed observ-
ers. Brain imaging technologies offer the prospect of allowing scientists 
to make predictions about experiences of people without relying on re-
portability. It must be clear that relying on scientific predictions only 
make sense when a certain authority is ascribed to them, which makes 
them epistemologically competitive to introspection.
This discontinuity instigated by brain imaging technologies further 
 debunks the idea that self being primarily determined by mind/brain 
(as inner) and world (as outer) are fundamentally detached from one an-
other. While brain imaging technologies provide an image of the brain as 
detached from the world, which is continuous with a Cartesian frame-
work, they undermine the Cartesian idea that introspection is a source 
of  privileged, authoritative knowledge of the self. Through brain imaging 
technologies, knowledge of the self can be obtained in the external world 
(res extensa), thereby challenging the assumption that there is an ontologi-
cal divide between mind/brain and world. However, actually bridging this 
divide is dependent on how radically the inside-outside model is debunked: 
considering the brain as a new, independent “inside” on the basis of brain 
imaging is recapturing this view through the back door. Nevertheless, the 
view that the self can acquire knowledge of itself in and through this world 
can be used to challenge the model that our self is categorically detached 
from the world and opens up, as I will demonstrate, a different framing of 
the role of brain imaging technologies in self-knowledge practices.
5.3 From Self-Determination to Self-Formation
If the self can acquire knowledge from itself through brain imaging tech-
nologies, it can also relate in a certain way to “itself” or at least an ob-
jectified dimension of itself. This knowledge can inform the self about 
its inclinations, habits and conduct, and raise the question of whether 
its present conduct coincides with its desired conduct. Put differently, 
this information can allow the self to evaluate its present conduct and, if 
needed, form itself in another or more preferred direction.
This alternative approach to the self as something that can form  itself 
in and through information acquired from the-self-in-the-world can 
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break with the idea that brain imaging technologies can be understood 
as representations of an inner self. From this perspective, the self (or 
brain for that matter) is, in accordance to EMT and AMT, not to be 
found “in the head.” In fact, this framework aims to surpass the dis-
cussion of whether the self should be understood as residing “inside” 
or “outside” the human body by making obsolete the question of where 
to locate the self. Rather, the self is understood as an ongoing formative 
process that takes place in a world mediated by existing institutions, 
scientific developments, technologies and the biological functioning of 
the human body. The formation of the self is conceived as a process of 
developing habits that are on par with long-term goals or ideals, which 
are set against the (environmental, psychological, biological) constraints 
and opportunities encountered during the process of formation.
When understanding the self in this way, not only is the question con-
cerning self-localization surpassed, but the interest also shifts to how the 
self can form itself in relation with the world in which it is unfolding. 
Now, also the question that has been addressed in the previous chapters 
can be taken up again: does blurring the distinction between self and 
world not destroy the autonomy of the self? If there is no independent 
self that can be separated from its interactions (neither as an isolated 
mind nor as an isolated brain) and if the self is rather formed by its 
interactions, would the self then be nothing more than a plaything of 
random and/or enforced influences? And if technologies inscribe their 
forms to human cognition to such a degree that the self interprets itself 
in technological terms, does the self, instead of an agent, not become a 
patient? I have indicated in Chapter 3 that I subscribe to the intuition 
that autonomy should be understood as self-determination as well as to 
the idea that freedom and control requires orientation toward certain 
values and ideals. However, now that the inside-outside distinction has 
been more radically soaked off, not only the “self” but also “determi-
nation” in “self-determination” as well as the role that technology can 
play in that process can and must be reframed. How is it possible to 
understand “determination” in “self-determination” from the proposed 
interactionist perspective?
The Different Meanings of “Determination”
My reflection on the notion of “determination” in “self-determination” 
in this context does not aim, at least not directly, to contribute to the 
determinism-indeterminism debate, nor does it, as indicated repeatedly, 
attempt to do justice to all the subtleties of the complex and multilayered 
questions regarding freedom. My aim is rather to investigate how over-
coming the inside-outside distinction and recognizing the technological 
dimension of “freedom” can reframe the question of whether free will is 
possible in terms of self-formation. First of all, I second Philippa Foot’s 
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view that the use of “determinism” does not necessarily imply universal 
determinism as well as that causation is not necessarily deterministic in 
the strict sense of the word: “an action said to be determined by the de-
sires of the man who does it is not necessarily an action for which there 
is supposed to be a sufficient condition” (Foot 1957, 441). Furthermore, 
it should be noticed that “determination” in “self-determination” is an 
ambiguous notion. Not only is it related to different concepts (like “cau-
sality” and “control”), but its meaning is also dependent on its subject: 
“determines” in “the brain determines our actions” does not have the 
same meaning as “determines” in “conscious thought determines our ac-
tions” or in “our environment and development determine our actions.” 
Some of the indicated “causes” may even go back before the birth of an 
agent; for example, heredity causes. What complicates things further is 
that the meaning of “determines” is also dependent on a particular inter-
pretation of its subject, of consciousness, brain and environment; for ex-
ample, there are recent studies that claim that particular brain processes 
are indeterministic (see Balaguer 2015), which indicates that ascribing 
causal agency to the brain does not necessarily exclude the possibility of 
the existence of free will.
Without being able or needing to go into all the complexities related 
to neural, mental and/or societal causation and control in regard to 
an organism’s behavior (different meanings and types of causality and 
causation, contesting views regarding mental states and properties, ex-
clusion argument, nature-nurture debate etc.), I only notice (and that 
is sufficient for our scope) that there are many contributing causes, in 
 different meanings of that word, involved in the determination of any de-
cision or action, including preconscious or nonconscious determinants.
What is crucial here is that these considerations in relation to my exter-
nalist critique of the idea of a “real, deep or genuine self” as something 
“within” implies that we cannot isolate one factor (be it neurological 
inclinations, conscious intentions or other dimensions of a person and 
her material and social surroundings), identify it as the real and exclusive 
source and cause of our decisions and actions, and take it as the locus of 
our self. There is no detached “real self” as a necessitating cause behind 
our decisions and actions. We cannot single out one factor that deter-
mines, in the sense of “necessitates,” our behavior.
“Determination” as Formation
If neither consciousness, brain or environment nor another dimension 
of a self can be conceived as a kind of “detached, inner source” that 
sufficiently determines its behavior, how then should we understand 
 “determination” in “self-determination?” It must come as no surprise that 
I propose to reinterpret “determination” as “formation.” Peirce offers, as 
I have discussed extensively in Chapter 2, a general characterization of 
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the conditions for self-formation (CP 8.320; see also Aydin 2009). First 
of all, according to Peirce, self-formation requires self-control. It is only 
possible to give ourselves a certain form if we have some control over 
our interactions. Self-control presupposes in its turn self-criticism. Self- 
criticism means in this context that an actor consciously reviews each 
of her (important) actions and compares them with certain longer-term 
goals and ideals that she wants to achieve. The decision to commit to an 
ideal and to try to realize it will eventually provoke the agent to adjust 
her (natural or acquired) tendencies or to form new habits.
Peirce proposes, as we have seen, a kind of reciprocal reinforcement 
between ideals and habit formation: the more we devote ourselves to a 
certain ideal, the more we will be able to form and cultivate matching 
habits; and the more we form and cultivate certain habits, the more we 
will be sensitive to the attractive power of the ideal that we wish to 
incorporate. However, certain habits could be also the result of inclina-
tions and contingent interactions. Longer-term goals and ideals enable 
assessing and adjusting those (unquestioned) habits.
There are some similarities between Peirce’s view of the self and 
Frankfurt’s (1971) concept of a person. Frankfurt elaborates how peo-
ple can have different first order (wanting something) and second order 
desires (desires about desires to do this or that). If someone not only 
wants to have a certain desire but also wants that desire to be effective, 
to be her will, she has, according to Frankfurt, a “second order voli-
tion.” A person is somebody who deliberately and decisively identifies 
herself with a particular desire, who, in Peirce’s (and my) terminology, 
commits herself to an ideal. Along similar lines, I believe that a person 
is able to discover in herself a discord between instant inclinations and 
higher- order volitions that are guided by longer-term wishes and goals. 
However, I depart from Frankfurt, as I will show later on, in my view 
regarding the “source” of those longer-term wishes and goals.
That we consciously can set distal goals and ideals for ourselves can 
hardly be contested. We take this as phenomenological evidence based 
on everyday life experience. It is made possible by our ability to reflect 
on ourselves, which is often instigated by a certain discord between how 
we act and how we would like to act. However, what is less evident and 
of vital importance for a self to have a degree of freedom, is whether 
conscious long-term intentions can really influence our behavior. Some 
opponents of free will argue that proximal conscious intentions and de-
cisions have no causal efficacy and power because they are produced 
by preceding unconscious processes in the brain. Other opponents of 
free will claim that they have no causal efficacy and power because 
they are necessitated by situational influences. Although these views are 
controversial, I can disregard here whether and in what sense proximal 
intentions and decisions necessitate behavior, since they do not affect 
the alternative perspective that I attempt to develop. What is a relevant 
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question for the proposed thesis is whether the arguments used by oppo-
nents of free will also apply to distal or longer-term intentions.
Slors (2015), for one, attributes causal efficacy and control to dis-
tal conscious intentions. On the one hand, he points at the wealth of 
empirical evidence (see Baumeister et al. 2011) that demonstrates how 
consciousness can influence our actions in the long run. On the other 
hand, he appeals to simple everyday life experience that strongly indi-
cate that distal intentions are efficacious: “When I form the intention, 
while checking the airline website and making the relevant reservation, 
to take the 2:15 flight to London next Wednesday, I usually find myself 
in that airplane on that day” (2013, 98; see also Monroe and Malle 
2010 and Stillman et al. 2011). These examples resonate in everyday life 
intuitions that self-formation is not impossible: in everyday life there 
might be indeed people who are to a great extent formed by contingent 
influences; at the same time, we tend to make a distinction between 
people who are more and people who are less successful in forming 
themselves. In other words: self-formation seems to be conditional but 
not impossible.
Slors further sophisticates his argument by borrowing from Dretske 
(1988, 43) a distinction between two kinds of causation: “triggering 
causes” and “structuring causes.” He argues that effective conscious 
intentions are indirect and should be seen as structuring causes of our 
actions, while our actions are possibly always triggered unconsciously 
by internal or external stimuli. Conscious distal intention formation is, 
according to him, a structuring cause, which could be conceived as a 
form of “self-programming”: “it causes us to be ‘programmed’ to be 
responsive in specific ways to specific stimuli in specific circumstances” 
(2015, 106). Slor’s notion of “self-programming” fits well within the 
Peircean framework: deliberate habit-formation could be understood as 
a form of programming. A steady orientation toward certain preferred 
goals and ideals enables us to regulate our behavior and ultimately form 
certain preferred habits, that is, to program ourselves.
So, we seem to have good reasons to believe that we not only can set 
distal goals and ideals for ourselves, but also that these goals and ideals 
could affect our future behavior and enable us to form a self that we 
would like to identify with. Longer-term goals and ideals provide ori-
entation and prevent us from fully disintegrating in contingent interac-
tions. They enable us to deliberately identify ourselves with some urges 
and inclinations that we find in ourselves and distance ourselves from 
others. I can, for example, set for myself the longer-term goal to live 
healthier. This goal can help me to regulate my behavior: it enables me to 
monitor and control my eating habits, for example. I will be responsive 
to urges (e.g., “mmm, I would kill for a hamburger”) and short-term 
conscious decisions (e.g., “let’s drive to Burger King for the last time this 
week”) that do not fit my health program, find ways not to succumb to 
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these urges and intentions and gradually adjust my habits in correspon-
dence with my long-term goal.
Now, it also becomes clearer how biological inclinations as well 
as conscious short-term intentions and decisions can be reinterpreted 
from the proposed perspective. Biological inclinations and short-term 
 conscious intentions, which might be instigated by the brain and/or our 
surroundings, can influence or even greatly determine our actions, but 
we do not necessarily have to identify ourselves with them. By virtue 
of longer-term goals and ideals, we can reflect on and effectively adjust 
our inclinations and short-term intentions and form ourselves in a more 
preferred direction.
The proposed approach is sympathetic to the idea of freedom as 
“self-determination,” but it also reframes its meaning. “An action is free 
if (and only if) it can be attributed to my (and not to an enforced or a 
random) will” is translated as “I can only consider an action free if (and 
only is) I have the possibility to identify with it and approve it.” However, 
this “my” does not reside in an inner realm that is unaffected by exter-
nal factors. From the proposed perspective, the self is not an isolated, a 
priori existing entity that “immediately” determines its decisions and 
actions from something “within”: the self is never a completely auton-
omous author of its decisions and actions but is greatly heteronomous 
and receptive. The notion of the “mediated self” neatly expresses that 
there is no “direct” or original self-conception and self-experience but 
that the self rather “indirectly” conceives and experiences itself. What 
we consider our most “real” or “deep” self, including our most personal 
goals and ideals, is affected by a conglomerate of “external” influences; 
hence, the very idea of an original, unmediated self is repudiated. The 
notion of self-formation contributes to this view that the self also forms 
itself by virtue of certain identifications. The self is not an “entity” but 
an “identity.” The extent to which this self can be considered “our real 
or deep” self depends on how well we impose a particular form onto our 
interactions by virtue of an orientation toward certain longer-term goals 
and ideals.
5.4  Brain Imaging Technologies, Extrospection 
and Self-Formation
Brain Imaging Technologies and Self-Formation
The proposed notion of the self as self-formation attempts to offer an 
alternative to the problematic view that the self is realized by the brain 
that acts as a causa sui. Yet, at the same time this does not exclude the 
possibility that brain imaging technologies could play a significant role 
in this process of self-formation. Brain imaging technologies can poten-
tially explicate how our neurophysiology both sets constraints and offers 
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opportunities for the development of specific habits that help or fail to 
help us realizing our long-term ideals.
The use of brain imaging technologies breaks, as argued earlier, with 
the Cartesian idea that privileged, authoritative knowledge of the self 
can only be acquired through introspection. The proposed potential 
of brain imaging technologies to externally acquire even more reliable 
knowledge of the self seems to make them very special or unique. How-
ever, also earlier psychological techniques such as Rorschach tests or 
Intelligence quotient (IQ) tests were used as external sources to attain 
knowledge of the self. What then makes brain imaging more unique 
than these older techniques? More specifically, if brain scans should not 
be understood as direct representations of the brain, how do they differ 
from earlier psychological techniques to attain knowledge of the self?
First of all, it must be acknowledged that with this respect there is a 
continuum between brain imaging technologies and earlier psychologi-
cal techniques: both types of techniques attempt to define or shed light 
on people’s personality as well as on how people relate to themselves, 
thereby providing scientific discourses that offer an implicit normative 
foundation of the self by setting standards that constitute what is “nor-
mal” or “good” (e.g., Hacking 1986; Danziger 1994). Analogously, we 
can say that both types of techniques embody principles that dictate 
what are good processes of self-formation, and offer normative guide-
lines for pursued goals and ideals. Similar to Rorschach and IQ tests, 
brain imaging technologies can be understood as, in the words of Ian 
Hacking, a way to “make up people” (1986). That is, they (among other 
factors) can constitute, facilitate and constrain the possibilities through 
which we can shape and interpret ourselves.
Additionally, methodological challenges against the idea of brain scans 
as direct representations of the human brain/self relativize the difference 
between imaging technologies and, for example, Rorschach tests. We 
have seen that Roskies, for example, shows that brain scans should not 
be understood as pictures of the brain because the information needed to 
interpret brain scans is for the largest part external to them (2007). We 
have also seen that the reading of brain scans cannot be cut loose from 
the experimental circumstances in which several interpretational choices 
are already made. Klein indicates that brain regions and networks are in-
volved in multiple processes and cannot be tied to particular functions. 
This suggests a variety of possible explanations for the activity that is 
visualized on a brain scan (Klein 2010).
Both earlier psychological techniques and brain imaging technologies 
seem to offer a certain view of the self, which, when uncritically ac-
cepted, competes with other possible descriptions of human behavior 
and self-formation. A Rorschach test conceptualizes the self in terms 
of different personality traits, whereas brain scans offer a view on the 
self that is grounded in neurophysiological differences. This continuity 
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between brain imaging and older technologies suggests taking a criti-
cal approach to the omnipresence of the neuroscientific discourse (e.g., 
 Dumit 2004; Slaby 2010).
However, the fact that brain imaging technologies are not represen-
tations of the brain/self does not imply that there is no significant dif-
ference between them and older technologies. In contrast to techniques, 
like Rorschach tests, characteristic for brain imaging technologies is that 
they foreground physiological responses. Instead of uncritically accept-
ing the neuroscientific narrative that brain imaging technologies offer 
direct representations of cognitive functioning, neurophysiological mea-
surements can be critically related to because they allow us to estab-
lish a new physical relation to our own process of self-formation. Brain 
imaging technologies foreground neurophysiological processes, which 
allows us to make sense of – and possibly influence – how our neurol-
ogy co-constitutes the habits that we develop and, in turn, enable us to 
orient toward our long-term ideals. This foregrounding can be seen as 
a new form of technological mediation that opens up new ways of self- 
formation, which highlight the pragmatic contribution of brain imaging 
technologies.
In the case of earlier psychological techniques, neurophysiological in-
teractions were silent processes implicitly running in the background, 
yet of significant influence on our actions and habits. If, however, as 
suggested, our biological and neurological possibilities and constraints 
significantly influence our self-formation, foregrounding those provide 
the opportunity to more explicitly and deliberately relate to them. For 
example, this allows individuals to respond to physiological processes, 
and see the physiological results of their interventions in real time. This 
opens up the opportunity to critically reflect on the relation between 
the urges and habits that we are aware of, and the physiological pro-
cesses that correlate with them. Making this correlation explicit allows 
 individuals to observe that the opportunities and constraints they are 
confronted with can be pragmatically formed not only on a psychologi-
cal, but also on a physiological level.
Extrospection as Critical Self-Identification
Current neuroscientific developments promise allowing individuals to 
 interact with patterns of brain activity, which could contribute to form 
preferred or more preferred selves. Especially the “neurophenomenology” 
program that aims to align first-person and third-person perspectives on 
conscious experience proposed by Varela seems promising in this regard 
(Varela 1996). Neurophenomenology attempts to integrate phenome-
nological qualitative experiences into existing quantitative  research in 
the neuroscience in order to (1) allow neuroscientists to  better interpret 
neurophysiological data relevant to conscious experience (Ibid.), and (2) 
144 Is Self-Formation Possible?
open up new possibilities for individuals to relate to p hysical processes 
correlating with their conscious experiences (Lutz and Thompson 2003). 
Thus far, primarily the former has been discussed, focusing on how phe-
nomenology can be used to epistemologically warrant neuroscientists to 
scientifically investigate conscious experience (e.g., Gallagher and Varela 
2003; Lutz and Thompson 2003; Garrisson et al. 2013). In the pres-
ent context, especially the latter is of interest because it takes seriously 
the potential to use measurements of brain activity for self-formation 
purposes.
The proposed view endorses the aim of neurophenomenology to move 
beyond a computational theory of cognition that interprets brain scans as 
representing how human cognition is functionally realized (Varela et al. 
1991). However, the emphasis on critical self-formation distinguishes 
this proposal from the project of neurophenomenology. The aim here is 
not to develop a methodology grounded in phenomenology that  allows 
for the scientific investigation of conscious experience. Instead, the lead-
ing question is how brain imaging technologies can provide knowledge 
that allows relating the feasibility of habitually realizing our goals and 
ideals in terms of our neurophysiology. This knowledge is not understood 
as obtained through introspection, and neither, as would be in line with 
neurophenomenology (Gallagher and Varela 2003; Varela 1996), as the 
product of a phenomenological reduction through which our habitual 
relation with the lifeworld is bracketed. From the proposed perspective, 
brain imaging technologies are interpreted as pragmatically allowing 
individuals to critically interact with processes that influence their self- 
formation that inevitably takes place in the lifeworld. Labeling this pro-
cess extrospection indicates that this knowledge is – although potentially 
of direct influence on our self-formation – always mediated by both brain 
imaging technologies and the pursued goals and ideals. Brain imaging 
technologies instantiate the existence of new perceptual experiences that 
can be used to deliberately intervene in our self- formation (Aydin 2015).
Understanding the knowledge acquired through brain imaging tech-
nologies in terms of extrospection allows for critical reflection on whether 
our habits are consistent with our pursued long-term goals or ideals. By 
making explicit whether our habits resonate with our ideals in terms of 
their neurophysiological origin, brain imaging technologies offer insight 
in how our neurological set-up affects and is affected by the way we 
form ourselves. This allows for establishing an explicitly critical relation 
with the way our conscious and deliberate self-formation interferes with 
– and is interfered by – our neurophysiology. Self- formation is the con-
tinuous shaping and being shaped by the constraints and opportunities 
that the world and our biology offer. Brain imaging technologies allow 
establishing this critical relation by foregrounding our neurophysiology, 
which is an aspect of our world that was previously out of sight. Conse-
quently, brain imaging technologies can be incorporated in the proposed 
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Peircean framework. When understanding ourselves in terms of self-for-
mation, we are constantly positioned between who we currently are and 
who we eventually want to be. By foregrounding our neurophysiology, 
brain imaging technologies offer insight in how we may more effectively 
be able to pursue our long-term ideals, because they reveal how our hab-
its relate to our neurophysiological make-up.
From this perspective, brain imaging technologies are not understood 
as tools to represent our inner realm, but are seen as ways to help us in 
orienting to our ideals by offering extrospective knowledge of the factors 
that conflict with them. This new form of knowledge is a form of critical 
self-identification, because it makes explicit the neurological constraints 
and possibilities that affect our behavior, which would implicitly remain 
of influence on our self-formation without us being aware.
Self-Formation and Neurofeedback
The proposed framework can be further clarified by applying it to food 
craving, a phenomenon closely associated with developing obesity (e.g., 
Weingarten and Elston 1990; Bowell and Kober 2016; Volkow et al. 
2011). The neural pathways that give rise to food craving could display 
the neurological constraints and opportunities in the attempt to form 
ourselves. Food craving can be defined as an intense desire to consume 
a particular food or food type that is difficult to resist (Weingarten and 
 Elston 1990). From the perspective of self-formation, such short-term 
desires function as constraints on the long-term ideal to form oneself as a 
healthy individual. Food craving correlates with patterns of brain activ-
ity that potentially undermines the realization of a particular  long-term 
ideal. If these patterns are the consequence of (earlier) “bad” habits, they 
potentially also can be altered by developing new habits. Studies suggest 
that noninvasively stimulating specific regions of the brain significantly 
reduces food craving by modulating neuronal constraints (e.g., Goldman 
et al. 2011; Ljubisavljevic et al. 2016). Apparently, our neurology not 
only functions as a constraint on our long-term ideals, but also offers the 
opportunity to develop new habits by altering neural pathways. Brain 
imaging technologies could potentially help us to develop new habits that 
counterbalance patterns of brain activity that instantiate food craving.
Recently, it has been suggested that the paradigm of “neurofeedback” 
can have a unique function in the treatment of eating disorders because 
it allows individuals to voluntarily regulate localized brain activity (e.g., 
Bagdasaryan and Le Van Quyen 2013; Bartholdy et al. 2013). While 
noninvasive brain stimulation still explicitly relies on external interven-
tion, neurofeedback is closely associated with neurophenomenology and 
explicitly directed at giving individuals the possibility to relate to their 
neurophysiology (Bagdasaryan and Le Van Quyen 2013). Respondents 
receive via real-time displays of EEG or fMRI feedback on the way they 
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respond to certain situations. Relating to these displays enables partic-
ipants to actively influence their brain activity in order to attend in a 
more focused manner or respond more sociably using video or audio. 
The clinical merits of neurofeedback on food craving are still in a trial 
phase, but positive results of neurofeedback were found in the treatment 
of also other disorders. For example, the use of neurofeedback reportedly 
had a positive effect on the ability of children diagnosed with Attention- 
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) to concentrate (Gevensleben 
et al. 2009), the capability of individuals to control addiction-related 
impulses by managing dopamine levels (Sulzer et al. 2013), and helped 
increase the mood of people suffering from Major Depressive Disorder 
(MDD) by self-regulating amygdala responses (Young et al. 2014).
These studies support the proposed idea that brain imaging technol-
ogies can potentially inform processes of self-formation because they 
offer extrospective knowledge that allows establishing a relation with 
one’s neurophysiology (e.g., Micoulaud-Franchi et al. 2014). They 
 illustrate how brain imaging technologies could contribute to the forma-
tion of a self that better satisfies our ambitions and life projects. Since 
 technologies mediate our self-identification, they can be integrated in 
our practices in such a way that they can help to bridge possible ten-
sions between how we act and how we would like to act. Neurofeedback 
makes the discrepancy between short-term urges and long-term goals 
physiologically accessible, bringing to the fore a dialectic between the 
process of self-formation and self-identification. When being confronted 
with the neurological constraints that constitute our habits, at the same 
time we are confronted with the opportunity to actively manipulate 
them and turn them into ways to more effectively realize our long-term 
goals. It must be stressed that it is still unclear to what extent neurofeed-
back is effective (see also Thibault et al. 2018). Yet, although one can 
be agnostic about its scientific status, neurofeedback does illustrate how 
brain imaging technologies could be used in self-formation processes. 
Note
 1 Since I reflect on the “context of discovery” only as a means to point at 
“blind spots,” I disregard Kuhnian challenges to the distinction between 
“context of discovery” and “context of justification.”
In the previous chapter, I argued that brain imaging technologies, instead 
of displaying how the self is functionally realized, allow attaining “ex-
trospective knowledge” that can be used in processes of self- formation. 
The notion of “extrospection” highlights that brain imaging  technologies 
can contribute to self-formation by foregrounding both the neurological 
constraints and possibilities that underlie our (unwanted) habits and 
 allow us to directly intervene in or develop new habits in the light of 
desired longer-term ideals.
This problem seems to become even more stringent in the context of 
Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) and Artifactual Mind Thesis (AMT); un-
derstanding the self as a formative process in the world runs the risk 
6 How Critical Is Critical 
Self-Formation?
Building on externalist views of the self entails that the self discovers 
and forms itself by virtue of an orientation toward goals and ideals pro-
vided by society, its institutes and its infrastructure. An issue that I have 
so far left implicit is to what extent those longer-term goals and ideals 
could be subjected to deliberate and critical judgment. If that would be 
impossible, it might greatly harm the proposed approach. I have chal-
lenged the view of the self as something that is determined, in the sense 
of necessitated, by an entity “within” – either consciousness or the 
brain – by arguing that longer-term goals and ideals enable adjusting 
urges and short-term conscious intentions. Longer-term goals and ideals 
also enable, we have seen, regulating and governing our interactions with 
our surroundings. Now, I seem to state that those longer-term values 
and ideals are ultimately determined by what a society finds admirable. 
Have I not simply replaced one necessitating determinant with another 
and rendered impossible free will and, hence, deliberate self-formation? 
In addition, if society provides the goals and ideals by virtue of which 
self-formation is possible, does that not imply that anybody who had 
been socially formed well in, for instance, Hitler’s Germany would have 
supported Nazism, and that the same problem occurs in less perverse 
cases. In short, is calling upon longer-term goals and ideals in order to 
soak off determining factors, variables and antecedents not ultimately a 
detour to yet another version of situationism?
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of falling into yet another determinism, which is also expressed with 
respect to the appropriation of EMT by Gallagher and Crisafi (2009). 
They propose (as we indicated in Chapter 4) that scientific, social, legal 
and educational institutions can be understood in terms of an extended 
mind at work: “we take one of these cognitively produced things and we 
use it for further cognitive production. Our subsequent acts of cogni-
tion are facilitated or enhanced or made possible by particular tools or 
institutional mechanisms” (Gallagher and Crisafi 2009, 51). While they 
think that it is productive to think about cognition as distributed over 
humans, nonhumans and institutions, there also seems to be a downside: 
“the extended mind can come back to bite us; it can place limitations on 
our thinking, as easily as it can enable great and wonderfully extended 
cognitive performances” (Ibid., 51). Social and institutional forces not 
only offer opportunities for self-formation, but also put constraints on 
how self-formation can take place. They further raise the concern of 
“whether thinking itself, as a human enterprise, and as an individual 
practice, has changed (…) because of the particular means that we have 
invented to facilitate or enhance cognition” (Ibid., 51). From AMT, the 
answer to this question is definitely positive: we have seen that in a cri-
tique of EMT, AMT holds that our thinking has no original starting 
point in an internal, unextended biological core that spins, selects or 
maintains the webs of cognitive scaffolding but rather unfolds itself by 
virtue of and through objects, artifacts and institutions. Hence, accord-
ing to AMT, thinking, and also our brain, has always been influenced by 
environmental factors and is increasingly affected by institutions, tech-
nologies and technological infrastructure.
In sum, how is critical self-formation possible if the pursued goals and 
ideals that enable that critical relation are greatly influenced by society? 
And how is it possible from an active externalist view to critically relate 
to our self-formation? Are we still free to relate to and shape our mind 
and self, if that self is inherently embedded in socio-institutional mecha-
nisms and structures? How critical is critical self-formation?
6.1  Are our Longer-Term Goals and Ideals Ultimately 
Determined by Society?
Are our longer-term goals, values and ideals ultimately determined by 
what a society finds acceptable? First of all, it can hardly be denied that 
our goals and ideals are strongly derived from what a society finds ad-
mirable. Therefore, I second Taylor (1992) who argues that all our goals, 
including our most personal preferences, are greatly determined by our 
society, history and tradition. We are born and discover ourselves in a 
social environment that imparts on us certain values, goals and ideals. 
How and in which direction we constitute ourselves is largely dependent 
on what is available in the culture in which we are raised. From this 
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perspective, Frankfurt’s “higher order desires” are also to a great extent 
generated by what a society finds preferable (see also Taylor 1976).
Often, there seems to be, on a basic level, no apparent reason to chal-
lenge those societal goals and ideals. If we want to live a healthier life, 
we often try to achieve it by pursuing goals and ideals that are generally 
accepted: eating less junk food, doing more exercise, not taking drugs, 
not smoking and so forth. These values and ideals enable us to resist 
internal urges and conscious intentions, which might be instigated by 
our biology or particular surroundings, and regulate our behavior. Tech-
nologies like brain imaging technologies can, as argued in the previous 
section, foreground our physiology and help more effectively realize our 
goals and ideals. Usually we do not challenge the legitimacy of those 
goals and ideals, even if we do not live by them.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that it is impossible to challenge goals 
and ideals that a society finds admirable. Situationists who b elieve that 
free will does not exist because our actions are determined by f eatures 
of the environment of which we are not aware, or of whose influence 
we are not aware (see, e.g., Williams and Bargh 2008), commit a fal-
lacy similar to neuroscientists who claim that the deterministic nature of 
brain processes rules out free will (see also the example of JoJo above). 
We have seen that, for example, brain imaging technologies can make 
neuronal patterns underlying tendencies and urges visible and subject to 
ratification, intervention or alteration. Dependent on our longer-term 
ambitions, those tendencies could be rejected but also endorsed. Anal-
ogously, the fact that a preference is strongly determined by societal 
factors does not necessarily make it enforced, and, therefore, not-mine 
and, therefore, unfree. Rather, the extent of freedom depends on the 
degree of critical identification with our conduct. Longer-term goals and 
ideals enable us to question immediate urges and conscious intentions. 
However, those longer-term goals and ideals could also be subjected to 
deliberation, critique and so forth. The self’s ability not to completely 
coincide with itself and anticipate possible alternative future behavior 
enables deliberate self-formation. The self is, in other words, divided, 
and is able to relate to itself and adjust its future conduct; in the words of 
Peirce, the actual self can engage in a critical dialogue with “that other 
self that is just coming into life in the flow of time” (Peirce CP 5.421). 
This dialog can, as I will further elaborate below, also be conceived as a 
narrative that can be more or less consistent.
It must be clear that challenging societal goals and ideals will not 
come about spontaneously; in order to make that possible, favorable 
conditions need to be created. The incentive for “critical identification” 
cannot only come from individuals, but should also be embedded at a 
societal level. A healthy, open society is characterized by built-in mech-
anisms and tools (democratic regulations, informed consent, the pos-
sibility to opt out etc.) that enable people to deliberately and critically 
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identify themselves with certain needs and desires, including the ideals 
that society finds preferable. The society we live in might, for exam-
ple, strongly favor both spouses working. However, there are men and 
women who after careful and critical deliberation reject this ideal, often 
by referring to “other” or “higher” goals and ideals. In their turn, the 
more critically acquired ideals are also subject to criticism and so ad 
infinitum. Even our most cherished goals and ideals, both on a personal 
and societal level, could be challenged.
I admit that there is here the potential for an endless sequence of eval-
uations, the so-called threat of an infinite regress. However, this is only 
a big problem if the final goal is to reach a completely independent and 
autonomous decision (I disregard here whether this “problem” under-
mines Frankfurt’s view of free will and personhood). From the proposed 
perspective, the possibility of an endless sequence of evaluations is not a 
problem, but rather a positive challenge: how “real” or “deep” the self is 
depends on the extent and intensity of its actual engagements in identify-
ing with ever-inclusive goals and ideals. Reaching a stage in which goals 
and ideals can no longer be contested is not only impossible but also 
undesirable (see Peirce CP 1.405, 1.173, 1.121; see also Aydin 2009). 
The belief in a Peircean ultimate ideal has, as we have seen, a regulative 
aim to enable genuine criticism and prevent absolutist claims that bring 
further analysis and improvement to a halt.
This remains a delicate issue: society can contribute to deliberative 
and self-critical thought but can also have a manipulative impact, which 
could render critical self-formation, and, hence, freedom, virtually im-
possible. In a worst case scenario, it is even possible that people who, 
to take up again the mentioned example, are in favor of both spouses 
working are manipulated by their society and people who are against 
it are deceived by other forces; what both groups consider their “own” 
choice is then, in reality, determined by factors that remain hidden for 
them, which would render critical identification impossible.
However, taking this objection to the extreme means returning to 
the assumption that there is a purely autonomous self. It is by virtue of 
 longer-term goals and ideals that a self is able to form itself in a partic-
ular direction and is not the result of contingent biological inclinations 
and contingent interactions with its surroundings. Without an orienta-
tion toward longer-term goals and ideals, the self would fall apart and 
never reach a sense of “wholeness.” So the question is not whether our 
decisions or actions spring from pure inner preferences or whether they 
are reliant on external factors but rather whether and how much room 
there is for critical identification. An action can be considered “really” 
and “deeply” mine, and hence free, if it is an expression of a critically 
formed self. Although the degree of critical thought that societies allow, 
and the measures that they take to foster it, greatly varies – and is an 
empirical issue – there seems to be no strong arguments that render it 
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impossible. Societies do often build in mechanisms that make room for 
other, foreign or deviant views. Hence, critical identification comes in 
different degrees and is at least possible on different levels.
6.2 A re our Cognitive and Neurological Means to Form 
Ourselves Determined by Institutions?
How can the posed threat to the possibility of critical self-formation 
be thwarted more specifically with regard to the externalist positions 
that I have defended, that is, AMT and the pragmatic appropriation 
of brain imaging technologies? How can we tackle the possibility that 
our very thinking has been formed by the particular institutions “that 
we have invented to facilitate or enhance cognition?” (Gallagher and 
Crisafi 2009, 51). Have EMT, and even stronger AMT, “come back to 
bite us?” (Ibid., 51). Can we critically relate to our self-formation, con-
sidering the external forces that influence the development of our mind 
and brain? This basically refers us to the question of to what extent we 
can form ourselves critically if we, at the same time, acknowledge that 
the technologies and the technological environments that are subject to 
such critical scrutiny and evaluation are greatly shaping the very fabric 
of ourselves. In the third part of this study, this question will be further 
investigated in terms of critical appropriation of (particular) “intrusive” 
technologies.
From her perspective, Catherine Malabou (2008) has articulated this 
threat by arguing that there is a close connection between the under-
standing of ourselves in terms of the plasticity of the brain and the soci-
etal demand to be flexible citizens and employees. Plasticity refers to the 
idea that neuronal interactions in our brain are not fixed once and for all, 
but can change in relation to both societal demands and our own prefer-
ences. According to Malabou, when uncritically accepted, the plasticity 
of our brain functions as a scientific legitimization of the societal status 
quo, as a neurological legitimation of societal demands. She holds that 
the idea of the plasticity of our brain conforms to the demand that to be 
flexibly capable to easily switch between different tasks, thereby denying 
the importance of individual variability: “In effect, anyone who is not 
flexible deserves to disappear” (Malabou 2008, 46).
Even if we would not fully agree with Malabou’s diagnosis, it points 
out that it is possible that the institutional frameworks through which 
we are shaped render critical self-identification and self-formation im-
possible: how can the self critically identify itself with the very same 
forces and constraints that have greatly shaped it? Malabou’s analysis 
brings to the fore that the idea that our actions, goals and ideals are 
predetermined by our neurophysiology can be understood as the ef-
fect of institutional forces that put constraints on our own process of 
self-formation.
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Along the lines of the reasoning in the previous section, we have, first 
of all, to acknowledge that institutions in very closed and totalitarian 
 societies could strongly engrave patterns in our brain, determine our 
practical thinking and render critical self-formation virtually impossi-
ble. For that reason, I have stressed that critical self-formation is not 
only an individual but also a societal challenge: critical self-formation 
entails societies building in mechanisms and tools that foster that capac-
ity. Moreover, the plasticity of the brain not only allows society imposing 
its demands on it, but it also enables assertive people actively engaging 
with and manipulating it. It is not either-or. Malabou recognizes this 
“affordance” of the brain too: plasticity does not only allow the environ-
ment to shape the brain but it also makes it possible for people to form 
neuronal interactions relative to their own preferred ideals (2008, 11). 
For example, someone who desires to become a piano player could coun-
terbalance an environment that does not encourage developing musical 
skills by practicing regularly on a piano available in, for example, train 
stations (which these days has become fashionable in the Netherlands), 
which would shape the neuronal and synaptic interactions in the brain 
through which piano skills are co-shaped. Forming these interactions is 
the consequence of the desire to develop oneself in this way. However, 
this indicates in its turn that this counterbalance, in this case making 
pianos available in train stations, is dependent on societal organization. 
Accordingly, Malabou (2008, 11) argues that the structure of society is 
not a mere reflection of what is going on in the brain anyway, but that it 
is possible to actively form and adjust brain and self, also in dissonance 
with societal preferences. What needs to be added to this “way out” 
suggested by Malabou is that it is always possible to highlight certain 
societal measures that allow a counterbalance, for example, making pia-
nos available in train stations, in their turn as determinants that restrict 
critical self-formation. As indicated in the previous section, it must be 
acknowledged that critical identification comes in different degrees and 
is at least possible on different levels.
By foregrounding our neurophysiology and offering extrospec-
tive knowledge, brain imaging technologies can disclose possibilities 
to form the brain more effectively and critically. Instead of offering 
 theoretical-conceptual knowledge of the plasticity of our brain – what 
seems to be Malabou’s proposal – brain imaging technologies allow the 
proposed perspective of the practical-perceptual visualization of one’s 
neurophysiology. Doing so, they can offer insight into how we more ef-
fectively can pursue our longer-term ideals, because they reveal how our 
habits relate to our neurophysiological make-up. Brain imaging tech-
nologies can help us to gradually make the transition from who we are 
and who society want us to be to who we eventually want to be; we can, 
for example, do something about our urges to give in to instigations 
from the market to consume fast food. Moreover, they can reveal that 
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a change in our habits is also accompanied with a neurophysiological 
change. This takes Malabou’s narrative one step further: by foreground-
ing the neurophysiological plasticity of the brain, brain imaging technol-
ogies reveal that we can change the brain processes that both enable and 
constrain the habits that we develop.
6.3 Reinterpreting Freedom as Self-Formation
From the proposed perspective, “self-formation” is not a given but a chal-
lenge. Decisive for the “realness” or “deepness” of the self is, as I have 
argued, not whether its actions spring from inner preferences, and are, 
therefore, not reliant on external factors, but rather the degree to which 
that self was able to form itself in a process of critical identification with 
various (biological, neurological, social, institutional) influences. This 
alternative approach could, I believe, contribute to reinterpreting current 
neuropsychological findings regarding free will and overcome some of 
the limitations of more established approaches in free will debates. I will 
briefly touch on how those findings could be integrated within the pro-
posed framework, without pretending to provide a detailed argument, 
which I leave to possible future research.
Own Actions and Odd Actions
If neuroscientists and social psychologists like Libet et al. (1983) and 
 Wegner (Wegner and Wheatley 1999) claim that our actions are often 
 determined by unconscious causes that are brought about by  neurological 
processes, they are absolutely right. Neuroscientists, who claim that un-
conscious causes co-shape our “true” or “real” self, could be also right. 
They are, however, wrong when they claim that we usually only identify 
ourselves with our conscious and not with our unconscious part. We do 
not necessarily have to identify with our unconscious urges and habits, 
but often we do. Driving a car is for the most part something that we 
do unconsciously. Indeed, if we think too much about how to operate 
the car, it can actually hinder our ability to drive safely. However, we 
usually do not respond to appraisal or blame after preventing or causing 
a car accident with “it was not me driving the car.” On other occa-
sions, we might identify less strongly with our urges: I might respond 
aggressively to my children’s inappropriate behavior, while not want-
ing to accept that I am an impatient or aggressive father. A person can 
identify less or more with her unconscious, biological inclinations. How 
“true,” “real” or “deep” her self is depends on the degree of deliberate 
and critical identification with those urges she feels in the process of 
self- formation. In other words, the extent a person can be attributed 
“real” or “deep” agency is dependent on the degree of self-critique in the 
process of self-formation.
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Further, we have seen that conscious longer-term intentions could in-
directly influence our actions. This idea integrates well with the pro-
posed framework. Take the example of the impatient and aggressive 
father: every time I respond aggressively to my children’s inappropriate 
behavior, I might experience a certain discrepancy between how I act 
and how I would like to act. After repeatedly reflecting on my behav-
ior, recurrently realizing that responding more calmly has a much better 
 effect on my children’s conduct, listening to the feedback of my wife on 
my behavior and trying out different techniques (from “counting to ten” 
to neurofeedback) in order to prevent the same mistakes, I might finally 
succeed in changing my behavior (recall Peirce’s account of self-control, 
discussed earlier). The measures outlined would then have helped me to 
adjust my tendencies and habits, and to gradually develop a disposition 
that better corresponds to my ideal. It must be clear that I may not only 
identify myself with unconscious habits and tendencies that cause my ac-
tions (that is, if they fit my longer-term goals and ideals), but also could 
not-identify with conscious decisions, which I may make anyway (recall 
the Burger King example above).
To what extent the ideals that I pursue are really my ideals instead of 
my wife’s or societies’ remains a difficult question to answer in general. 
Excessive biological inclinations, a very dominant wife or an extremely 
repressive society might leave me virtually no room to critically form my-
self in pursuit of (ever more) preferable goals and ideals. However, in 
general it is possible to intervene in biology – not all wives are (equally) 
dominant and not all societies (equally) repressive. Moreover, without 
intuitions engraved in my biology, the feedback of people around me and 
the goals and ideals society provides me, I would not be able to acquire 
the critical attitude needed to form myself into a person that is not the 
plaything of contingent circumstances. Freedom should, therefore, not be 
sought outside those determinants. However, even though those determi-
nants form who I am, there is no determinant that is singled out as neces-
sitating my actions. Longer-term goals and ideals as well as technologies 
that could foreground different aspects of my personality (physiological 
or psychological) enable me to display the gap between who I am and 
who I would want to become and gradually work toward a preferred self.
This view of the relation between short-term and longer-term inten-
tions sheds a different light on what I consider “my actions.” I consider 
an action as “my action” if it fits the goals and ideals that I want to ac-
complish. Whether an action can be considered as “my action” does not 
depend on whether it can be attributed to a necessitating determinant 
“within” (conscious or unconscious), but to whether it fits the character 
traits and dispositions that others and I find typical for me, whether it 
reflects the longer-term goals and ideals that define me.
Of course, this view needs further refinement. Simply considering any 
action that conflicts with my ideals as “not mine” is too blunt. I need to 
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convince others and myself that I really have devoted myself to the goals 
and ideals that are in discord with the action in question. In general, this 
view is not at odds with every day lived experience: if somebody does 
something that is completely dissonant with what she usually personi-
fies, questions could be and often are raised: was it really Mary? Is this 
the result of a misunderstanding? Did she act under pressure? Has she 
had a really bad day? Is she on drugs? And so on.
There might be other situations when a person continuously displays 
actions that seem to be in discord with her ideals. We even might call 
these shortcomings “in character,” even if the ideals she fails to meet 
might ultimately be her target. This again raises questions and we often 
seek structural reasons: peer-pressure, weakness of will, addiction, neu-
rological proclivities and so forth. Whether her actions are really “odd,” 
and, therefore, could not be (completely) attributed to her, depends on 
the plausibility of explanations offered for this discrepancy.
We see here again a strong relation between the “realness” or “deep-
ness” of the self and critical self-formation: whether an action is an 
 expression of my “real” or “deep” self (and, hence, can be attributed 
to me) depends on the degree to which that self was able to form itself 
in a process of deliberate and critical identification with various influ-
ences (biological, neurological, social etc.). However, evaluating to what 
 extent my actions are on a par with my “real” or “deep” self is not only 
considered in prospect, but often also in retrospect.
Taylor (1992) offers an “instrument” to evaluate whether my actions are 
on a par with my “real” self. If there is no tension between my actions 
and the long-term goals and ideals that I pursue, which form to a great 
extent (depending on the degree of critical identification) my “real” self, 
I can also often manage to fit my actions into a comprehensible story. 
And I could manage to do that even if those actions were not the result 
of conscious decisions. I can still persuade others and myself that the 
actions can be given, as Taylor says (1992), a meaningful place in a co-
herent narrative about myself.
From this perspective, the writings of Wegner and Wheatley (1999) 
and others on “unconscious actions” and “confabulation” can be rein-
terpreted. If I intend to live a healthier life and somebody asks me why 
I bought “healthier” cookies, I will be tempted to give reasons that fit 
into my project of living a healthy life. That does not mean that choosing 
those cookies (at that time) was a conscious choice. If I have been suc-
cessfully practicing living a healthy life for a long time, I will buy healthy 
food out of habit and without thinking consciously. In this instance, 
my choice would be the result of an unconscious cause that I explain 
Successful and Unsuccessful Self-Interpretation 
and Self-Formation
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afterwards. So even if my unconscious choice harmonizes with my ide-
als, it has to be characterized as what Wegner calls “confabulation”: I 
reconstruct a certain intention for something I did unconsciously and 
then pretend I consciously experienced that intention prior to the action.
This example shows that “confabulation” does not have to be sheer 
fabrication. It can make complete sense for others and myself why I 
acted so and not otherwise, even though I reconstructed a reason for my 
action afterwards. The question again is not whether the action imme-
diately springs from conscious inner intentions or decisions, but rather 
whether it is “really” or “deeply” on a par with my longer-term goals 
and ideals. The more I am able to convince others and myself – from a 
Peircean perspective: ideally an infinite (internal and external) commu-
nity of critical minds – that the consistency between the action and my 
longer-term goals and ideals is not accidental but the result of deliberate 
and critical self-formation, the more I can attribute the action to my 
“real” or “deep” self.
It is quite possible that my unconscious choice to go for a healthy type 
of cookie has another reason than the one I have provided, even though 
I really believe in the given reason and attempt to give it a meaningful 
place in a coherent narrative about myself. It is possible that the real 
reason was not that those cookies were healthy, but simply that they 
were to the right on the shelves in the store; and due to a particular brain 
mechanism goods that are lying to the right on a shelf are chosen more 
often than goods that are lying to the left (I’m referring here to Nisbett 
and Wilson’s (1977) experiment). “Confabulation” could in that case be 
qualified as unsuccessful self-interpretation, as suggested by Slors (2012, 
142–161). Unsuccessful self-interpretation could be a sign of self-deceit, 
although that is not necessarily the case.
Often, one way to find out is to gauge whether other related actions 
are also on a par with my pursued long-term goals and ideals. Suppose 
that I not only took the cookies, but without thinking also pitched into 
my cart the cream that I always bought in my unhealthy period, which 
tasted so nice on top of my cookies. If I really do not know how that 
cream ended up in my cart and, for example, tell others and myself after-
wards that I bought it to train myself not to give in to unhealthy urges, 
then I am probably fooling myself. I invent reasons to make my actions 
fit my ideal, while the fact is that I just have not succeeded in achiev-
ing that ideal. In this instance, failed self-interpretation is also a sign of 
failed self-formation.
This proposed framework for self-deception suggests that I do not or 
do not want to recognize that my short-term intentions (unconscious or 
conscious) and long-term projects are not “really” or “deeply” brought 
into line. There may be consistency between them, but this consistency 
is not the result of critical and deliberate self-formation but rather of 
 accidental circumstances (in the first “healthy cookies” case, the result 
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of the influence of a neurological proclivity of which I am not aware). 
Brain imaging technologies in the proposed framework of self-formation 
could help to make visible to what extent our confabulations are expres-
sions of contingent urges or urges that are in par with our long-term 
goals and ideals.
As mentioned earlier, Doris presents extensive evidence showing that 
we often act in a rash and downright complacent manner. When the 
causes of an actor’s cognition or behavior are not recognized by her 
as reasons for that cognition or behavior, were she conscious of these 
causes at the time of acting, Doris characterizes these causes as “de-
featers.” Agency is defeated because reason is overwhelmed or circum-
vented (Doris 2015, 52, 64f). From my perspective, what is decisive is 
not whether I am consciously aware of all the causes of my actions, but 
rather whether they can be convincingly given a meaningful place in a 
coherent narrative about myself and are together expressions of a delib-
erately and critically formed “real” or “deep” self.
In response to his findings regarding defeated agency, Doris develops 
another, more positive argument, which is also relevant for the approach 
that I propose. In his collaborativist account of agency, Doris (2015) 
stresses that we adopt values in collaboration with others (our intimates, 
peers, culture). In addition, he suggests that we do not only tell stories to 
each other about who we are and why we acted; these stories also exert a 
powerful force over us and co-determine our agency. From this perspec-
tive, our self-ignorance and liability to confabulate about our reasons 
for action provide an opportunity for collaborative agent-formation. In 
social interactions, dissonance between our attitudes and our behavior 
can become visible, which often prompts us to avoid situations where 
this dissonance could be displayed or try and bring our attitudes in line 
with our behavior, or vice versa.
From the proposed interactionist perspective, I can completely endorse 
Doris’ collaborativist account of agency: our self-formation is indeed 
co-determined by the contributions of others to the stories that we tell. 
We especially achieve diachronic identity in collaboration with others (in 
the next part of the book I will take this even further and argue that so-
cietal and technological interaction is a necessary condition for develop-
ing not only a social, but also a singular self). Doris rightly suggests that 
social interaction could facilitate better reasoning and the expression of 
individual agential values. That is, social interaction can reveal whether 
a person’s actions and longer-term goals are on a par and whether this is 
the result of deliberate and critical self-identification and self-formation; 
in the process of negotiation, I could discover that the coherent narrative 
I “made up” is the result of accidental influences (recall the “healthy 
cookies” example). However, there are no guarantees: social interaction 
could facilitate better reasoning and decrease self-deceit, but perverted, 
manipulative groups or societies could actually increase self-ignorance 
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and render critical self-formation virtually impossible. We see here that 
not only brain images but also the responses of other p eople could func-
tion as “technologies” or “techniques” that make discrepancies between 
urges and long-term intentions visible. What is special about brain 
 imaging technologies is that they make visible and enable intervention 
into neurological patterns underlying our conduct.
Free Will and Unfree Will
From the proposed perspective, I have neither directly shown that free 
will exists nor that it does not exist. This question has rather been 
 reformulated and specified by interpreting “free will” in terms of the 
ability to determine and subsequently form oneself. I have developed 
this view of “freedom” as “self-formation” in response to, on the one 
hand, accounts that challenge the idea that our (real) self can govern our 
behavior (certain brain researchers and situationists), and, on the other 
hand, views that attach freedom solely to internal causation and claim 
that only actions that originate in factors internal to me can be morally 
attributed to me.
From the proposed view, I have argued that our “(real) self” does not 
correlate with something “within.” There is no detached inner “real self” 
as a necessitating cause behind our decisions and actions. Several factors 
contribute to self-determination in an intrinsic interaction:  biological 
 inclinations, conscious decisions and social circumstances. However, 
we cannot single out one factor that determines (in the sense of “ne-
cessitates”) our behavior. I have argued that longer-term ambitions and 
ideals enable us to make a distinction between who we are and who we 
want to be, and, hence, identify ourselves with certain determinants and 
not-identify with others. From this perspective, self-determination can 
be understood as a process of self-formation. The self is not conceived 
as something that is completely determined by neurological or social or 
even (shorter-term) conscious influences, but rather as a relational being 
that attempts to regulate its behavior by virtue of extrospective knowl-
edge acquired from technologies, longer-term goals and ideals and possi-
ble discrepancies between the two with the aim to form a more attractive 
self, which is a better index of freedom.
This perspective sheds a different light on free will. If there is no a pri-
ori existing self that coincides with something “within” (consciousness 
or brain), then there also cannot be an a priori existing “free” or “un-
free” self that is completely dependent on that “within.” Acting freely, 
in the sense of acting in such a way that I act, may well not have the im-
plication that my action is the immediate result of conscious intentions; 
it does, however, from the proposed perspective, mean that longer-term 
goals and ideals allow me to work on my undesirable habits and to grad-
ually become the self that I want to be. This view also allows us to see 
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that our will is not free or unfree, but rather to a greater or lesser degree 
free. Acquiring freedom requires practice and can succeed to varying 
degrees.
This perspective acknowledges that biological inclinations and short-
term conscious intentions might be to a great extent instigated by the 
brain and/or our surroundings. However, the argument that we often 
act unconsciously or are greatly influenced by our surroundings by no 
means excludes the possibility of the existence of free will. An action can 
be considered as my action and, therefore, an expression of a free will, 
if it fits with the longer-term goals and ideals that I pursue and consider 
worthwhile and desirable. Then, I can also adequately explain why I 
acted in the way I did.
I have argued that freedom comes in different degrees: the degree of 
freedom depends on the degree of critical identification with our con-
duct. Longer-term goals and ideals enable us to question immediate 
urges and conscious intentions. However, those longer-term goals and 
ideals could also be subjected to deliberation and critique. Whether we 
have free will on “higher levels” is dependent on the degree of being able 
to critically endorse the goals and ideals by virtue of which we form our-
selves. Freedom and unfreedom are expressions of the degree of success 
or failure of critical self-formation.
Moreover, “critical identification” is not only a responsibility of 
 individuals, but also a societal challenge. Since society greatly influences 
the goals and ideals by virtue of which people are formed, and even 
the criteria those people use to evaluate whether they ought to identify 
 themselves with those goals and ambitions, society has a great responsi-
bility to set conditions that allow people to critically appropriate those 
goals and ideals.
From the proposed perspective, there is a strong relation between the 
“realness” or “deepness” of the self and critical self-formation: whether 
an action is an expression of my “real” or “deep” self – and, hence, of 
free will – depends on the degree to which that self was able to form 
itself in a process of deliberate and critical identification with various in-
fluences (biological, neurological, social). So the question is not whether 
our decisions or actions spring from inner preferences or whether they 
are reliant on external factors, but rather whether and how much room 
there was, is and will be for critical self-identification and, hence, critical 
self-formation.
Is self-formation in a technological world possible? In this part of the 
book, I have investigated this question by setting the stage with a brief 
discussion of positions pro and contra the existence of freedom rele-
vant for my theme: Kantian notions of autonomy and responsibility, sit-
uationist and brain-determinist accounts of freedom and positions that 
endorse the existence of free will in the context of neuroscience. I have 
argued that despite sophisticated and relevant differences,  proponents 
and opponents of autonomy, freedom and responsibility often assume 
a false categorical distinction between an “inside” and an “outside” 
realm, which prevents them from overcoming an essentialist view of the 
self and a dualist view of (real) self and world. This dualist framework 
evokes, as I have shown, particular notions of “control” and “freedom,” 
which inform and also misinform debates about autonomy, freedom and 
responsibility. Although participants in these debates do not agree on 
the question of whether consciousness/mind, the brain or the environ-
ment can be attributed causal efficacy and control, they often share, as 
I have shown, the view that freedom can only be attributed to an agent 
that is not fundamentally affected or determined by something external. 
I have claimed that radically dissolving the inside-outside distinction 
has the potential to bring about a radically different view of autonomy 
and freedom, and shed a different light on the question of whether self- 
formation is possible.
Next, I have tried to radically challenge the inside-outside fallacy that 
underlies dualist views by demonstrating that the mind, which was for 
Descartes, Kant and other essentialists and dualists the mark of the in-
ternal, has a material dimension and that matter, which was for those 
authors the mark of the external, has a mental and intelligible dimension. 
I have elaborated this view of the mind as “artifactual” (and the material 
as mental) in a constructive criticism of the EMT. I have indicated that 
EMT is a very interesting, fruitful and bold attempt to demonstrate how 
our cognitive system can contain external objects and technical artifacts, 
but that it still preserves a pivotal distinction between inside and outside 
in its account of the relation between the human organism and the world 
of external objects and artifacts, a distinction which they proclaim to 
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have overcome. Inspired by Charles S. Peirce’s philosophy of mind, in 
particular, I have tried to find a way out of this “inside–outside” fallacy. 
External objects, artifacts or processes should, I have proposed, not be 
conceived as inanimate and unintelligent matter utilized by a separately 
living, inner mental sphere that has set certain pre-established goals for 
itself. Instead of being extended by an inner biological cognitive core, 
mind, I have argued, unfolds itself through objects and artifacts; it has 
an artifactual character. Mind as such is, especially in our modern tech-
nological culture, shaped by virtue of and through technical artifacts. 
Recognizing this artifactual dimension of mind will, I have concluded, 
enable a more critical analysis of contemporary claims that ascribe cer-
tain original and irreducible features to thinking. AMT displays that in 
both internalists’ views and EMT the radical influence of technologies is 
rendered invisible. By depriving cognition of its original, non-derived and 
independent features (the “mark of the mental”), situated in a presumed 
inside, it becomes possible to recognize how the mechanisms attributed 
to it were influenced by certain technologies, but also to make visible 
and evaluate those technologies and the thinking that they have gener-
ated. AMT enables addressing the question of self-formation within a 
framework that does not separate an inside world from an outside world 
and evaluate which realm controls the other but within one that recog-
nizes the role of technologies in developing and becoming a self.
The notion of self-formation was then further elaborated by focusing 
on a particular type of technologies that are increasingly shaping our 
view of mind, brains and self, namely brain imaging technologies. Brain 
imaging technologies are, as I have shown, of special importance for this 
study because data and images provided by brain scanners are used to 
draw causal relations between brain processes and cognitive functions, 
and to potentially resolve the question of whether the self is free or deter-
mined, and, hence, self-formation is possible. In that respect, I have de-
veloped two lines of reasoning: the first line of reasoning shows that the 
usage of contemporary brain imaging technologies to understand how 
the self is functionally realized is continuous with a problematic Carte-
sian framework that relies on the idea of a fully autonomous self that is 
detached from the world, which was inspired by the camera obscura. 
From the proposed approach, it becomes possible to recognize the rele-
vance of brain imaging technologies without having to endorse a dualist 
view of mind/brain and world. As we have seen, this requires, first of all, 
acknowledging that brain images are not “immediate” representations 
or photographs of brain processes. This is not only because of method-
ological difficulties concerning reliability and validity, but also because 
fMRI images necessarily frame the brain in a particular way, making the 
very notion of “direct representation” untenable. The proposed approach 
helps revealing this particular framing. Second, the proposed approach 
reveals that brain images do not show that the brain is the “locus of the 
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self” or our “real self” but rather they mediate a particular conception 
of the relation between brain and self: brain images, in so far as they are 
taken as potential functional evidence, bring about the idea of the brain 
as an agent – and hence as a real or deep self – that instigates cognition 
and controls behavior. Third, the proposed view i llustrates that brain 
images do not prove the existence or nonexistence of free will, but rather 
mediate a particular conception of freedom: by framing the brain as an 
isolated region, the (Cartesian) idea of freedom as an independent realm 
that is unaffected by external influences is sustained and rehabilitated.
The proposed framework enables putting forward a different 
 interpretation of what brain imaging technologies display, which takes 
us beyond Cartesian dualisms. If technologies mediate our conception of 
the self as well as the self’s capacity for free will, then it does not make 
any sense to try to acquire an unmediated, original conception of free 
will. We should rather acknowledge that our view of free will is and al-
ways has been influenced by the technologies that we employ to  identify 
it. Free will understood as “the capacity of an agent to d etermine itself 
and not be determined by someone or something else” disregards the 
fact that the medium (in our case, brain imaging technologies) that is ex-
pected to establish whether “free will” exists (i.e., whether we are able to 
determine ourselves) co-determines how we conceive “free will.” How-
ever, brain images cannot provide us with direct access to a “within” – 
the brain – that is not affected by a “without” because our very notion 
of that “within” is co-determined by external influences. The brain as an 
independent realm that is unaffected by external influences can only be 
validated in the context of neuroscience by making the external, techni-
cal conditions that have generated it invisible.
The second line of reasoning displays a discontinuity between the use of 
brain imaging technologies and the Cartesian framework. We have seen 
that brain imaging technologies challenge the idea that i ntrospection is a 
source of privileged, authoritative knowledge of the self. I have proposed 
a pragmatic understanding of brain imaging technologies. This ap-
proach shares with enactivist and neurophenomenological  perspectives 
the idea that the self is not an identifiable entity, and that both subjective 
experiences and scientific insights on how aspects of the self are real-
ized should be considered (Gallagher and Varela 2003; Gallagher 2007). 
In this respect, I brought to the fore the relevance of the knowledge 
obtained through brain imaging technologies for the experiencing sub-
ject. When being confronted with previously unobservable neurophysi-
ological processes, the possibility to critically identify with these opens 
up. Brain imaging technologies can confront individuals with how their 
habits are co-constituted by neurophysiological processes. This, in turn, 
constitutes the possibility to develop new ways of self-formation.
From this perspective, brain images are not used to represent the “real” 
determinants of a person’s behavior and show that she cannot control 
Conclusion Part II 163
her actions and is a powerless spectator, but rather practically confront 
the concerned person with her actions and enable her to change them in 
such a way that they correspond better with the way she would like to 
act. Neurofeedback was used as an example to show how current neuro-
scientific developments could be integrated in the proposed framework: 
using neurofeedback, individuals can critically reflect on whether their 
habits are consistent with the long-term goals or ideals they orient to.
This is where the two different lines of reasoning converge. Instead of 
debating brain imaging technologies in terms of their representational 
qualities, from the proposed framework they are understood in terms 
of how they mediate new opportunities for self-formation by making 
present how our neurophysiology co-constitutes our habits. By attaining 
extrospective knowledge of our physiology, brain imaging technologies 
potentially allow for intervening in the habits we form when pursuing 
our existing long-term ideals. Understood in this way, brain imaging 
technologies contribute to self-formation by making explicit the neuro-
logical constraints and possibilities that coincide with our (unwanted) 
habits, without relying on a Cartesian, representationalist framework.
In the last chapter of this part of the book, I discussed an important 
caveat. I challenged the view of the self as something that is determined, 
in the sense of necessitated, by an entity “within” – either conscious-
ness or the brain – by arguing that longer-term goals and ideals enable 
us to not identify with and adjust our urges and short-term conscious 
intentions. However, I have also stated that those longer-term values 
and ideals are ultimately determined by what a society finds admirable. 
Have I not simply replaced one necessitating determinant with another 
and rendered impossible free will and, hence, deliberate self-formation? 
From EMT to an even stronger AMT, this problem becomes even more 
stringent, since it holds that our thinking unfolds itself by virtue of and 
through objects, artifacts and institutions, which implies that our think-
ing as well as our brain become even more dependent on technologies 
and institutions. In addition, if the structures or brain can be changed 
according to particular goals and ideals, ultimately derived from society, 
using brain imaging technologies, what does then guarantee that we are 
not a plaything of contingent societal systems and ideologies?
I responded to this difficulty by, first of all, recognizing that our goals 
and ideals are indeed strongly derived from what a society finds admira-
ble. However, this, as I have contended, does not make it impossible to 
challenge societal goals and ideals. Facilitating this possibility requires 
creating favorable conditions, which cannot only be done by individuals 
but should also be embedded at a societal level. I have argued that crit-
ical identification comes in different degrees and is at least possible on 
different levels. The plasticity of the brain shows that not only the envi-
ronment can shape the brain, but that it is also possible to form neuro-
nal interactions relative to goals and ideals that diverge from particular 
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 societal demands. Since the structure of society is not a mere reflection 
of what is going on in the brain anyway, it is possible to actively form 
and adjust it, also in dissonance with societal preferences.
This approach reframes free will. From the proposed perspective, 
 acting freely does not have the implication that my action is the immedi-
ate result of conscious intentions. However, it does indicate that critical 
self-identification allows me to work on my undesirable habits and to 
gradually become the self that I want to be, which might be a better 
indication of freedom. From this perspective, the self is not an isolated, 
a priori existing entity that is “immediately” determined by something 
“within” – consciousness or brain – but rather continuously discovers 
and forms itself by virtue of its identifications and non-identifications 
with its various (biological, neurological, social, institutional) determi-
nants. The self is always a “self in the making.”
After having elaborated why the self should be conceived as “self- 
formation” (part I) and in what sense self-formation is possible (part II), 
the question that arises now is: how then ought we to form ourselves? In 
which direction should we shape ourselves in a culture that is saturated 
with technology? And if technologies can contribute to self-formation, 
how then can we technologically form ourselves?
In this part of the book, I will investigate the question of how to form 
ourselves by first analyzing if technological self-formation is conceived 
best as technological “self-enhancement.” Developments in nanotech-
nology, biotechnology, information technologies and cognitive science 
(NBIC; and more recently and specifically artificial intelligence) have fu-
eled high hopes and expectations. Radical techno-optimists believe that 
these disciplines will converge (hence, NBIC-convergence) and radically 
transform and improve society and humans: discoveries in one field will 
serve for research in another and generate a synergy that will multiply 
the power of research and enable spectacular advances. Some advocates, 
labeling themselves as trans- or posthumanists (lately, additional brands 
and flavors have been introduced), forcefully defend harnessing this 
knowledge for radical enhancement of human capacities and functions. 
In the words of one of the transhumanists’ spokesmen:
Transhumanists view human nature as a work-in-progress, a half 
baked beginning that we can learn to remold in desirable ways. 
 Current humanity need not be the endpoint of evolution. Transhu-
manists hope that by responsible use of science, technology, and other 
rational means, we shall eventually manage to become  posthuman, 
beings with vastly greater capacities than present  human beings have 
(Bostrom 2003b)
Transhumanists and other techno-optimists believe that after liberating 
ourselves from dogmatic views that have attempted fixing our nature, 
we can become masters of our own fate. Now that we have left all meta-
physic and religious systems that attributed to us a static nature or an 
essence, we are able to form ourselves as we prefer. And if we are able to 
Part III
How Should We 
Technologically 
Form Ourselves?
166 How Should We Form Ourselves?
form ourselves as we prefer, then why not boundlessly enhance ourselves? 
Instead of education through oral and textual means, now technologies 
enable us to enhance ourselves much faster and better. High-Tech bio- 
interventions (cloning, genetic alterations) and cutting-edge technologies 
and artifacts that can be internally or externally connected to different 
human faculties (auditory, visual and other bodily prosthetics, neural 
implants) will allow us, transhumanists believe, to improve ourselves in 
ways that go beyond anything we can imagine: the sky is the limit! From 
this perspective, technological self-formation is understood as techno-
logical “self-enhancement,” and technological “self-enhancement” is 
explained in terms of better, stronger and smarter.
Building on the developed perspective in this study, I will demonstrate 
that conceiving “self-formation” as “self-enhancement” is questionable, 
inadequate and untenable for two reasons. First, I will argue that trans-
humanists are confused about their own conception of the posthuman: 
although they anticipate radical transformation of the human through 
technology and propose overcoming essentialist views of the human, at 
the same time they assume that the criteria to determine what is “nor-
mal” and what is “enhanced” are univocal, both in our present time 
and in the future. This way they sustain the very essentialist view that 
they want to overcome. Since some transhumanists believe that there are 
strong similarities between the ideal posthuman that they propose and 
Nietzsche’s Overhuman, I will develop my critique of transhumanists’ 
notion of enhancement on the basis of a comparison between the two 
“ideals.” Inspired by Nietzsche’s notion of the Overhuman, I will argue 
that overcoming an essentialist conception of the “ideal human” requires 
copious variations of criteria, both diachronic and synchronic, of what 
can be considered “normal” and “enhanced.” Paradoxically, the radi-
cal and disruptive technologies on which transhumanists have pinned 
their hopes make sustaining a uniform criterion for enhancement un-
tenable: new and emerging technologies are, as I have argued repeatedly 
throughout this study, not neutral means but often bring about different 
and, from our current perspective, foreign standards for determining 
what are “normal” and “enhanced” capacities.
Next, I will argue that the idea that technologies bring about new and 
foreign standards for what is considered as “enhancement” and affect 
our deepest and most cherished norms, values and ideals abolishes the 
assumption that we are masters and commanders of our own process 
of self-formation, which also affects our relation to ourselves. Hook-
ing into the uncanny valley debate, I will interpret the uncanny feeling 
not so much as a response to a lack of humanness in human-like ro-
bots, but rather as a response to the inability to fathom and appropriate 
what makes me “me”: the alterity in human-like robots confronts me 
with some-thing within that also remains strange to me, which, at least 
partly, could explain why in our attempts to form ourselves (through 
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education or technologically) we come across some-thing within that 
resists complete appropriation, something “uncanny” that we cannot 
mold as we prefer. Contra to what many transhumanists claim, what is 
formed is not a “patient” that we can completely control and mold as we 
please. Acknowledging that the technological uncanny is ever- stronger, 
becoming a permanent structure of selfhood, signifies that technol-
ogy cannot simply be externalized and conceived as an outside factor 
that can determine or liberate us, nor as something that can destroy or 
strengthen us. Employing Lacan’s notion of “extimacy” and Nancy’s 
view of being “closed open” for intrusive technologies, I will illustrate 
that technology as “other within” is increasingly becoming both the nec-
essary condition for forming a stable social self and an obstacle that 
prevents it from reaching the singularity that it seeks. Acknowledging 
this view of the self being inherently compromised renders an ethics of 
enhancement  unintelligible and calls for an alternative and much more 
nuanced view of self-formation.
In the remaining two chapters of this part of the book, I will pro-
vide this alternative, more nuanced view: instead of understanding 
 technological self-formation in terms of making ourselves “faster,” 
“stronger” and “smarter,” we should, I will propose, conceive it in terms 
of technological sublimation, which will also redefine, as I will show, 
the notion of “human enhancement.” The notion of sublimation will be 
developed through a constructive engagement with respectively Freud, 
Lacan,  Nietzsche and Peirce, which will culminate in what I will call 
Technological Sublimation Theory (TST). This theory, as I will frame 
it, recognizes on the one hand that there are no invariable, uniform and 
independent criteria to establish what is “enhancement” and on the 
other hand resists embracing an “anything goes” view of self-formation, 
 putting forward certain guidelines for what is “good self-formation.” In 
the last chapter of this part, I will apply the developed theory to three 
technological fields, namely smart technological environments, brain 
imaging technologies and smart drugs.
Transhumanists believe that technology could transform the human into 
a so-called posthuman, a technologically enhanced future ideal b eing. 
Recent contributions to the human enhancement debate have w ondered 
whether Nietzsche would be an advocate of transhumanism and 
whether his notion of the Overhuman (Übermensch) would strengthen 
transhumanists’ notion of the posthuman.1 Some authors claim that his 
philosophy fits well in the transhumanists’ mode of thought. Although 
Nietzsche focuses on education, Sorgner (2009) holds that he would also 
have encouraged technological means to realize the Overhuman, since 
both procedures are, he believes, structurally analogous. More (2010) 
emphasizes the importance that both Nietzsche and transhumanists 
grant to critical thinking, scientific inquiry and self-transformation. He 
even states – referring to himself – that Nietzsche has directly influenced 
the founders of the transhumanist movement.
Other authors find it difficult to ally Nietzsche with transhumanist 
thought. According to Bostrom, transhumanism has, despite “some 
 surface level similarities with the Nietzschean vision,” as much or more 
in common with humanism, the Enlightenment and liberalism (Bostrom 
2005, 4). Hauskeller (2010) believes that reconciling Nietzsche with 
transhumanism is impossible since Nietzsche has, he claims, contempt 
for all core humanist values and aspirations. Babich (2011) argues that 
transhumanism is but one more expression of the ascetic ideal, which is a 
life-negating belief that Nietzsche has contested throughout his writings.
Still, other authors relate the transhumanist movement to Nietzschean 
aspirations but reject both as unacceptable ideologies. Habermas, who 
rejects every type of genetic enhancement, identifies transhumanists as 
“self-styled Nietzscheans,” who are “intoxicated by science fiction” and 
breeding fantasies and believes that they only succeeded in “staging a 
media spectacle” (Habermas 2003, 22).
My aim here is neither to settle the (anachronistic) question of whether 
Nietzsche is a transhumanist nor is it Nietzsche-exegesis for its own 
sake. Instead, I will use Nietzsche’s figure of the Overhuman to analyze 
and evaluate the transhumanists’ posthuman.2 This investigation will 
reveal that transhumanists are confused about their own conception of 
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the posthuman: transhumanists anticipate radical transformation of the 
human being through technology and at the same time assume that the 
criteria to determine what is “normal” and what is “enhanced” are uni-
vocal, both in our present time and in the future. Inspired by Nietzsche’s 
notion of the Overhuman, I will argue that the slightest historical and 
phenomenological sense undermines this essentialist perspective and 
discloses copious variations of criteria, both diachronic and synchronic, 
for what can be considered “normal” and “enhanced.”
Radical transformation through technology does not simply enable 
us to become “stronger,” “smarter” or “healthier,” but it can and often 
will also change the very standard or yardstick with which we measure 
what counts as “stronger,” “smarter” or “healthier.” Put yet differently: 
new and emerging technologies are not neutral means but could bring 
about different and, from our current perspective, foreign standards for 
determining what are “normal” and “enhanced” capacities. Since the 
qualitative meanings of these terms are themselves not fixed, it is unin-
telligible and too reassuring simply to predict that new technologies will 
enhance human beings. I need to stress that my critique is directed at the 
conception of “enhancement” in transhumanism and affects affiliated 
approaches such as posthumanism or metahumanism (Ferrando 2013; 
Deretić and Sorgner 2016), insofar as they share or have not overcome 
the transhumanist’s view of “enhancement.”
7.1 Transhumanists and Their Ideal Human
Transhumanism
Although there are significant differences in preference, nuance and radical-
ness, most influential transhumanists (More 1990; Savulescu 2001; Stock 
2002; Bostrom 2003a; Harris 2007) share a common ground. First of all, 
transhumanists believe that we should or even ought to enhance ourselves 
and/or humanity as such, which will require overcoming current limita-
tions of the bodily or mental constitution of the human being (Parens 1998; 
Naam 2004; Garreau 2005; Wilsdon and Miller 2006). Transhumanists’ 
examples of enhancement of physical capacities are increasing strength and 
stamina, being more resistant to illnesses and defeating aging. Mental en-
hancements include improvements of sensory perception, memory, imagi-
nation, mood and self-esteem. In contrast to therapy, Bostrom and Roache 
claim, “enhancement interventions aim to improve the state of an organism 
beyond its normal healthy state” (Bostrom and Roache 2008, 120).
Second, leading transhumanists think that transhumanism can be 
viewed as an extension of humanism, from which it is partially derived. 
According to More (1990), “[t]ranshumanism shares many elements of 
humanism, including a respect for reason and science, a commitment to 
progress, and a valuing of human (or transhuman) existence in this life 
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rather than in some supernatural ‘afterlife.’” Transhumanists promote in 
compliance with humanism, says Bostrom (2003b, 4), “rational think-
ing, freedom, tolerance, democracy, and concern for our fellow human 
beings.” Transhumanists do not abandon or leave humanism behind but 
attempt to realize humanist values by other means.
Third, transhumanists believe that in improving ourselves we are not 
limited to traditional humanist methods, such as discipline and educa-
tion through oral or textual means. Rather, we can also use and should 
make widely available technologies that will radically modify and 
 enhance our human nature. In the words of More:
Transhumanism differs from humanism in recognizing and 
 anticipating the radical alterations in the nature and possibilities of 
our lives resulting from various sciences and technologies such as 
 neuroscience and neuropharmacology, life extension, nanotechnol-
ogy, artificial ultraintelligence, and space habitation, combined with 
a rational philosophy and value system (More 1990)
Other technologies that transhumanists focus on are genetic engineer-
ing, prosthetics and powered exoskeletons and tissue engineering (Brey 
2008 provides a categorization).
Fourth, many transhumanists expect that exponential technological 
progress will eventually enable us to move beyond what some would 
think of as “human.” Quoting More (1990) again: “Transhumanism is 
a class of philosophies that seek to guide us towards a posthuman con-
dition.” According to Bostrom (2013), the idea of the posthuman being 
is based on the premise “that the human species in its current form does 
not represent the end of our development but rather a comparatively 
early phase.” Some transhumanists also claim that so-called existential 
risks (global pandemic, comet impact, misuse of nanotechnology) com-
pel us to evolve technologically, for the sake of our survival, into new 
and better humans (Bostrom 2002, 2013).
Transhumanists’ Ideal Human
To acquire deeper insight into the transhumanists’ ideal or more ideal 
human being requires further understanding of what they mean by 
 “enhancement.” “Enhancement” is, as indicated above, often contrasted 
to therapy. “Therapy” is understood as repairing a bodily or mental 
 defect, whereas “enhancement” is conceived as improving a healthy or 
normal bodily or mental constitution. “Therapy” aims at a transition from 
less normal to normal, whereas “enhancement” implies transition from 
 normal to better than normal. A “transition from normal to better than 
normal” can have at least two different meanings: (1) improving qualities 
in some individuals that already exist in average people; (2) introducing 
improvements that no human being has yet displayed (Brey 2008).3
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These distinctions allow the categorization of human beings into four 
different, less and more ideal, types: the disabled, the enabled, the over-
abled, and the differently-abled. The disabled lack certain bodily or men-
tal functions, qualities, traits or capacities, which can be found in average 
people (e.g., being blind, missing a limb, having a memory deficit). The 
enabled possess average people’s functions, qualities, traits or capacities 
(having an average intelligence quotient (IQ), living approximately 80 
years, being able to appreciate good music). The over-abled have func-
tions, qualities, traits or capacities that can be found in average people, 
but are much stronger, fine-tuned or further developed (e.g., being able 
to run 100 km per hour, playing a very difficult instrument with virtuos-
ity, processing and remembering huge amounts of information). Finally, 
the differently-abled are characterized by functions, qualities, traits or 
capacities that no current human beings possess and that grant them an 
advantage over current human beings (X-ray vision, the ability to fly, see-
ing things in four dimensions and other capacities unimaginable for us).
Transhumanists mostly focus on the last two types: the over-abled and 
the differently-abled. In Why I Want to be a Posthuman When I Grow 
Up, Bostrom (2008) describes the process of becoming a posthuman 
being. The improvements that Bostrom mentions indicate a continuity 
between what we already are or have and what we eventually might 
become or realize:
You have just celebrated your 170th birthday and you feel  stronger 
than ever. Each day is a joy. You have invented entirely new art forms, 
which exploit the new kinds of cognitive capacities and s ensibilities 
you have developed. You still listen to music – music that is to Mozart 
what Mozart is to bad Muzak. You are c ommunicating with your 
contemporaries using a language that has grown out of English over 
the past century and that has a vocabulary and expressive power that 
enables you to share and discuss thoughts and feelings that unaug-
mented humans could not even think or experience (Bostrom 2008, 5)
In sum, we will still have birthdays, many birthdays. Strength and joy 
will still be qualities that we find important. We will still appreciate  music 
and have developed a highly sophisticated receptivity for it. We will still 
use language to communicate with one another, albeit this language will 
enable a much more refined expression of thoughts and feelings.
Although Bostrom does recognize that our ability to imagine posthu-
man life is very limited, he believes that it is not completely impossible to 
imagine how posthumanism will emerge: 
As we seek to peer farther [sic] into post-humanity, our ability to con-
cretely imagine what it might be like trails off … Yet we can at least 
perceive the outlines of some of the nearer shores of posthumanity, as 
we did in the imaginary scenario above (Bostrom 2008, 5f)
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That there is a continuity between the over-abled and differently-abled 
is further stressed by Bostrom’s conviction that a person does not have 
to change substantially in his transformation into a posthuman being:
A person could obtain considerable increased life expectancy, intelli-
gence, health, memory, and emotional sensitivity, without ceasing to 
exist in the process … these developments are not viewed as spelling 
the end of the original person … If most of what someone currently 
is, including her most important memories, activities, and feelings, 
is preserved, then adding extra capacities on top of that would not 
easily cause the person to cease to exist (Bostrom 2003a, 499)
Bostrom (2008, 16) compares the transformation into a posthuman 
 being to migration, career change or religious conversion, and believes 
that we should not use unattainable criteria for technological self- 
transformation; in addition, he states that “[a] posthuman mode of being 
is one that includes at least one posthuman capacity” (Bostrom 2003b, 
3). We will radically change and have better, other or more capacities but 
could “still embrace most traditional values and principles of personal 
conduct” (Bostrom 2003b, 7).
This view is shared by most transhumanists. Hans Moravec char-
acterizes the posthuman robot as our evolutionary heir: “Intelligent 
 machines, which will grow from us, learn our skills, and share our goals 
and values, can be viewed as children of our minds” (Moravec 1999, 
126). Even Kurzweil’s (2005) singularity, which marks a radical shift or 
conversion in the history of mankind, presumes continuity between the 
over-abled and differently-abled. Exponential growth of technological 
know-how and accumulation of technological (ultra)intelligence under-
pin the singularity. The resulting ultra-intelligent life forms, however, 
will share our moral values: “the nonbiological intelligence will be em-
bedded in our society and will reflect our values” (Kurzweil 2005, 424).
7.2 Nietzsche’s Overhuman
The “Over” in “Overhuman”
One of the first questions that Nietzsche’s notion of the Übermensch 
raises for English writers is: how should one translate this word? In some 
translations Übermensch is translated as “Superman.” I prefer “Overhu-
man” to “Superman” for two reasons: first, it preserves the allusions and 
word play Nietzsche intends with his recurrent references to going under 
(going down, downfall) and going over (overcoming, transform). Second, 
“Superman” conjures up images of the comic book and motion picture 
characters that possess supernatural powers (Superman, Spiderman, 
Hulk etc.). This association draws attention to certain extraordinary 
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capacities and functions and passes over the über in Ü bermensch, 
which is, I believe, of eminent importance for adequately understanding 
 Nietzsche’s proposed “ideal.”
The “over” in “Overhuman” designates detachment, above all. 
 Although the Nietzsche literature provides divergent answers to what 
exactly Nietzsche wants to overcome, a persistent motive that can 
be detected throughout his work is that he wants to overcome the 
 Platonic-Christian worldview (Müller-Lauter 1971; van Tongeren 1989; 
Aydin 2003). According to Nietzsche, Christianity has effectively ren-
dered one possible interpretation of the human being absolute by sub-
jecting her4 to an unchanging moral value system that is sanctioned by 
an omnipotent and eternal God. The seeds for this ideology he traces 
back to Plato’s Idea of the Good. That is why Nietzsche can say: “Chris-
tianity is Platonism for the “people”” (BG Preface). Plato’s Idea of the 
Good forms the bedrock of the belief that the human being has an in-
variable and ahistorical essence, which should be cultivated according to 
certain universal values and norms.
Here, I have to emphasize the crucial role that power relations and 
struggle play in Nietzsche’s worldview. His concept of “will to power” 
is, as I have extensively elaborated in part I of this study, character-
ized by intrinsic relationality: power is only power in relation to another 
power. Moreover, power is a necessary striving to expand itself. Power 
is only power insofar as it can maintain itself against other powers and 
strives to predominate over them. Since the world is “‘will to power’ and 
nothing else” (BG 36), nothing has existence and meaning outside the 
“game” of power relations, and existence and meaning can only emerge 
within the “game” of power relations. Because of this, there is also no 
possibility to withdraw from this “game.” Even rejecting the claim that 
reality is will to power is an expression of will to power. Also, setting a 
standard or criterion in order to establish or measure what is “normal” 
and what is “enhanced” is nothing else than an expression of will to 
power, which always can be questioned by other wills to power. Weak-
ening or desisting struggle by absolutizing one criterion or standard that 
once and for all fixes what is good, enhanced or ideal (and, hence, not 
acknowledging other possible standards) is for Nietzsche “life threaten-
ing”: it blocks the emergence of (new) life forms and (new) meanings (I 
will come back to this later on). This is exactly, Nietzsche believes, what 
the Platonic-Christian ideology is doing.
From this perspective, it is not very surprising that the features that 
 Nietzsche attributes to the Overhuman stand in opposition to those that he 
identifies with the Platonic-Christian ideal. Against the  Platonic-Christian 
desire for equality and a common value system, Nietzsche (SZ II, 78) 
 endorses a world marked by inequalities and struggles. For him, the idea 
that all human beings are equal (in the sense of “similar”) as h uman be-
ings and have, therefore, equal rights, values and duties finds its source 
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in the belief that human beings have a common essence that is secured 
by some-thing or someone (for Nietzsche that is ultimately “God”) that 
inscribes that essence in their nature. Human beings, according to Ni-
etzsche, do not share a common essence. They should, therefore, not 
strive for similar worldviews and value systems but attempt to develop 
different life forms by continuously challenging the status quo.
Also, unlike the Platonic-Christian influenced masses who desire 
dependence and life within an inclusive herd, Nietzsche’s Overhuman 
stands in splendid solitude (SZ I, 46). According to Nietzsche, the poten-
tial to establish radical new ways of living can only come from individ-
uals who are not completely absorbed and exhausted by society and its 
Sittlichkeit der Sitte and have enough distance and power to challenge it 
(SZ I, 36; Aydin 2008).
In contrast to the Platonic-Christian desire to dwell on the eternal 
and dismiss the earthly body and way of life, Nietzsche’s Overhuman 
loves the body and its senses.5 In contrast to the soul, the body is not a 
unity but a multiplicity, and does not exhibit eternal forms but change 
and fluidity (SZ I, 23f). Nietzsche diagnoses views that want to escape 
the here and now as symptoms of not being able to cope with the fact 
that life has no a priori universal meaning and goal. The body, he be-
lieves, could make us see and appreciate the multiplicity of life forms and 
the necessity to create meaning and establish new goals. In Nietzsche’s 
words: “Along the guiding thread of the body…we learn that our life is 
possible through an interplay of many intelligences that are very unequal 
in value, and thus only through a constant, thousand-fold obeying and 
commanding” (WN, 30, 77).
At first sight, the process of secularization seems to pave the road for 
the Overhuman: “God died: now we want – the overman to live” (SZ 
IV, 232). In different passages, Nietzsche welcomes this development as 
liberation. Equality he believes, for example, can no longer be justified: 
“‘we are all equal, human is human, before God – we are all equal!’ Be-
fore God! – Now, however, this God has died…this god was your great-
est danger” (SZ IV, 232). Since God has functioned as an orientation 
point for how human beings understood themselves and lived their lives, 
with the death of God also the “human being” “dies”: human beings 
become a problem for themselves, that is, how to define and understand 
“human nature” becomes a philosophical challenge. For Nietzsche, 
this “problem” or “challenge” brings new opportunities. The death of 
God renders an absolute criterion obsolete, enticing the human being to 
 create her own values and, hence, be her own God (SZ I, 47). The death 
of God could liberate human beings from a uniform value system and 
open up a sea of interpretations and experiments, which could instigate 
radically new world(view)s and new identities.
Unfortunately, the modern, secularized human being, Nietzsche 
believes, has not overcome the Platonic-Christian ideal. The religious 
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“surface” has been peeled off, but the Platonic-Christian value system 
is preserved. The same normalizing and homogenizing tendencies can 
be detected in our modern culture. In democratic societies, for example, 
qualitative differences are considered to be bridgeable and are reduced 
to quantitative differences. The law has taken the place of God: “the 
democratic instincts of the modern soul! Everywhere, equality before 
the law” (BG 22); “the democratic movement is the heir to Christianity” 
(BG 202). The herd mentality is also reflected in socialist movements 
(BG 203). In modern philosophy and science, the multiplicity that we 
find in the world is disregarded by assuming that reason can capture 
pure objectivity and find absolute truth, which is for Nietzsche nothing 
else than yet another expression of the Platonic-Christian disposition 
(GS Preface 3).
The process of modernization, which appears to have the potential to 
subvert the idea of an absolute criterion for determining what a human 
being is or ought to be, has not, in Nietzsche’s opinion, been potentiated. 
For Nietzsche, democracy, liberalism and also humanism are, among 
many other modern ideologies, all guises of the tendency of the modern 
human being to canonize and eternalize her present state after the death 
of God. The modern, subject-centered rational individual finds universal 
criteria to determine what is true and right in an “inner-world,” which 
increasingly makes “The Great Lawmaker” redundant. Secularization, 
for Nietzsche, even becomes an additional threat. There is nothing any-
more that can relativize the belief system of the modern individual, not 
even a God. The human being finds the measure for understanding and 
determining her identity and her values as well as the world in herself. 
He becomes “the measure of all things.” The human being has no other 
objective and destiny outside herself. The modern, Western individ-
ual imprisons herself in the self-glorification and self-deification of her 
 present state. Other possible life forms are, hence, excluded. Nietzsche 
detects this tendency even in evolutionist perspectives, where the leading 
idea is not self-overcoming but self-preservation (SZ IV, 232; WN, 134f, 
257, 264).
This discovery is dramatically portrayed in Also sprach Zarathustra. 
After failing to convey his optimistic message of the Overhuman to the 
masses, Zarathustra attempts a different strategy: he warns them of 
what will happen if they are not willing to make the necessary prepara-
tions for the advent of the Overhuman. He tries to scare them by speak-
ing to them of the “most contemptible person,” the “last human,” who 
is the Overhuman’s antonym. The “last human” symbolizes not the will 
to overcome oneself, but rather the will to preserve oneself. It symbolizes 
human beings who, in Nietzsche’s words, “no longer launch the arrow 
of their longing beyond the human” (SZ I, 9). To his surprise, Zarathus-
tra discovers that his audience is not repulsed by the presented opposite 
scenario, but rather recognizes itself in the last human (SZ I, 10). The 
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modern, secularized individual is completely content with herself. The 
last thing that this individual wants is self-overcoming: “Each wants the 
same, each is the same, and who-ever feels differently goes voluntarily 
into the insane asylum” (SZ: 10). Redemption from the acquiescence of 
invariability (“nihilism” is another word Nietzsche uses for this state of 
mind) seems to have become impossible.
The “Over” as an Index of Transcendence
The Overhuman is a name for something that should liberate us from 
both the Platonic-Christian heritage and the modernist path on which 
we have embarked. It promises to overcome the idea that an external 
measure determines our essence and values as well as the view that we 
are the ones who determine this measure and, hence, our essence and 
values. The opposition between the Overhuman and the last human 
clearly shows that Nietzsche’s concern is not only an episode in our 
history (Christianity). The “last human” rather expresses the persistent 
(“human, all too human”) tendency to resign to a presumed invariable 
identity, whereas the Overhuman promises to undermine and overcome 
every possible invariability and sameness. This explains why Nietzsche 
can lump Platonism, Christianity and humanism, which at first sight are 
very different ideologies, together. We will use Nietzsche’s notion of the 
Overhuman to assess whether this tendency to assume univocal criteria 
to determine what is an “enhanced” or an “ideal human” can also be 
detected in transhumanist views. The “humanist” dimension in trans-
humanism relates, therefore, to this essentialist tendency. Of course, 
this Nietzschean assessment might not apply to other possible types of 
“humanism.”
Sometimes Nietzsche seems to give concrete examples of Overhumans: 
Napoleon, for example, is characterized as a “synthesis of U nmensch 
[brute] and Übermensch” (GM I, 16). Cesare Borgia, another example, 
is called “a type of overman” (TI, 211). These identifications are, how-
ever, always relative and oppositional. Napoleon and Borgia represent 
“a type that is an overman in comparison” (EH, 147): they are Over-
humans “in contrast to ‘modern’ people, to ‘good’ people, to Christians 
and other nihilists” (EH, 101). In Also sprach Zarathustra, the ques-
tion of whether there have been Overhumans is raised a couple of times. 
Zarathustra leaves no room for speculation: “Never yet has there been 
an overman” (SZ II, 71).
In Also sprach Zarathustra, this use of the opposite as a means to 
 signify an Overhuman takes on many forms, as humans fail again and 
again to meet Zarathustra’s expectations, and the gap between all the 
types of humans that we can imagine and the Overhuman becomes ulti-
mately unbridgeable. The Overhuman is portrayed as anti-ideal par ex-
cellence because it departs furthest from everything that we can imagine 
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and comes nearest to the radically different. Even the higher human beings 
who become Zarathustra’s “disciples” and demonstrate characteristics 
that stand in opposition to Christianity and the democratic, s ecularized 
ideal are not fully identifiable as Overhuman. The last pope, for example, 
who was the incarnation of Christ himself, broke with God and claims 
that he is even more Godless than Zarathustra (SZ IV, 209f). Although 
these figures are Overhumans by comparison and contrast, they cannot 
be positively identified as Overhumans. If that were possible, the Over-
human would be yet another ideal that attempts to fix the  human in a 
particular life form and value system, which is, as Nietzsche indicates, 
characteristic of all worldviews so far: “But have you ever asked your-
selves properly how costly the setting up of every ideal on earth has been? 
How much reality always had to be vilified and misunderstood in the 
process” (GM II, 24). Also, the higher human beings ultimately do not 
and cannot live up to Zarathustra’s standards (SZ IV, 264f).
The Overhuman not only has never existed, but also will never ex-
ist, as something particular. It also can never be a human being with 
extraordinary characteristics, a kind of Superman, and certainly not 
an ideal human as might be identified according to modern ideology. 
The Overhuman is portrayed in different ways as something that goes 
beyond every possible idea of a particular human. Every characteriza-
tion of the Overhuman remains a negative indication. It lies, therefore, 
 beyond every imaginable measure, which makes speaking of the Over-
human a highly paradoxical enterprise. By its very nature, the Overhu-
man cannot be conceptualized or realized. In fact, everything that is said 
about it is too much.
The Overhuman is a name for Nietzsche’s conviction that the human 
being is not an end point but an in-between-being: “What is great about 
human beings is that they are a bridge and not a purpose: what is lovable 
about human beings is that they are a crossing over and a going under” 
(SZ I, 7). The prefix über in Übermensch indicates that the human being 
is an orientation without a beginning in a primary cause and an end in a 
final goal. Again, what is crucial is the über. It transcends every charac-
terization. The Overhuman is a “transcending indication.”
Nietzsche’s notion of transcendence should not, however, be confused 
with traditional religious notions. It does not refer to an afterlife but tries 
to depict a fundamental dimension of our very earthly and bodily exis-
tence. This view is also expressed in Nietzsche’s definition of the human 
being as the “not yet determined animal.” This definition indicates that 
the human being “essentially” does not coincide with its actual state. By 
overcoming their present state, human beings do not alienate themselves 
from their nature but do justice to what makes them human: becoming 
(Aydin 2007b). The human would cease to be human (and entirely rec-
oncile itself with its animal part) if it were to coincide completely with 
its actual state. For Nietzsche, new technological developments do not 
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represent the first time that humans have been faced with the prospect of 
overcoming their actual state; ideally, this potential is the human being’s 
permanent condition.
From Nietzsche’s perspective, human life can only recognize and 
 justify itself by pursuing something that in no way can be reduced to 
but rather goes beyond its present state, even after the death of God. 
In Nietzsche’s words: “It is not enough that you reconcile yourself with 
the one you kill [namely, yourself]. Let your sadness be love for the 
 overman – thus you justify that you still live!” (SZ I, 26). The human 
being is a longing for something beyond herself, an “arrow and longing 
for the overman” (SZ I, 41). In something that she is not yet, the human 
being finds a justification for what she is and must become, which is also 
the only way to give meaning to her life.
7.3 Sounding Out Hollow Idols
The figure of the Overhuman challenges the essentialist idea of one 
possible interpretation of the human, which denies and destroys the 
potential richness of human life (EH, 155). In Nietzsche’s idiom, this as-
sessment can be characterized as “sounding out of hollow idols,” which 
is done with a “tuning fork.” An idol is an ideal that “rob[s] reality of 
its meaning, value, and truthfulness,” which is, according to Nietzsche, 
something that all essentialist worldviews do (EH, 71). Although at 
first sight the transhumanists’ concept of posthuman seems to discard 
an essentialist view, Nietzsche’s notion of the Overhuman reveals, as I 
will show in this section, that the transhumanists’ ideal human being 
is at its core invariable, uniform and independent, which are, as I have 
discussed in the first part of this study, throughout the history of phi-
losophy the three main aspects of an “essentialist” or “substantialist” 
approach (Stegmaier 1977; Aydin 2003). Transhumanists’ account of the 
posthuman being is essentialist because they misunderstand and misrep-
resent, as I will show on the basis of Nietzsche’s account of the human 
and Overhuman, the very “nature” of the human.
The Invariable Posthuman
Predictions and anticipations of radical change in the constitution of the 
human being, as expressed by terms like “the singularity,” suggest that 
transhumanists adopt an anti-essentialist anthropological framework. 
But, on reflection, their view is rather conservative: transhumanists want 
a very specific and restricted “radical” change.6 They want, as we have 
seen, humans to improve radically their functions and capacities using 
new and emerging technologies, without changing or jeopardizing their 
humanist values and goals. Those values and goals secure unequivocal 
criteria for what can be considered “enhancement.”
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Within that unequivocal humanist framework, causal relations are 
then drawn between preferred values, capacities that can contribute to 
realizing those values and human enhancement technologies that could 
improve those capacities. This is done in the following way: (1) value x 
is identified as an intrinsic or at least as an indisputable preferred value; 
(2) capacity y is identified as an important capacity that affects value x, 
in the form: value x can be better realized by improving capacity y; tech-
nology z is identified as a technology that affects capacity y, in the form: 
technology z can improve capacity y. Technology z can then be qualified 
as a “human enhancement technology” because (1) it can improve ca-
pacity y, which in its turn (2) can significantly contribute to realizing 
value x, which (3) is identified as a preferred value.
To illustrate how particular technologies are in this way qualified as 
“human enhancement technologies,” I give three examples: inserting a 
brain implant for extra information storage can be considered as a hu-
man enhancement technology, because (1) inserting a brain implant for 
extra information storage can improve (inter alia) memory, (2) improv-
ing memory can improve (inter alia) rational thinking and (3) rational 
thinking is identified as a preferred value. Genetic manipulation can be 
considered as a human enhancement technology, because (1) genetic 
modification can improve (inter alia) deductive/logical competence, 
(2)  improving deductive/logical competence can enhance (inter alia) 
autonomy and (3) autonomy is identified as a preferred value (Schaefer 
et al. 2014. Nootropics can be considered as a human enhancement tech-
nology, because (1) nootropics increase (inter alia) IQ, (2) giving more 
 people the opportunity to increase their IQ will lead to (inter alia) more 
equality and (3) equality is identified as a preferred value.
Assuming unequivocal humanist criteria for what can be considered 
“enhancement” and “enhancement technology” secures that a person 
can radically transform herself and essentially still remain the same per-
son, as also indicated by the transhumanist presumption of  continuity 
between the over-abled and differently-abled. Although  transhumanists 
are in favor of altering and, therefore, “violating” h uman nature (which 
is not in line with certain bioconservative humanist views), they believe 
that this altering will not lead to a defilement, but rather to a more ef-
fective realization of humanist aspirations. This is why transhumanists’ 
“humanism” is a “humanism plus.” The differently-abled could have 
more and different functions and capacities – which are brought about 
by certain technological interventions – than the over-abled but will 
share and even better realize the same unequivocal humanist values, 
goals and ideals. The posthuman is in fact a superhumanist.
This view is highly problematic, because transhumanists covertly as-
sume the possibility of a priori criteria for what the human is and ought 
to be, criteria falling outside of and, therefore, not affected by the em-
pirical realm. However, Nietzsche’s notion of the Overhuman and his 
180 How Should We Form Ourselves?
conception of the human being as the “not yet determined animal” dis-
close such conceptions as modern manifestations of yet another attempt 
to turn the human “into a mummy,” capturing him with “mummified 
concepts” (TI, 167). Transhumanists reduce the human being to charac-
teristics (faster, stronger, smarter) that they find ideal in their current era 
and scope. Their lack of historical and phenomenological sense prevents 
them from seeing that all criteria used to establish what the human is 
or should be are context-bound and time-bound. Also, the meaning of 
concepts such as “free,” “rational” and “tolerant” that are attributed 
to the transhumanists’ ideal human being are very much dependent on 
their (technological) framing of the human.
What is decisive here is not the question of whether technology z can 
really improve capacity y, which in its turn can contribute to realizing 
value x. Let us assume that there is or will be sufficient empirical sup-
port for those hypotheses. The crucial point here is that transhumanists 
fail to see how much their conception of the human is influenced by 
their scope of interest, namely, existing and emerging technologies, and 
their technological vocabularies. These technologies are not neutral but 
rather “norm,” explicitly or implicitly, as I have also illustrated with Ar-
tifactual Mind Thesis (AMT) with regard to cognition, what is consid-
ered as a “human” and what is meant by “enhancing human capacities” 
and “optimizing values” (Aydin 2015).
This point sheds a completely different light on the causal relations 
that are drawn between values, capacities and technologies. Let us reflect 
again on the particular technologies mentioned earlier. A brain implant 
for extra information storage, which presumably would improve mem-
ory, is not a neutral technology, but rather expresses, feeds into or brings 
about a particular conception of “memory” and “rationality”: memory is 
interpreted as “processing and retrieving information,” which are char-
acteristics that are normally attributed to computers. Improving rational 
thinking is then, to a great extent, interpreted in terms of faster process-
ing and retrieving greater amounts of information. Rational thinking, 
hence, is believed to be computational in nature. Transhumanists (and 
many other people) do not seem to realize that this conception arose only 
in the 1940s and 1950s (Sternberg and Sternberg 2012).
Genetic modification (a.k.a. genetic engineering), which presumably 
would improve deductive/logical competence, is not a neutral technology 
but rather expresses, feeds into or brings about a particular conception 
of competence and autonomy: genetic engineering is compared to (re)
programming DNA in cells. The concept of gene (re)organization then 
corresponds to the arrangement of “files” in a computer system, which 
are part of an information processing system. In a recent  paper (Haraway 
1991; Chen et al. 2013), the formalism of chemical  reaction networks 
is used as a “programming language.” Sometimes the genetic code is 
considered to be a (quaternary) digital code. Gene (re)organization, it is 
Self-Formation as Enhancement 181
believed, will then directly or indirectly affect mental rules, models and 
algorithms, which in their turn will improve computational capacities. 
Improving autonomy is also in this case interpreted in terms of increas-
ing computational competence.
Nootropics, which presumably would improve IQ, are not neutral 
technologies, but rather express, feed into or bring about a particular 
conception of intelligence and equality: nootropics are believed to af-
fect brain function (e.g., by strengthening synapses between neurons 
and underlying synaptic plasticity or by increasing blood circulation) 
and improve mental functions such as memory and concentration. 
These and related functions are operationalized in IQ tests in indices 
as  “recognizing similarities,” “picture completion” and “digital sym-
bol coding.” Intelligence is again framed in terms of “processing and 
 retrieving information” and quantified as a score. Enabling people to in-
crease this score, some transhumanists believe, could contribute to more 
equality. However, psychologists such as Stanovich (2009) have argued 
that IQ tests reduce “intelligence” to a particular selection of traits and 
identify it in terms of what the test can measure. These tests fail to assess 
skills such as judgment and decision-making that most people associate 
with “good thinking.”
Recognizing how technologies “norm” and have always normed con-
ceptions of the (ideal) human discloses copious variations of criteria, 
both diachronic and synchronic, for what can be considered “enhance-
ment.” In their characterization of the posthuman being, transhuman-
ists generalize and substantialize a current self-understanding of what a 
human being is and ought to be and, implicitly or explicitly, disregard 
other possible conceptions of “normal,” “healthy” and “enhanced,” and 
disqualify other possible (ideal) life forms.
Here, Nietzsche’s criticism of evolutionary perspectives might also ap-
ply to transhumanism: not self-overcoming but rather self- preservation 
seems to be the transhumanists’ goal (recall also Bostrom’s above 
 portrayal of the posthuman). In Nietzsche’s words: “They kill and stuff 
the things they worship, these lords of concept idolatry” (TI, 167). The 
standardization of the (ideal) human is nothing else than yet another 
echo of an essentialist metaphysics. This Nietzschean critique helps us 
to reveal how transhumanists wrongly assume that their criteria for 
 determining what is an “enhanced being” are not affected by their par-
ticular understanding of the technologies on which they have pinned 
their hopes and their particular technological grammar, which allows 
them to believe that these criteria are a priori. What is considered “nor-
mal” and “healthy” is redefined in terms of what technologies are able 
to measure, diagnose and treat. It is possible that what is now considered 
“normal” or “healthy” will increasingly be thought of as defective or 
disvalued as what transhumanists consider “enhanced states” become 
more the norm (Hanson 1999).
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From a psychological perspective, Nietzsche often interprets this es-
sentialist tendency as a symptom of the inability to cope with the finitude 
and contingency of life and all our life projects. Transhumanists’ goals 
such as self-preservation, longevity, equality and happiness fit, therefore, 
much better in Nietzsche’s characterization of the “last human” than in 
his portrayal of the Overhuman (SZ I, 10).
The Disembodied and Disembedded Posthuman
Nietzsche argues that essentialist philosophers like Plato disqualify the 
body and its senses due to their exhibition of multiplicity, change and 
fluidity, and their inability to display eternal forms. In contrast to the 
ratio, the body and its senses are incapable of generalizing. Nietzsche 
attempts to turn, one might say, Plato upside down (Stack 1983, 56). He 
repeatedly stresses the love of the Overhuman for the body and its senses 
(Hauskeller 2010). His thinking “along the guiding thread of the body” 
displays humans as embedded and embodied creatures who due to their 
particular social contexts and specific material constitutions have of-
ten very individual, nongeneralizable standards for what is “normal,” 
“healthy,” “good” or “ideal.”
Here, we again encounter the problematic presumption of an unequiv-
ocal criterion for enhancement. This presumption, however, is now ex-
plained by transhumanists’ “rational” (generalizing) Platonic approach. 
Transhumanists identify humans who lack certain functions or abilities, 
which are from their perspective essential, as “disabled” and presume 
that adding a function or capacity by virtue of technologies will make 
those humans able again. Give a well-functioning prosthesis to a person 
who has a leg missing, and he will be abled. Meanwhile, if abled and 
over-abled people are given additional functions or abilities, then, trans-
humanists believe, they become differently abled. So, if an abled person 
is given extra information storage that can be implanted into her brain, 
then he will become differently-abled. Transhumanists, being liberalists, 
often indicate that deciding to use particular technologies is up to indi-
viduals, but at the same time assume that their prospected technologies 
will affect humans in a similar, uniform way, and in so doing disregard 
the highly particular social and material circumstances of real – flesh 
and bones (and metal and code) – people. In contrast, Nietzsche’s fo-
cus on the body and its embeddedness in a particular context indicates 
that people could respond in various and sometimes even opposing ways 
to certain technologies and could have very idiosyncratic standards for 
what they find “normal,” “healthy” or “enhancing.”
In her dissertation on “somatechnologies,” Dalibert (2014) focuses 
on the way people embody technologies and shows how big the dis-
crepancy is between the transhumanist qualification of certain aids as 
“enhancement technologies” and the way real persons of flesh and blood 
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experience those aids. A prosthesis or a spinal cord stimulation device 
can indeed make people mobile again or make them function more ef-
ficiently. Whether those changes are experienced as “enhancement,” 
however, is also dependent on how people bodily relate to those technol-
ogies. A woman interviewed by Dalibert confirms that with spinal cord 
stimulation, she has much less pain and can move much more easily. 
At the same time, she indicates that she does not experience the device 
unambiguously as improvement. For example, she finds it very awkward 
that her husband can feel the pulse generator under her skin when they 
are in bed (Dalibert 2014, 212).
How important the social context is can be further illustrated by 
 divergent responses to a technology such as the cochlear implant. 
 Although many people might consider a cochlear implant as “enhance-
ment,” there are members of the “deaf community” who do not embrace 
this technology. They believe sign language is their cultural cornerstone. 
Deaf children who receive cochlear implants at a young age will be less 
likely to be educated in sign language during their early years, which is 
seen by the deaf community as a loss of culture – one that, in some cases, 
has been passed down through generations (Ringo 2013). There are also 
deaf parents that argue that they are entitled to have deaf children. One 
way of doing this would be to select a “deaf embryo” by using in vitro 
fertilization and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (Fahmy 2011). In 
their social context cochlear implants are seen neither as enhancement 
nor as normal or healthy, but rather as deterioration.
Nietzsche’s critique of unequivocal criteria for what can be considered 
“normal” and “ideal” prompts us to go even further: it is even possible 
that in one context or one period in history, x is considered as enhance-
ment, whereas in another context or other period in history the opposite 
of x is seen as enhancement. “Faster, stronger smarter” might be ideal 
in our era. In other eras or other contexts, “slower” (e.g., the wise man 
who reads and “processes information” slowly), “weaker” (e.g., the pas-
sivist who prevents a war), “simpler” (e.g., the holy “idiot” who knows 
no resentment) could qualify as enhancement, depending on how those 
notions are framed. The same criticism could be applied to the main 
 values of transhumanists: rationality can also be interpreted as cold cal-
culation and as an antonym of affection. Autonomy can be interpreted 
as egoism and as a danger to communal bonds. Equality can be inter-
preted as leveling everybody down to the same common denominator 
and as a destroyer of all competition and motivation.
This critique can be further refined from the perspective of Nietzsche’s 
“will to power”: it is in the struggle of different standards that the “re-
alities” that are set by these standards emerge and gain meaning and 
significance. Let me clarify by an example: probably there was no other 
time in which there was so much struggle about how to understand and 
apply the Bible than the Middle Ages. However, it was by virtue of this 
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struggle that the Bible in the Middle Ages was “real” and had meaning 
and significance. The Bible loses its significance in secularized times not 
because it has been repudiated in a struggle of interpretations, but be-
cause there is no struggle anymore about how to interpret it. In other 
words: the Bible has not been repudiated, but it has become irrelevant.
These and similar cases make clear that understanding “enhancement” 
from one (trans)humanist perspective and envisaging a posthuman being 
with certain extraordinary features is only possible if the multiplicity 
that characterizes the lives of real human beings is disregarded, separat-
ing people’s (rational) “souls” from their material and social contexts. 
However, historical and phenomenological inquiry shows that people 
are, in Nietzsche’s words, no “thinking frogs, no objectifying and regis-
tering devices with frozen innards,” but reliant on and moved by “blood, 
heart, fire, pleasure, passion, agony, conscience, fate, and disaster” (GS 
Preface 3). For some people and in certain circumstances, realizing 
 certain goals in the most efficient way might be the decisive criterion for 
“enhanced.” Other people in other circumstances, however, might find 
social, emotional or aesthetic criteria much more important.
From a more psychological point of view, Nietzsche often interprets 
this “human, all too human” tendency to disembody and disembed the 
(post)human being again in terms of an inability to cope with and take 
responsibility for life as it is. With no realm of “objective judgments,” 
“goods in themselves” or any “natural right,” (weak) human beings ex-
perience a finite, temporally mutable, contextual and contingent life as 
an unbearable burden or curse that requires redemption (SZ II, 76–79). 
Transhumanists want life, but they cannot cope with life as it is, with 
all its trouble, mess, banality and limitations. They want a “body,” but 
they cannot cope with a body that might suffer, get ill or die (Babich 
2011, 35). Nietzsche’s ultimate response to this tendency to deny and 
escape “real life” is a radical, all-encompassing Yes-saying to life, which 
finds its completion in the willing of the eternal recurrence of the same 
(Müller-Lauter 1999b, 248f).
The Autotheist Posthuman
Besides “invariability” and “uniformity,” a third aspect characterizes 
essentialist approaches, namely “independence.” In modern Western 
philosophy, especially that influenced by Descartes and Kant, “indepen-
dence” has been strongly associated with “autonomy.” The capacity for 
autonomy, according to Kant, is “the basis of the dignity of human and of 
every rational nature” (Kant 2003, 53). The ability to determine and gov-
ern ourselves is not only seen as an essential characteristic of the human 
being, but also as the highest intrinsic value to which we should aspire.
Transhumanists not only adopt this Enlightenment ideal of taking 
control of our own lives, but also redefine it from the perspective of 
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emerging technologies: we could truly liberate ourselves from the re-
strictions of our body and mind if we were able radically to modify our 
biology according to our wishes and, hence, completely control it. In 
Kosko’s words: “Biology is not destiny. It was never more than tendency. 
It was just nature’s first quick and dirty way to compute with meat. 
Chips are destiny” (Kosko 1999, 256). Kevin Warwick declares: “I was 
born human. But this was an accident of fate – a condition merely of 
time and place. I believe it’s something we have the power to change” 
(Warwick 2000, 145).
In addition, many transhumanists believe this notion of an auton-
omous self fits in the liberal or even the libertarian view that each 
 individual is the final arbiter of what is right and appropriate for his 
life or body. Transhumanists not only claim that emerging technologies 
will enable us to optimize and expand our mental and bodily capaci-
ties, but they will also allow us to emancipate ourselves from (govern-
mental) authorities that limit our freedom. We will be able to design 
our lives as we please. The posthuman is master and commander of his 
own fate.
At first sight, this notion of the posthuman seems to resemble 
 Nietzsche’s idea of the Overhuman. The figure of the Overhuman also 
urges people to detach themselves from oppressing forces (especially 
from mediocrity and the status quo!) and to become sovereign beings. 
On reflection, however, Nietzsche’s Overhuman poses very different 
conditions for overcoming limitations from the transhumanists’ view. 
From a Nietzschean point of view, “overcoming limitations” does not 
mean finding new (technological) ways to improve capacities that could 
contribute to realizing certain values set by a particular (in this case, 
humanist) value system. The Overhuman rather challenges the inevi-
tably “limiting scope” of every particular worldview and value system 
and their criteria for establishing what is an (ideal) human being. That 
 explains, as indicated before, why Nietzsche is unable to provide any 
 description of the Overhuman and why envisaging an ideal human being 
as a “current human being + extraordinary characteristics” is not suffi-
cient to radically transform the human being.
The elaborated view of the Overhuman as an index of transcen-
dence is an attempt to express this paradoxical challenge. Recogniz-
ing a dimension in human existence that in no way can be controlled, 
appropriated or domesticated is a necessary condition for radical self- 
transformation. By virtue of this transcendent dimension, the human 
can never  completely coincide with her current state, which is a con-
ception that is also expressed by Nietzsche’s idea that the human being 
can never be completely determined. Radical self-transformation is only 
possible if the anticipated ideal in no way can be reduced to the current 
(and past) self-understanding of the human being. Transhumanists who 
claim that the human being will be able completely to design her life 
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and fate deny this transcendent dimension and necessarily reduce, in 
their projections of an ideal human being, the human to a contemporary 
 (humanist)  perfect image, to an idol. The human being has from their 
view no other goal beyond herself.
In contrast to the transhumanists’ autotheist posthuman, the Ni-
etzschean “ideal” is a much less convenient and reassuring idea. The 
 metaphor of the tightrope walker in Also sprach Zarathustra, who “lost 
his head and the rope” and “threw away his pole and plunged into the 
depths even faster than his pole” (SZ I, 11), shows that success is not 
guaranteed. At least, it is naïve to assume that adopting new and emerg-
ing technologies will not affect our standards for determining what 
is “normal,” “healthy” and “enhanced.” Transhumanists should take 
into account that in following unknown paths, we even could end up 
throwing overboard the very (humanist) ideals that impel us to enhance 
our lives. Overcoming and, therefore, “violating” human nature could 
 indeed come with “violating” the humanist value system.
Some technologies that are available today already affect our current 
standards. Cochlear implants, for example, challenge common ideas 
about what is “normal hearing” and instigate intense debates and se-
rious disagreements about what is “enhancement.” Moreover, imagine 
cochlear implants that would allow people to hear relevant “sounds” 
that are completely beyond the reach of “normal” hearing. Would our 
traditional standards for “bad” and “good hearing” then still suffice? I 
think not.
Cochlear implants also challenge common views about agency. If 
somebody “wears” a cochlear implant, then who/what hears and, hence, 
who/what can be considered the “agent of hearing”: the human being, 
the cochlear implant or (and that would fit within the proposed frame-
work) the “synthesis of human being and implant”? Transhumanists 
consider technological developments as transparent and as always under 
control of humans without taking into account the possibility of tech-
nologies becoming “actants” themselves and co-shaping both human 
subjectivity and the world.
Radical self-transformation implies accepting the possibility that in 
adopting new technologies the very notion of what is an (enhanced) 
 human being will be revised. Being susceptible to this possibility means 
accepting that we are not autonomous masters and commanders of our 
fate. In their depiction of the posthuman being, transhumanists illus-
trate, yet again, how comfortably essentialist their view of the human 
being is, a “comfort” that in reality disguises and suppresses fear for 
radical change and an unknown future. Paradoxically, the Nietzschean 
conception of self-transformation seems a better basis for the singularity 
idea. That we are “a bridge and not a purpose” (SZ I, 7) comes with 
the uncanny possibility that we will not be the ones who will cross that 
bridge.
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7.4 Reframing “Enhancement”
Toward a Non-Essentialist View of “Enhancement”
Transhumanists envisage a development from abled to over-abled 
 human beings, evolving in their turn into differently-abled posthumans. 
Nietzsche’s notion of the Overhuman has been used as a “tuning fork” 
to “hear” whether transhumanists escape an essentialist conception in 
which one particular view of the enhanced or ideal human being is ren-
dered absolute, disregarding how people in different contexts experience 
a “normal,” “healthy” or “ideal” life form.
At first sight, the transhumanists’ visualizations of radical self- 
transformation, as expressed by terms like “the singularity,” seem to fit 
into an anti-essentialist anthropology. On reflection, however, their view 
of the posthuman only allows for a very specific and restricted “radical” 
change and variety. It displays the three main aspects that, through-
out the history of philosophy, have been characteristic of an essentialist 
anthropology. Their posthuman is essentially invariable, because they 
assume that their criteria for establishing what is enhancement are pre-
given and, therefore, not susceptible to change, and disregard the fact 
that their ideal human being is “normed” by the technologies on which 
they pin their hopes. Their posthuman individual is essentially uniform 
because they believe that they can presume a general notion of enhance-
ment, overlooking that, due to very different material and social condi-
tions, human beings respond in various and sometimes even opposing 
ways to technologies and have very particular standards for what they 
consider as “enhancement.” Their posthuman being is essentially inde-
pendent because they think that, irrespective of the profound influence 
of emerging technologies, human beings are and can be in total control 
of their fate, disregarding the fact that radical transformation might be 
impossible without the demise of the present human being and her val-
ues and norms.
This Nietzschean scrutiny of the posthuman being discloses the trans-
humanists’ ideal as a hollow idol that “rob[s] reality of its meaning, 
value, and truthfulness.” Transhumanists’ univocal criteria deny the 
boundless (present and future) potential multiplicity that can be found 
in the real world. The more practical implication of this observation 
is that, first, transhumanists are unable to do justice to how people in 
different contexts and settings experience and conceptualize “ normal,” 
“healthy” and “enhanced.” This way, they (implicitly or explicitly) dis-
qualify standards that people have in everyday life. Second, in portraying 
the ideal human being as a “current human being + certain extraordi-
nary features,” transhumanists do not anticipate radical transforma-
tion, but rather strive to maintain the human being in her present state. 
Transhumanists are, therefore, not able to account for radically new or 
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alternative life forms. Third, in assuming that our current basic stan-
dards will also apply to the posthuman, transhumanists portray a too 
cozy picture of the future, disregarding the possibility that in embracing 
new and emerging technologies, we might be forced to challenge and 
maybe even give up our most cherished values and norms.
In this chapter, I have only focused on the question of whether Ni-
etzsche’s conception of the Overhuman can reveal certain unfounded, 
unsound or tenuous aspects in the transhumanists’ ideal, disregarding 
the dispute between transhumanists and bioconservatives. However, 
this assessment has far-reaching implications for how to evaluate the 
positions of both camps. On the one hand, the transhumanists’ ideal 
seems to be much more conservative than they realize, which brings 
them closer to bioconservatives than they think. Transhumanists as-
sume that their standards for “normal,” “healthy” and “enhanced” are 
generalizable and, hence, basically independent of how different people 
in different contexts experience and value “enhancement” technologies. 
On the other hand, the transhumanists’ depiction of the posthuman be-
ing is much too reassuring, which challenges us to reflect more seriously 
on the incentives and implications of the possible impact of emerging 
technologies and radical self-transformation.
Enhancement and Self-Formation
What are the bearings of this reflection on the concept of “enhancement” 
on the proposed notion of self-formation? The answer to this question is 
multilayered. First, my reflection on “enhancement” confirms the view 
that our (technological) environment determines to a great extent how 
we evaluate our selves and what we consider “good self-formation.” This 
is, as we have seen, also confirmed empirically: particular “flesh and 
blood (and metal and code)” individuals have diverse standards for what 
is “normal” and “enhanced” and, therefore, experience, appreciate and 
appropriate technologies in different ways. What is “normal,” “healthy” 
and “enhanced” seems to be very much dependent on particular contexts 
and lifestyles. In addition, the introduction of new technologies often 
challenges, disrupts and “overwrites” existing standards and imposes 
new ways of framing our understanding of “enhancement.” We have 
seen that technologies are not neutral instruments but “norm,” what we 
consider a “disabled,” “normal” or “enhanced” self. Moreover, domi-
nant technologies come with the risk of imposing one notion of self and 
self-formation on us, damaging the potential to form ourselves in differ-
ent ways and reducing us to one form, which is one of the most import-
ant concerns in Nietzsche’s work. A proper assessment of how people 
respond to “enhancement technologies” like prosthetics, implants and 
pharmaceutical drugs requires taking into account other criteria besides 
efficiency and functionality.
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Moreover, this view is consistent with the proposed interactionist per-
spective, radical externalism and AMT as well as with my elaboration of 
the  influence of brain imaging technologies on our conception of mind, 
brain and self. Recognizing the normative character of technologies in 
a dynamic environment renders the idea of an invariable, independent 
and uniform (humanist) criterion to determine what is an “enhanced” or 
“ideal human” untenable.
Second, this interactionist and externalist view of the self as some-
thing “outside” itself is, as I will elaborate in the next chapter, s tructural: 
because the self is “another for itself” and has always been open for 
technologies, it does not completely possess itself. This explains why in 
attempts to form ourselves (through education or technologically), we 
come across something that resists complete appropriation, something 
uncanny, which is not recognized in transhumanist views. This view 
is an implication of going beyond the inside-outside distinction: if we 
recognize that our “inside” is to a great extent shaped by our “out-
side,” then also our “inside” becomes to a great extent an “outside” 
for us.
Third, that our standards are greatly determined by technologies and 
that we cannot completely possess ourselves does not have to mean that, 
as argued in previous chapters, we are necessarily fixed by foreign forces. 
Although self-formation does not occur in a realm that is independent 
of social, physical and technological determinants and, hence, we have 
to recognize that we cannot simply form ourselves as we please, it seems 
to be possible to critically relate to those determinants and  identify 
 ourselves with certain determinants in a certain way and not identify 
with others. The question that now arises against this background is 
if and how it is possible to recognize that we are shaped by different 
social, material and, increasingly, technological factors and, at the same 
time, appropriate and organize those forces in such a way that we can 
critically impart a form to ourselves that we can consider “good.” My 
answer to this question is “through sublimation.” In the next chapter, 
I will work out the notion of the “extimate self” on the basis of an in-
vestigation of the technological uncanny. In the last two chapters of this 
part of the book, I will explicitly elaborate the idea of self-formation as 
sublimation. 
Notes
 1 See, among other publications, the 2010 special issue “Nietzsche and Eu-
ropean Posthumanisms” in the Journal of Evolution & Technology. In a 
special issue of the journal The Agonist in 2011, Keith Ansell-Pearson and 
three other Nietzsche scholars renewed this debate.
 2 I will also disregard Nietzsche’s own views of technology, which consist of 
scattered remarks in predominantly the works of his middle period (1876–
1882). Although Nietzsche sometimes mentions particular technologies 
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(such as the steam engine, the railway, the telegraph), his main focus is on 
how modern technology organizes society and, especially, affects human 
creativity. It is of note that Nietzsche’s attitude toward technology is ambiv-
alent: technology could be a source for creative growth but also cause inertia 
and decay (McGinn 1980). These views are interesting, but of no significant 
relevance for the theme of this study.
 3 In most transhumanists’ writings, the meanings of the terms “normal” and 
“enhanced” are unclear. Often, transhumanists (implicitly or explicitly) un-
derstand “normal” in the sense of statistical distribution within a popula-
tion: the distribution of a trait is “normal” if most individuals are clumped 
in the middle of the distribution curve with some outliers. They then almost 
always assume that the categories “normal,” “healthy” or “enhanced” are 
descriptive and do not require further analysis (Marsh 2006). The aim of 
this investigation is not to challenge (bio)statistical framings of “normal” 
or “healthy,” but to show how transhumanists’ conceptions of these terms 
are influenced (“normed”) by their particular understanding of the technol-
ogies on which they have pinned their hopes and to make clear why that is 
problematic.
 4 Modern theologians increasingly hold to the view that the human being is 
an indissoluble unity of mind/soul and body (Milne 1982, 120–122). From 
their point of view, Nietzsche’s critique of soul/mind-body dualism might be 
more applicable to Platonist and Cartesian thought than to Christian.
 5 Sparrow (2007) develops a similar argument in relation to nanotechnology.
Transhumanists and other techno-optimists often assume, as I have elab-
orated in the previous chapter, that it is possible to refer to invariable, 
independent and uniform standards for measuring what is “disabled,” 
“normal” and “enhanced,” which are the features of an essentialist view 
of the (post)human. The essentialist element of “independence” also comes 
with a dualist notion of the human, because it apparently secures an auton-
omous and pure (real) self that is not fundamentally affected by external 
factors and can form itself on the basis of general guidelines and laws that it 
derives from itself; in one word, a causa sui. Overcoming the inside-outside 
distinction has a price: the guidelines, laws and standards on the basis of 
which we establish what is “good self-formation” cannot be autonomously 
established but are influenced by our social, material and technological 
environment and, hence, variable, both synchronically and diachronically.
Recognizing that technologies are normative and, hence, “norm,” 
what we consider “successful or good self-formation” or an “enhanced 
self” has also a far-reaching existential implication. Going beyond the 
inside-outside dualism and recognizing that what we consider our “in-
side” self is to a great extent shaped by our “outside” world implies 
that our “inside” is to a great extent also for us an “outside,” which we 
cannot completely possess. Therefore, we cannot completely master and 
constrain our own process of self-formation. Or put differently, we do 
not completely possess the self that we attempt to form. It is not merely 
a “patient” that we can mold as we please.
This sense of otherness within can be experienced, as I will discuss 
in this chapter, as uncanny. Our very selfhood seems to contain an 
otherness that cannot be simply externalized, but is a constructive and 
structural part of what makes up who we are, which can elicit an eerie 
feeling. The question that I will address is how this otherness within 
that goes beyond the inside-outside distinction should be comprehended, 
whether there are more “voices,” more types of “otherness” within the 
self – which is already suggested by the idea of a self that forms itself – 
and how these types of otherness relate to one another. The notion of the 
“uncanny” will be used to unravel these relations of alterity within, and 
to shed light on our existential condition in the light of a world saturated 
with technologies.
8 The Technological Uncanny 
as a Permanent Structure 
of Selfhood
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The concept of the “uncanny” has a history. In his seminal 1906  essay, 
On the Psychology of the Uncanny (Zur Psychologie des Unheimlichen), 
Ernst Jentsch takes as a starting point for his investigation of the un-
canny the etymological meaning of the German word unheimlich (liter-
ally, “un-home-ly”), indicating that someone who experiences something 
uncanny is not quite “at home” or “at ease” in the situation concerned. 
The impression of the uncanniness of a thing or incident involves a “dark 
feeling of uncertainty,” which is related to a “lack of  orientation” (Jentsch 
1906/2008, 217, 224). Jentsch indicates that there is one exemplary expe-
rience that illustrates this uncanny feeling most clearly, namely the “doubt 
as to whether an apparently living being really is animate and, conversely, 
doubt as to whether a lifeless object may not in fact be animate” (Jentsch 
1906/2008, 221). For Jentsch, this is portrayed particularly in fiction and 
more specifically in storytelling. The lifelike doll Olympia, which fea-
tures in E.T.A. Hoffmann’s story “The Sandman” (Der Sandmann), is for 
Jentsch the prototypical example of an artifact that instigates a gloomy 
feeling of uncanniness (Jentsch 1906/2008, 224).
The feeling of the uncanny that is brought about by automata was 
taken up in 1970 by the Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori and des-
ignated as the “uncanny valley.” Reviewing the different explanations 
of this “uncanny valley” will allow me to put forward an alternative 
interpretation of why encounters with humanlike automata elicit an ee-
rie feeling. Hooking into how Jacques Lacan, via Sigmund Freud, takes 
up Jentsch’s view of the uncanny, I will propose that uncanny feelings 
not only say something about our psychological responses to humanlike 
robots, but also echo an ontological structure at the ground of human 
existence. Inspired by Lacan’s notion of “extimacy,” I will depict uncan-
niness as a fundamental dimension of our self-relation, as a permanent 
structure of subjectivity.
Lacan’s notion of “extimacy” (Lacan 1997, 139; 2006, 224, 249) con-
tributes to explaining why our capacity to form ourselves is restricted. 
This concept displays how the self is to a great extent a product of 
 external influences and, therefore, cannot simply mold itself into what-
ever shape it pleases. However, Lacan’s analysis primarily focuses on the 
symbolic order (language, laws, customs), not sufficiently taking into 
consideration the increasing impact of technologies on our self. Taking 
up Jean-Luc Nancy’s concepts of “intrusion” (Nancy 2008, 161, 163, 
167, 168, 169) and “being closed open” for technology (Nancy 2008, 
168), I will illustrate how in our current era a technological order is ever-
more strongly shaping our selfhood. This technological order is “other” 
and “own” at the same time, which explains why technology can be 
experienced as uncanny.
Acknowledging that the technological uncanny is increasingly becom-
ing a permanent structure of selfhood indicates that technology cannot 
simply be externalized and seen as an outside factor that can determine 
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or liberate us, nor as something that can destroy or strengthen our au-
tonomy. Both transhumanists, who put their hopes on technologies that 
could enhance our physical and mental capacities, and bioconserva-
tives, who warn us for the dangers of technologically tinkering with 
our  biological and psychological make-up, do not sufficiently consider 
the implications of technology becoming “extimate.” The proposed view 
calls for a more sophisticated account of how technology is shaping us as 
well as how we would like to be shaped by it.
8.1 The Uncanny Valley
Ernst Jentsch (1906/2008, 223) already indicated that people confronted 
with clever automata are likely to grow more uneasy as the automata be-
come more lifelike and refined. The more sophisticated the machine, the 
less confidence a spectator would have in drawing a line separating the 
animate from the inanimate. In his 1970 article entitled “The uncanny 
valley,” Japanese roboticist Mashihiro Mori depicted more precisely the 
relationship of familiarity and similarity in human likenesses and the pos-
itive or negative feelings that automata and other humanlike artifacts pro-
voke. As a robot or other human duplicate becomes more humanlike there 
is an increase in its acceptability, but as it approaches a nearly human 
state responses quickly turn to strong revulsion; as the robot’s appearance 
continues to become less distinguishable from that of a human being, the 
emotional response becomes favorable once again (see Figure 8.1).
It should be noted that as the graph of the uncanny valley (Mori 
1970/2012, 99) flattens toward its peak, there is very little distance 
 between the last instance where we still appreciate the robot’s clever 
Figure 8.1 Mori’s uncanny valley graph (1970/2012, 99). 
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 resemblance and the first disorienting moment that we feel repelled by its 
appearance. This “little distance” indicates that it is “minor differences” 
that instigate an uncanny feeling, an observation that can also be found 
in a different context in Freud, which I will take up later in this chapter.
In designing humanoid robots, Mori advised to escape the uncanny 
valley by keeping a safe distance from complete human likeness (Mori 
1970/2012, 100). Instead of realistic eyes or hands that prompt uncanny 
feelings, designers, Mori recommends, should attempt to manufacture 
stylish devices that are sufficiently different from human faculties and, at 
the same time, could be easily and comfortably incorporated or related 
to (Mori 1970/2012, 100). His advice has been taken up by different 
engineers and filmmakers who, also for commercial reasons, try to avoid 
having their designs fall into the uncanny valley (Geller 2008). However, 
at the end of his paper Mori indicates – without further explanation – 
that his graph could also fulfill another function: 
We should begin to build an accurate map of the uncanny valley so 
that through robotics research we can begin to understand what 
makes us human. This map is also necessary to create – using non-
human designs – devices to which people can relate comfortably 
(Mori 1970/2012, 100) 
The order suggests that understanding what makes us human through 
an analysis of the uncanny valley is of even greater importance than 
creating “homey” robots. I will return to this later.
In later years, multiple studies sought to establish whether the  uncanny 
valley is a real phenomenon, and if it is, to explain why it exists. Partic-
ipants’ ratings on familiarity or eeriness have been plotted against the 
human likeness of human replicas using humanoid robots, androids and 
computer-generated characters; also morphing techniques have been 
employed to morph doll faces into human faces. Some of these studies 
show nonlinear relations that resemble the uncanny valley (MacDor-
man and Ishiguro 2006; Seyama and Nagayama 2007). A more recent 
study (Mathur and Reichling 2016), in which participants’ ratings of 80 
real-world android faces were observed and examined, also detected a 
curve resembling the uncanny valley. However, other empirical stud-
ies did not detect nonlinear relations and, hence, did not confirm the 
uncanny valley hypothesis (Hanson 2005; MacDorman 2006; Bart-
neck et al. 2007; Poliakoff et al. 2013). There are no rigorous, controlled 
studies that unequivocally support the existence of the uncanny valley. 
However, there is support for its existence from a large number of more 
anecdotal studies and observations. Hence, whether the uncanniness of 
humanlike artifacts is a function of their human likeness remains debat-
able (Wang et al. 2015, 394).
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Multiple hypotheses have been proposed to explain the uncanny 
 valley. Among these are a number of so-called perceptual theories. 
The Pathogen Avoidance hypothesis (MacDorman and Ishiguro 2006; 
 MacDorman et al. 2009) was suggested by Mori himself, claiming that 
the uncanny valley must be related to “our instinct for self- preservation” 
(Mori 1970/2012, 100). From this perspective, visual anomalies in 
 human replica, which are perceived as genetically very close to humans, 
elicit disgust because an evolved mechanism for pathogen avoidance de-
tects these deficits as indicative of a heightened risk for transmissible 
diseases.
Alternatively, the Mortality Salience hypothesis (MacDorman and 
Ishiguro 2006) suggests that some humanlike robots remind human 
observers of their own inevitable mortality, thereby eliciting the un-
canny feeling driven by a fear of death. Resembling death, people who 
move jerkily, humanoid automata would elicit the fear of being replaced 
by an android doppelgänger, being soulless machines or losing bodily 
control (see also Ho et al. 2008). Eerie feelings are explained in terms 
of defense systems that then are triggered to cope with that unpleasant 
prospect.
The Evolutionary Aesthetics hypothesis posits that humans are highly 
sensitive to visual aesthetics. This hypothesis suggests that selection 
pressures have shaped human preference for certain physical appear-
ances signaling fitness, fertility and health. From this perspective, low 
attractiveness rather than lack of realism would explain the uncanniness 
of a human replica (Ferrey et al. 2015; see also Hanson 2005).
In addition to perceptual theories, theories have been proposed that 
focus more on cognitive aspects to explain the uncanny phenomenon. 
The Violation of Expectation hypothesis was also suggested by Mori 
himself (1970/2012), using the example of a prosthetic hand that ap-
peared real at first sight, but elicited eerie sensations as people realized 
that it was artificial. From this perspective, human replicas elicit an un-
canny feeling because they create expectations, but fail to match them 
(Mitchell et al. 2011). Here, uncanniness is elicited not so much by how 
humanoids look, but rather by how one thinks or assumes they will or 
should look like. Saygin et al. (2012) suggested that a humanoid stuck 
inside the uncanny valley elicits repulsion because it is no longer judged 
by the standards of a robot doing a passable job of pretending to be hu-
man, but is instead judged by the standards of a human doing a terrible 
job of acting like a normal person.
The Categorical Uncertainty hypothesis goes back to Jentsch, who ar-
gued that uncanniness is associated with uncertainty and mistrust which 
generates disorientation. From this perspective, the uncanny phenome-
non concerns the process whereby cognitive uncertainty emerges at any 
category boundary; negative affective responses are seen as a result of 
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categorically ambiguous images, for example, morphed images of a real, 
a stuffed and a cartoon human face (Yamada et al. 2013).
The Mind Perception hypothesis addresses the question: “On what 
bases do people perceive each other as humans?” From this perspec-
tive, the uncanny feeling is linked to violating the cognitive expectation 
that robots lack certain capacities that characterize humans, especially 
 subjective experience, that is, the ability to feel and sense things (Gray 
et al. 2007).
A theory that also focuses on robots coming too close to humans in-
stead of not close enough is the Threat to Distinctiveness hypothesis, 
which suggests that humanlike robots, blurring category boundaries, 
undermine human uniqueness (Kaplan 2004; Ferrari et al. 2016). From 
this perspective, the fear of being replaced by a robot might not insti-
gate fear of death but poses a threat to human identity, which elicits 
repulsion.
Wang et al. (2015, 395f) have evaluated the validity of different 
 perceptual theories and indicated that they suffer from limitations 
 attributable to the methodologies used to test their hypotheses. An-
other problem they raise is the usage of morphed images or computer- 
generated characters instead of existing human replicas, which forfeits, 
according to them, a certain degree of ecological validity. They have also 
evaluated cognitive theories that attempt to explain the uncanny feeling 
(2015, 397f) and pointed out that some theories of this kind neglect to 
explain what the cognitive expectations for humans and those for robots 
are, and why violating such expectations could elicit the uncanny feel-
ing. They also note that cognitive theories fail to explain why attributing 
human feeling and sense experience to nonhuman and nonliving things, 
which belongs to a broader phenomenon known as anthropomorphism, 
does not seem to elicit negative effects in various other domains. In ad-
dition, Wang et al. (2015, 398f) discuss conceptual difficulties in the 
translations and definitions of “uncanny” (shinwakan in Japanese) and 
“human likeness,” and problems in measuring the dependent variable in 
the uncanny valley hypothesis. They suggest that unclear interpretations 
and conceptualization of the variables in the uncanny valley hypothesis 
may have contributed to inconsistent findings.
Wang et al. (2015) stress the importance of studying the cognitive un-
derpinnings of the uncanny phenomenon. They argue that many of the 
mentioned hypotheses provide plausible accounts of the uncanny phe-
nomenon from different perspectives, while “they have neglected to verify 
the underlying assumption that observers would spontaneously perceive 
a human replica that closely resembles humans as a person” (2015, 401). 
Wang et al. (2015) believe that this assumption is plausible, given the 
proclivity we have to anthropomorphize inanimate or nonhuman entities 
in literature, the arts, sciences and in perception (Guthrie 1993).
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Recognizing the cognitive process of anthropomorphism allows Wang 
et al. (2015) to propose their own Dehumanization Hypothesis. They 
argue that attributing humanlike characteristics to robots does not by 
itself explain the uncanny feeling; instead, the uncanny feeling, they 
 believe, must be understood as a response to a lack of humanness. An 
anthropomorphized human replica is not perceived to be a typical robot, 
but is rather seen as a “robotlike” human. If the “robotlike” human then 
reveals its mechanistic nature, its humanness (above all, the capacity for 
emotions and warmth) is questioned, which leads to dehumanization, 
thereby diminishing its likability and eliciting the uncanny feeling. This 
hypothesis is not necessarily in conflict with other hypotheses but in-
terprets their findings from a different perspective: “The more human 
observers attribute humanlike characteristics to (anthropomorphize) a 
human replica, the more likely detecting its mechanistic features triggers 
the dehumanization process that would lead to the uncanny feeling” 
(2015, 402).
8.2  An Alternative Explanation of the Uncanny Valley, 
or the Importance of “Minor Differences”
The various hypotheses that I have listed above undoubtedly explain 
relevant aspects of the negative responses of certain humans to certain 
humanlike robots. Moreover, Wang, et al. rightly show the plausibil-
ity of the assumption that in many studies, observers tend to sponta-
neously perceive a human replica that closely resembles humans as a 
person. What is also noteworthy in relation to this assumption is that 
it is not the big but rather the little differences that evoke feelings of re-
pulsion: observers spontaneously take humanlike robots as persons, but 
are then repelled if they do not come close enough to humans, if small 
disparities reveal their lack of “humanness.” The difference between 
having this “humanness” or not having it seems to manifest itself in 
very subtle and elusive features: a small delay, an unexpected accelera-
tion, an unfamiliar gesture. One moment the humanoid is human and 
the other he is not.
From a psychological perspective, the nonhuman, mechanistic traits 
of humanoids are primarily revealed in a lack of emotions and warmth, 
which, from this perspective, might be a sufficient explanation. How-
ever, from a more philosophical-existential perspective, the looming 
“little big” question is: “what makes this humanness”? What makes the 
ability to feel and sense “human?” Would we consider an android that 
perfectly possesses these capacities human? Or are these capacities mere 
surface markers of a deeper layer that designates a human? What is re-
quired to bridge the gap between a humanoid and a human? Often, these 
questions lead to a kind of philosophical embarrassment: what makes 
198 How Should We Form Ourselves?
us human seems to escape us. The psychological accounts of fe elings 
of uncanniness seem to allow us to see something that may have other-
wise remained hidden, something strange about our own identity and 
existence.
I am not the first to make the move from a psychological to a more 
 existential-philosophical account of the uncanny. Katherine Withy (2015, 
48) argues – building on Heidegger – that the psychological a ccounts 
of the feeling that may accompany uncanniness refer to an “originary 
angst” that grounds falling (Verfallen), an “angst” expressing that the 
human cannot get a full hold of its own ground. From this perspective, 
“humanness” is not characterized in terms of certain capacities that can 
be observed and measured, but is rather rendered virtually inaccessible; 
as our mode of existence it is “too close to see.” The feelings of uncan-
niness are interpreted as a fundamental mood that discloses a deeper 
ontological structure at the ground of human existence.
Yet, instead of building on Heidegger, I would like to remain closer 
to the originators of the analysis of the uncanny. In his 1919 essay enti-
tled “The ‘Uncanny,’” Sigmund Freud discusses and criticizes Jentsch’s 
concept of the uncanny. He also draws on the work of Ernst Hoffmann 
and, like Jentsch, considers him the “unrivalled master of the uncanny in 
literature” (Freud 1981, 3686). In contrast to Jentsch, Freud did not re-
gard almost-real objects as such as disturbing and dissonant, but rather 
believed that such feelings reveal deeper turmoil and psychopathology 
(Freud 1981, 3683). When Hoffmann’s protagonist Nathaniel sees his 
object of love (the doll Olympia) partly dismantled with her eyes popped 
out of their sockets, thinks Freud, a repressed feeling resurfaced, namely 
the submerged fear of castration that survived from early childhood. 
Freud describes the uncanny as a “class of the frightening that leads 
back to what is known of old and long familiar” (Freud 1981, 3676) 
and, citing Schelling, as “the name for everything that ought to have re-
mained … secret and hidden but has come to light” (Freud 1981, 3678). 
For him, Jentsch’s conception of the uncanny is incomplete, since the 
recurrence of something repressed is required in order for a situation 
to be experienced as uncanny: without such resemblance, it can merely 
be frightening, which is different from uncanny. Freud stresses that this 
explains why the uncanny does not simply refer to something foreign 
but to an instance where something is foreign, yet disturbingly familiar 
at the same time. It is the “minor differences” that instigate a sense of 
uncanniness.
It is impossible and unnecessary to go here into questions regarding 
the validity of Freud’s theory of repression. What I would like to take 
from Freud’s approach is the idea that uncanniness revolves around the 
tension between unfamiliar and familiar, and hidden and revealed. Al-
lowing us some freedom of interpretation and going outside of Freud’s 
psychoanalytic framework, we might say that the humanlike robot elicits 
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a feeling of uncanniness because it reveals something that ought to have 
remained hidden, namely the unfathomability of that which makes us 
human. The “minor difference” between the robot and the observer of 
the robot disorients not only because the robot is slightly different but 
also because what makes the observer different appears to be incom-
prehensible. From this perspective, the uncanny feeling is interpreted 
not only as a response to a lack of humanness in the robot, but also as 
a response to the viewer’s own inability to fathom and appropriate this 
“humanness” that the viewer herself possesses.
In line with this view, I propose that the uncanny valley might say 
at least as much about us as it says about humanlike robots. The ro-
bot might confront us with something uncanny in us. It is because 
a  humanlike robot resembles me without being completely identical 
(“minor differences”) that I am confronted with my own unfounded-
ness, which is constitutively strange to me. I not only become aware of 
what makes me different from the robot, but also of the impossibility 
for me to appropriate this difference. I do not suggest (nor exclude) 
that this explanation or interpretation could be validated by empirical 
research. Rather, I propose it as an explanatory, theoretical framework 
that could provide more insight into how technology is increasingly 
invasive and how our self has always been open for this technological 
intrusion.  Following Lacan, who, via Freud, takes up the idea of the 
uncanny, will enable me to further elaborate the idea of these alterity 
relations within.
8.3 The Otherness of the Self as “Extimacy”
Freud uses the term “narcissism of minor differences” to show how it 
is the little differences “in people who are otherwise alike that form 
the basis of feelings of strangeness and hostility between them” (Freud 
1981, 2355; see also 2553, 4506). Rudi Visker (2005, 433) explains that 
 “narcissism” for Freud refers to an initially completely self-contained 
Ego that gradually opens up to reality. There is a movement from the 
inside to the outside: initially the Ego is a narcissistic entity exclusively 
focused on its libidinal drives, but then can gradually learn to redirect 
part of its energy and invest it in things outside itself. From this perspec-
tive, the self is originally a closed entity that can and should learn to 
gradually lose its protective shell and open up to the outside world and 
other people that, on first sight, seem strange and foreign. At this point, 
Visker (2005, 433) turns to Lacan. He notes that Lacan starts from the 
inverse hypothesis: the movement is not from the inside to the outside 
but from the outside to the inside. There is no closed original Ego, but 
rather the Ego is discovered and developed through the other.
Visker argues that connecting the notion of the “uncanny” to the con-
cept of “narcissism of minor differences,” which Freud himself did not 
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explicitly do, and, via Lacan, reversing Freud’s hypothesis, can foster 
 insight into “alterity-relations within.” This type of relations indicates 
that not only the otherness of other people needs to be recognized, as 
Levinas relentlessly stressed in Totality and Infinity (1961/1969) and 
other works, but also the otherness that somebody finds in herself.
In his famous essay “The Mirror Stage” (1949/2005), Lacan argues 
that the child discovers itself as a unified entity in and through some-
thing else, such as its own mirror image, the body of another child and 
the responses of its parents. It would be inaccurate to say that the child 
recognizes itself in the Other, since it is only by virtue of that other and 
the discourses, goals, ideals and desires that others impart on it that the 
child develops and discovers a self. From this perspective, identity is the 
result of identification, though without assuming that there is a subject 
prior to that process of identification (see also Julien 1990, 43–51).
Lacan’s view of the relation between self and other is paradoxical and 
uncomfortable: the other is both the necessary condition for forming a 
self and, at the same time, an obstacle that prevents the self from reach-
ing the unity that it seeks. In Visker’s words:
identity will always bear the trace of an exteriority that it cannot 
fully interiorize. I am another (je est un autre) means: I cannot do 
without that other through whom I get an I. That other becomes 
someone that I cannot expel. In other words, my alienation is origi-
nal, for it is implied in my self-constitution. There is no “self-hood” 
without “foreignhood.” The self is not something I possess, my 
“self” is irremediably infected with an otherness that prevents me 
from being fully at one with myself (Visker 2005, 433)
Instead of understanding the alterity within in terms of introducing 
 another “in” the self, the self is revealed as something that is from the 
beginning contaminated with another. Lacan calls this otherness of the 
self extimacy: the “own”-ness of the self is both strange and fa miliar, 
both inside and outside, neither inside nor outside. The self is always 
outside its center; the self is, one could say, referring to Helmuth Pless-
ner’s view that the human never completely coincides with herself, “ex- 
centric” (Plessner 1975).
Besides developmental psychological accounts of the self (such as the 
mirror stage), Lacan uses surrealistic and Escher-ish figures to visu-
alize the dizzying structure of extimacy, for example, in the topology 
of the Möbius strip: the Möbius strip’s half-twist results in an “odd” 
object (Lacan 2014, 120) because the single surface of the strip passes 
 seamlessly from the “inside” to the “outside.” Not only is it impossi-
ble to distinguish the inside surface from the outside one, but it is also 
impossible to tell left from right. It is disorienting and confusing: “You 
literally can’t make heads or tails of it” (Robertson 2015, 18). For Lacan, 
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self-relations are characterized by this perplexing strain to distinguish 
“inside” from “outside.”
This otherness within has for Lacan different dimensions. For one, 
the self’s alterity within entails the influences of the external world that 
we have gradually incorporated. As we have indicated above, a child 
discovers and develops a unified self through embodying different 
 external instances. The image that the self projects on itself through 
others is, according to Lacan, also an imago: a unified, stable and ideal 
 totality (“that’s you Helena, yes you are a wonderful girl, you are a prin-
cess, you’re going to grow up to be beautiful and smart, just like your 
mommy”). The self attempts to realize this ideal image through identi-
fication, and subsequently enters a lifelong quest to correspond wholly 
with this Ideal-I, a quest that, Lacan stresses continuously, can never be 
completely fulfilled (Lacan 2005, 12, 15, 18). The imago also refers to 
the imago Dei, the image of God in which human beings were created 
and with which they should strive to conform but can never completely 
achieve. It is important to stress that the imago is not an emanation of 
the individual but the result of an encounter with larger Others and their 
desires, goals and ideals. Lacan sometimes designates this dimension, 
which also corresponds to a phase in the development of a child, as the 
“Imaginary Order” (Lacan 2005, 158, 161).
The images that others project on the self, by virtue of which it devel-
ops a sense of an unified Ego, also gradually enable the self to enter into 
what Lacan sometimes calls a Symbolic Order (and sometimes the “Big 
Other”): the pre-existing order of customs, institutions, laws, mores, 
norms, practices, rituals, rules, traditions and so on of cultures and so-
cieties, which are entwined in various ways with language (Lacan 1997, 
20, 81). The Imaginary and Symbolic do not coincide: the Imaginary 
is central to Lacan’s account(s) of ego formation and manifests itself 
in dyadic relations (such as in the self and its mirror image), whereas 
the Symbolic constitutes triadic relations by introducing, besides dyadic 
and intersubjective relation, a trans-subjective symbolic order that nor-
matively regulates the relations between particular beings and society 
(Lacan 1997, 81, 234). In short, the self is what it is in and through 
From this Lacanian perspective, not only the other or otherness out-
side escapes definition – as Levinas (1961/1969) attempted to illustrate – 
but also the self that is confronted with that otherness. The self is not 
something I completely possess, but is rather irremediably infected with 
an otherness within that prevents it from being fully at one with itself. 
The alienation is original, for it is implied in its self-formation. The self 
finds itself attached to something within, which is experienced as its 
selfhood, without being able to sufficiently understand and explain this 
attachment. It was already there before the self discovered itself as a 
self-reflecting agent. It cannot be fully objectified because it is always 
too close to the self.
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mediations of the endorsed image that others project on it as well as 
through subjecting it to socio-linguistic arrangements and constellations.
There is, besides the Imaginary and Symbolic Order, also something 
else that constitutes the self, a dimension that Lacan designates with dif-
ferent (related) names: the Thing (La Chose), the Real Other or the Real 
Order. In the Mirror Stage (1949/2005), Lacan stated that in the image 
of the child reflected in the mirror there is one element, like the eyes 
of a creepy, living doll that fails to integrate into a functional totality 
and necessarily appears fixed and immobile: the gaze. It has an uncanny 
way of detaching itself from me, said Lacan (Lacan 2014, 97; Robertson 
2015, 25). It refuses to integrate into a functional totality. The reflection 
in the mirror serves to organize the child’s movements and body parts in 
a unified whole. At the same time, this framing seems to leave behind a 
“residue” that escapes the subject’s sense of complete mastery over her 
body (Lacan 2005, 3). Visker stresses that this drive within, unlike angst 
in Heidegger or shame in Levinas, is not something that is liberating 
or beneficial but an uncanny guest, a Thing that the self needs to be 
 protected from. In all my attempts to control and “domesticate” it, I rec-
ognize that it escapes me, might cross the borders that I and society have 
set, disorient me, and potentially might destroy me (Lacan 1997, 43–56).
However, the Thing is also not sheer negativity, as Lacan’s depictions 
of the Thing might suggest. It is something that does not fit and cannot fit 
into an encompassing frame of meaning. By virtue of this aspect, the self 
can never be completely captured and domesticated by the ideal images 
that others project on it, nor by the symbolic order in which it is immersed. 
It is this dimension that gives the self particularity and singularity.
This characterization of the self renders Lacan’s psychological anthro-
pology completely at variance with Anglo-American ego psychology and 
the Enlightenment spirit, which seek to strengthen people’s ego and lib-
erate them from restrictions. Despite having consciousness, the self is not 
a locus of autonomous agency; it is not the seat of a free “I” determining 
its own fate. The self is thoroughly compromised. The other (in its three 
manifestations as Imaginary, Symbolic and Real) is both the necessary 
condition for forming a self and an obstacle that prevents the self from 
reaching the unity, autonomy and singularity that it seeks, not only be-
cause it cannot meet certain demands of others or because it has been 
shaped by a world that it was thrown into (to borrow a Heideggerian 
term), but also because it can never fully appropriate what it desires. 
Without the other, it is impossible to discover and develop subjectivity 
or selfhood and, at the same time, the other prevents it from becoming 
an autonomous being, unaffected by its traces, inscriptions and whims; 
or put yet differently, in all my attempts to become an independent and 
unique self, I remain to a great extent a repository for the projected de-
sires and fantasies of larger others and a plaything of the idiosyncratic 
and disruptive vagaries of an unruly force within.
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This makes, as indicated earlier, the “otherness” in the self more dis-
turbing, since the self is unable to externalize it, detach itself from it 
and localize it, which explains its uncanniness. Since the self becomes 
what it is by virtue of its encounters with manifestations of this other, 
it remains always a stranger or other for itself. The self is never com-
pletely “at home.” Its “own”-ness is, as we have seen, both strange and 
familiar, which explains why uncanniness is a permanent dimension of 
its subjectivity.
It is crucial to understand this other within from a radical anti- 
essentialist view that goes beyond inside-outside dualisms, since the other 
that is beyond our control is, at the same time, responsible for forming 
our self; our self-relation is inherently an alterity relation. The self is, con-
tra Freud, not something that has to learn to open itself for others, but 
rather has to find a way to live and not to be crushed by that other that, 
from the beginning, is already inside: the stranger outside me can make 
me aware of and awakens the otherness inside me, which can fill me with 
incongruity, confusion and sometimes rage (see also Visker 2005, 435).
8.4 Being “Closed Open” for Technology
Lacan illustrates how otherness structurally constitutes the self. In 
his depiction of how society shapes the self, he predominantly focuses 
on the world of language, laws and customs. However, in our present 
 culture, we are witnessing, besides or in addition to a Symbolic Order, 
the ever-stronger ubiquity of a Technological Order. Today, virtually 
all  facets of our lives are saturated with technology. It must be said that 
the material world is not absent in Lacan’s account. It is notable that his 
prime example of Otherness involves an artifact, namely the “mirror 
image.” In fact, in the 1949 text, Lacan seems to think of artifacts as 
equally relevant props as humans (parents, peers etc.) within the con-
text of subjectivation, but in subsequent reinterpretations of the mirror 
stage during the 1960s, he increasingly highlights the supporting role of 
fellow human beings, caregivers’ narratives and socio-linguistic factors. 
If Lacan would have lived and written in our era, where technologies 
are becoming more intimate and intrusive than ever before, he probably 
would have emphasized more the role of technologies such as screens, 
tablets, mobile phones, social networking services, brain imaging and 
other medical technologies, and algorithms and other digital grammars. 
In order to explain how we find ourselves in an “extimate” relation not 
only with a symbolic but also with a technological order, and how this 
relation is increasingly shaping our selfhood, I will complement Lacan’s 
notion of “extimacy” with Nancy’s view of being “closed open” for tech-
nologies. This technological order that is “other” and “own” at the same 
time, might further explain in what sense technology is experienced as 
uncanny in our current era.
204 How Should We Form Ourselves?
In 1990, French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy got severely ill and needed 
to undergo a heart transplant. In an autobiographical essay e ntitled L’in-
trus (The Intruder), he documented this experience. Nancy notes that his 
heart has always seamlessly kept him alive, supplying oxygen and nutri-
ents to the tissues in his body. Before his illness, his heart was, as Nancy 
describes, the most private and intimate part of himself and, at the same 
time, not more than a piece of meat, invisible and without meaning. After 
he got ill, his relation to his heart radically altered: in order to survive, he 
had to get rid of it. Nancy says: “My heart became my stranger” (2008, 
163). Nancy was still his heart, but, at the same time, his heart became 
something foreign. Instead of an ally, suddenly his heart became a dan-
gerous enemy. His heart became an intruder, not one that enters from 
outside but one that enters from inside (Nancy 2008, 162f). We see here 
that the idea of an “intruder from inside” renders the apparently clear-
cut distinction between “inside” and “outside” opaque.
Besides his sick heart, Nancy describes many other forms of strange-
ness that he experienced. The donor heart that he got was seen as a 
stranger. As Nancy states: “my heart can be a black woman’s heart” 
(Nancy 2008, 166). Also his own immune system – normally his most 
important protector and ally – became a threat, since it needed to be 
suppressed in order to accept the donor heart. Furthermore, his age be-
came a stranger, since the donor heart could be 20 years younger than 
he is (Nancy 2008, 169). And this was not the end of Nancy’s strange en-
counters: after his heart transplant, Nancy got sick again and developed 
cancer; now the cancer cells, which prior to his illness were not identified 
as different, became a dangerous stranger.
The long list of strange entities that he came across in his body led to 
Nancy’s observation that not only parts of his body, but also his body 
as such is a stranger to him. Moreover, while reading Nancy’s essay, it 
gradually becomes clear that its main theme is not his heart transplant, 
nor his cancer cells, nor his illness. His line of thought culminates in a 
reflection about how the “intruders” from within and without reframe 
his view of his “self.” He writes:
I am the illness and the medicine, I am the cancerous cell and the 
grafted organ, I am these immuno-depressive agents and their palli-
atives, I am these ends of steel wire that brace my sternum and this 
injection site permanently sewn under my clavicle, altogether as if, 
already and besides, I were these screws in my thigh and this plate 
inside my groin (Nancy 2008, 170)
In addition, Nancy’s focus shifts from observations on his body and the 
way he relates to it to a reflection on the technologies that are inserted 
in his body, the technological manipulation of his body and how his 
relation to these technologies sheds a different light on his body and self.
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In relation to the notion of the “intruder,” Nancy employs the idea of 
the self being “closed open,” which together signify how the t echnologies 
that are used to treat and keep his body alive are evermore interwoven 
with his very self: “‘I’ always find itself tightly squeezed in a wedge of 
technical possibilities” (Nancy 2008, 162). The idea of being “closed 
open” indicates that the technologies used to treat Nancy should not be 
seen as strangers from an outside realm that infringe the self; rather, the 
self is exposed as always having been part of that “outside.” As Nancy ex-
plains: “What a strange me! Not because they [the surgeon, the technolo-
gies] opened me up, gaping, to change the heart. But because this gaping 
cannot be sealed back up. (…) I am closed open” (Nancy 2008, 167f).
Nancy stresses that current technologies highlight the alterity in self-
hood, though, at the same time, he makes clear that they did not cause 
or generate it: “never has the strangeness of my own identity, which for 
me has always been nonetheless so vivid, touched me with such acuity” 
(2008, 168; see also Slatman 2007). Nancy attempts to illustrate – very 
much in line with Lacan – that alterity is a constant dimension of our self 
and self-experience. It can also be experienced if the body is not ill. The 
heart transplant and other technological intruders make this experience 
only more acute, but have not generated this being “closed open.” We 
have always been strangers to ourselves. In Nancy’s words:
The intruder is nothing but myself and man himself. None other 
than the same, never done with being altered, at once sharpened and 
exhausted, denuded and overequipped, an intruder in the world as 
well as in himself, a disturbing thrust of the strange, the conatus of 
an on-growing infinity (Nancy 2008, 170)
The self has always been outside itself and, hence, can never be com-
pletely closed in order to entirely possess itself.
It is clear that for Nancy (and for Lacan), the self has always been “closed 
open,” but that does not imply that with the advent of new technologies 
there is nothing new under the sun. New and emerging technologies have 
expanded the possibilities to “intrude” in the “closed open self,” which 
is also confirmed by Nancy: “I am turning into something like a science- 
fiction android, or else, as my youngest son said to me one day, one of the 
living-dead” (Nancy 2008, 170). Besides tradition, education and culture, 
now technology has become a dominant force in self-formation processes, 
as Nancy very intimately has experienced. The human has always been 
“closed open,” but now she can immediately intervene in her own bodily 
constitution. The potential to be “closed open” has always existed, but 
technologies today take increasing advantage of this potentiality:
Man becomes what he is: the most terrifying and the most troubling 
technician, as Sophocles called him twenty-five centuries ago, who 
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denatures and remakes nature, who recreates creation, who brings 
it out of nothing and, perhaps, leads it back to nothing. One capable 
of origin and end (Nancy 2008, 170)
Lacan’s idea of “extimacy” highlights that the self is not a closed “in-
side” that then learns to open up to the outside world, but that the self is 
rather discovered and developed in and through a pre-existing symbolic 
order, an order that, on the one hand, is constitutive for its subjectivity 
and agency and, on the other hand, is an obstacle that prevents it from 
reaching the autonomous unity that it desires. What Nancy’s elaboration 
of his experience of being “closed open” for technologies adds to this 
framework is that the self, as an epistemic object, is evermore deeply im-
mersed in a pre-existing realm of biomedical knowledge and technology. 
This technological realm is increasingly shaping the self. The technology 
that potentially always can intrude in the self also affects and transforms 
how the self experiences itself, and in which direction the self is formed. 
For Nancy, technology does not extend the mind or the self, but the self 
has always been open and exposed and now technology is excessively 
confiscating it (see also Aydin 2015): “the subject’s truth is its exteriority 
and its excessiveness: its infinite exposition. The intruder [in this case 
technology] exposes me to excess. It extrudes me, exports me, expropri-
ates me” (Nancy 2008, 170).
Complementing Lacan’s notion of “extimacy” with Nancy’s view of 
being “closed open” for technologies makes it possible to reinterpret the 
other within in terms of technology within. The technology within is not 
completely strange or foreign, since it is a constitutive part of our sub-
jectivity and selfhood. At the same time, technology prevents one from 
becoming an autonomous and singular being, unaffected by its engrav-
ings. Technology is strange and familiar, at the same time. That “at the 
same time” explains why it can be experienced as uncanny.
8.5  Alterity in Selfhood and the Question of 
Technological Self-Formation
The idea of the uncanny has been used to designate an alterity within 
that cannot be simply explained in terms of something external that 
challenges or influences our internal convictions, preferences, values or 
goals. From Freud, I have taken the view that the uncanny cannot be 
simply be opposed to the canny: heimlich and unheimlich are not sim-
ply opposites, since unheimlich signifies the concealed and the hidden 
and, at the same time, the familiar and domestic. The uncanny within is 
strange and familiar, at the same time.
Lacan’s notion of “extimacy” has been employed to further illustrate 
how “ownness” does not exclude but rather includes “otherness.” This 
notion expresses on the one hand that even our most personal goals, 
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aspirations and ideals that we attempt to realize in order to become an 
ideal-I are derived from significant others in our lives. The sense of being 
a unified Ego is derived from images that others project on me. My de-
sires are ultimately desires of others, such as my parents, educators, role 
models, superstars, Party, God, Nature and Science. In confrontation 
with significant others, we gradually enter a symbolic order that enable 
us to become part of a community and define ourselves from a third per-
son perspective as subjects with certain roles, duties and responsibilities.
On the other hand, Lacan stresses that there is also some-Thing in us 
that prevents being completely absorbed by societal aspirations, values 
and ideals, including ethical, political and (we can add) technological 
rules, regulations and grammars. Although by virtue of this drive hu-
mans are singular beings, Lacan points out that this dimension should 
not be romanticized; in its purest form, it is an unfathomable and dis-
orienting abyss of withdrawn-yet-proximate alterity. In order to regulate 
its drives and impose a form to them, the self needs help in the form 
of a symbolic and technological frame or narrative. Lacan stresses the 
importance of the Symbolic and Imaginary and their protective, orient-
ing and stabilizing workings. At the same time, he points out that the 
process of subjectivation and socialization always hold the chance of ex-
cessively repressing and fixing the self through a particular “sheltered” 
system that ultimately becomes a straitjacket and prevents developing a 
singular identity.
Through a reading of Nancy’s Intruder, I have tried to complement 
Lacan’s social order of language, laws and regulations with a technolog-
ical order that is increasingly shaping the very nature of our selfhood. In 
our current era, technologies and technological systems can be added to 
the Lacanian Imaginary Other that projects its desires on us and the “Big 
Other” that regulates our conduct: an IPhone is not only a handy device 
for making calls, texting and surfing the web, but promises us to up-
grade our identity and lifestyle. Brain imaging technologies are increas-
ingly used not only to diagnose diseases and lesions, but also to correlate 
brain activation with psychological states and traits up to a level that, 
some predict, will enable us to correct the mental states that someone as-
cribes to herself or even establish whether someone really possesses free 
will (Aydin 2018a). Upcoming persuasive technologies will influence our 
wishes and desires more seamlessly, making it even harder to recognize 
them as being projected to us (Frischmann and  Selinger 2018).
The idea of a socio-technological order influencing and regulating 
our conduct and interactions as well as generating social stability is not 
a completely novel view. Philosophers like Hegel and Gehlen have ar-
gued that institutions and institutionally conveyed mental habits have 
the formal and informal function to unburden and give coherence 
and continuity, to compensate for the human’s lack of instinctual de-
termination. Also, “alienation theories,” often strongly influenced by 
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Hegel and Marx, thematize the estrangement of the self in our modern, 
 technological culture. However, Lacan and Nancy illustrate that this 
order is a constitutive dimension of the self, and cannot be simply exter-
nalized and objectified. Instrumentalist and determinist approaches to 
technology as well as techno-optimist and techno-pessimist approaches 
(including transhumanist and bioconservative approaches) often over-
look that technology cannot be simply situated outside humans and 
their condition. The “technological other” limits our capacity to form 
ourselves, not because it constrains an original capacity to make auton-
omous decisions, but because this “technological other” has engraved 
– and is evermore deeply engraving – its structures in our very origin. 
Technology increasingly enables us to form ourselves into  stable and 
 socially dependable beings and, at the same time, prevents us from reach-
ing the autonomy and uniqueness that we seek, which could a ccount for 
the uncanniness that some technology seems to elicit.
Reflection on the uncanny feeling triggered by a humanlike robot 
prompts the question not only of what makes robots different from hu-
mans, but also what makes humans different from robots: the lack of 
humanness that would elicit the uncanny feeling instigates the question 
of what makes up this “minor difference.” In confrontation with the 
humanlike robot, I not only become aware of what makes me different 
from it, but also of the impossibility for me to appropriate that differ-
ence. The elaboration of the “extimate structure” of the self has led to 
the finding that the self is formed in the image that the “outside world” 
projects on it. Since the “outside world” is increasingly a world of tech-
nology, the self, being “closed open,” is increasingly being shaped in 
the image of technology; technology is increasingly becoming the “Big 
Other,” the dominant “intruder within.” Thus, perhaps in the confron-
tation with the strange and, at the same time, familiar robot, the self not 
only uncannily senses the human in the robot, but also the robot in the 
human. From this view, it is inaccurate and inadequate to frame the self 
as something that could or should close itself off from, or alternatively 
learn to open itself for, technology. In line with what Lacan and Nancy 
say about the other within, I propose instead that the self should find a 
way not to be restricted and crushed by, but rather live in a critical and 
deliberate way with, the technology which from the beginning is already 
inside.
However, there is a complicating factor which I have ignored so far. 
For Lacan, the social order, on the one hand, protects the self from 
 arbitrariness and excess, and, on the other hand, always comes with the 
chance that protection keels over to repression. What Lacan does not 
seem to have envisaged, besides the view that that the symbolic other 
could be toppled by a technological other, is that this technological 
other, instead of securing order, could also become a source of disrup-
tion itself. We have seen that transhumanists and other techno-optimists 
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who propose enhancing human capacities by means of existing and 
emerging technologies often do not take into account that these tech-
nologies are influencing, challenging and disrupting our very standards 
for establishing what are “enhanced capacities.” They wrongly assume 
that it is possible to refer to univocal standards for measuring what is 
“disabled” and “normal” as well as what is an enhanced self or “success-
ful or good self-formation” (Aydin 2017). In addition, the authority of 
traditional “Big Others” is more easily questioned and challenged in our 
current global society, which harbors different and sometimes opposing 
views, values and ideals, different and opposing views that are accessible 
to ever greater parts of the world population through the Internet and 
other media. Not only do we need to deal with the human being as a 
“monster and an abyss,” a being that escapes every possible uniform 
categorization and, therefore, continuously is able to challenge and dis-
rupt current standards, we now also seem to witness a “technological 
other” becoming an additional disruptive force. The technological other 
is becoming an additional disorienting dimension that also could further 
intensify the uncanny within.
In the wake of univocal standards being challenged and undermined 
from different others without and within, the question of how to form 
ourselves becomes evermore acute. How is it against this background 
still possible to sustain the ideal of “good self-formation”? How can one 
develop a coherent, social and a singular self in the light of our intrin-
sic technological condition? Recognizing that technology “conditions” 
our humanness, could we also consciously employ it to “condition” our 
 humanness in a certain desired direction and form ourselves in a “good” 
way? I believe that the notion of “sublimation” might prove itself fruitful 
in this respect, which I will discuss in the next chapters. 
The developed idea of “self-formation” is presented as an alternative 
to essentialist and dualist notions of the self. Instead of understanding 
it as an a priori given entity that is independent of its environment, the 
self rather shapes itself by imparting a particular form to the interac-
tions it has with its world. Since technologies play an ever-stronger role 
in this shaping, self-formation is increasingly captured as technological 
self- formation, which for some techno-optimists gives rise to boundless 
 aspirations for self-enhancement. New and emerging technologies could, 
they believe, improve our neural organization and capacities as well as 
reshape our motivational patterns and emotional responses. These tech-
nologies promise us mastery over our biochemistry and ultimately total 
control over our lives.
In the previous chapters, I have shown that this enhancement rheto-
ric does not go beyond essentialist and dualist accounts of the human 
and its relation to technology but only rehabilitates such ontological 
frameworks. Transhumanists propose overcoming essentialist views 
and anticipate radical transformation of humans through technology. 
Nonetheless, they assume that present humans will not cease to exist, 
nor radically change in this radical transformation, and that the crite-
ria to determine what is “normal” and what is “enhanced” are both in 
our present time and in the future, to a great extent univocal, and that 
 humans are and will remain in control of their self-formation.
These assumptions bring bioconservatives, despite their opposition 
to human enhancement technologies, closer to transhumanists than on 
the first sight is noticeable. In both approaches only – technologically 
enabled – humans are seen as agents, without taking into account that 
technologies could also function as “actants,” shaping both hu man 
 subjectivity and the world. This way technological development is 
seen as transparent and as always under control of human subjectivity; 
 technologies are considered as value-neutral tools that are employed by 
autonomous humans in order to realize the goals that they have set for 
themselves. This view of human-technology relations we came across 
in various forms in, among other, instrumentalist, determinist, techno- 
optimist and techno-pessimist approaches.
9 Self-Formation as 
Sublimation and the 
Question Concerning 
Technology
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Throughout this study, I have argued that the environment, which is 
increasingly a technological environment, cannot be simply situated out-
side humans and their condition. Overcoming an essentialist and dualist 
view requires recognizing that technology has become an intrinsic part 
of our mind, body and self, and both “norms” and disrupts the  standards 
that we use to establish what we consider “normal,” “healthy” or “en-
hanced” features and capacities.
This picture of a self beyond the inside-outside distinction appears to 
be far from harmonious and reassuring. Technologies increasingly seem 
to shape the very fabric of our selfhood, including the desires, goals and 
ideals that we consider as most personal. In addition, these desires, goals 
and ideals seem to be continuously subject to the disruptive influence of 
new and emerging technologies as well as to the idiosyncratic whims of 
an unruly force “within.” The self appears, as I have elaborated in the 
previous chapter, to be compromised and seem to have virtually no space 
to critically and deliberately form itself.
How to recognize this unsettled structure of the self and prevent 
adopting the view that the self is not more than a plaything of contingent 
influences and forces? How is it against the displayed background still 
possible to sustain the ideal of “good self-formation”? In the wake of 
univocal standards being challenged and undermined by an external and 
internal technological “other” as well as from uncontrollable drives, the 
question how to form ourselves becomes evermore acute. In this chapter, 
I will argue that the notion of “sublimation” might prove itself fruitful 
in this respect. Instead of understanding self-formation as enhancement, 
I will propose that it can be better captured as sublimation, while also 
reflecting on the role of technologies in that process. This notion of sub-
limation will be developed through revisiting some of the authors that 
have functioned as guides throughout this study. Most importantly, the 
idea of critical self-formation by virtue of longer-term goals and ide-
als will be taken up again and further integrated in the proposed self- 
formation as sublimation framework.
9.1  Sublimation as Substitution of Raw Drives for 
Social Valuations
Sublimation is a key notion in Freud’s psychoanalysis. It is a necessary 
condition for full psychic health and the desired result of successful psy-
choanalytic treatment. In general, the aim of psychoanalytic treatment 
is bringing hitherto repressed drives, desires and wishes to consciousness 
through language and dialogue, and canalizing and redirecting energy 
that has previously displayed itself in unpleasurable symptoms to more 
useful and appropriate ends. For Freud, sublimation involves the redi-
recting of a repressed sexual drive toward a nonsexual aim. In his words: 
“the diversion of sexual forces from sexual aims and their direction to 
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new ones – a process that deserves the name of ‘sublimation’” (Freud 
1981, 1500; see also Freud 14:94).
Freud’s definition of “sublimation” might appear straightforward, 
but has prompted a great deal of discussion and has been a source of 
much confusion. As Laplanche and Pontalis stress: “The lack of a co-
herent theory of sublimation remains one of the lacunae in psychoan-
alytic thought” (1973, 433). A major problem with Freud’s notion of 
sublimation is that it seems to fail to distinguish sublimations from neu-
rotic symptom formation (Gemes 2009). Freud’s “repression theory” 
indicates that drives that have been repressed can manifest themselves 
as “substitute formations” in various types of behavior. However, his 
account of sublimation does not seem to enable separating those substi-
tute formations, those instances of the “return of the repressed” (Freud 
1981, 2215, 2984), which are symptoms, from those that are genuine 
sublimations. Relatedly, illness cannot be separated from health. An 
 obsessive-compulsive who washes her hands 100 times a day may have 
redirected a sexual aim to a nonsexual one, but that could hardly be 
considered a case of successful sublimation.
This difficulty might be partly explained by Freud’s famous recog-
nition that it is impossible to sharply and unambiguously distinguish 
the normal from the pathological: “We no longer think that health and 
illness, normal and neurotic people, are to be sharply distinguished from 
each other, and that neurotic traits must necessarily be taken as proofs 
of a general inferiority” (Freud 1981, 2300). Nevertheless, Freud’s psy-
choanalytic practice could not do without making a distinction between 
health and illness.
Freud makes the distinction between health and illness throughout 
his work, and stresses that sublimation results in behavior or activity 
that can be considered socially or culturally valuable. Sublimation is ex-
plained by referring to social valuations: “A certain kind of modification 
of the aim and a change of object, in which our social valuation is taken 
into account, is described by us as ‘sublimation’” (Freud 1981, 4702). He 
repeatedly relates sublimation to “deflecting the sexual instinctual forces 
away from their sexual aim to higher cultural aims” (Freud 1981, 1956).
Some critics of this view of sublimation have attempted to make the 
distinction between pathological and normal without having to intro-
duce nonclinical criteria like social valuation. For example, Fenichel 
(1945) tried to provide a strict psychoanalytic account on the basis 
of the distinction between sublimation as a successful defense and re-
pression as an unsuccessful defense. Although the distinction between 
repression and sublimation is not always clear in Freud, there are pas-
sages that strictly distinguish the two, which Fenichel seems to take as 
lead:  “Premature repression makes the sublimation of the repressed in-
stinct impossible; when the repression is lifted, the path to sublimation 
 becomes free once more” (Freud 1981, 2238). Fenichel discusses three 
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differences between repression and sublimation. First, he indicates that 
in sublimation, “the original impulse vanishes because its energy is with-
drawn in favour of the cathexis of its substitute” (1945, 141). Second, he 
argues that sublimated impulses “find their outlet,” whereas repressed 
impulses do not (1945, 141). Third, he points out that in sublimation, as 
opposed to neurotic substitute gratifications, there is a desexualization 
(1945, 142).
Gemes (2009, 45f) tries to illustrate on the basis Freud’s discussion 
of the Leonardo case that Fenichel’s distinction between unsuccessful 
repression and successful sublimation cannot be sustained. He argues 
that one could hardly say that Leonardo’s original homosexual impulse 
had vanished, since they are expressed in many of his activities, such 
as his drawings of perfect idealized male bodies. This observation also 
challenges Fenichel’s idea of desexualization as a marker that separates 
sublimations from pathological symptoms. We have seen that also the 
example of the obsessive-compulsive displays the unsustainability of 
this distinction, which makes Fenichel’s as well as Freud’s distinction 
 between pathology and sublimation, in terms of the distinction between 
sexualized and nonsexualized expression, untenable. Both sublimations 
and pathological symptoms seem to appear in sexualized and nonsexu-
alized forms.
It seems to be difficult to understand sublimation in strictly psycho-
analytical terms independent of social valuations. At the same time, 
 making sublimation dependent on what a particular society happens to 
find acceptable is, as Laplanche and Pontalis indicate, also not without 
problems, since it could lead to repression and arbitrariness: “Should 
the fact that activities described as sublimated in a given culture are 
accorded particularly high social esteem be taken as a defining charac-
teristic of sublimation?” (1973, 433).
It is not a coincidence that reflection on the meaning of “ sublimation” 
in Freud culminates in a tension between drives and social valuation. 
The tension between “unregenerate instincts and overbearing culture” 
lies at the heart of his psychoanalysis and his notion of the self: “Since 
the individual can neither extirpate his instincts nor wholly reject the de-
mands of society, his character expresses the way in which he  organizes 
and appeases the conflict between the two” (Rieff 1965, 28). From this 
perspective, a clear-cut distinction between framing sublimation in terms 
of social valuation and understanding it in strictly  psychophysiological 
terms is difficult to sustain. Freud seems to consider a compromise 
 between these two forces attainable but not a final resolution; culture 
remains always potentially repressive and drives always lie in wait below 
the surface, ready to disrupt socially accepted behavior. There is always 
the hazard of a renewal of conflict. While favoring sublimation, Freud 
stresses the limits of our capacity to redirect the drives and substitute 
raw gratification for culturally valued representations.
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9.2  Sublimation as Organizing Drives Around 
a Disruptive Void
Partly continuing Freud’s line of thought, Lacan has taken up, as I have 
indicated in the previous chapter, the tension between drive and culture. 
This tension is expressed more or less consistently throughout his work 
in his account of the three categories or dimensions of otherness: the 
Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic. In order to explain his view of 
sublimation, I have to review and map out these three categories and 
make clear how they constitute the self in its psychological development 
in its early years and, more importantly, how they form structural di-
mensions throughout its life. Lacan explains, as we will see, the tension 
between drives and social valuation eventually in terms of a tension be-
tween the singular and the general, which I will use to more precisely 
identify what is at stake in the idea of self-formation as sublimation.
The Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic
From Lacan’s developmental psychological perspective, the Real is as-
sociated to the state from 0 to 6 months of age in which the infant is 
completely entwined with nature, primarily with its mother. There is no 
sense of separation between itself and the world that exists beyond it. 
The Real refers to a stage prior to individuation, language and culture. 
Although in this neo-natal stage, the self is closest to the pure material-
ity of existence, it marks already a break with wholeness and fullness, 
which makes the Real in its purest form incognizable and impossible. 
The Real is a border category that can only be denoted as a loss and a 
void. The primal drive that determines the child’s conduct in this stage 
is, according to Lacan, “need” (Lacan 2006, 580). Lacan sometimes 
compares this primal need to the primordial animal need for copulation 
(Lacan 1997, 208). A baby tries to satisfy this need with no sense for any 
separation between itself and the external world or the world of others. 
For this reason, Lacan sometimes also depicts this state of nature as a 
realm of fullness or completeness: there is a kind of primordial “need” 
but no ego that experiences itself as a separate agent in need of some-
thing outside itself.
At the age between 6 and 18 months, the infant gradually steps out 
of the order of the Real and starts to experience itself as a detached 
being. This awareness of separation is both a gain and a loss; the infant 
develops a sense of self that is accompanied with a sense of loss of full-
ness and non-separation that it had in the Real. The separation of the 
infant from the mother as a unity is initially not accompanied with the 
infant experiencing itself as a unity. Having no control over its body, it 
experiences itself as fragmented and in pieces. It may see its own hand 
without knowing the hand belongs to it. Instead of need, demand is the 
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dominant drive in this phase (Lacan 2006, 580). The infant demands to 
return to the sense of original unity; it wants the idea of “other,” and 
it being another, to disappear. Demand is thus the demand to return to 
a primordial state of fullness and non-separation that will also end the 
lack and vulnerability the infant is experiencing. But of course that is im-
possible, because that lack or absence is the condition for individuation, 
for becoming a separated Ego and, eventually, a functioning cultural 
being. Whereas needs can be fulfilled, demands are unsatisfiable.
The outside world offers a kind of rescue from this unpleasant  situation. 
At some point in this period, the baby will see its image in the mirror 
and recognize it as its own self, recognize its own body in the bodies of 
other children that resemble her or be encouraged by responses of its 
parents to recognize itself as a separate self (Lacan 2006, 75f).  Lacan 
characterizes this recognition simultaneously as misrecognition: the im-
age that is seen by the infant or is echoed by her parents is not the real 
thing, but a reflection or a fantasy as well as an idealization (“yes, that is 
you Helena, good girl Helena, you are so great, you are a real princess”). 
The misrecognition has as function idealization as compensation for the 
loss or alienation from the order of the Real. The infant moves from 
insufficiency to anticipation: still unable to be whole, it begins to antici-
pate being whole, moving from a “fragmented body” to an “orthopedic 
vision of its totality,” to a vision of itself as whole and integrated, which 
is “orthopedic” because it serves as a crutch, a corrective instrument, an 
aid to help the child achieve the status of wholeness (Lacan 2006, 78).
This process, of misrecognizing one’s self in the mirror image and im-
age of significant “big” others, creates the ego, the thing that says “I,” 
which is an “ideal I,” a perfect whole self who has no insufficiency ( Lacan 
2006, 76). The fiction of the stable, whole, unified self that we see in the 
mirror becomes a compensation for having lost the original oneness with 
the mother’s body. For the rest of its life, the infant will for Lacan mis-
recognize its self as the image in the mirror that provides an illusion of 
self and of mastery. The idea of a unified Ego and a sense of autonomy is 
ultimately a fiction created to cope with an original trauma caused by loss 
of a primal sense of unity as well as of safety and security. The leap from 
“nature” into “culture” comes with a price: in order to enter culture, the 
unity with mother’s body, the state of nature, is lost; in order to protect 
ourselves from the knowledge of the loss of being one with mother’s body, 
that is, the state of nature, we misperceive ourselves as autonomous, sta-
ble and whole, and not lacking anything (Lacan 2006, 80).
After this self-identification through its own mirror image, the child 
will gradually understand the place of that image within a larger social 
and eventually symbolic order. The self enters this order and becomes 
a speaking subject that can designate itself by “I.” The symbolic order, 
through language, is in essence a contract or tie between an individual 
and society. Submission to socio-linguistic instances outside ourselves, 
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such as customs, institutions, laws, mores, norms, practices, rituals, 
rules, traditions, all intertwined with language, is required in order to 
enter into the Symbolic order. To become a speaking subject, one have 
to be subject-ed to, one has to obey the laws and rules of language, 
which Lacan sometimes designates with “the name of the Father”: “It 
is in the name of the father that we must recognize the basis of the sym-
bolic function which, since the dawn of historical time, has identified 
his person with the figure of the law” (Lacan 2006, 230). Whereas the 
Real concerns need and the Imaginary concerns demand, the Symbolic 
is all about desire, according to Lacan (Lacan 2006, 580). At the heart 
of desire is, as I have indicated earlier, a misrecognition of fullness where 
there is really nothing but a screen for our own projections, a fantasy 
that does not correspond to anything in the real – in short, a lack. It is 
that lack at the heart of desire that ensures we continue to desire. To 
come too close to our object of desire threatens to uncover the lack that 
is, in fact, necessary for our desire to persist, so that ultimately desire is 
most interested not in fully attaining the object of desire but in keeping a 
distance, thus allowing desire to persist (Lacan 2006, 465, 583).
The Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic are presented in a chrono-
logical order, marking three stages in the psychological development 
of an infant. Although for Lacan they reflect subsequent dominant 
 dimensions in the early development of a human being, one stage is not 
simply superseded by another. The Real, Imaginary and Symbolic not 
only chronologically but also structurally constitute the very fabric of 
the self, which means that all three continue to exert their influence 
throughout the life of an adult (see Moyaert 2011).
By subjecting itself to laws and restrictions that control both its de-
sire and the rules of communication, the self enters the Symbolic Order 
and becomes a subject. However, the ideal, fantasy image that the self 
has of itself – in its core, a misrecognition as compensation for the loss 
of a primordial unity in the transition from the Real to the Imaginary 
order – continues to exert its influence: although other Big Others, like 
role models, superstars, Party, God, Nature, and Science, might have 
overwritten the dreams and wishes parents initially projected on the self, 
the self remains a repository of the conscious and unconscious wants 
and machination of other speaking beings (Lacan 2006, 230f). Also the 
Real is never completely absent (Lacan 2006, 255). Indeed, Lacan often 
says that as far as humans are concerned, “the real is impossible,” im-
possible because the very entrance into language marks our irrevocable 
separation from the Real (Lacan 1997, 70, 125). Although it cannot be 
expressed in language, it nevertheless continues to exert its influence, 
since it is the rock against which all the self’s idealizations and societies 
linguistic structures ultimately fail. The fact that all fantasies and ideal 
constructions always fail ensures that desire is continuously fueled; de-
sire in the symbolic order could, in fact, be said to be a way to avoid 
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coming into full contact with the Real, so that desire is ultimately most 
interested not in obtaining the object of desire, but rather in reproducing 
itself (Lacan 1997, 14, 68, 76). Lacan often distinguishes between desire 
and drives. An essential characteristic of desire is its restlessness and in-
satiability, whereas drives, according to Zizek (1996), derive a perverse 
enjoyment from this desire-fueled libidinal circling around an unattain-
able point. Insatiable desire is fueled by ever-wanting drives; there where 
desire is frustrated, drive is gratified. This way the Thing as object-cause 
of desire is identified with the realm of drives.
It must be clear that the Imaginary and Symbolic do not coincide: the 
Imaginary is central to Lacan’s account(s) of ego formation and mani-
fests itself in dyadic relations (such as in self and mirror image), whereas 
the Symbolic constitutes triadic relations by introducing, besides dyadic 
and intersubjective relation, a trans-subjective symbolic order that nor-
matively regulates the relations between particular beings and society 
(Lacan 2006, 44, 365, 388). The Imaginary becomes dependent on the 
Symbolic, insofar as evermore sensory-perceptual phenomena, like im-
ages and experiences of one’s body, affects as consciously lived emotions 
or envisionings of the thoughts and feelings of others are shaped, steered 
and (over-)determined by socio-linguistic structures and dynamics. Sim-
ilar to Freud, one can recognize in Lacan’s account of these three dimen-
sions a tension between “culture” and “nature,” since the Imaginary 
and the Symbolic, often inextricably intertwined, representing stabiliz-
ing culture, work in tension with the Real as wild nature.
How can the distinction between culture and nature, derived from the 
relation between the Imaginary and the Symbolic, on the one hand, and 
the Real, on the other, contribute to the proposed view of self- formation? 
And how could it shed light on the role of technologies within this frame-
work? In order to clarify this, we first need to understand how for Lacan 
the distinction between culture and nature is on a par with the distinc-
tion between the general and the singular.
The General and the Singular
The Imaginary and the Symbolic constitute for Lacan the inter- and 
trans-subjective world that enables the individual to engage with other 
people and hook into a “general reason.” Entering this world marks a 
separation from the Real, but does not completely abolish its workings. 
For Lacan, it is by virtue of the Real that an individual cannot be com-
pletely absorbed by the general, including ethical, political, social and 
(we can add) technological rules and regulations. Visker says: “it is that 
about my being which makes it my being and not someone else’s, it is 
the difference that differentiates me” (Visker 2005, 438). What I cannot 
grasp, generalize and compare, what I cannot express in language and 
symbols, is also what makes me different, what makes me a singular 
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person. Especially in his later works, Lacan extensively discusses the 
role and significance of the Real in different contexts under different 
(related) names, such as the Real, the Real Order, the Real Other, the 
unknowable x, the Thing, the gaze and the little object a (Lacan 1997, 
43–87; Lacan 2006, 671–703).
A person is characterized by some-Thing that is not generalizable and 
cannot be completely reduced to general structures and features. Besides 
significant others that project their desires and ideals on my desires, and 
the symbolic and technological order that imparts its rules and regu-
lations on me, my selfhood is also characterized by a “difference” or 
“singularity” that can never be completely absorbed and nullified by 
those ideal images, projections and regulations. My mirror image or the 
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) image of my brain al-
ways misses out on something – a “residue” – that cannot be articulated, 
nor appropriated; at the same time, what is “left out” makes me the 
different, unique, singular person that I am. This Thing, this residue re-
mains, as Lacan has pointed out repeatedly, inaccessible, also for the self 
in question (Lacan 1997, 52, 54). My mirror or fMRI image, and every 
other possible image of me that I can envision, is incapable of capturing 
what makes me “me,” not only for others but also for myself.
Let me further clarify this line of thought with an example: I am at-
tached to a male sex that biologically does not appear to be very different 
from the biology of other members of the human species. This male sex 
is not neutral, but accompanied with images and ideals that others have 
projected on me (“a man is strong,” “a man is rational,” “a man is a pro-
vider,” “a man is also sensitive” etc.), others that often are conveyors of 
the signs and signifiers of the Big Other, that is, the trans-subjective sym-
bolic order of explicit and implicit laws, regulations and conventions. 
Significant is that I have not chosen this biological constitution as well as 
the signs and signifiers that are accompanied by it and translate “sex” in 
terms of “gender,” and, hence, I cannot completely control or possess it. 
It rather possesses me; notwithstanding that it can “possess” people in 
different ways, since it is possible to attempt to alter it by, for example, a 
surgery, or challenge, deny or reinterpret its signs and signifiers.
However, even if I would completely accept my sex and its symbolic 
connotations, my biological features and their signs and signifiers do not 
exactly tell me or explain to me what it is to be or how to act as “this” 
man. On the one hand, I am called to account and take responsibility 
for the sex/gender that I have not or at least have not completely chosen, 
and, on the other hand, my sex/gender is not able to completely deter-
mine nor articulate what exactly makes me “me” and, hence, makes me 
different from other people with the same sex/gender. There seems to be 
always something that escapes the biological order and the symbols that 
we use to articulate it; in the words of Lacan: “some-thing that cannot 
or refuses to integrate into a functional totality” (Lacan 2006 78, 345f).
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This analysis allows drawing an analogy with technology. We are not 
only born in a biological and cultural constitution that we have not cho-
sen but that, nevertheless, to a certain extent defines us; we are also born, 
as Nancy’s account of his illness illustrates, in a technological order that 
we have not chosen, but that nonetheless to a certain extent defines and 
shapes us. However, similar to the symbolic order, this technological 
order is not completely able to capture, articulate and determine what 
makes me “me.” I might wear the same brand of clothes, own the same 
IPhone, attend the same technical university, make use of the same tech-
nological infrastructure, use the same technical phrases and think in the 
same technological grammar as other people, but there is also always, 
at least potentially, some-Thing in me or attached to me that refuses to 
completely integrate into a functional technological order. This other-
ness in or rather of the self, as Lacan indicates, can never be completely 
captured and domesticated by the symbolic and technological order and 
the (ideal) images that it projects on the self.
It is important not to interpret the relation between the Symbolic/
Technological Other and Imaginary Other, on the one hand, and the 
Real Other, on the other hand, in terms of a simple opposition between 
the “symbolic/technological influences and projections of a superficial 
me” and a “pure, authentic and real me.” The Symbolic/Technologi-
cal/Imaginary Other is not “more other” or “less mine” than the Real 
Other. Identifying myself as male or an Apple-evangelist, and passion-
ately defending these identifications is not less authentic or more “other” 
(contra Heidegger) than attempts to distance myself from them. At the 
same time, I consider myself not only a man or an Apple-evangelist, but 
also something that escapes every general identification, although I am 
unable to articulate what this “something else” comprises.
The relation between my three “others” within is and remains uncom-
fortable: the symbolic and material order and the ideal images that we 
pursue are – and I repeat what I have said earlier – both the necessary 
condition for forming a unified, coherent and social self and an obstacle 
that prevents it from reaching the singularity that it seeks, not only be-
cause it has been shaped by them or cannot meet the demands imparted 
on it, but also because it can never fully appropriate its own singularity.
The relation between my three “others” within is also uncomfort-
able because the Thing within can be a threat. It not only secures 
the possibility of liberation from the symbolic and technological order 
without and within and the desires of others projected on the self, 
which attempt to fix the self in a particular form, but it can also be 
a troublesome and dangerous force that unsettles existing configura-
tions, orientations and life plans. On the one hand, the Thing provides 
individual singularity. On the other hand, this singularity can give 
way to an eccentricity that can disrupt and even destroy both society 
and the self (Moyaert 2011, 250).
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This explains why society in all its manifestations has, according to 
Lacan, the secret task to defuse “the Thing,” which always bears the 
dangers of tilting the balance: attempts to socialize humans always hold 
the chance of excessively repressing and fixing them through a particular 
“sheltered” system that ultimately becomes a straitjacket and make them 
ill. Although Lacan stresses the importance of the Symbolic and Imagi-
nary and their protective, orienting and stabilizing workings, he seems 
to see recognizing the Real as the biggest challenge for every society. 
For Lacan, the Thing is the dimension that not only makes a human a 
particular, singular person and ensures plurality and novelty, but also 
the dimension that makes her irreplaceable and, hence, gives her dignity 
(Lacan 1997, 112, 118; Moyaert 2011, 250).
The social and technological order, being an inherent part of the 
self, does not necessarily completely determine the self and the way it 
forms itself. The self seems to encompass a power or drive that cannot 
be completely tamed and restrained, though this should not be taken as 
a comforting idea or a dimension that secures harmony in the self, let 
alone autonomy. On the contrary! The self is and remains compromised. 
Lacan proposes an ethics that does not deny and completely neutralize 
the Thing, but instead finds ways to make room for it and live with it. 
At the same time, signifying this Thing as a void, a gap, a lack, an abyss 
around which the symbolic order is structured and a cause that prevents 
ever fulfilling our desires, leaves us with a tragic conception of the self 
and self-formation. Against this background, he introduces his notion 
of sublimation, which I will discuss in the next section and relate it to 
self-formation.
Self-formation as Sublimation from a Lacanian Point of View
From 1936 onwards, Lacan mentions sublimation in different con-
texts and explains it in terms that show similarity with Freud’s view. 
In 1954, for example, he characterizes sublimation as working to meet 
the  requirements of the law (Lacan 1988). However, Lacan believes that 
the notion of sublimation is underdeveloped in the writings of Freud. 
Although he explicitly takes up ideas he finds in Freud’s account of subli-
mation, his view, as I will show, significantly diverges from the Freudian 
notion of sublimation.
In The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan, using his own idiosyncratic 
idiom, defines “sublimation” as the process that “elevates an object to 
the dignity of the Thing” (Lacan 1959/1960, 112). He develops his view 
of sublimation in relation to the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real, 
which, as I discussed, are his three essential registers of the human con-
dition. Lacan’s definition of sublimation immediately confronts us with 
a paradox: an imaginary object should be elevated through a particular 
transformation to represent the Thing that lies outside the signified and, 
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hence, cannot be imagined. How to represent something that cannot 
be represented? Sublimation seems in one way or another to allow the 
symbolic to move closer to the real by means of the imaginary. If the 
Thing is a void, a gap, an emptiness around which the symbolic order is 
organized, then to raise an object to the dignity of the Thing in sublima-
tion is to attempt to (symbolically) represent the Thing by something else 
(in the symbolic order) that will end up being nothing but an emptiness.
In order to make sense of this paradoxical and very abstract articu-
lation of sublimation on the basis of the Symbolic, Imaginary and Real, 
we need a better understanding of the significance of these dimensions 
for ethics. Lacan often characterizes the Real as a “primordial field” 
that is related to the pleasure principle, the mother, and the foundation 
of ethics:
Well now, the step taken by Freud at the level of the pleasure princi-
ple is to show us that there is no Sovereign Good – that the Sovereign 
Good, which is das Ding, which is the mother, is also the object of 
incest, is a forbidden good, and that there is no other good. Such 
is the foundation of the moral law as turned on its head by Freud 
(Lacan 1997, 70)
In his reading of Freud (and Lévy-Strauss), Lacan explains the prohibi-
tion of incest as the taboo that is at the root of becoming a social being, 
and, hence, ethics, which also marks the step from nature to culture. As 
Robertson (2015, 86) explains: 
The prohibition of incest forces the self to employ its drives for the 
benefit of society. Insofar as the incest prohibition casts the mother 
out of the subject’s field of possible object-choices, it promotes her to 
the function of the object-cause of the subject’s desire. 
The prohibition of incest coincides with the introduction of the moral 
law but, at the same time, transforms the incestuous object into the pri-
mordial agent of all desire. The mother functions, Lacan says, as an 
object that desire organizes itself “around” (Lacan 2014, 106). The orig-
inal loss of the mother remains the hidden drive behind desire as well as 
the lack that ensures the continuation of desire. A certain distance from 
the Thing is required and maintained by the prohibition of incest, which 
keeps the self from and keep it near the original void, and that way, 
keeps its desire going. Sublimation concerns organizing desire “around” 
the original void in such a way that we remain close enough to the void 
to continuously fuel the desire and not so close that we are crushed by it.
Lacan attempts to recognize both the value of a moral law and the 
desire to undermine it. In fact, both are strongly interrelated: order pro-
duces the perverse desire to undermine order. For Lacan, without the 
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symbolic order, desire cannot be channeled and, hence, exist. And at the 
same time, by channeling the desire, the desire to transgress that struc-
ture and order is initiated. It is not a coincidence that Lacan sometimes 
equates the Thing with sin, since the Thing refers to the possibility of 
transgression of the moral law:
Is the Law the Thing? Certainly not. Yet I can only know of the 
Thing by means of the Law. In effect, I would not have had the idea 
to covet it if the Law hadn’t said: “Thou shalt not covet it.” But 
the Thing finds a way by producing in me all kinds of covetousness 
thanks to the commandment, for without the Law the Thing is dead. 
But even without the Law, I was once alive. (…) I believe that for a 
little while now some of you at least have begun to suspect that it is 
no longer I who have been speaking. In fact, with one small change, 
namely, “Thing” for “sin,” this is the speech of Saint Paul on the 
subject of the relations between the law and sin in the Epistle to the 
Romans, Chapter 7, paragraph 7 (Lacan 1997, 83)
The Thing always marks a form of transgression. It is predicated upon 
prohibition. The law regulates but also offsets desire in such a way as to 
increase the sense of temptation and going beyond traditional morality. 
The Thing is beyond good and evil, although it is usually figured as 
evil by conventional morality – the parallels with Nietzsche’s critique of 
 morality are quite obvious, which, however, I will not discuss here.
Now the difference between Freud and Lacan’s notion of sublima-
tion becomes clearer. In line with Freud, Lacan conceives sublimation 
as a “form of satisfaction of the Triebe” (Lacan 1997, 110). However, 
he does not conceive sublimation as redirection of the libido toward a 
nonsexual object, as providing a socially accepted substitute for sexual 
gratification. Sublimation for Lacan does not relate to a sublime moral 
beauty that supports traditional ethics, but rather concerns symbolically 
organizing our drives in such a way that the Real, which is the emp-
tiness that the original love object has left behind, is not evaded but 
enabled to exert its influence. In organizing and satisfying our drives, 
we need to attempt to revisit the original object of desire and, at the 
same time, to somehow affirm it as the empty center (and lack) that fuels 
desire.  Lacan’s credo “don’t give up on your desire” is no libertarian slo-
gan, but expresses the idea that desire can only be sustained and fueled 
if the Thing as cause of desire is recognized and affirmed, which always 
comes with the possibility and danger of transgression.
Lacan also sometimes relates sublimation to Freud’s notion of the 
death drive (Lacan 1997, 2015–2017), but again reframes it in such a 
way that it cannot be simply reduced to Freud’s view. Freud explains 
the death drive as a fundamental desire inherent in all organic life to 
restore an inorganic unity, which will end all suffering and resolve all 
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tension. Lacan takes up this Freudian idea of the death drive as restoring 
a primordial unity but relates it to the unity in the order of the Real. For 
Lacan, the death drive is desire carried to the extreme, to the absolute 
limit of desire, beyond pleasure (jouissance). It is the unleashing of abso-
lute animal desire without any constraint or law, which leads ultimately 
to destruction and self-destruction, that is, to death. However, this drive 
to destroy everything also has a “positive” side. The death drive should 
be regarded as a “destruction drive” because “it challenges everything 
that exists. But it is also a will to create from zero, a will to begin again” 
(Lacan 1997, 212). In this way, Lacan connects sublimation to the death 
drive and a creatio ex nihilo: 
[T]he notion of death drive is a creationist sublimation, and it is 
linked to that structural element which implies that […] there is 
somewhere […] beyond [the signifying] chain, the ex nihilo on which 
[that chain] is founded and is articulated as such (Lacan 1997, 212) 
In representing the Real, sublimation operates as creation from noth-
ing, from emptiness, within the Symbolic. Sublimation “is precisely that 
which reveals the true nature of the Trieb [drive] insofar as it is not 
simply instinct, but has a relationship to das Ding as such, to the Thing 
insofar as it is distinct from the object” (Lacan 1997, 177). Sublimation 
is symbolic creation fueled by the Real and pushed to its limits, beyond 
traditional moral constrains and considerations of good and evil. In 
short, sublimation is the creation of the singular within the symbolic.
How can this Lacanian notion of sublimation contribute to the  further 
development of the proposed notion of self-formation? First of all, we 
need to acknowledge that a self that attempts to form itself is already 
subject to the laws, mores, customs and restrictions of an Imaginary 
and Symbolic Order that controls and regulates its desires and conduct. 
Without the images imparted by others and the laws and morals imposed 
by the Big Other, the self would not be able to form an ego and become 
a subject in the first place. Its desires are to a great extent a repository 
for the projected desires and fantasies of significant others. However, the 
Symbolic Order and its laws and morals that channel the desires of the 
self and impart a form on it, by its very existence, initiates the possibility 
of transgressing that form. If the Real is in its purest form disorientation 
and disruption, then organizing our drives “around a void” implies reg-
ulating and imposing a form on them without destroying the possibility 
of going against the status quo and socially accepted laws and morals. 
As Thurston formulates in the context of sublimation within art: “sub-
limation is Janus-faced poised between the raw singularity of the drive 
and the polite decorum of the art gallery” (2003, 30). The inherently 
paradoxical challenge of sublimation involves recognizing that forming 
ourselves is impossible without subjecting ourselves to the laws, norms, 
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values and ideals imposed by society (the Imaginary and Symbolic) and, 
at the same time, affirming and fueling a force (the Real) that can never 
be completely appropriated by society and ourselves, a force that can 
challenge and disrupt every possible standard for self-formation, which 
is a requirement for the emergence of novelty and the formation of a 
singular self (see also Zizek 1989).
Lacan often turns to art to illustrate the importance of emptiness and 
the paradoxical challenge of sublimation: “in every form of sublima-
tion emptiness is determinative. […] All art is characterized by a certain 
mode of organization around this emptiness” (Lacan 1997, 129–130). 
Various examples of “organization around a void” are provided: a build-
ing that revolves around empty spaces, painting on an empty canvas, 
the writing of poetry in the absence of love, the rituals of the Medieval 
France troubadour in his longing for the unattainable Lady (see Lacan 
1997, 161–164). Maybe Lacan’s most prominent example is the shaping 
of a vase on a potter’s wheel:
If [a vase] really is a signifier, […] it is in essence a signifier of nothing 
other than of signifying as such, in other words, of no particular sig-
nified. […] It creates the void and thereby introduces the possibility 
of filling it (Lacan 1997, 120)
The idea of creating a void that solicits filling it also articulates Lacan’s 
view of sublimation as “creation ex nihilo” (Lacan 1997, 115–127; see 
also James 2009). The Thing represents a creation out of nothing be-
cause it is a signifier of signifying as such. The Thing is not the object 
(the vase) but the emptiness that is represented by the object in order for 
it to function in symbolic discourse. The vase is, in the words of Lacan, 
“an object made to represent the existence of the emptiness at the center 
of the Real that is called the Thing, this emptiness as represented in the 
representation presents itself as a nihil, as nothing” (Lacan 1997, 121). 
For Lacan, genuine art is able to symbolically represent an emptiness 
that allows filling it, at least potentially, with something that did not 
exist before and, hence, transgress the status quo and accepted values, 
norms and ideals. Genuine art exemplifies how remaining close to the 
emptiness of the Real allows stretching the limits of the symbolic and 
making room for the emergence of the terrifying beauty of the sublime.
9.3 Sublimation as Imposing Form to Great Diversity
We have seen that Freud attempts to separate sublimations from neurotic 
symptoms by taking social valuations as a demarcation criterion; subli-
mation is conceived as the capacity to substitute raw instinctive grati-
fication for culturally valued representations. Freud’s view makes, to a 
certain extent, sense: on the one hand, it does justice to the fact that we 
are born, develop and form ourselves in a society that imposes on us 
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certain values, norms and ideals as well as to the experience that what 
we consider normal and abnormal, healthy and ill and enhanced and 
abled is greatly dependent on those societal values, norms and ideals; 
on the other hand, it acknowledges the constant tension between what 
society expects and what uncontrollable libidinal drives that seek psy-
chophysiological gratification demand. Problematic in Freud’s view is 
that it makes sublimation very dependent on what a particular society 
happens to find acceptable, which not only could lead to repression and 
arbitrariness, but also seems to disregard the importance of enabling 
individuals to develop themselves into singular persons.
As we have seen, Lacan takes up the tension between the cultural 
and the natural on the basis of his three dimensions of the Real, the 
Imaginary and the Symbolic. He highlights that the Imaginary and the 
Symbolic cannot be simply externalized and viewed as sociocultural in-
fluences that repress the individual, since they are a constitutive condition 
for developing a unified ego as well as moral and communicative subjec-
tivity. At the same time, he emphasizes the importance of a “singularity” 
that by virtue of the Real could (at least potentially) and should never 
be completely absorbed and nullified by ideal images, projections, laws, 
values and regulations imparted by society. In Lacanian sublimation the 
tension between culture and nature is strongly intensified and situated 
in the heart of self and self-formation: the pre-existing imaginary and 
symbolic order is both a necessary condition for forming a stable social 
self and an obstacle that prevents it from reaching the singularity that it 
seeks. Sublimation refers to the paradoxical challenge to (re)discover a 
void or emptiness and organize our drives around it in such a way that 
it becomes possible to stretch societal boundaries, without abolishing 
them. This way, a singular self can be formed within the social order.
We came across the tension between indeterminateness, chaos and 
struggle, on the one hand, and regulation and organization, on the other, 
earlier in this book, though without explicitly relating it to the notion of 
“sublimation,” namely in my discussion of Nietzsche and Peirce, the two 
main guides in the process of developing a non-essentialist, non-dualist 
and non-relativist view of self-formation that takes into account the influ-
ence of technologies on the self. Freud and, more aptly, Lacan’s notions 
enable framing the proposed notion of self-formation, which has been 
strongly inspired by Nietzsche and Peirce, explicitly in terms of sublima-
tion. Moreover, these approaches provide complementary ingredients that 
enable finalizing the development of the proposed notion of self- formation 
in a highly technological world beyond the inside-outside dualism.
Sublimation as Organized Struggle
In my discussion of Nietzsche’s ontology of the will to power, we have seen 
that, besides “struggle,” Nietzsche extensively focuses on “organization” 
and offers what I have called an Organization-Struggle Theory (OST) 
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To what extent Nietzsche’s scattered ideas regarding and related to 
sublimation have influenced Freud and Lacan is difficult to establish 
and is not very relevant for my investigation. What is relevant is that 
 Nietzsche’s OST can now be explicitly interpreted in terms of subli-
mation and contribute to the development of this notion in a manner 
that takes into account the tackled issues and challenges regarding 
self- formation. First of all, Nietzsche further radicalizes the problem 
as  formulated by Freud and Lacan: not only is there a tension between, 
on the one hand, a stable social order that enables regulating and or-
ganizing human drives, and, on the other hand, wild libidinal drives 
that are continuously fueled by something that transcends the sym-
bolic order and can never be completely neutralized, but Nietzsche 
also foresees that the social realm of laws, morals, customs and regu-
lations is increasingly incapable of fulfilling its function of organizing 
that realm:
In an age of disintegration where the races are mixed together, a 
person will have the legacy of multiple lineages in his body, which 
means conflicting (and often not merely conflicting) drives and value 
standards that fight with each other and rarely leave each other 
alone. A man like this, of late cultures and refracted lights, will typ-
ically be a weaker person (BG 200)
For Freud and Lacan, the social order offers order. It can function as a 
counterpart to disruptive libidinal drives. Conversely, one of the most 
important strands in Nietzsche’s work is the erosion of stable value 
 systems and grand narratives. The modern human is becoming a disor-
ganized collection of competing drives and value systems, incapable of 
forming herself into a strong, healthy and fruitful composition.
For Nietzsche, Christian morality has been extremely successful in 
organizing conflicting drives and value systems, though by denying and 
splitting of (aggressive) drives that are found unacceptable to a degree 
that one does not even acknowledge that one has such drives. This re-
pression and splitting off of certain drives have led to stabilization, so-
cialization and cultivation, although at the cost of making the human 
that enables analyzing and evaluating will to power unities in terms of 
strong and weak or healthy and sick. Because for Nietzsche “The world 
seen from inside (…) would be just this ‘will to power’ and nothing 
else. –” (BG 36; see also Z II: “Self-overcoming”; BGE 13), what he says 
about reality on an ontological level could be also applied to hu man self-
hood. In fact, Nietzsche applies an early version of this  theory to humans 
and explicitly relates it to the notion of “sublimation,” though in that 
phase in his work (and also often later) instead of “wills to power,” his 
main ingredients are “drives” and “instincts” (KSA 9.211; 9.273).
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a weak and ill creature: in Nietzsche’s words, a herd animal. Nietzsche 
foresees that modern humans, including those who have become indif-
ferent toward the Christian God, lack any power and creativity to im-
part new and more healthy forms to themselves; due to this impotence, 
Nietzsche predicts, they will gradually disintegrate.
OST indicates that only the combination of strong organization and 
intense struggle is a trait of strength and health. From this theory, weak-
ness can manifest itself in two types: through achieving a high degree 
of organization by excluding all struggle or through harboring intense 
struggle without great organizational force. Both types of weak “will to 
power”-organizations are unfruitful, since they are incapable of bringing 
about radical novel life forms. Although the type that contains little di-
vergence and struggle can sustain itself for a long time, it is unproductive 
and in the long run liable to a process of disintegration; because it has no 
potential to generate, it is ultimately life negating and life threatening. 
For Nietzsche, this is what Western culture is facing in the aftermath of 
Christianity. The strong or healthy “will to power”-organization that 
Nietzsche is promoting is characterized by considerable divergence and 
struggle that is forced into a unity in a structured manner.
In contrast to Freud and Lacan who were primarily focused on com-
mon individuals and their development in a (often anonymous) culture, 
Nietzsche was much more concerned with very particular cultures and 
value systems and analyzed what made one culture weak and ill and 
 another vibrant and healthy (e.g., the Christian versus the Greek) as well 
as with the role great individuals played and could play in the growth 
and decay of cultures. He did refer to individuals, but often only as op-
portunities or models that could elevate Western culture. At one point, 
he took, for example, Wagner to be such a case, or as explicitly displayed 
in Ecce Homo, he also took himself as an example of a strong type (EH, 
96–98). However, Nietzsche’s elitist approach and his focus on great 
exemplars or geniuses does not have to prevent deriving ideas that can 
contribute grasping what could be strong or healthy self-formation with 
regard to all humans in a democratic society. It is clear that the strong or 
healthy type for Nietzsche is characterized by redirecting drives in such 
a way that they contribute to the development of a more encompassing 
unity without amputating them:
a cultural edifice in the single individual will have the greatest sim-
ilarity to the cultural architecture of whole eras and, by analogy, 
provide continuous instruction about them. For wherever the great 
architecture of culture developed, it was its task to force opposing 
forces into harmony through an overwhelming aggregation of the 
remaining, less incompatible powers, yet without suppressing or 
shackling them (HH I, 276)
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Nietzsche stresses the importance of redirecting and organizing weaker 
drives without shackling and annihilating them:
Overcoming of the affects? No, if that means their weakening and 
annihilation. But instead employing them; which may mean a long 
tyrannizing of them… At last they are confidently given freedom 
again: they love us as good servants and happily go wherever our 
best interests lie (KSA 12:1[122])
The distinction between repressing drives and reorienting their direction 
and function enables contrasting what Nietzsche would call “ressen-
timent” with sublimation, which enables highlighting an important 
 feature of the latter. From a Nietzschean point of view, sublimation 
 refers, as Gemes has pointed out (2009, 48), to substituting a drive’s 
primary aim for a secondary aim that is consonant with the orientation 
of a master drive without destroying or diminishing its energy. Richard-
son puts it in a logical terminology: “Drive A rules B insofar as it has 
turned B towards A’s own end, so that B now participates in A’s distinc-
tive activity” (1996, 33). Conversely, repression refers to denying and 
blocking a drive’s primary aim by splitting it off from other drives and 
not integrating its aims with the aims and orientation of other drives; as 
a consequence, this drive will be suppressed and shackled, and will not 
have the opportunity to express itself (Gemes 2009, 48). For Nietzsche, 
resentment is the result of forcing a drive to stifle and denying it, that is, 
repressing a drive. Gemes puts this distinction in more psychoanalytic 
terms: “sublimations involve integration or unification, while patholog-
ical symptoms involve splitting off or disintegration” (2009, 48). This 
example illustrates how successful sublimation should be understood – 
Leonardo, instead of stifling his homosexual drives, redirects the literal 
possession of male bodies toward the secondary aim of expressing this 
possession in idealized representations of male bodies. It must be clear 
that this example can only be appreciated if one disregards the problem-
atic allusion of taking again particular social valuations as demarcation 
criterion and presupposing that there is something wrong with directly 
acting on homosexual urges by having sexual relations with other males.
Nietzsche’s appraisal of integration, instead of repression, adds a 
significant element to the proposed notion of sublimation, namely 
 “affirmation,” which is also the antidote for resentment. The idea of 
affirming one’s life, affirming both the harsh facts of one’s life and one’s 
never completely controllable drives, runs throughout Nietzsche’s whole 
work. It must be clear that Nietzsche does not promote a type of pas-
sive affirmation: it is not about resigning in our fate or simply letting 
all of one’s drives have free expression. That would not result in a self 
characterized by organized struggle, but would rather lead to unbound 
internal conflict, chaos and, inevitably, disintegration. Nietzsche defends 
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active affirmation: it is about actively shaping the self by integrating 
all, and sometimes conflicting facets of one’s life in a preferred lifestyle 
and harnessing one’s drives to allow them strengthening one another 
that leads to a form of concerted expression in a particular direction. In 
 Nietzsche’s words:
The multitude and disaggregation of impulses and the lack of any 
systematic order among them results in a ‘weak will;’ their coordi-
nation under a single predominant impulse results in a ‘strong’ will: 
in the first case it is the oscillation and lack of gravity; in the later, 
the precision and clarity of direction (KSA 13:14[219])
In contrast to Freud, the Nietzschean notion of sublimation does not 
involve redirecting repressed sexual drives toward a nonsexual, socially 
valued aim. The erosion of traditional value systems makes employing 
social valuations as demarcation criterion for sublimation unattainable. 
Moreover, for Nietzsche, desexualization is not a dimension of sublima-
tion, though redirecting and integrating aggressive drives, which oth-
erwise would manifest themselves in violent sexual outburst, in such a 
way that they strengthen a particular constellation could be part of the 
process of sublimation.
Yet another significant difference between Freud and Lacan, on the 
one hand, and Nietzsche, on the other, is that for Nietzsche, the realm 
of drives is not surpassed by other (higher order) realms (an Ego and 
Superego or an Imaginary and Symbolic Order). In Nietzsche’s words:
While “we” believe we are complaining about the vehemence of 
a drive, at bottom it is one drive which is complaining about the 
other; that is to say: for us to become aware that we are suffering 
from the vehemence of a drive presupposes the existence of another 
equally vehement or even more vehement drive (D 109)
This implies that also so-called higher-order values and laws are mani-
festations or symptoms of a certain drive having dominated other drives. 
In his later work, this struggle between drives is elaborated, as we have 
seen earlier, in terms of will to power relations.
These differences should not conceal similarities between Nietzsche 
and, especially, Lacan’s view of sublimation. Lacan’s idea of “organi-
zation around a void” has resemblances with Nietzsche’s view of or-
ganized struggle. Both stress the importance of imparting to drives a 
form and simultaneously enabling the possibility of change, transgres-
sion and emergence of something novel. Lacan understands the tension 
between organization and stability, on the one hand, and the emptiness 
that can give birth to novelty, on the other, as a tension between the law 
and desire that can never be completely fulfilled. What is at stake is the 
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formation of a singular self without completely disrupting and destroy-
ing both society and the individual self. For Lacan, sublimation is, as we 
have seen, the creation of the singular within the symbolic. Nietzsche 
does not characterize sublimation in terms of a conflict between the law 
and wild drives. For him, societal configurations, values and laws are 
also expressions of certain drives having surpassed and organized other 
drives. In contrast to Greek culture, Christian culture, in his view, does 
not combine strong organization with intense struggle (as expressed in 
Greek, Wettkampf), which does not foster the emergence of new life 
forms. Nevertheless, the mark of the healthy and strong, and, hence, 
successful sublimation, is, for both Nietzsche and Lacan, organizing 
drives in such a way that they possess the potential to bring about new 
life forms.
Nietzsche and Lacan provide different ingredients that enable further 
elaboration and operationalization of the idea of self-formation in terms 
of sublimation. On the one hand, Nietzsche specifies the conditions that 
enable the emergence of new life forms: the combination of strong or-
ganization and intense struggle. Hence, sublimation requires organizing 
intense internal struggle into a form that has the potential to bring about 
new life forms. A decadent or nihilistic type of self-formation can be seen 
as the antonym of self-formation as sublimation. The decadent is a type 
of will to power that is unable to organize the conflicting variance within 
itself. We have seen earlier that Nietzsche defines decadence as the “[i]nca-
pacity for organic formation,” which is further explained as a physiolog-
ical deficiency of organizing force, which manifests itself as a becoming 
independent of the part with respect to the whole (Müller-Lauter 1999a, 
4). This incapacity of organizing itself is resolved by the weak by negating 
and repressing the parts that it is unable to integrate. Nietzsche’s predom-
inant example is the Christian, who is unable to integrate the harsh facts 
of life and aggressive drives, and “resolves” this incapacity by negating 
and repressing and resenting these factualities and drives with the help 
of a fabricated, “true” reality after death (Müller-Lauter 1971, Chapters 
2–4). The decadent imposes a form on itself by a weakening or restrain-
ing internal struggle. That internal struggle is, however, at the same time, 
necessary for growth and bringing about novelty. Since a “will to pow-
er”-organization only exists and grows by virtue of struggle, excessive 
organization has disintegrating consequences in the long run. In contrast 
to decadence, self-formation as sublimation from a Nietzschean point of 
view highlights the importance of actively affirming all occurrences in 
one’s life, bitter and sweet, ugly and pretty, allowing them to strengthen 
one another by integrating them in a particular lifestyle. This emphasis 
on active affirmation and integration cannot be found explicitly in Lacan 
and adds an important aspect to the notion of sublimation.
On the other hand, Lacan, first of all, helps to interpret Nietzsche’s 
scattered ideas that I earlier tried to structure in OST in terms of 
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“sublimation.” He also relates more strongly than Nietzsche sublimation 
to self and self-formation, and enables this way including ideas derived 
from Nietzsche to the proposed notion of self-formation as sublimation. 
More substantively and thematically, Lacan highlights the importance 
of the conflict between the general that is depicted as societal expecta-
tions, values and laws, on the one hand, and the singular that is made 
possible by transgressing the general by virtue of a void that can never 
be filled, on the other. Moreover, he stresses the compromised status of 
the self, since the self is constituted by an Imaginary and Symbolic order 
that secures individual and social stability as well as by the order of the 
Real that is responsible for bringing about novelty.
Although Nietzsche’s diagnosis of traditional narratives, values and 
laws losing their dominance and their capacity to regulate forces within 
a society is very important, it does not explicitly relate the fact that we 
are still born in a certain society with an existing “Imaginary and Sym-
bolic Order,” which constitutes us, to the challenge of self-formation 
as sublimation. Maybe Nietzsche’s idea of “active affirmation and in-
tegration” could also be related to societal narratives, values and laws: 
from that perspective, they would also need to be actively affirmed and 
integrated in the process of self-formation as sublimation. However, 
neither Nietzsche nor Lacan relate these elements to one another and 
explain how this possible affirmation and integration should be com-
prehended. In fact, their mistrust of the repressive potential of society 
often brings them very close to one another and possibly reveals the 
influence of Nietzsche on (Freud and) Lacan. This mistrust also explains 
why both Nietzsche and Lacan primarily focus on making room for nov-
elty and singularity through social transgression, since they both believe 
that attempts to socialize humans always hold the chance of excessively 
repressing and fixing them through a particular “sheltered” system that 
ultimately becomes a straitjacket and makes them ill. Although Lacan 
stresses the importance of the Symbolic and Imaginary and their pro-
tective, orienting and stabilizing workings, he remains a Nietzschean 
by stressing that recognizing the Real is the biggest challenge for every 
society, since the self ultimately derives its dignity from the workings of 
the Real.
The emphasis on the importance of struggle, transgression and 
 novelty does not imply that Nietzsche and Lacan completely oversee the 
 importance of social organization. In fact, there is also another type of 
decadence in Nietzsche that could be considered an antonym of subli-
mation. Internal struggle is, as I have discussed earlier, a condition for 
a “will to power”-organization to become strong and remain healthy. 
When, however, the internal struggle cannot be organized in such a way 
that tension is generated that can be discharged in a certain direction, 
decline occurs. The ruling drive is then incapable of organizing the inter-
nal struggle. Although struggle is necessary for gathering more power, 
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it contains, at the same time, the danger of decadence. The greater the 
struggle, the more difficult it is to organize it, the greater the chance of 
decay. Lacan, as I have discussed, stresses that she self also needs to pro-
tect itself from the abysmal and uncanny Thing /Real and can only create 
something new within the Symbolic Order if it keeps a distance from and 
engage in “organization around a void.” Both Nietzsche and Lacan d epict 
the paradox inherent in the process of self-formation as  sublimation 
in different ways, but they do not sufficiently value and elaborate the 
constitutive contribution of society. Although they both recognize that so-
ciety provides goals and values that regulate the individual’s drives and de-
sires, they do not seem to consider the possibility that these goals and 
values do not have to be necessarily restrictive but could also foster, and 
even be a necessary condition for change, novelty and s ingularity. Next, 
I will show how Peirce’s notion of the ethical-esthetic ideal could fill this 
gap and further nuance and enrich the notion of sublimation.
Sublimation as Organized Heterogeneity by Virtue of 
Social Goals and Ideals
Peirce attempts to illustrate (as I discussed in Chapter 2) that in our en-
counters with the world, whether we are awake, sleeping or  hallucinating, 
we always and necessarily have to adopt or presuppose three phenom-
enological categories which he simply calls the categories of Firstness, 
Secondness and Thirdness. These categories subsequently correspond 
with the elements of novelty, brute interactions and regularity. Com-
pared to Nietzsche and Lacan, Peirce provides a more congealed and 
specified account of especially the aspect of regularity on the basis of his 
category of Thirdness as well as how regularity relates to the two other 
dimensions. We have seen that, according to Peirce, self-formation is 
only possible if we impart a form to ourselves by virtue of an orientation 
toward certain goals and ideals. Self-formation is, as I explained earlier, 
depicted as a challenge, as something that is not simply given but should 
be realized. For Peirce, goals and ideals are imperative in the process of 
self-formation. Without goals and ideals, which we derive from the soci-
ety that we happen to live in, imparting a form to ourselves is impossible.
Since the orientation toward goals and ideals is a normative challenge, 
the question is not only how self-formation is possible, but also how we 
ought to form ourselves. Peirce acknowledges that people, depending on 
the society in which they live, devote themselves to different and possibly 
opposing goals and ideals, which nevertheless enable them to organize 
their interactions and to develop themselves in a certain direction. In ad-
dition, these goals and ideals are established and continuously assessed 
and adjusted in concrete interactions with the world: new scientific find-
ings, unpredictable events or unexpected experiences (Firstness) could 
destabilize certain conceptions and challenge established habits, which 
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prompts the adjustment of pursued goals and ideals. For this reason, 
Peirce stresses that goals and ideals are virtual, since they are always 
situated in the future and always subject to adjustment and correction. 
This approach indicates that Peirce does not ignore the Nietzschean 
view that societal values and norms are not fixed but subject to change 
and disruption, both synchronically and diachronically. However, he, 
in contrast to Nietzsche, believes society, under certain conditions, can 
evolve and gradually dissolve aggressively contesting goals, values, am-
bitions and aspirations as well as enable critical self-formation. Instead 
of posing the individual against society, he considers individuals as “cells 
of a social organism” (CP 673), who discover and develop themselves in 
an interaction with their environment.
Peirce conceives self-formation not as an isolated, individual  challenge, 
but situates it in a social environment that can constructively contribute 
to evermore apt interactions with and conceptions of what we encounter. 
In the process of forming ourselves by virtue of certain ideas, goals and 
ideals, we attempt to persuade “a future, critical self,” which is not an-
other individual person, but a personified community, that is, a virtual 
interlocutor who can question my ideas, goals and ideals continuously 
from different points of view; this implies that the social is always pres-
ent in the individual.
Although Lacan and, indirectly, also Nietzsche, take into account the 
influence of society on self-formation, both of them consider this influ-
ence primarily as restricting the potential imbedded in the (ever-wanting, 
wild drives of the) individual and, hence, a danger for self-formation. In 
contrast, Peirce does not evaluate society as such as a danger, although 
some societies could be perverse, constraining and suffocating; he rather 
considers personified community as a “critical self” that is a necessary 
condition for enriching and improving self-formation. Without goals 
and ideals that transcend immediate individual feelings, drives and ac-
tions, self-criticism could not be genuine, since real criticism requires 
standards that cannot be reduced to the individual’s preferences; oth-
erwise, it would be a bit like having a butcher inspecting the quality 
of his own meat. Those ideals are also subject to criticism, but again 
that is only possible in the light of yet a higher ideal that is pursued 
and so on and so forth. It must be clear that in order to be able to chal-
lenge societal goals and ideals, favorable conditions need to be created. 
From a Peircean perspective, a healthy, open society is, as we saw ear-
lier, characterized by built-in mechanisms and tools (such as democratic 
regulations, informed consent, the possibility to opt-out etc.) that enable 
people to deliberately and critically identify themselves or not-identify 
themselves with certain needs and desires, including the goals and ide-
als that society finds preferable. Crucial in this line of reasoning is that 
criticism does not exclude but rather requires anticipating standards and 
ideals that transcend individual, particular preferences. Ultimately, we 
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have to appeal, Peirce says, to an ultimate ideal that is in itself admi-
rable, “a habit of feeling which has grown up under the influence of a 
course of self-criticisms and of heterocriticisms” (CP 1.573f). For Peirce, 
this ultimate ideal that gradually manifests itself under the influence of 
a course of criticisms from different directions is mirrored in a perfectly 
cultivated emotional life form.
As far as I know, Peirce never uses the term “sublimation” to charac-
terize this perfected type of self-formation. However, his characteriza-
tion of this ultimate ideal shows striking similarities with Nietzsche’s 
and Lacan’s depictions of sublimation. Let me briefly recall those pas-
sages found in Peirce’s writings:
I should say that an object, to be esthetically good, must have a 
multitude of parts so related to one another as to impart a positive 
simple immediate quality to their totality; and whatever does this is, 
in so far, esthetically good, no matter what the particular quality of 
the total may be (EP II, 201)
Developing a sense for the esthetic ideal entails forming, one could say, a 
sublime practical and emotional disposition. This general disposition en-
ables the orientation toward goals by virtue of which evermore meaning-
less, useless and inefficient parts of the social organism are related to one 
another in such a way that they become meaningful, useful and efficient. 
Instead of denying, repressing or cutting off parts of the organism that 
do not seem to fit, the challenge is to gradually integrate them and use 
them to strengthen and further develop the organism. We can recognize 
here the idea that sublimation involves, instead of repression, integra-
tion, which we have found through Freud and Lacan in Nietzsche. Peirce 
also stresses the idea that this integration of parts within a whole, which 
from a Nietzschean perspective was elaborated in terms of organizing 
intense struggle, should not be achieved at the expense of multitude and 
diversity: “See that self-government is exercised; but be careful not to do 
violence to any part of the anatomy” (M 675, 15–16; see also Colapietro 
1989, 111f).
From a Peircean perspective, diversity and regulation do not exclude 
one another, but diversity can only be preserved and intensified by sub-
mitting it to a form or idea. He sometimes uses the terms “evolutionary 
love” or “creative love” to indicate how diversity and regulation could 
go together. I recall a significant passage in his works that attempts to 
explain how this is possible:
The movement of love is circular, at one and the same impulse 
 projecting creations into independency and drawing them into 
harmony. This seems complicated when stated so; but it is fully 
summed up in the simple formula we call the Golden Rule. (…) It 
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is not by dealing out cold justice to the circle of my ideas that I can 
make them grow, but by cherishing and tending them as I would 
the flowers in my garden. (…) Love, recognizing germs of loveliness 
in the hateful, gradually warms it into life, and makes it lovely [my 
italics] (CP 6.288f)
Instead of exercising brute force (Secondness) that would restrict and 
confine, the “movement of love” evokes, arouses, infects (Thirdness) a 
thing to realize its potential, to develop itself from something homoge-
nous and undifferentiated to a well-organized heterogenous and differ-
entiated form. We can recognize a Nietzsche-like concept of “amor fati” 
in Peirce’s idea of not only accepting the “hateful,” but also transfiguring 
it to constructive and meaningful life. Applied to the self, we can say 
that sublimation is a type of self-formation that involves not restricting 
or cutting off parts of the self, but rather accepting and transfiguring 
even the meaningless, useless and hateful parts, and stimulating the re-
alization of their constructive potential by imparting on them a form by 
virtue of a certain ideal. This explains why ideals that are more inclusive 
are more admirable than those that are less inclusive, and why the ulti-
mate ideal that can include all parts of the organism and prompts them 
to constructive, maximum self-realization is the most admirable ideal.
The idea of sublimation as imposing form on multitude and diversity 
and as actualizing potentialities, we also can find in Nietzsche and La-
can. Peirce can add to this idea that it is the orientation toward goals and 
ideals and eventually toward an ultimate ideal that can bring about max-
imum inclusion, regulation and self-realization. Moreover, for Peirce it is 
crucial that the orientation toward the ultimate ideal, which is a regula-
tive ideal projected in the future, is not an individual but a social enter-
prise that takes place within an endless community of critical minds, an 
ideal that gradually brings about “a habit of feeling which has grown up 
under the influence of a course of self-criticisms and of heterocriticisms.” 
Self-formation as sublimation, one could say, necessarily entails seeking 
beyond our actual, individual preferences and becoming part of a big-
ger, even a cosmic process. For this reason, I have indicated earlier that 
Peirce could be considered an anti- or posthumanist philosopher, since 
he does not take the human being to be the final product of evolution. 
The same could be said about Nietzsche, as have been illustrated by his 
notion of the Übermensch.
9.4 Technological Sublimation Theory
Instead of conceiving self-formation as “enhancement” in terms of 
“faster, stronger, smarter,” I have proposed that it is more adequate and 
feasible to understand it in terms of “sublimation.” Or alternatively, “en-
hancement” could be reinterpreted in terms of “sublimation.” If we bring 
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together the different and most important aspects of “sublimation,” de-
rived from ideas in the works of Nietzsche, Peirce, Freud and Lacan, and 
take into account the role that technology plays in self-formation, we 
can sketch the contours of the view of self-formation as sublimation in a 
technological environment. This configuration results in a theory that I 
will call “Technological Sublimation Theory” (TST).
Intrinsically bound to the proposed view of self-formation as sub-
limation, there are two fundamental caveats: first of all, technology 
has increasingly become “extimate,” that is, it has become an “other 
within” that we cannot simply externalize and use as a neutral means 
to form ourselves. Being outside of ourselves implies that we are to a 
certain  extent outsiders for ourselves, strangers to ourselves. Not only 
do we possess technology, but technology also possesses us, since it in-
creasingly has, besides language, laws, rules and regulations, become a 
 permanent structure of our very selfhood. Self-formation as sublimation 
entails that the self is and always remains compromised: technology both 
enables and constrains self-formation. Technology as “other within” has 
become both the necessary condition for forming a socially dependable, 
consistent and stable self and, at the same time, an obstacle that prevents 
it from reaching the singularity that it seeks.
Second, sublimation entails that there are no univocal standards for 
self-formation. The anti-essentialist self beyond inside-outside dualism 
is formed in interaction with and derives the goals and ideals that enable 
imposing a form to itself from its environment. Since environments can 
be very different and are subject to change, the standards for what can 
be considered “good self-formation” or “enhancement” also show copi-
ous variations, both diachronic and synchronic. Since our environments 
are increasingly technological environments and developments in tech-
nology are gaining serious momentum, self-formation may result, as I 
have discussed, in self-transformation. However, radical  transformation 
through technology does not simply enable us to become “stronger,” 
“smarter” or “healthier,” but it can and often will also influence norm 
and disrupt the very standards for establishing what is “good self- 
formation” or “self-enhancement.” In other words, new and emerging 
technologies are not neutral means but often bring about different and, 
from our current perspective, foreign standards for determining what 
are “normal” and “enhanced” capacities. Moreover, technology not 
only influences the immediate goals and ideals that are used to regulate 
our thoughts, actions and habits, but also higher-level goals and ideals 
that are used to criticize, adjust and validate lower-level goals and ideals. 
This is an implication of technologies becoming extimate; they are no 
longer external factors that influence an inner, autonomous realm but 
are able to affect the very standards that guide our conduct, shaping 
our most intimate and cherished convictions and beliefs. Therefore, es-
tablishing universal or univocal standards for what is considered “good 
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self-formation” or “enhancement,” independent of our particular tech-
nological surroundings, is impossible.
These caveats do not render “good self-formation” impossible. In 
fact, understanding self-formation as sublimation is motivated by the 
aim to indicate what is “good self-formation” without endorsing essen-
tialist and dualist views of the self that consider the self as an indepen-
dent and invariable unity, disconnected from its dynamic environment. 
Against this background, self-formation as sublimation can be charac-
terized under three strands: what, why and how. Before summarizing 
the most important aspects of the what, why and how of self-formation 
as sublimation, I need to stress that these distinctions are artificial be-
cause sublimation is as such a process without a clear-cut beginning 
and end, and cannot be simply framed in terms of isolated steps di-
rected at realizing a static aim. This categorization attempts to make 
the complex notion of sublimation graspable by structurally highlight-
ing its most important dimensions and phases, which in reality are 
strongly interwoven.
The what of self-formation as sublimation attempts to characterize 
in general what is self-formation as sublimation, what are its general 
characteristics. Being “extimate” and “closed open” entails that, as we 
have seen, I find in myself an “other within” that I have not chosen and, 
at the same time, cannot simply detach myself from but rather have to 
relate myself to. In fact, this “other within” involves a double alterity 
within, since it contains both our symbolic and material order, which 
provides regularity and stability and some-Thing, corresponding to the 
realm of drives that are feeding off the dissatisfaction of desire, which is 
a source of instability but can also soak off rigid constraints and enable 
singularity. Among this symbolic and material order, we find, among 
other dimensions, “our” name, skin color, ethnicity, body, customs and 
laws, but also, and increasingly, “intrusive technologies” that are ever-
more-strongly shaping our very selfhood. Instead of denying and reject-
ing this double alterity within, sublimation entails accepting the “other 
within,” since denying it would result in a kind of contradiction: the 
self would reject what made it what it is. With regard to technologies, 
this means that we cannot simply externalize the technologies that are 
shaping our self and evaluate them as detached entities but that sublima-
tion entails accepting in a particular way these intrusive and extimate 
technologies.
If this would be the whole story, sublimation would be nothing else 
than passively resigning to our fate. However, sublimation does not sim-
ply call for accepting the “other within,” but also integrating it in a life 
form or lifestyle that we could endorse and find admirable.1 Sublimation 
entails making ours what is not completely ours and taking responsibil-
ity for what we are not completely responsible for. We could say that we 
need to actively accept the “other within,” which is only possible if we 
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deliberately and critically integrate it, that is, make it part of, incorpo-
rate it in a fitting life form or lifestyle. With regard to technologies, this 
means that sublimation entails critically integrating “intrusive technol-
ogies” in an appropriate-for-us life form or lifestyle. Actively “accept-
ing” and “integrating” the “other within” could be captured under the 
heading “appropriating.” Self-formation as sublimation, hence, entails 
appropriating our symbolic and material-technological order as well as 
our ever-wanting drives and insatiable desire.
The what provides a general characterization of self-formation as sub-
limation, but does not yet make clear how sublimation could be real-
ized. The how of sublimation highlights relevant means and measures to 
 realize sublimation but also specifies and operationalizes the  structure 
and aim of sublimation. Appropriating the “other within,” that is, our 
symbolic and material order, as well as ever-wanting drives and  insatiable 
desire require that we do not completely coincide with our present self. 
Although the “insatiability” and “instability” that drives bring about 
enable soaking off rigid constraints that the existing symbolic and ma-
terial order convey on us, it is by virtue of particular goals and ideals 
that we can actively accept and integrate both this order and our drives. 
Goals and ideals enable the “other within” being incorporated in a more 
encompassing project that we aspire to and in a more coherent narra-
tive that reflects who we want to be. Hence, sublimation entails, first of 
all, actively accepting and integrating (appropriating) our symbolic and 
material order as well as our ever-wanting drives and insatiable desire 
(the “other within”) by virtue of making visible the goals and ideals 
embedded in or promoted by that order. Acknowledging that technolo-
gies are increasingly part of the order that shapes the self, it is by virtue 
of goals and ideals that we can actively appropriate them. With regard 
to technologies, sublimation entails, therefore, appropriating “intrusive 
technologies” through making visible the goals and ideals embedded in 
or promoted by them.
Second, crucial is not whether the goals and ideals by virtue of which 
we appropriate our symbolic and material-technological order and drives 
determine or do not determine our conduct but whether we d eliberately 
and critically identify with them. Real critical identification with goals 
and ideals, which could lead to their adjustment or even rejection, is 
only possible in the light of other or longer-term goals and ideals; these 
could also be subjected to criticism but only in the light of yet other or 
higher goals and ideals and so on. This requirement also applies to tech-
nologies: it must be always possible to subject “intrusive technologies” 
and congealed technological infrastructures to fierce criticism through 
making visible and enable challenging the goals and ideals embedded 
in or promoted by them by virtue of other or longer-term goals and 
ideals. The filter bubble is a good example of how deliberate and crit-
ical self-identification is rendered impossible, since, in the words of Eli 
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Pariser, “personalized filters usually have no Zoom Out function, it’s 
easy to lose your bearings, to believe the world is a narrow island when 
in fact it’s an immense, varied continent” (Pariser 2011, 61).
Third, deliberately and critically appropriating the “other within” in 
general and technologies in particular, which is a mark of sublimation, 
is a challenge that cannot be only realized on an individual level but 
has to be fostered by and embedded in society as such. The possibil-
ity of individuals deliberately and critically identifying themselves with 
certain goals and ideals needs to be secured by an open society that 
has incorporated certain mechanisms and regulations, such as informed 
consent, the possibility to opt-out and the acceptance of minority views 
and life forms. Since the organization and design of societies is ever-
more delegated to technologies, it is crucial to secure possibilities to de-
liberately and critically engage with the technologies and technological 
 infrastructure that is evermore shaping not only our interactions with 
our surroundings, but also our sense of self. Critically engaging with 
that infrastructure requires political and societal measures that make 
visible the goals and ideals embedded, endorsed or promoted by it, and 
enable challenging, adjusting or even dismissing those goals and ideals 
on the basis of other, higher or longer-term goals and ideals.
Fourth, good self-formation as sublimation entails the continuous in-
corporation of and devotion to evermore inclusive ideals. The ultimate 
ideal as the most inclusive ideal refers to a phase that could be reached 
after an endless process of “self-criticisms and of heterocriticisms.” We 
see here how criticism, society and evermore inclusive ideals go t ogether: 
that an ultimate ideal can be “consistently pursued in any and all 
 circumstances” (Potter 1997, 49) means that it does not encounter any 
resistance within an endless community of critical minds. Being a regu-
lative ideal and always projected in the future, the ultimate ideal entails 
“nothing more” than hope. However, this hope is a necessary condition 
for the persistence of critical self-formation, since it prevents absolutist 
claims bringing further criticism to a halt. The more we devote ourselves 
to the pursuit of inclusive goals and ideals, the more we will be able to 
form and cultivate a disposition that is responsive to an infinite (internal 
and external) community of critical minds, which in its turn will again 
increase sensitivity to the attractivity of even more inclusive ideals. The 
ultimate ideal secures that there is always, one could say in Lacanian 
terminology, a “permanent void” that prevents self-formation reaching 
a final state, which structurally and permanently enables the possibility 
to overcome the status quo.
With regard to technologies, this aspect of sublimation calls for devo-
tion to an ultimate ideal that fosters the ongoing cultivation of a critical 
disposition toward technologies and technological environments. This 
requires, at the very least, making visible which values, goals and ide-
als are embedded in or promoted by the technologies and technological 
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environments in question, which could be done in public (physical and 
virtual) spaces, debates, discourses and performances. By making these 
goals and ideals visible in public, an (infinite) community of critical 
minds is invited to evaluate, challenge and adjust them.
The why of self-formation as sublimation attempts to characterize why 
we should appropriate the “other within” by virtue of a critical identi-
fication with ever-inclusive goals and ideals, secured by  sociopolitical 
measures. Although the why of sublimation is motivated by realizing a 
kind of ideal, it intends, at the same time, to recognize the limitations 
and challenges that modern reality poses as well as the possibilities that it 
offers. It wants to recognize that self-formation lacks univocal standards 
and cannot be completely controlled without giving up the possibility 
to impose on ourselves a form that, although necessarily reflecting the 
imprints of our environment, still can be considered “ours.” Moreover, 
the absence of univocal and definitive standards for establishing what is 
suitable or good self-formation implies that the ultimate ideal cannot be 
ascribed a definite particular content that is derived from a moral the-
ory, since every moral theory presupposes standards that could also be 
subjected to criticism. This “absence” is a necessary condition for devel-
oping a singular form, which also explains why good self- formation as 
sublimation ultimately refers to an esthetic ideal that is always projected 
in the future, and, hence, is regulative, tentative and virtual. Its most 
important working is to secure a “permanent void” that enables individ-
uals to critically engage with and appropriate the “other within” (their 
symbolic and material order as well as their drives) in order to form a 
singular self.
With regard to technologies, this means that self-formation as sublima-
tion entails appropriating intrusive, extimate technologies (technologies 
that are increasingly shaping the very fabric of the self) in order to give 
ourselves a stable and socially valued as well as a singular form. Securing 
the “void” in a technological context entails the possibility of making 
visible the values, goals and ideals that are embedded in or promoted by 
technologies and subjecting them to criticism from an infinite commu-
nity. Not only is it important to cultivate a critical disposition toward 
technology but, conversely, the aim is also to design technologies that 
foster a critical disposition. These technologies we might call “sublime 
technologies.” Sublime technologies and technological environments not 
only prompt certain actions and decisions, but also foster the cultivation 
of a critical disposition that enables feeling toward which ideals we have 
to orient ourselves and which particular habits we have to develop in 
order to actively and critically appropriate the “other within” in such a 
way that we give ourselves a socially valued and singular form, a form 
that does justice to being both a dependable social being and a being that 
never can be captured in general characteristics. Art and artist might 
be able to provide examples and methods that demonstrate or illustrate 
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Table 9.1  Technological Sublimation Theory
Self-formation as sublimation With regard to technology
Caveats 1 The self is compromised, since it 
contains an “other within” and, 
hence, cannot completely control 
its course of self-formation 
Technology as “other within” has 
become both the necessary condition 
for forming a stable social self and 
an obstacle that prevents it from 
reaching the singularity that it seeks
2 There are no univocal standards for 
“good self-formation”
Technologies bring about different and 
new standards for determining what 
is “good self-formation”
What Sublimation entails actively 
accepting and integrating 
(appropriating) our symbolic 
and material order as well as our 
ever-wanting drives and insatiable 
desire (the “other within”)
Sublimation entails actively accepting 
and integrating (appropriating) 
technologies that are increasingly 
shaping the very fabric of the self 
(“intrusive technologies”)
How 1 Sublimation entails appropriating 
the “other within” by virtue of 
making visible the goals and ideals 
embedded in or promoted by it
Sublimation entails appropriating 
“intrusive technologies” through 
making visible the goals and ideals 
embedded in or promoted by them
2 Sublimation entails appropriating the 
“other within” through deliberate 
and critical identification with 
and, if needed, adjustment or 
rejection of relevant goals and 
ideals by virtue of other or longer-
term goals and ideals
Sublimation entails appropriating 
“intrusive technologies” through 
making visible and enabling 
challenging the goals and ideals 
embedded in or promoted by 
technologies and technological 
infrastructures by virtue of other or 
longer-term goals and ideals
3 Sublimation entails sociopolitical 
measures that make visible 
dominant goals and ideals and 
enable critical self-identification 
and self-formation
Sublimation entails sociopolitical 
measures that make visible and 
enable challenging dominant goals 
and ideals embedded in or promoted 
by technologies and technological 
infrastructures
4 Sublimation entails devotion to 
an ultimate ideal that prevents 
absolutist claims bringing further 
criticism to a halt and self-
formation reaching a final state
Sublimation entails devotion to an 
ultimate ideal that fosters the 
ongoing cultivation of a critical 
disposition toward technologies and 
technological environments
Why Sublimation entails appropriating 
the “other within” by virtue of 
an ultimate, esthetic ideal that 
secures a permanent “void” in 
order to give ourselves both a 
stable and socially valued and a 
singular form
Sublimation entails appropriating 
“intrusive technologies” by virtue 
of an ultimate, esthetic ideal that 
secures a permanent “void” in order 
to give ourselves both a stable and 
socially valued and a singular form
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how a “void” in technologies and technological environments could be 
incorporated and how sublime technologies could be developed.
This sketch of how self-formation as sublimation in a technological 
environment should be grasped is summarized in the Table 9.1. It must 
be stressed that this characterization is programmatic and solicits fur-
ther elaboration and illustration.
To sum up what self-formation as sublimation in a technological 
world entails:
Acknowledging the impossibility of complete control and the lack 
of univocal standards, self-formation as sublimation entails appro-
priating intrusive technologies, which are increasingly shaping the 
very fabric of the self, by virtue of an ongoing deliberate and critical 
identification with goals and ideals embedded in or promoted by 
those technologies, through sociopolitical measures and devotion to 
ever higher and more inclusive ideals that culminate in an ultimate, 
esthetic ideal, that enables forming both a stable and socially valued 
and a singular form.
The culminated self-formation as sublimation view in the context of 
appropriating technologies can be named “Technological Sublimation 
Theory” and abbreviated as TST. It must be clear that this theory is 
normative. It is normative not because it entails making visible norms, 
values and goals embedded in technologies, but rather because it pro-
vides normative guidelines for appropriating technologies and forming a 
“good” self. In the next and last chapter, I will attempt to further opera-
tionalize TST by applying it to three technological fields. 
Note
 1 Here also insights in the social influence of technology acceptance in 
 social psychology research might prove itself useful, especially the effect of 
self-identity on technology acceptance decision in relation to the Technology 
Acceptance Model (TAM) (see Lee et al. 2006).
Technological Sublimation Theory (TST) attempts to recognize that our 
technological environment greatly shapes who we are and influences 
who we ought to be and, at the same time, it resists the idea that the self 
is not more than a plaything of contingent forces that render the possi-
bility to form ourselves in a good way an illusion. TST attempts to do 
justice to both the impact of the technological world on the self and the 
potential of the self to impose a unique, singular form to itself that can 
be considered suitable and admirable.
Increasingly penetrating our very selfhood, technologies are becoming 
evermore existential, that is, part of what makes us who we are. More-
over, the radical externalist, interactionist view of the impact of our en-
vironment, and particularly technologies, on the self entails that the self 
is “closed open” for technologies: technologies as the “other within” 
cannot be simply externalized but are increasingly becoming something 
that is and is not us, at the same time. They are increasingly becoming 
“extimate”; both familiar and strange, they can be experienced as un-
canny. Since they increasingly make us who we are and, hence, cannot 
be completely controlled by us, the question of how we can and ought 
to form ourselves becomes increasingly urgent. TST offers guidelines in 
order to tackle this challenge.
In this chapter, I will apply TST to three different types or fields of 
technology: technological environments, brain imaging technologies 
and smart drugs. I will illustrate how this theory can help to reassess 
our relation to these technologies and provide guidelines for how we 
could appropriate them in order to impose a good or suitable form to 
ourselves. These fields of technology have been selected because they 
lucidly illustrate how technologies are increasingly becoming extimate: 
they no longer can be simply identified as external technologies that we 
can independently relate to, but are rather increasingly shaping who we 
are and how we experience ourselves. Applying TST to these technolo-
gies will also enable further clarifying its structure and logic, and assess-
ing its practical value.
The set-up of this chapter is as follows: first, I will discuss technolog-
ical environments that are becoming evermore “smart” and “nudge” us 
10 Technological Sublimation 
Theory Applied to Three 
Technological Fields
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in certain directions. Technological environments influence our behav-
iors from the outside but are evermore strongly penetrating in the inside. 
Second, I will discuss brain imaging technologies and the role they play 
in influencing and explaining psychological functions, including our ca-
pacity to form ourselves. Brain imaging technologies are situated, one 
could say, between the inside self and the outside world but are evermore 
commonly blurring that distinction. Third, I will discuss nootropics or 
so-called smart drugs and the way they increasingly influence what we 
consider good self-formation. Smart drugs affect the self from the inside 
but increasingly shape outside behavior. I need to stress that this illustra-
tion and application is programmatic and preliminary and is intended to 
set the stage for further research.
10.1  Self-formation as Sublimation in Smart 
Technological Environments
Smart Technological Environments
Human capacities have always depended on how humans engineer 
their environment to support their activities (Laland et al. 2000; Ingold 
2000; Godfrey-Smith 2014). However, these processes have recently 
reached a new level as digital technologies are starting to drastically 
transform our environment. After several technological revolutions in 
which technologies became evermore present in our daily lives, the 
digital technologies that are currently being developed are actually 
fading away from sight (Clowes 2015). Although much of the network 
that constitutes the current computer era is invisible to us (wires, base 
stations, servers, antennas, satellites etc.), in the upcoming years the 
“computer as we know it” is expected to undergo a great transition: 
a new generation of technologies will move, and are already gradu-
ally moving, from our desktops and smartphones to the background, 
merging into objects and infrastructures (Weiser 1991; Floridi 2014; 
Bibri 2015). Information and communication technologies (ICTs) will 
not only be embedded in devices that we explicitly “use,” but increas-
ingly become an intrinsic part of the material environment in which we 
live. ICTs will, as numerous signs bear witness, be evermore seamlessly 
and unobtrusively integrated in our lives. Instead of one-directional 
commands or messages fed in our devices (“what time is it, Siri?”), 
we will find ourselves in technological environments that will sense, 
predict and adapt to our behavior. Not only voice and gestures but also 
cues like respiration and body temperature could function as vehicles 
for interaction (Aarts and de Ruyter 2009). Instead of new technolo-
gies being introduced in a natural environment (which is currently the 
 leading paradigm), these new technologies are aimed to become the 
environment itself.
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This vision of new technological environments is exemplified by the 
Ambient Intelligence (AmI) and the Internet of Things (IoT). These par-
adigms display smart environments equipped with sensors and commu-
nication networks that not only detect and perceive their inhabitants, 
but also work on them by virtue of increasingly complex sensors, system 
architectures and software that can gather, store, manage and analyze 
data with great sophistication. The full operability of these t echnological 
environments will depend on progress in different frameworks, includ-
ing the accuracy of sensing technologies, the robustness of wireless com-
munication and the advancement of the human-technology interaction 
approaches.
Characteristic of these technological environments is not only the 
connectedness of multiple devices embedded in an individual environ-
ment (shades being connected to lights in a home), but also of multiple 
devices embedded into multiple environments (cameras connected in a 
home and also connected to a fire department) as well as the connected-
ness of multiple technological environments (different smart homes in a 
city) and so on and so forth. Depending on the degree and type of con-
nectedness, the different technological environments could be, at least 
potentially, considered part of one, ubiquitous and always on, techno-
logical environment. By connecting to and exchanging data with other 
devices and technologies, smart environments are able to increasingly 
act autonomously. The extent to which smart environments will shape 
the course of their own cognitive development will probably depend on 
their  capacity and success to self-structure their learning (see Settles 
2012 and Smart 2017).
How Smart Technological Environments Shape our Selves
Instead of being a neutral background for human existence, “active 
technological environments” are powerful, intrusive and, at the same 
time, increasingly concealed technologies that could strongly regu-
late our interactions, deeply influence our thoughts, habits and values 
and intimately shape our existence (see also Van den Eede 2011 and 
Kiran 2012). Studies on how the online self is constituted in cyberspace 
 (Hongladarom 2016) and how social media constructs, maintains and 
remixes identities online (Papacharissi 2011; see also Poletti and Rak 
2014) already demonstrated the major impact of digital environments 
and their characteristics on identity formation. However, now being im-
mersed in a technological environment also increasingly is taking place 
in the outside world. These “active technological environments” give 
rise to the coming about of what Aydin et al. (2019) call “Technological 
Environmentality” (TE). This concept highlights that the environment 
in which human existence plays itself out has taken on a technologi-
cal character and that this environment is actively doing something, 
246 How Should We Form Ourselves?
resulting in a new, technological condition for the life of homo faber. 
Imperceivable, user-sensitive, artificially intelligent electronics and 
 software are aimed to merge seamlessly with our biological selves and, 
as Clark (2003, 34) indicates, “in so doing they will ultimately blur the 
boundary between the user and her knowledge-rich, responsive, uncon-
sciously operating electronic environments.” TE has not only great po-
tential to further  liberate us from heavy, physical labor and improve 
different aspects of our daily lives – ranging from logistics and security 
to health and  intimacy – but also to strongly influence and regulate our 
actions and decisions as well as give rise to a new repertoire of thoughts, 
experiences, emotions and habits.
Aydin et al. (2019) have derived insights from Postphenomenology 
and Material Engagement Theory (MET) and combined them in order 
to more suitably and sufficiently conceptualize how active technological 
environments are increasingly influencing human beings. More specifi-
cally, they have reflected on how Postphenomenology and MET employ 
the concepts of “agency” and “intentionality.” First, they have elabo-
rated how the postphenomenological concept of “mediated agency” and 
the MET concept of the “dance of agency” can be combined in order 
to understand the emerging constellation of humans and technological 
 environments. These two approaches highlight, the authors claim, a dou-
ble dimension of agency: from a MET approach, humans and  material 
objects interact and are engaged in a “dance” that shape an interwoven 
and hybrid agency. From a postphenomenological approach, the inter-
action between humans and material objects also results in a particular 
agency, though not only in relation to the objects that they interact with 
and that mediate their agency but also in relation to other humans, ob-
jects and environments.
In Aydin et al. (2019), the example of a smart elderly home that 
 determines which doors will open and which will not, on the basis of 
 radio-frequency identification (RFID) chips integrated in clothes, is given 
to illustrate this double agency of technological environments: first, the 
inhabitants with, for example, Alzheimer, and the smart house engage in 
a dance – and, hence, an agency – that results in specific patterns of the 
people moving through the house and experiencing the house. Second, 
the technological environment as an agent also mediates how the inhab-
itants relate to their world, including people that they can meet inside 
and outside the house and the activities that they can engage in.
The other basic concept that is utilized in order to understand how 
“active technological environments” influence humans is “intentional-
ity.” From a MET approach, intentionality emerges from the interplay 
between humans and the material environment. For example, the inten-
tion of a potter to make a particular pot is the result of the interplay be-
tween the potter’s actions on the one hand, and the clay and its physical 
affordances on the other (Malafouris 2008a; see also Merleau-Ponty 
Technological Sublimation Theory Applied 247
1962, Bateson 1973, Gibson 1979 and Greeno 1994). Because the 
mediating role of environmental technologies does not easily fit the 
human- technology-world scheme that is at the heart of the postphe-
nomenological approach, the concept of a mediated intentionality that 
is brought about by the environment needs to be complemented with 
the MET approach. Aydin et al. (2019) propose to expand the concept 
of “immersion” to the extent that it can indicate how technologies can 
merge with our world and, at the same time, can have a bidirectional 
intentional relation with humans. Schematically, this immersion rela-
tion is noted as “human ←→ technology/world.” In contrast to back-
ground relations that have as structure “human (technology/world)” 
(Ihde 1990) and also depict technologies as part of the world, emersion 
relations display a high degree of interactivity between human beings 
and the environment.
The example of the smart elderly home can illustrate the added value 
of this configuration. The technologies immersed in the elderly home 
intentionally direct human beings through sensor networks that detect 
patterns of movement; these environmental technologies can be ascribed 
intentions because they intentionally can lock certain doors and open 
others for particular inhabitants. The responses of the elderly to these 
technological intentions will, in turn, influence the workings of their 
technological environment.
From this broadened perspective, it becomes possible to grasp how 
technologies immersed in the environment are not only interactive but 
mediating as well. They help to shape human practices and experiences, 
but in radically different ways than the mediations conceptualized in 
Postphenomenology so far. Underlying the postphenomenological ap-
proach is the insight that technologies are not elements of the world, but 
of the relation between humans and world. By complementing postphe-
nomenology with MET, it is possible to see that in “active technological 
environments,” technologies do indeed become part of the world and 
still play a role as mediators.
Aydin et al. (2019) propose that environmental technologies are not 
means used to establish a connection between user and environment, but 
rather a “milieu” that connects humans and world by interactively “en-
compassing” the ways in which humans are related to the world. They 
provide as analogy water being the milieu for fish: the water connects 
fish in specific ways to other fish and plants and objects and, more fun-
damentally, constitutes them as fish and the environment as their world. 
In their words:
This, then, is what we would like to call Technological Environmen-
tality. Technology is becoming a mediating milieu, merging with 
the world to the point of becoming invisible, but at the same time 
intentionally directed at humans and helping to shape how humans 
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act, perceive, and live their lives. This radically new environmen-
tal character of human existence marks a new stage in the history 
of homo faber and, therefore, of the human condition itself (Aydin 
et al. 2019, 337)
The idea of TE becoming a mediating milieu is in line with the notion of 
extimate technologies developed in this study: the technologies embed-
ded in the environment cannot be simply identified as external technolo-
gies that we can independently relate to, but are increasingly part of the 
fabric of our selfhood and evermore determining the way in which we 
form ourselves.
Sublimation in Smart Technological Environments
How can we critically relate to “active technological environments” 
that, due to their relative autonomy and active processing nature, are be-
coming more and more opaque in their workings and evermore effective 
in influencing and directing our conduct? How can we deliberately and 
critically form ourselves in smart technological environments that are 
increasingly becoming “extimate”? I do not pretend that TST  provides 
conclusive answers to this question. It can rather map out the most im-
portant conditions and provide some guidelines for forming a “good 
self” in smart technological environments.
In line with the first caveat that has been formulated, TST recognizes 
that smart environmental technologies become a necessary condition for 
forming a stable and socially dependable self and, at the same time, an 
obstacle that prevents reaching its desired singularity. A smart elderly 
home can enable an inhabitant to stay in her familiar surroundings, ad-
equately interact with other people and institutes, fulfill certain social 
and individual responsibilities and remain relatively independent of care-
givers who decide how she should spend and live her day; at the same 
time, it can intrude in different degrees in her life, selecting the TV pro-
grams that she could watch, choosing what food she can eat, evaluating 
how much medication she needs to take, regulating her sleeping pattern 
and determining where she can and cannot go.
Now the example of the smart elderly home can also illustrate more 
specifically what an “extimate technology” entails. The information col-
lected by the different devices in a smart elderly home needs to be related, 
interpreted and evaluated. A so-called central decision-making platform 
can gather data from the sensors and actuators, process and analyze 
measured data and send feedback to the user or to the actuators. It may 
also store measured data and run prediction algorithms that can ex-
ploit features of artificial intelligence and make use of deep learning and 
machine learning techniques to learn and develop models for the home 
environment as well as for the behavioral and physiological patterns of 
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the occupants (Majumder et al. 2017). Although smart houses could this 
way enable the elderly to remain in their familiar home environment, 
improve safety, reduce social isolation, increase self- esteem and enjoy 
their normal lives with friends and family, at the same time, the on- 
and off-body sensors and actuators that monitor and detect anomalies, 
perform health analysis, influence and regulate conduct will establish 
an intimate alignment with the inhabitants and instigate a  particular 
life style. Inhabitants will design and experience their life in accordance 
with the possibilities and impossibilities offered by a  particular tech-
nological  infrastructure, an infrastructure that can intrude to such a 
degree in their views and decision-making processes that they eventually 
will not be able to simply externalize it but will experience it as part of 
their very self, as an “other within.”
This brings me to the second caveat that has been identified: TST 
 recognizes that smart technological environments could bring about dif-
ferent and new standards for determining what is “good self-formation.” 
How does that work out for smart elderly homes? From a more tradi-
tional perspective one could, for example, say that, comparable to the 
influence of a nurse or care provider, smart environmental technologies 
diminish the inhabitant’s privacy and autonomy in order to secure her 
safety. Both are then considered as neutral means that in themselves have 
no normative implications. However, one needs also to recognize effects 
that are different from conventional nursing or care homes: whereas in 
a nursing home the infringement on privacy and decrease of autonomy 
often goes hand in hand, in a smart elderly home this does not have to 
be the case, at least not in the same way. It is possible that as smart en-
vironmental technologies become more intrusive and the infringement 
on privacy increases, sensors, actuators and even cameras are accepted 
if the loss in privacy is traded for autonomy. Moreover, compared to a 
care provider, who depending on temperament and mood may verbally 
or physically obstruct or direct an inhabitant’s action or decision in a 
certain way, the intervention of an often “invisible,” consistent and sta-
ble technological environment might be experienced as less of a privacy 
infringement. In addition, the actions and decisions delegated to a tech-
nological environment rather than to another human being might also 
be experienced as an increase of autonomy for the elderly, if sufficiently 
incorporated. Instead of another person doing certain things for her, an 
elderly person in a smart home might experience that she is doing those 
things herself.
One might notice here that this is not a very apt evaluation of the 
differences between conventional and smart homes from the mentioned 
caveat: instead of expressing them in terms of more or less autonomy or 
privacy, this caveat inherent in TST rather highlights that new smart el-
derly homes might not only quantitatively change, but also qualitatively 
reframe values like autonomy and privacy, attributing another or new 
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meaning to them. A smart elderly home is not a neutral environment 
but will gradually inscribe in the thoughts, actions and habits of its in-
habitants its “script” of what “privacy” and “autonomy” are, of what 
a “humane” way of living is. “Privacy” and “autonomy,” after living 
in a smart house, might no longer be the same thing as they were be-
fore living there. Not being able to choose one’s own food might earlier 
have been experienced as a serious limitation of autonomy, whereas after 
having embodied these technologies it might be experienced as a smart 
and deliberately chosen healthy diet. The more strongly the elderly in 
the smart home embody the environmental technologies that regulate 
their behavior, the more the technologies will become transparent and 
experienced as intrinsic part of their constitution, which, as said, ex-
plains why certain technological interventions will not be felt as usual 
privacy  infringement or autonomy decrease. Nevertheless, the techno-
logical environments, in taking part in the decision-making process and 
regulating and changing it, will introduce different and possibly even 
radically new thoughts, habits and experiences. The smart technologies 
will intrude in the inhabitant’s “inner realm” and transform what she 
finds useful, meaningful and admirable. They will not only replace the 
means that an inhabitant employs to realize certain goals, values and 
ideals, but also might and often will affect the meanings ascribed to and 
that “feel” associated with them as well as introduce new goals, values 
and ideals that are worth pursuing and cherishing.
Self-formation as sublimation entails, as I elaborated, appropriating, 
that is, deliberately and critically accepting “intrusive technologies,” 
technologies that are increasingly shaping the self and determining its 
decisions and actions. The aim is to integrate these “intrusive technolo-
gies” in such a way that a person can form herself in a socially acceptable 
as well as a singular way. In order to disclose the how of sublimation, 
the different aspects that indicate how this should be done have to be 
highlighted. The first step is making visible the goals and ideals embed-
ded in or promoted by the technologies and technological infrastruc-
tures at hand. With regard to smart elderly homes, various goals and 
ideals are mentioned in different stake holder analyses (Sponselee et al. 
2008; Clark and McGee-Lennon 2011; Ehrenhard et al. 2014): eco-
nomic goals and ideals with regard to reducing elderly healthcare and 
well-being costs; business goals and ideals that suppliers of AmI and IoT 
technologies want to achieve; goals and ideals of the inhabitants and 
their families with regard to safety and well-being; and, importantly, the 
idiosyncratic preferences of elders that a palette of options provided by 
standardized technologies does not automatically cover. TST especially 
encourages foregrounding and revealing how in smart homes important 
goals and ideals are operationalized from the embedded technologies 
perspective, which are also attributed a particular type of agency; for ex-
ample, “safety” could be framed and operationalized by the technologies 
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embedded in the smart house in terms of detecting smoke and gas leak-
age, or unusual movement and falls.
Second, appropriating “intrusive technologies” requires not only 
 making visible but also enabling challenging goals and ideals embed-
ded in or promoted by technologies and technological infrastructures 
by virtue of other or longer-term goals and ideals. The question here 
is whether the mapped-out goals and ideals sufficiently coincide with 
the various goals and ideals that can be identified from different per-
spectives after careful deliberation. Sensors and cameras might be able 
to detect smoke and gas leakage as well as unusual activity and falls, 
but the inhabitant of the smart house might associate safety more with 
her familiar neighborhood or the nice couple that lives at the other end 
of the hall and helps her with her groceries. Or she might consider ac-
tivity detection a decrease of safety because she worries that burglars 
could hack into the system and use it to find out when she is sleeping. 
Think also of the possibility of an elderly lady having a lover but being 
afraid that the sensors will detect erotic interactions or interpret them 
as unusual behavior, which might be a reason for not inviting her boy-
friend to her home. The biggest challenge is to be as inclusive as possible 
in identifying goals and ideals that are of crucial importance for the 
well-being of the inhabitant. Often, this boils down to including, besides 
goals and ideals that concern functional and technical aspects, goals and 
ideals that are especially specific for the inhabitant in question. How-
ever, now the biggest challenge is realizing communication between all 
the sensors and actuators as well as integration of different technologies, 
systems and services from different manufacturers through establishing 
standard protocols and enabling interoperability. This might be critical 
for the consistent operation of the system but is often only a necessary 
and not sufficient condition for a “good” smart home, just like having 
electricity and heat is not the end but the beginning of designing an ap-
propriate home; a house is not yet a home.
The third aspect of self-formation as sublimation that has been 
 highlighted entails sociopolitical measures that make visible and enable 
challenging the goals and ideals embedded in or promoted by technolo-
gies and technological infrastructures. The smart elderly home example 
immediately makes clear that realizing a “good” smart house cannot 
be accomplished by efforts of individuals but only through collabora-
tion of all involved stakeholders: engineers, suppliers, programmers, 
ICT support, but also family of the elderly, insurance companies, law 
makers, politicians and of course the elderly person herself. This aspect 
underlines the importance of creating buffers in society that make room 
for debate and criticism on different levels. Governments and insurance 
companies need to safeguard the rights of elderly people to choose be-
tween different smart systems. Lawmakers need to take measures that 
protect the data that these systems collect and store. Public discussions 
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need to reveal and map out the different interests in order to make sure 
that all the ingredients required to design smart homes (and not just 
houses) that go beyond resolving operability issues are there. The main 
aim here is to discuss and develop frameworks that articulate which 
goals and ideals should be used to evaluate what is a “good” elderly 
home on the level of a particular society and culture.
The fourth and “final” step in the process of self-formation as subli-
mation is to ensure that debate about and reflection on how technologi-
cal environments are shaping and determining the thoughts, habits and 
experiences of the people involved never reaches an end. This permanent 
room or void can only be maintained if goals and ideals that are estab-
lished in social interaction and conversation always remain provisional. 
By projecting an ultimate, virtual and maximally inclusive ideal in the 
future, it becomes possible, at least potentially, to challenge every par-
ticular goal and ideal, as beautiful as it seems. Applied to technolog-
ical environments, the ultimate, esthetic ideal prevents smart systems 
from becoming closed black boxes that cannot be adjusted by users. The 
ultimate, esthetic ideal ensures taking into account that inhabitants of 
smart elderly homes have different and divergent worldviews and that 
what is good for others does not have to be good for them. It creates a 
“void” that enables forming a singular life style, without losing sight of 
the different relevant practical, legal and social conditions that need to 
be met in the design of the house. Elderly individuals have their own par-
ticular histories, views, habits and feelings, which cannot be completely 
generalized and captured in a standardized technological environment. 
Taking this into account and building rich modularity in the design of 
a smart elderly home allows elderly people to deliberately and critically 
shape their selves in interaction with different stakeholders as well as the 
devices that promise to make their lives better.
This example also makes clear how from TST, if certain conditions 
are met, there does not have to be a discrepancy between the preferences 
and desires of the inhabitants of smart homes and the influences that 
other stakeholders impose on the design of the house. Enabling idiosyn-
cratic preferences of the inhabitants are, as such, not a sufficient condi-
tion for singular self-formation. While they could make room for new 
configurations, they can also limit the range of possibilities and block 
actualizing potential, potential that remains out of an inhabitant’s view. 
Put differently, singularity is not the sheer result of fulfilling individ-
ual preferences and desires by decreasing the influence of “evil” others 
(e.g., producers and suppliers of the devices) in the design of the house, 
although giving producers and suppliers too much and unwarranted 
power should be prevented. TST rather promotes collectively finding out 
what would be a “good home” for the particular inhabitant in question 
through mapping out which goals the smart house seeks to realize, what 
are the interests, aims and limitations of relevant stakeholders, including 
Technological Sublimation Theory Applied 253
those of the inhabitant, in the light of an ultimate ideal, that is, an ideal 
that secures a void that solicits unforeseen sublime designs.
10.2  Self-formation as Sublimation through Brain 
Imaging Technologies
Brain Imaging Technologies
In the 1990s, brain research witnessed such a gigantic increase in inter-
est and popularity that in July 1990, with the Library of Congress and 
the National Institute of Mental Health, former US President George H. 
W. Bush declared that period “the decade of the brain.” Expectations 
were materialized in neuroscientific funding, research, publications, 
public debates and emerging applications. In the following years, ad-
vances in brain research, in combination with the dominant scientific 
(and philosophical) consensus that mind in one way or another emerges 
from the brain, have led to the ever-stronger view that brain research has 
the enormous potential not only to clarify and solve biomedical issues, 
but also to tackle behavioral and social problems. That explains why 
various scholars and policy makers have coined the current era as the 
“decade of the mind” (Kutas and Federmeier 1998; Moriarty 2008, 29).
Brain imaging technology has commanded attention that goes be-
yond its usage in the laboratory and the medical field; it has increas-
ingly featured as a “holy grail” in, among other fields, public policy 
making (Snead 2007; Littlefield 2009), education (Mobbs et al. 2007), 
law (Sinnott-Armstrong et al. 2008), popular media (Frank 2009) and 
private enterprises (e.g., NoLie MRI, Cephos). It also plays an increas-
ingly prominent role in social sciences: brain imaging technologies such 
as positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) are, as I have discussed earlier, increasingly used 
not only to diagnose diseases and lesions but also to correlate brain ac-
tivation with psychological states and traits. Many philosophers have 
become interested in brain imaging technologies because the images that 
they display seem to have bearing on psychological and philosophical 
issues such as consciousness, free will, weakness of will, responsibil-
ity, moral deliberation, rational choice, agency and identity. Data and 
images provided by brain scanners are used to draw (causal) relations 
between brain processes and cognitive functions, with the aim to po-
tentially resolve problems concerning thinking and behavior. Although 
technology to visualize brain activity is fairly new and at a very incipient 
level of development, it is precisely the visual quality of these produc-
tions that make them particularly appealing, stirring both scientific and 
public imagination (Beaulieu 2002; Dumit 2004; Eastman and Camp-
bell 2006; Weisberg et al. 2008). The idea that brain imaging allows 
“reading” what is going on in the brain and provides “brain facts” that 
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enable uncovering the secrets of the human body, mind and behavior is a 
prospect that causes tempers to flare (Choudhury et al. 2009).
Of all brain imaging technologies, fMRI stands out: being noninvasive 
and depicting different parts of the brain in moving colors and shapes, 
it has an appeal and perceived accessibility that makes it particularly 
popular. The neuroscientist Nikos Logothetis comments: “Its popular 
fascination is reflected in countless articles in the press speculating on 
potential applications, and seeming to indicate that with fMRI we can 
read minds” (Logothetis 2008, 869). For this reason and in order to 
apply TST on one particular brain imaging technology, I will focus my 
further discussion on fMRI.
In Chapter 5, I have discussed brain imaging technologies, and in par-
ticular fMRI, in the context of the attempt to reframe free will in terms 
of self-formation. In that context, different characteristics of fMRI have 
been briefly depicted. We have seen that the relation between fMRI 
images and brain activity is not immediate and clear-cut. In fact, the 
technology measures, as we have seen, the so-called Blood Oxygenation 
Level Dependent (BOLD) response, because oxygenated and deoxygen-
ated hemoglobin in the blood have different magnetic properties, an 
MRI scanner can read changes in magnetization and translate them into 
a computerized image (Matthews and Jezzard 2004). The data and im-
ages provided by brain scanners are used to infer something about the 
role of particular brain areas in cognitive functions. In addition, brain 
imaging data are taken as evidence that a given brain region plays a par-
ticular causal role during the performance of a cognitive task (so-called 
“reverse inference”).
I have discussed different methodological objections against these in-
ferences: first of all, it is clear that brain images are not simple pictures 
of BOLD signal differences. In addition, the BOLD differences that are 
associated to brain activity are small, noisy and multifaceted. Instead 
of measuring quantitative signal magnitudes, brain images rather dis-
play statistical significant differences in BOLD signal. Brain images are 
in fact maps of places where we can assume with a certain probability 
that the presumed correlation between data and a stereotyped pattern 
of activation is unlikely to be the result of chance fluctuations from a 
true zero signal (Klein 2011). Moreover, interpreting brain imaging is 
belief-opaque: inferences are dependent upon the beliefs and experience 
of the researchers about how to analyze their results. We have also seen 
that reverse inference is no less controversial: a causal relation between 
activation of a certain brain area and a particular cognitive function 
cannot be drawn because brain regions can perform multiple functions 
and be involved in a variety of different processes (Klein 2010).
In an attempt to more radically reflect on the usage of fMRI images 
as functional evidence, I have argued that the discussed methodological 
objections show that brain images do not directly display neural activity, 
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but nevertheless, neither challenge nor sufficiently explicate the partic-
ular way brain imaging technologies frame the relation between brain, 
cognition and world. These methodological objections indicate that 
brain images might not be reliable and valid pictures of brain processes 
but, at the same time, they reinforce the view of the brain as an agent by 
framing the brain as an isolated realm that – if certain methodological 
problems are solved – could provide functional hypotheses.
How Brain Imaging Technologies Shape our Selves
Brain imaging technologies in general and fMRI in particular are in-
creasingly shaping our image of ourselves. In Chapter 5, I illustrated 
how brain imaging technologies are rehabilitating the Cartesian frame-
work, which was itself influenced by the camera obscura: fMRI me-
diates and transfers similar Cartesian notions of self and freedom. By 
focusing on the inside of the head and (interactions between) certain 
regions of brain activity, an fMRI image depicts the brain as a relatively 
isolated realm and allows approaching it as an independent inner agent. 
Instead of the mind, fMRI attributes a privileged status to the brain: it 
ascribes to the brain the capacity to process information collected by 
the senses, which enables the execution of certain decisions and actions 
as well as control and manipulation of the world. fMRI portrays the 
brain as the locus of the self and attributes to it a particular concept of 
freedom, namely freedom as “not being determined by something else 
but capable of determining behavior and utilizing the world,” which is 
taken as a synonym of “control.” One could say that fMRI increasingly 
shapes the self in its image.
Although this idea of freedom was also attributed to mind and brain 
before the discovery and usage of fMRI, fMRI (and other brain imaging 
technologies) has made it appear more credible because it allegedly is 
capable of clearly displaying the interior of the “inner dark room” and 
disclosing not only what really determines our mind and behavior but 
also how it is able to do it. The prospect that fMRI can provide objec-
tive knowledge of how the brain causes decisions and actions does not 
weaken the camera obscura framework of freedom, but rather reinforces 
it and makes it “scientific.” This way, propositions, like that fMRI can 
grant “a glimpse into someone’s mind” and enable us to “measure what 
someone sees with his mind’s eye” (2010, 264; see also Lamme 2006), 
suddenly do not sound completely esoteric but can be expressed in sci-
entific journals. fMRI potentially becomes a mirror of the soul, which 
could disclose all the secrets of human thought and behavior. Somebody 
who can adequately read that mirror, a “brain technician” (Armstrong 
1968/1993, 109), would be able to know someone’s thoughts and be-
havior even better than the person herself and explain why she acts in 
a certain way and is not able to act differently. Proposed applications 
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range from offering better understanding of human learning, shedding 
light on schizophrenia, providing new insights into addiction and vi-
olent behavior, tamper-proofing lie detection and screening employees 
for pedophilia. And if the brain is the central operating system of both 
the “hardware” and the “software” of humans and fMRI is the portal 
that provides access to their thoughts and can explain their behavior, 
then making adjustments in and through that operating system will also 
enable controlling and determining their conduct.
The field of law is one of the most prolific and growing spheres of 
emerging fMRI applications, primarily taking place in the US. This is, 
according to Wolf (2008, 21), not surprising because “law has every-
thing to do with human intentions, states of mind, competence, culpa-
bility, and responsibility, the points of possible connection between law 
and neuroscience are legion.” Criminal law in particular is integrally 
concerned with understanding the mind of the defendant. In order to 
prosecute, lawyers are required to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt” 
that a suspect had a particular mental state indicating an intent to kill 
before committing the murder (this is a defining feature for first degree 
murder), the intent to deceive (a defining feature of fraud charges) or 
the capacity to control his/her actions (a defining feature of the insanity 
defense). Jones and Shen clarify: 
Culpability of the accused thus depends, in part, on a determination 
of his/her mental state at the time of the offense. The phrase ‘mens 
rea’ (‘guilty mind’) derives from the Latin phrase ‘Actus non facit 
reum nisi rea sit,’ which means ‘An act is not guilty unless the mind 
is guilty’ (Jones and Shen 2012, 361)
All issues in criminal law depend, to some extent, on inquiring into the 
content of “the mind” of the defendant, which makes fMRI images ex-
tremely appealing.
It must be clear that, in contrast to smart technological environ-
ments, fMRI images are not shaping the self in the sense of immediately 
directing its behavior or manipulating its environment. However, the 
assumption that fMRI enables reading the mind not only expresses a 
representationalist view, but also mediates a particular conception with 
regard to the role that the brain plays in relations between self, behav-
ior and world. By portraying the brain as the locus of the self, fMRI 
images are depicted as representations of the “real” determinants of a 
person’s behavior, rendering the (conscious) self a powerless spectator 
who is very much dependent on the brain’s condition and working or-
der. If, in the context of law, fMRI images show that deviant behavior 
is the result of the brain being “impaired,” “not functioning well” or 
“out of control,” a perpetrator could be cleared from responsibility and 
liability.
Technological Sublimation Theory Applied 257
This line of reasoning raises a disturbing question in this respect (that 
I will not further discuss here): why does only an “impaired brain” and 
not also a “healthy brain” relieve a person from responsibility and lia-
bility? Are they not both beyond the conscious self’s control? We were 
not able to choose our brains, so why are we made responsible for their 
doings, bad or good? I am not saying that this conclusion must be nec-
essarily drawn but only that strongly endorsing the brain as the central 
operating system of the self and its behavior raises this kind of questions.
In addition, fMRI images not only provide information to specialists 
that have to interpret and evaluate a person’s decisions and actions, but 
they also impel the examined person to identify herself with the images 
of her brain, and form herself in light of what those images display. 
Perpetrators often adopt the language that clinicians use to understand 
and explain their behavior, as illustrated by Strakowsi: “the fMRI shows 
that I am not a bad person but have a disruption of the ventrolateral 
prefrontal-amygdala emotional pathway” (Strakowski et al. 2011). 
I am not being cynical here; I acknowledge that clinical diagnosis can be 
helpful in controlling and treating deviant behavior and recognize that 
clinicians are often very much aware of the limitations of brain imaging 
technologies. The point is that fMRI is not a neutral instrument but that 
it mediates a very particular conception of the self and its relation to its 
behavior and world. It informs and misinforms how the self is and can 
be shaped – and can be treated.
From the perspective developed in this study, brain images are not 
seen as representations of a “within”– the brain – that is not affected 
by a “without.” The idea that brain images can provide direct access 
to the “inside self” can only be validated insofar as the technical con-
ditions that have generated it remain invisible. This does not imply (as 
I elaborated earlier) that the information that fMRI images provide is 
completely irrelevant. fMRI images can display certain correlations 
between brain activity and behavior and, more importantly, enable a 
person to use that information to intervene in and adjust her behavior. 
From this perspective, which is crucial, the self is not understood as an 
isolated, a priori existing entity that is “immediately” determined by 
something “within”– consciousness or brain – but as something that 
deliberately discovers and forms itself by virtue of its identifications and 
non- identifications with its determinants on the basis of certain goals 
and ideals. A person can critically relate to the information provided 
by fMRI images and ask herself whether she wants to identify herself 
with her current habits. Although it is possible to recognize certain 
brain  patterns or mechanisms as playing an important role in a per-
son’s decisions and actions, they are not understood as representants of 
the “real” determinants of a person’s conduct. Instead of representing 
the “real” determinants (and rendering the self a powerless spectator), 
fMRI images allow for the practical-perceptual visualization of one’s 
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neurophysiology. By foregrounding neurophysiological processes and 
revealing how our habits relate to our neurophysiological make-up, they 
can offer insight in how we more effectively can pursue our long-term 
goals and ideals.
It is clear that from this perspective, it is not suitable to demonstrate 
on the basis of fMRI who someone “really” is. fMRI images will not 
enable discovering whether someone is a “real killer,” not only because 
fMRI images do not provide valid and reliable knowledge of a particular 
mental state or a “guilty mind” but also, and more importantly, because 
brain or mental states are not taken as loci of the self. From the pro-
posed perspective, the self is not completely determined by something 
within or without but rather continuously discovers and forms itself by 
virtue of its identifications and non-identifications with its determinants 
on the basis of certain goals and ideals. fMRI images could contribute 
to discovering certain inclinations and offer insights on how it more 
effectively can become the self it aspires toward.
Sublimation through Brain Imaging Technologies
In Chapter 6, I briefly discussed “neurofeedback” as an illustration of 
how brain imaging technologies could be reinterpreted from the pro-
posed perspective. Now that we have further developed that perspective 
in terms of self-formation as sublimation, it is possible to more structur-
ally and comprehensibly elaborate how it could be applied to this field. I 
will take again “neurofeedback” as an example in order to illustrate how 
the proposed and now more advanced theory (TST) could be applied and 
operationalized. As we have seen, neurofeedback entails offering people 
dealing with certain afflictions, via real-time displays of electroenceph-
alogram (EEG) or fMRI, feedback on the way they respond to certain 
situations. This self-reflection enables actively influencing through fMRI 
brain activity in order to bridge possible tensions between how some-
body acts and how she would like to act. In order to further specify the 
usefulness of TST, I will again focus on the treatment of food craving 
through neurofeedback, a phenomenon closely associated with develop-
ing obesity. As a disclaimer, I highlight again that the clinical merit of 
neurofeedback on food craving is still in a trial phase (Weingarten and 
Elston 1990; Bowell and Kober 2016; Volkow et al. 2011).
In line with the first caveat that has been formulated, TST recognizes 
that brain imaging technologies in general and fMRI in particular dis-
close the brain and its processes and mechanisms as an essential deter-
minant for forming a preferred stable self and, at the same time, as an 
obstacle that prevents reaching the self’s desired singularity. On the one 
hand, it acknowledges that fMRI displays the brain as an active agent 
by virtue of which we can form ourselves in a certain direction. fMRI 
can make visible how the brain plays an important role in regulating and 
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determining our thinking, decision-making and behavior. By providing 
extrospective knowledge of neural pathways that give rise to, for exam-
ple “food craving,” fMRI makes it possible to intervene in and adjust the 
self’s undesirable behavior, shaping it into the stable self that it aspires 
toward. On the other hand, fMRI displays the brain “as another within” 
that cannot be simply controlled by the self. The neurological proclivities 
that it discloses, which explain, for example, the intense desire to con-
sume a particular food or food type, cannot be simply externalized and 
detached from the self. Those desires and tendencies are experienced as 
part of the self, explaining why the self can say “I am craving for a ham-
burger.” And it is precisely because the self identifies itself with “craving 
for a hamburger” that it cannot easily control that tendency and form 
itself in another direction. Moreover, if neurofeedback would enable the 
self to use “extrospective knowledge” to intervene in the brain’s pro-
clivities and successfully prevent eating a hamburger, one could again 
say that it is the “plastic” brain that provides room and opportunity 
to intervene in certain tendencies and adjust the self’s conduct. fMRI 
discloses the brain both as an opportunity to form a stable and socially 
dependable self and an obstacle for deliberately forming a singular self.
The second caveat TST highlights is how fMRI could bring about dif-
ferent and new standards for determining what is “good self- formation.” 
One might say that the displayed fMRI images with regard to our ex-
ample of food craving are not very different from a friend holding a 
(symbolic) mirror to confront a person with her behavior: “Stop eating 
hamburgers! Driving to the McDonald’s during lunch break has become 
a dangerous habit!” However, on reflection, it becomes clear that fMRI 
images are far from neutral and interchangeable. Whereas a friend’s 
analysis and advice could be reduced to an opinion (“Shut up, that is 
like your opinion dude!”), fMRI images have a more scientific status. 
They seem to immediately display what is going on with somebody who 
is  suffering from food craving and why it is so difficult for her to resist 
the desire to drive to McDonald’s. And because fMRI images could be 
seen as more objective than a friend’s opinion, they might also be ex-
perienced as more compelling and persuasive. Different from a friend’s 
advice, fMRI images used in neurofeedback seem to leave a person’s 
autonomy intact, since that feedback does not come from another partic-
ular person with certain motives and intentions but from an impersonal, 
scientific device that seems to neutrally mirror what is going on in the 
autonomous person’s biology.
Again, it would be insufficient to evaluate the difference between a 
friend’s opinion and the fMRI image in terms of more or less scientific 
and objective or more or less securing autonomy. If fMRI images are 
presented and discussed in a clinical setting, using clinical terminology 
to describe what they indicate (“Ma’am, you have an eating disorder!” 
or “Ma’am, you have a form of hyperalimentation!”), moral valuations 
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are replaced by clinical valuations. Instead of a person being too weak 
to resist greasy food or too lazy to prepare a proper meal, she now has 
a brain condition preventing her from resisting hamburgers; “having a 
weak will” or “acting irresponsibly” are reinterpreted in terms of certain 
solidified brain mechanisms determining certain habits in the self’s be-
havior. This could be used to evade responsibility: “It is not me; it is my 
brain that craves hamburgers!” More importantly for our theme, we see 
now that the way that fMRI images depict the brain and frame its rela-
tion to self and world has practical bearing. fMRI’s particular framing 
enables ascribing to the brain a causal agency that strongly constrains or 
even annuls the self’s ability to think or act against the brain’s propensi-
ties. It replaces the freedom that was ascribed to the self with a control 
that should be attributed to the brain, a control that is further elaborated 
in terms of groups of neurons firing and wiring together in certain pat-
terns. fMRI displays the brain as the locus of the self, dictating what 
and when the self craves but also how that craving could be resisted and 
regulated. The more fMRI images are seen as real representations of the 
brain as a central operating system of the self, the more the technologies 
and procedures that generate these images and instigate that particular 
framing become transparent and invisible.
These caveats are an intrinsic part of TST and do not render self- 
formation impossible. As we know, self-formation as sublimation entails 
appropriating technologies that determine the nature of the self while 
still allowing a person to create who she is in a way that is both socially 
stable and singular. Instead of taking brain images as representations of 
a brain that controls the self and manipulates the world, the proposed 
framework considers brain images as a particular and potentially useful 
mediator of the relations between brain, world and self. TST entails, first 
of all, making visible the goals and ideals embedded in or promoted by 
the fMRI images. We have seen that envisaged aspirations of fMRI im-
ages go beyond making visible diseases and range from tamper- proofing 
lie detection to providing insight in various psychological disorders. In 
the context of using neurofeedback to tackle food craving, the fMRI 
images intend to provide knowledge and methods in order to alter  neural 
pathways correlated to food craving in favor of a healthy lifestyle. It is 
important to explicate here how a “healthy diet” and an “unhealthy 
diet” are framed and operationalized in the context of using fMRI im-
ages in neurofeedback. Food craving is correlated to particular hardened 
neural pathways in the brain that cause unhealthy habits; noninvasively 
stimulating specific regions of the brain with the help of fMRI imag-
ing seems to significantly reduce food craving by modulating neuronal 
 constraints, which lead to a healthy diet and a healthy lifestyle (G oldman 
et al. 2011; Ljubisavljevic et al. 2016).
Second, appropriating “intrusive technologies” requires not only mak-
ing visible, but also enabling challenging the goals and ideals embedded 
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in or promoted by those technologies by virtue of other or longer-term 
goals and ideals. The concern here is whether the mapped-out goals that 
motivate overcoming food craving are similar enough to the goals that 
will be identified after careful reflection from other points of view. Al-
though fMRI images mediate our self-identification, the goals and ideals 
that we identify with in the process of realizing a preferred self cannot 
be fully captured by or reduced to the goals and ideals embedded in or 
promoted by the fMRI images. In the context of neurofeedback, fMRI 
images might help to alter certain neural pathways that give rise to food 
craving and contribute to developing healthier habits, but the person suf-
fering from food craving might have associations with the more healthy 
lifestyle as well, and maybe even more with the social aspect of hanging 
out with friends and occasionally giving in to a nice, greasy hamburger. 
Or after deliberate and critical reflection, she might discover that her 
wish to fight food craving is not motivated by health reasons at all, but 
rather by trying to match standards set by thin models in music and film. 
After this discovery, she still might proceed with the attempt to over-
come food craving, but then with the aim of realizing an ideal that has 
grown up a bit, due to more thorough critical reflection. The challenge 
here is to integrate the fMRI images that mediate self-identification in 
such a way that they contribute to realizing maximally inclusive ideals 
that mirror not what somebody spontaneously prefers or what is fash-
ionable or trendy in a particular subculture, but that prove admirable af-
ter thorough deliberation and critique through mapping out all involved 
stakeholders and their interests and motives.
The third ingredient of TST entails sociopolitical measures that 
make visible and enable challenging the goals and ideals embedded in 
or promoted by, in the case at hand, fMRI images in the context of 
neurofeedback. Although the example of treating food craving through 
neurofeedback appears to be a particularly individual endeavor (individ-
uals set their goals in concrete practices and decide how to realize them), 
adequately interpreting and valuing brain images and the aspirations ex-
plicitly or implicitly embedded in them requires the involvement and col-
laboration of various stakeholders. First of all, clinicians are responsible 
for making clear to users what the advantages as well as the limitations 
will be in using fMRI images in order to treat food craving. They need 
to make clear that the information provided by fMRI images can make 
the discrepancy between short-term urges and long-term goals physio-
logically accessible, enabling them to relate and respond to it. However, 
they also need to make users aware of the fact that the displayed fMRI 
images are not pictures of mind states and that these images mediate in a 
particular way the brain and its relation to behavior; they need, in other 
words, to prevent reductionist accounts of what fMRI images display. 
By approaching brain imaging and neurofeedback pragmatically, it also 
becomes possible to include other ways to frame and tackle food craving: 
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instead of or in addition to neurofeedback, people who struggle with 
food craving could, for example, arrange with their spouses that their 
car or car keys are unavailable at certain times of the day, making it 
more difficult for them to get to the McDonald’s. Extrapolating, it must 
be clear that raising awareness of the opportunities, limitations and rel-
ativity of the applications of brain imaging technologies is of crucial 
importance among the public and political actors at all levels.
Besides enabling insight in what fMRI images depict, sociopolitical 
measures could be taken to make visible and challenge the goals and 
ideals embedded in or promoted by fMRI images. These measures are 
aimed at creating room for considering other and more inclusive goals 
and ideals in the context of treating food addiction. Besides offering 
individuals therapies that enable them to control addictive impulses, 
one could also insert buffers that make visible and challenge the large-
scale promotion of fast food in our society, which might, at least partly, 
prevent individuals from developing unhealthy addictions. It needs not 
much effort to show that legally forcing companies like McDonald’s 
to disclose the ingredients in their hamburgers on little labels on their 
boxes is not sufficient for raising the required awareness. Another way 
to insert a buffer in society is to instigate debate about ads portraying 
the skinny role models that trigger some people to change their eating 
habits. This is not to discourage people from developing healthier diets, 
but to enable them to discover their motives for doing it and adjust their 
conduct using standards that they find admirable after thorough delib-
eration and reflection.
The fourth and “final” step in the process of self-formation as sub-
limation is securing a permanent void by projecting an ultimate and 
maximally inclusive ideal in the future, which enables challenging every 
particular goal and ideal set in the present. With regard to fMRI used 
in neurofeedback to treat food craving, projecting an ultimate, esthetic 
ideal enables developing a tailor-made healthy diet that fits within the 
particular lifestyle aspired to by a person, without losing sight of the 
social concerns, valuation and interests of a healthy life. The question of 
what is a healthy lifestyle is increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to 
answer in general. Of course, one could name habits that are proven un-
healthy: today no one would deny that smoking, alcoholism and highly 
processed fatty foods are hazardous to health. By no means does the 
TST endorse an “anything goes” philosophy. However, one needs also 
to acknowledge great variations, both diachronic and synchronic, in ap-
praisal of substances being good or bad for health. Whether treatment 
of food craving through neurofeedback will make a person healthy and 
experience herself as healthy will greatly depend on its particular inte-
gration in very particular practices and particular outlook and prefer-
ences of the person in question as well as her particular social context 
and circumstances. This does not exclude the possibility of many people 
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experiencing the neurofeedback treatment of food craving improving 
their health in a similar fashion. Its most important purpose is to se-
cure room for inclusive approaches and valuations of the effects of this 
kind of technologies. Some people might be able to successfully integrate 
those technologies in their life projects and evaluate them as a contri-
bution to living a healthy life. Others might value their effects very dif-
ferently and even take an opposite stand, discovering that, for example, 
the neurofeedback has strengthened their obsession with a healthy diet 
and only increased their dissatisfaction with their bodily condition. TST 
recognizes the importance of a practical and socially effective appropri-
ation of fMRI images (people functioning better), without losing sight 
of the fact that people could respond very differently, depending on how 
they value and integrate the extrospective knowledge about their neu-
rophysiology provided by fMRI images into their life projects. Again, 
it must be clear that singular self-formation cannot be reduced to sub-
jective preferences and desires with regard to living a healthy life, but 
rather is the mark of a collective effort to map out which goals, in this 
case, neuroimaging seeks to realize. It is about identifying what are the 
interests, aims and limitations of relevant stakeholders, including those 
of the subject that is undergoing treatment, in the light of an ultimate 
ideal that counterbalances every attempt to definitely fix what is meant 
by a healthy lifestyle.
10.3 Self-formation as Sublimation with Smart Drugs
Smart Drugs
The use of smart drugs, also called nootropics or cognitive enhancers, 
is on the rise. Smart drugs refer to natural and synthetic substances 
that are presumed to enhance cognitive function, particularly memory, 
alertness, creativity and motivation. Besides stimulants like caffeine, 
the best-known and probably most used smart drugs are methylpheni-
date (Ritalin) and Adderall (mixed amphetamine salts) and increasingly 
modafinil (provigil), which are medically prescribed for treating atten-
tion deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and narcolepsy, respectively. 
These are among a suite of pharmaceuticals now being used by healthy 
people, particularly university students, to enhance their capabilities for 
learning or working.
The effects of smart drugs are not well investigated, let alone deter-
mined, but their popularity is evident. In a large survey of tens of thou-
sands of people (79,640 respondents in 2015 and 29,758 in 2017), 14% 
reported using stimulants at least once in the preceding 12 months in 
2017, up from 5% in 2015. US respondents reported the highest rate of 
use: nearly 30% said they had used drugs for pharmacological cognitive 
enhancement at least once in 2017, up from 20% in 2015. However, the 
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largest increase in use is found in Europe: use in France rose from 3% 
in 2015 to 16% in 2017; from 5% to 23% in the UK; and from 10% to 
25% in the Netherlands. Expectations are that this trend will intensify 
in the future (Frood 2018).
It is known that smart drugs modulate important neurotransmitter 
systems such as dopamine and noradrenaline. Laboratory studies have 
shown that modafinil enhances aspects of executive function in rested 
healthy adults, particularly inhibitory control (Turner et al. 2003). 
ADHD medications show a modest degree of memory enhancement 
(Grön et al. 2005). Other compounds with different pharmacological 
actions are in early clinical trials, having shown some positive effects 
on memory in healthy research subjects. However, it is still very uncer-
tain whether any of these new drugs will be proven effective and safe. 
In addition, their workings seem to be dependent on the psychophys-
iology of the user, like weight, blood flow and mood. There has also 
not yet been any definitive research into the addictive potential of these 
drugs, and it is unclear what side effects are likely at doses outside the 
prescribed range.
Responses to smart drugs vary from very positive to very negative. Op-
ponents consider the use of smart drugs to be unnatural, dangerous and 
fraudulent. The objection that smart drugs are unnatural is often based 
on assumptions regarding what is natural: medical treatments for the 
sick, exercise and education are seen as “natural” and, hence, “good.” 
If smart drugs take us beyond “natural” limits of human functioning, 
their enhancements are seen as unnatural, and what is unnatural should 
evoke caution and skepticism (Fukuyama 2002; Kass 2002).
An objection that has been given more attention is that smart drugs 
are risky. Since our brain is both a very important and a highly com-
plex organ, it is, opponents who highlight this aspect argue, very dan-
gerous and irresponsible to use smart drugs not knowing their effects 
and unintended side effects in the long run. The use of methylphenidate 
without clinical supervision already shows, some claim, dangerous side 
effects such as symptoms akin to those of schizophrenia, depression and 
anxiety. Prolonged abuse has been associated with psychotic symptoms, 
including hallucinations and paranoia (Morton et al. 2000). Others have 
pointed out that using smart drugs comes with the risk of long-term 
damage to the brain’s working memory and ability to move efficiently 
from one task to another. There may especially be a heavy cost of the 
use of smart drugs on the uniquely delicate, developing brain of young 
people, opponents claim: it might cause a long-term decrease in the brain 
plasticity that would be necessary for task switching, planning ahead 
and adaptive flexibility in behavior (Urban and Gao 2014).
Other opponents argue that healthy people who take smart drugs 
are not only taking a chance with the unknown long-term side effects, 
but also gain undue advantage over others. Smart drugs influence the 
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competition between those who would prefer to use them and those who 
would rather not, creating an incentive or even a pressure among non-
users to start using too, which could lead to a situation in which all 
students need, or believe that they need, to use cognitive enhancers to be 
able to compete. If, however, they are able to resist using smart drugs, 
the drugs could increase factual inequalities between members of society 
(Sahakian and Marein-Zamir 2007; Forlini and Racine 2009; Dubljević 
2013).
On the other side, advocates of human enhancement technologies like 
transhumanists often argue that fear for these new drugs is unnecessary 
and should be viewed, along with emerging technologies such as brain 
stimulation and prosthetic brain chips, “in the same general category as 
education and good health habits, and information technology – ways 
that our uniquely innovative species tries to improve itself” (Greely et al. 
2008, 702). Although they recognize that smart drugs require relatively 
little effort, are invasive and are for the time being not equitably distrib-
uted, they believe that none of these provides compelling grounds for 
prohibition. Exercise, nutrition and sleep seem to have similar charac-
teristics and effects as smart drugs and are, hence, morally equivalent 
to them, proponents of smart drugs claim, though we do not prohibit 
them. Considering smart drugs as cheating is, they claim, begging the 
question, since the rules used to consider them cheating need to distin-
guish currently allowed cognitive enhancement, such as double expres-
sos and private tutors, if they are to be banned. The appeal to “natural” 
is rejected on the grounds that the lives of almost all human beings is 
“unnatural”; if we accept “unnatural” cognitive enhancers like writ-
ing and laptop computers, why should we prohibit other “unnatural” 
enhancers? And as for the objection on the basis of drug abuse, they 
do recognize drug abuse as a major social problem but they argue that 
regulatory rules differentiate between different types of drugs (from 
caffeine to heroine), which should also apply to smart drugs; the mere 
fact that cognitive enhancers are drugs is no reason to outlaw them. An 
 evidence-based approach is required here, they argue. Their general take 
on smart drugs is that like all new technologies, they could be used well 
or poorly; maximizing its benefits and minimizing its harms should be 
our most important concern (Greely et al. 2008).
How Smart Drugs Shape our Selves
TST does not approach technologies in terms of do’s and don’ts. The 
same applies to smart drugs, also because more traditional substances 
that could be considered “mood enhancers” such as chocolate, wine and 
cigarettes have been an accepted part of our culture for many centu-
ries, which is not to say that these substances can be considered healthy. 
Just like people are changing their appearances, bodies and moods with 
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make-up, balding remedies, plastic surgery, steroids and caffeine, more 
individuals are finding their ways to more modern cognitive enhancers. 
If these drugs were to become broadly available and mainstream, they 
could increasingly become a technology that shapes the self, which im-
plies that, as I argued repeatedly, they would no longer be simply exter-
nalized and evaluated as an external influence.
Currently, a great number of smart drugs are examined and tested. 
For example, donepezil, a drug approved by the US Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) to slow the memory loss of Alzheimer’s patients, 
seems to improve the memory of “healthy” people. Controlled popu-
lations of pilots who had taken donepezil remembered their training 
better, as evidenced by their improved performance on the maneuvers 
they had learned and on their response to stressful emergency situations 
( Yesavage et al. 2002). It is expected that many different smart drugs 
will make their way toward clinical trials. Of course, this does not ex-
clude the possibility that many nootropics that looked promising in an-
imal models will completely fail when brought to clinical trial. Another 
hurdle for smart drugs is that while they might enhance certain cognitive 
capacities, they could cause deleterious effects; for example, mice that 
have become more receptive for learning through cognitive enhancers 
seem to be also more sensitive to pain (Gazzaniga 2005, 75–79). Cur-
rently, available memory drugs are mild and marginal in their effects. 
Future drugs are expected to be much more powerful, which makes the 
question of how we should live with them more urgent.
It must be clear that the purpose of this reflection is not to review and 
settle debates about the usage of smart drugs in terms of allowance or 
prohibition. Approaching smart drugs in those terms is only possible 
if the question that I have addressed throughout this book was to be 
circumvented, namely the question of how technology is mediating and 
shaping the very standards that we use to analyze and evaluate its us-
age. As repeatedly has been elaborated, technologies that intrude in the 
very fabric of the self are not neutral but rather “normalize,” explicitly 
or implicitly, what is meant by “enhancing human capacities” and “op-
timizing values” (see also Aydin 2015). As I have briefly discussed in 
Chapter 7, this also applies to smart drugs. Smart drugs, which presum-
ably would improve cognitive capacities, are not neutral technologies, 
but rather express, feed into or bring about a particular conception of 
cognition. They do not simply measure IQ but also frame what is IQ. 
Generally, IQ tests measure people’s analytical skills, verbal comprehen-
sion, perceptual organization, working memory and processing speed. 
These are skills important in different academic settings, which explains 
why IQ tests are reasonably good predictors of academic success. How-
ever, they are far from perfect indicators of success in the “real world.” 
Just like the “real world” cannot be reduced to the “academic” world, 
intelligence cannot be reduced to IQ.
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Let me explain this in more detail applying the structure that illus-
trates the framing and moral evaluation of technology with regard to en-
hancement provided in Chapter 7. I briefly recap this structure: (1) value 
x is identified as an intrinsic or at least as an indisputable preferred value; 
(2) capacity y is identified as an important capacity that affects value x, 
in the form: value x can be better realized by improving capacity y; tech-
nology z is identified as a technology that affects capacity y, in the form: 
technology z can improve capacity y. Technology z can then be qualified 
as a “human enhancement technology” because (1) it can improve ca-
pacity y, which in its turn (2) can significantly contribute to realizing 
value x, which (3) is identified as a preferred value. Applied to smart 
drugs, smart drugs can be considered as a human enhancement tech-
nology, because (1) smart drugs increase (inter alia) IQ, (2) giving more 
people the opportunity to increase their IQ will lead to (inter alia) more 
equality and (3) equality is identified as a preferred value. Again, the 
aim of this structure is not to establish whether smart drugs z can really 
improve capacity y, which in its turn can contribute to realizing value x. 
The crucial point is that this question can only be adequately under-
stood and investigated if one has made clear how smart drugs z frames 
what is considered an “enhanced capacity” and an “optimized value,” 
respectively. Characteristic of almost all smart drugs is that in framing 
their expected effects, “smart” describes how well one processes infor-
mation and figures out tasks; smarter is frequently just another word for 
faster (Gazzaniga 2005, 84). So we may all get faster at figuring out new 
problems, but it is not clear at all what it would mean to get “smarter” 
beyond the given characterization, for example, with regard to making 
better judgments and decisions.
The structure presented in Chapter 7 rudimentarily includes the fur-
ther developed Self-Formation Theory. It recognizes how technologies 
are increasingly “normalizing” what we consider “smart” and “good 
thinking,” disclosing copious variations of criteria, both diachronic and 
synchronic, for what can be considered “cognitive enhancement.” It also 
indicates that generalizing and substantializing particular framing of 
cognitive enhancement is reductive and, implicitly or explicitly, disre-
gards other possible conceptions of “normal” and “enhanced” cognition.
Sublimation through Smart Drugs
TST could now be employed in order to understand what appropri-
ating entails, that is, what is meant by actively and critically accept-
ing and integrating smart drugs. In order to further specify how the 
theory could prove itself useful, I will focus on a particular kind of 
smart drug, namely memory enhancers. There have been many differ-
ent smart drugs associated with memory improvement, like modaf-
inil (provigil),  d- amphetamine (adderall), methylphenidate (ritalin), 
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rivastigmine (exelon), galantamine (razadyne) and donepezil (aricept). 
For convenience, I will use donepezil as an example. As indicated, do-
nepezil is a drug that is used to treat dementia in, for example, Alzhei-
mer patients. Again, I do not claim here that it has been proven that 
this drug significantly improves memory in the long run. Instead, I take 
hypothetically as a starting point that it or an altered version of it does 
improve long-term verbal and visual episodic recall (which is confirmed 
in some studies and counterfeit in other; see Grön et al. 2005; Fitzger-
ald et al. 2008; Balsters et al. 2011), does not have severe side effects 
and does not come with legal issues. Let’s call this improved version 
“donepezilplus” for convenience.
The first caveat of TST recognizes that smart drugs in general and 
donepezilplus in particular enables forming a preferred stable self and, 
at the same time, create an obstacle that prevents reaching the self’s de-
sired singularity. Donepezilplus could improve a healthy user’s capacity 
to recall visual and verbal episodes to such a degree that she acquires 
a photographic memory that enables remembering everything that 
she experiences. Donepezilplus would (literally) open up a whole new 
world for this person. She would experience the world in eternal Pla-
tonic forms, not forgetting anything. Donepezilplus might, for example, 
offer this person who earlier worked as a policeman the possibility to 
become a world-famous profiler, solving crimes that no one else could 
solve. Instead of phronesis, one could say, contemplation has become 
her most dominant capacity. However, we need to acknowledge here the 
double-edged knife that characterizes donepezilplus as “other within”: 
donepezilplus is both the necessary condition for becoming a world- 
renowned profiler and, at the same time, an obstacle to see and choose 
a different course of life. It is by virtue of donepezilplus that it becomes 
possible to have an extraordinary capacity, which, at the same time, be-
comes a capacity that can no longer be usurped and controlled, since it 
forms the self in a particular direction, in this case in a world-renowned 
profiler who structures the world the way world-renowned profilers do 
and only sees and actualizes possibilities that world-renowned profilers 
see and actualize. The more donepezilplus becomes a structural ingredi-
ent administrated to her body, a permanent add-on to her mental world 
and an integrated part of her life, the less difficulties she will have at-
tributing the capacity of photographic memory to herself. Until one day, 
donepezilplus is out of stock at her reliable pharmacy or internet store; 
then the “otherness” of donepezilplus will become visible again as well 
as the question of who she really is, the person on or off donepezilplus.
The second caveat of TST highlights how smart drugs could bring 
about different and new standards for determining what is “good 
self-formation.” Donepezilplus not only allows a healthy person to bet-
ter remember things but by radically transforming a healthy person’s 
life, it also introduces new goals and expectations. Before the usage of 
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donepezilplus, being an excellent policeman was measured by, for exam-
ple, securing the safety of the neighborhood. After popping donepezil-
plus, this accomplishment, one could imagine, is experienced as far from 
sufficient since the bar is set much higher now. Not being able to solve 
a big crime every month could be experienced as failure, as a waste of 
talent made possible by donepezilplus. In addition, this drug could in-
troduce a “new normal” (Greely et al. 2008; Fitz et al. 2014). Nonusers 
of donepezilplus are not able to compete with users or not able to meet 
certain expectations that have become a norm and are forced to also use 
it. What was once a choice for people aspiring a more “adventurous” 
life could become a de facto necessity for all. What was “good perfor-
mance” before the introduction of donepezilplus could be valued as “bad 
performance” after people started using it. Moreover, as a result of the 
usage of donepezilplus, photographic memory could become a highly 
valued capacity on the basis of which people compete and, hence, rede-
fine what is considered a “smart” or even an “intelligent” person. Done-
pezilplus introduces new standards for what is “good performance” and 
transforms the meaning attributed to old ones.
Recognizing these caveats, TST aims to illustrate how it is possible to 
integrate these “intrusive technologies,” which are increasingly shaping 
the very nature of the self while still allowing that a person can shape 
herself in a socially suitable and also singular way. The first step is to 
make visible which goals and ideals are embedded in or promoted by, 
in this case, the usage of the smart drug donepezilplus. We have already 
discussed the reasoning that makes this visible. Applied to donepezil-
plus, it would look like this: donepezilplus can be considered as a human 
enhancement technology and, hence, something that should be aspired 
toward, because (1) donepezilplus gives a person photographic memory, 
(2) giving people photographic memory will enable (inter alia) solving 
major crimes and, hence, creating a safer world and (3) safety is a pre-
ferred value. It is important to explicate here how “safety” is framed 
and operationalized in the context of using donepezilplus. Safety is un-
derstood as the result of solving major crimes, and that is seen as the 
result of, in part, revealing, mapping out and connecting major facts and 
events (data) related to a crime.
Second, appropriating “intrusive technologies” requires not only 
making visible, but also enabling the challenging of goals and ideals 
embedded in or promoted by the smart drug donepezilplus by virtue of 
other or longer-term goals and ideals. What is at stake is whether the 
mapped-out aims coincide with those identified after deliberation and 
reflection. In general, this challenge amounts to fighting reductionism. 
Although donepezilplus mediates our self-identification, the goals and 
ideals that we identify with in the process of realizing a preferred self 
cannot be fully captured by or reduced to the goals and ideals embedded 
in or promoted by this smart drug. Safety, for one, could be increased 
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by fighting crime using profilers with photographic memory. However, 
a more efficient way to fight crime and increase safety might be by of-
fering educational programs and appropriate labor to people who live 
in bad neighborhoods and don’t see many alternatives. After deliberate 
and critical reflection from different perspectives, our protagonist might 
also discover that using donepezilplus to solve major crimes is not her 
genuine passion but a symptom of trying to compensate for not meeting 
the expectations of her father who was a war hero. She still might decide 
to use donepezilplus in order to solve major crimes, now not to please 
her father but to create a better world for herself and her children. Or 
she might convince the CIA, her employer, to work with a highly sophis-
ticated big data company that can do the profiling better than people on 
donepezilplus, and stop taking donepezilplus.
This case also reveals another aspect that should be considered. Hav-
ing a pill that enhances memory may enable a student to get a high 
score on an exam or a former policeman to become a world-renowned 
profiler who makes the world a safer place, but it’s also possible that, 
depending on particular circumstances, its long-term usage will lead to 
a whole new set of problems and disorders. Nietzsche considered what 
he sometimes called “active forgetting” a more valuable capacity than 
“memorizing.” In the second essay of his Untimely Meditations (UM), 
he argued that it is possible to live almost without memory, and to live 
happily in that state, as animals demonstrate. However, he believed that 
it is altogether impossible to live at all without forgetting. Active forget-
ting in this context has nothing to do with memories fading away, but is 
a positive and active force, a capacity that an individual, a society and a 
culture need to live healthy and happy lives, have faith in themselves and 
create a new future. Active forgetting enables selective remembering. Ac-
tive forgetfulness is an active ability to suppress negative and traumatic 
memories, which is a necessary condition for a culture to uphold and de-
velop itself further. It is a kind of defense mechanism that blocks harm-
ful thoughts, enables a positive spirit and makes place for the new (see 
also Aydin 2017). Nietzsche wrote, “The person [or group, or culture] in 
whom this apparatus of suppression is damaged, so that it stops work-
ing, can be compared (and not just compared) to a dyspeptic; he cannot 
‘cope’ with anything” (GM II, 1). It is probably not a coincidence that 
psychiatry offices are full of people with unhappy memories they would 
like to get rid of. Not only for victims of horrendous emotional events 
such as accidental trauma, abuse and stressful relationships but also for 
more ordinary, happy people, memory enhancers could in the long run 
create more problems than they solve, precisely because forgetting seems 
to be a pivotal ingredient of happiness.
This digression neatly illustrates the challenge to integrate a smart 
drug in such a way that it contributes to realizing maximally inclusive 
ideals that, after thorough deliberation and critique, prove admirable. 
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Besides goals and ideals that concern functional and socially valued as-
pects, it is crucial here to also include goals and ideals that are of specific 
value for the particular person in question. In discovering what is good 
self-formation, taking into account social valuations is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition: taking donepezilplus might indeed greatly fit 
within the aspirations of one person and enable her to make the world a 
safer place, whereas for another person it might be a pathway to hell and 
the last thing that would make her feel safe. Witnessing horrors every 
day that remain hidden in the everyday lives of ordinary people might 
disclose a world where the latter does not want to live anymore, prompt-
ing her to seek another pathway.
The third aspect of TST entails sociopolitical measures that make visi-
ble and enable challenging the goals and ideals embedded in or promoted 
by smart drugs, in our case, the smart drug donepezilplus. Critically re-
flecting on and challenging these goals is not an individual matter but 
a collective challenge that requires the involvement and collaboration 
of different involved stakeholders. Doctors and pharmaceutical compa-
nies are responsible for making clear to users what the advantages and 
side effects of using donepezilplus are, which requires being trained to 
take a broader perspective and also consider social and psychological 
variables that might be relevant for the effect of the drug. Given the 
power of pharmaceuticals in our society, it is of upmost importance that 
economic interests do not lead to skewing the health benefits of this and 
other smart drugs. Lawmakers should limit abuse of this drug, and at 
the same time prevent creating incentives to illegally produce and sell 
it. Public discussion needs to increase awareness of the different, and 
sometimes contrasting, interests of users, sellers and producers of this 
kind of drugs as well as prompt reflection on the desirability and unde-
sirability of a culture that incorporates and normalizes the use of smart 
drugs by healthy people. In this reflection, the motives of individuals 
who have idiosyncratic goals and ideals that do not completely fit in this 
culture should also be taken into account, though without making them 
dominant to such a degree that they can no longer be examined and 
questioned from other perspectives. As indicated repeatedly, individual 
goals may not always be authentic or critically acquired but could be 
projections of contingent “big others” inscribed in our unconsciousness.
The final step in the process of self-formation as sublimation is to 
secure a permanent space that enables challenging each particular goal, 
however beautiful it may seem. Projecting an ultimate, virtual and maxi-
mally inclusive ideal in the future creates this void. With respect to smart 
drugs, the ultimate ideal that can never be fully realized prevents critical 
reflection about how to integrate smart drugs in our society and lives to 
reach an end. Whether donepezilplus will make a person “smarter” and 
what “smarter” means will greatly depend on its particular integration 
in the very particular practices, outlook and preferences of the person 
272 How Should We Form Ourselves?
in question as well as her particular social context and circumstances. 
Some people might be able to successfully integrate a smart drug like 
donepezilplus in their life projects and evaluate it as enhancing their 
cognitive capacities. Others might value its effects very differently and 
even take an opposite stand, experiencing the improvement of long-term 
verbal and visual memory as a heavy yoke. The most important aim 
of the ultimate ideal is to secure room for singular valuations of smart 
drugs like donepezilplus, which make it possible to deviate from every 
particular characterization of “smartness”; “smartness” might involve 
getting faster at figuring out stuff, but being smart cannot be reduced 
to this element. The ultimate ideal enables disclosing not just function-
alist values related to processing information, but also other values that 
prove to be important in being smart. If we want to prevent a murder, 
then having photographic memory that enables figuring out very fast 
how to find the perpetrator can be considered “smart.” However, if our 
purpose is to go west, leave our old life behind us and start anew, then 
having photographic memory would not do us much good. Moreover, 
what can be considered “smart” will also depend on values and stan-
dards that currently do not even exist. They remain, to a great extent, 
virtual because they will be brought about by technologies of the future: 
sublime technologies that might shape sublime selves that we cannot 
imagine today, or monstrous technologies that might shape monstrous 
selves; or both.
How ought we to form ourselves? And, more specifically, how ought 
we to form ourselves in a technological world? This was the primary 
question of the third part of this study, which contained four chapters. I 
opened this part arguing that transhumanists and other techno- optimists 
who propose approaching technological self-formation as radical 
self-enhancement are confronted with two problems, which I have suc-
cessively discussed in the first two chapters. In Chapter 7, I demonstrated 
that transhumanists’ and other techno-optimists’ presumed notion of 
“enhancement” is unsustainable because radical self-transformation 
does not only imply enhancing the human by technologically improv-
ing her capacities and adding new functions to her constitution but also 
introducing new and different standards for establishing what is “en-
hancement.” Transhumanists seem to be confused about their own con-
ception of the posthuman. If variations of criteria, both diachronic and 
synchronic, of what can be considered “normal” and “enhanced” can 
already be observed in both past and present contexts and situations, 
what then gives the assurance that present standards can be sustained 
in the future, especially if that future is subject to radical and disrup-
tive technological influences? I contrasted the transhumanist’s notion of 
the posthuman with Nietzsche’ notion of the Overhuman (Übermensch) 
and employed the latter as a “tuning fork” to “hear” whether transhu-
manists escape an essentialist conception in which one particular view 
of the enhanced or ideal human being is rendered absolute. Although 
transhumanists’ visualizations of radical self-transformation claim to 
overcome an anti-essentialist anthropology, on reflection they display, 
as I have shown, the posthuman as essentially invariable, uniform and 
independent. This Nietzschean critique reveals the transhumanists’ de-
piction of the posthuman is much too reassuring: it does not consider 
the possibility that transformations into a being that goes beyond the 
present human might also herald a world with radically different stan-
dards as well as the destruction of our present values, goals and ideals, 
including our most cherished (humanist) ideals. This prospect does not 
so much render the transhumanist project worthless, but it challenges 
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us to reflect much more soundly and seriously on the incentives and 
implications of the possible impact of emerging technologies and rad-
ical self-transformation. Moreover, a more adequate understanding of 
“technological enhancement” requires considering what the conditions 
are for allowing for divergent possibilities to form ourselves in different 
ways, which entails including in the assessment of “enhancement” other 
criteria besides efficiency and functionality.
The second objection with regard to “enhancement” rhetoric, which 
I have discussed in Chapter 8, concerns disregarding that in attempts 
to technologically form ourselves we come across some-Thing within – 
something uncanny – that often can and does resist molding ourselves 
as we please. I examined this notion of the “uncanny within” through 
an analysis and evaluation of Masahiro Mori’s the uncanny valley in 
robotics, reviewing different psychological hypothesis that attempt to 
explain the uncanny valley. Within that field, I highlighted Wang et al. 
(2015) Dehumanization Hypothesis, which takes mechanistic traits of 
humanoids, that is, a lack of emotion and warmth, as an explanation of 
uncanny responses to humanlike robots. Recognizing that this and other 
psychological explanations undoubtedly explain relevant aspects of the 
negative responses of certain humans to certain humanlike robots, I have 
proposed a more philosophical-existential perspective that addresses the 
looming “little big” question of “what makes humanness?” From this 
perspective, I have proposed that the uncanny valley might say at least as 
much about the viewer of humanoids as it says about humanoids, namely 
that a humanlike robot not only instigates awareness of what makes the 
robot different from the viewer but also what makes the viewer differ-
ent from the robot as well as of the impossibility to appropriate that 
difference, which elicits uncanniness; it confronts the viewer of the ro-
bot with her own unfoundedness, which is and remains constitutively 
strange. Lacan’s notion of “extimacy” was employed to further explain 
this experience of strangeness that is not simply the effect of something 
external intruding in the self; “ownness” structurally contains “other-
ness,” we have seen. This other within was more explicitly interpreted in 
terms of “technology within” through complementing Lacan’s notion of 
“extimacy” with Nancy’s view of being “closed open” for intrusive tech-
nologies: in the confrontation with the familiar and, at the same time, 
strange robot, the self not only uncannily senses the human in the robot 
but also the robot in the human. If new and emerging technologies are 
becoming increasingly “extimate” and are shaping the very fabric of the 
self, understanding technologies as means that can enhance or treat the 
human disregards that the self cannot simply externalize technology and 
autonomously determine if and how it wants to use it in order to realize 
certain goals that it has set for itself, which, in fact, would be yet another 
shadow of an essentialist and dualist framework. Instead of the “faster, 
stronger, smarter” rhetoric, I have proposed to understand technological 
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self-formation in terms of “technological sublimation,” which could also 
redefine the very notion of “human enhancement.” This view was devel-
oped in the last two chapters of this part of the book.
In Chapter 9, I developed the notion of self-formation as sublimation 
on the basis of insights derived from Freud, Lacan, Nietzsche and Peirce. 
This notion of sublimation elucidates how technology is becoming an 
intrinsic part of our mind, body and self, and could disrupt the stan-
dards that we use to establish what we consider “normal,” “healthy” or 
“enhanced” features and capacities. It recognizes this unsettled struc-
ture of the self and, at the same time, attempts to prevent adopting the 
view that the self is no more than a plaything of contingent influences 
and forces, unable to impart a stable and socially valued form to itself 
that it could consider its own. I showed that Freud understands sublima-
tion as the redirecting of a repressed sexual drive toward a nonsexual 
and socially valued aim. Although he does not resolve the problem that 
social valuations could be both repressive and arbitrary, which does not 
warrant singularity, he does highlight an important dimension of subli-
mation, namely the constant tension between what society expects and 
what libidinal drives demand. Lacan takes up this tension and reinter-
prets and intensifies it on the basis of his three categories of the Real, the 
Imaginary and the Symbolic, accentuating that the social-cultural order 
cannot be simply externalized because it is a constitutive condition for 
developing a unified ego as well as moral and communicative subjectiv-
ity, and cannot completely absorb and nullify the stubborn drives that 
are also a part of the self. Complementing what Lacan says about the 
social-cultural order with a material-technological order, the tension be-
tween a technological culture and nature has been situated in the heart 
of self and self- formation: technology is increasingly becoming both the 
necessary condition for forming a unified, coherent and social self and 
an obstacle that prevents it from reaching the singularity that it seeks. 
From a Lacanian perspective, sublimation becomes a (paradoxical) chal-
lenge to (re)discover a void or emptiness that, instead of denying, enables 
usurping our drives, this way forming a singular self within a social 
order. I also argued that Nietzsche adds to this notion the importance 
of actively integrating as much facets of one’s life as possible, includ-
ing conflicting elements, and consolidating them in a preferred lifestyle. 
From this perspective, sublimation requires organizing intense internal 
struggle into a form that can bring about ever-new life forms, securing 
singularity. 
Next, I have argued that Freud, Lacan and Nietzsche show consider-
able differences, but seem to all view society primarily as restricting the 
potential contained in the individual and, hence, as a danger for forming 
a singular self. I have employed Peirce to illustrate that society does not 
have to be as such a danger for singularity, but is rather a necessary con-
dition for critical self-formation: the orientation toward societal goals 
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and ideals, and eventually toward an ultimate ideal, prevents the indi-
vidual becoming trapped in one-sided convictions, including subjective 
ones, and creates room for forming a singular self that “has grown up 
under the influence of a course of self-criticisms and of heterocriticisms.”
By bringing together the different and most important aspects of “sub-
limation,” derived from ideas from the works of Freud, Lacan, Nietzsche 
and Peirce, and taking into account the role that technology plays in 
self-formation, I then outlined in a comprehensive theory what self- 
formation as sublimation in a technological world entails, a view which 
I have called Technological Sublimation Theory (TST): self-formation 
as sublimation involves, I have summarized, appropriating intrusive 
technologies, which are increasingly shaping the very fabric of the self – 
therefore, rendering complete control impossible and univocal standards 
unattainable – by virtue of an ongoing deliberate and critical identifica-
tion with goals and ideals embedded in or promoted by those technol-
ogies, through sociopolitical measures and devotion to ever higher and 
more inclusive ideals that culminate in an ultimate, esthetic ideal that 
enables forming a stable and socially valued as well as a singular form.
In the tenth and final chapter of this part of the book, I have retrieved 
particular guidelines from TST and applied them to three technological 
fields: technological environments (shaping the self from the “outside”), 
brain imaging technologies (bridging and merging “inside” and “out-
side”) and smart drugs (shaping the self from the “inside”). The smart 
elderly home was taken as an example of a smart environment to illus-
trate how self-formation as sublimation could be realized. I have tried 
to show how sublimation in this respect entails collectively finding out 
what would be a “good home” for the particular inhabitant through 
mapping out which goals are inscribed in the smart technologies of the 
house, and what are the interests, aims and limitations of the different 
relevant stakeholders, including those of the inhabitant, in the light of an 
ultimate ideal, that is, an ideal that permanently makes room for criticiz-
ing the different explicated values, goals and ideals in order to design the 
best house for that particular inhabitant. Neurofeedback has been taken 
as an example of brain imaging technologies. I have tried to show how 
sublimation entails a collective effort to map out which goals – in this 
case – neuroimaging seeks to realize, what are the interests, aims and 
limitations of relevant stakeholders, including those of the subject that is 
undergoing treatment, in the light of an ultimate ideal that enables criti-
cizing the explicated values, goals and ideals from different perspectives 
and realizing what could be a healthy lifestyle for the person in question. 
As an example of self-formation as sublimation through smart drugs, 
I have taken “donepezilplus,” a fictional improved version of the drug 
 donepezil. Sublimation entailed, as we have seen, collectively making vis-
ible which goals donepezilplus seeks to realize, in the light of an ultimate, 
all-inclusive ideal that enables criticizing the displayed values and goals 
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of the different stakeholders, including the user of the drug, in order to 
integrate it in the very particular practices and outlook of the person in 
question as well as her particular social context and circumstances.
It must be clear that TST as well as the guidelines derived from it are 
not a philosopher’s stone. The theory is programmatic, and the guide-
lines do not provide clear-cut directives. However, it does enable map-
ping out the most important conditions and provide relevant general 
guidelines for forming what could be considered a “good self,” at the 
same time recognizing that that self has been influenced and shaped by 
particular “extimate” technologies. Displaying those conditions and of-
fering those guidelines make, on the one hand, the paradoxical challenge 
of critically relating to something that cannot be fully explicated and ob-
jectified palpable; on the other hand, they indicate how to create a void 
that soaks off the rigid constraints that this technological order imposes 
on the self. They help, one could say, tame the “technological monster” 
that the human has become by unpacking and critically evaluating its 
inner drives and goals. Further elaborating and nuancing the application 
of TST to the proposed technological fields and examining other tech-
nological fields through the proposed lens as well as investigating the 
advantages and limitations observed in applying TST could contribute to 
sharpening the mapped-out conditions and guidelines and provide cues 
to sophisticate TST. In particular, the application to technologies such 
as big data, AI and algorithms, which are currently under development, 
could further test, modify and refine this theory.

Epilogue
Groundwork for a Philosophy of 
Existential Technology
In this study, I have gradually and progressively developed a particular 
notion of self-formation in a technological world. Thorough explana-
tions were needed to show why an interactionist approach to self and 
self-formation beyond the inside-outside dualism is, on the one hand, 
difficult to grasp and sustain, and, on the other hand, philosophically 
tenable and doing the most justice to our current state of affairs. It is 
difficult to grasp, because the contested view of an invariable, inde-
pendent and unified self is at the root of the development of Western 
philosophy and culture, and seems to be engraved in our everyday life 
conceptions of self and its relation to the world. It is difficult to sustain 
because attempts to overcome essentialist and dualist views of self and 
self-formation often quietly end up rehabilitating the very framework 
that they intend to overcome. At the same time, it is philosophically 
tenable because it is in line with and contributes to increasingly com-
mon contemporary pragmatist and phenomenological views of self and 
self-formation; and it also does justice to our current state of affairs 
because it complies with our everyday life experience of being strongly 
influenced and shaped by our increasingly technological environment. 
In attempts to overcome essentialist and dualist views in favor of an in-
teractionist view, we seem to be confronted with a discrepancy between, 
on the one hand, how we conceive ourselves and our interactions with 
the world, and, on the other hand, how we experience ourselves and our 
interactions with the world. In theory we often are still essentialists and 
dualists, whereas in practice we are interactionists.
This book can be viewed as an attempt to contribute to overcoming 
this incongruity between theory and practice, taking as starting point 
our lived experience of being increasingly surrounded with and influ-
enced by technologies that intrude more and more into our selfhood, 
without giving in to the view that it is impossible to provide a theory 
with explanatory power that exceeds a particular context, application 
or case study. It must be clear that the importance of particular settings, 
applications and case studies is by no means downplayed here, as also 
illustrated in the last chapter of this book. However, providing a suitable 
theoretical framework is of crucial importance to aptly grasp what is at 
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stake, recognize which normative questions a given context, application 
and case study raises and figure out how to tackle those questions. In 
order to answer subsequently what is the self, whether self-formation in 
a technological world is possible and how the self ought to be formed, 
I have engaged with a variety of authors and positions. After a critical, 
first-hand reading of Aristotle and Descartes’ essentialist and dualist on-
tology and anthropology, Nietzsche’s and Peirce’s views were employed 
for establishing a basis for an interactionist perspective that displayed 
the self as something that in relating to itself and its environment dis-
covers itself not as a substance but as a process and a challenge, that is, 
as a self impelled to form itself in a certain direction, which can be done 
more or less deliberately and critically.
The next step entailed, using Peirce as the main guide, going beyond 
the autonomy-determination opposition through debunking in different 
ways the inside-outside distinction. From the artifactual mind thesis, 
the mind, which traditionally has been viewed as an inner realm that 
secures freedom and autonomy, was demonstrated to be greatly deter-
mined by the “outside” world. This does not render normative questions 
irrelevant, but rather highlights even more the importance of critically 
evaluating the technologies that surround us and increasingly shape 
our mind and self. This normative approach, which presumes that de-
liberate and critical self-formation is at least not impossible, has been 
elaborated through adopting the distinction between, on the one hand, 
unconscious urges and shorter-term intentions and actions, and, on the 
other hand, longer-term goals and ideals. Because brain imaging tech-
nologies are often used by both advocates and opponents of free will as 
functional evidence, they have been examined from both a Cartesian 
and an interactionist perspective. From the proposed critical self-forma-
tion framework, these technologies are approached not as technologies 
that represent the inner world of the self, but rather, pragmatically, as 
technologies that could contribute to develop a preferred self by fore-
grounding both the neurological constraints and possibilities that un-
derlie our (unwanted) habits, allowing the use of that extrospective 
knowledge to directly adjust old or develop new habits in the light of 
desired  longer-term ideals. After illustrating how criticizing societal and 
institutional goals and ideals does not exclude but rather includes orien-
tation toward (other or more inclusive) goals and ideals, the notion of 
freedom has been reinterpreted in terms of critical self-formation in light 
of evermore inclusive goals and ideals.
In the last part of the book, I criticized the view of technological 
self-formation as enhancement in two ways: first, I tried to illustrate that 
standards for “enhancement” are not univocal and, hence, are depen-
dent on particular contexts and environments as well as on the technol-
ogies embedded in those contexts and environments, which themselves 
will shape the individuals interacting with those environments, including 
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their ethical standards. Then, I argued that being shaped by those en-
vironments, the self increasingly experiences technology as another 
within, as both familiar and unfamiliar, which also explains why tech-
nologies sometimes are experienced as uncanny. Because technologies 
are becoming extimate, the self is confronted with the challenge of how 
to critically relate to some-Thing within that has become a very part of 
its fabric. Confronted with these difficulties, next I have proposed that, 
building on Freud, Lacan, Nietzsche and Peirce, instead of conceiving 
self-formation as “enhancement,” it is more feasible to understand it as 
“sublimation,” or alternatively “enhancement” could be reinterpreted 
in terms of “sublimation.” I have demonstrated that his view, on the 
one hand, attempts to recognize that our environment, which is increas-
ingly a technological environment and subject to radical change, greatly 
shapes our present and future selves, and, on the other hand, resists the 
idea that the self is merely a product of random powers. The proposed 
Technological Sublimation Theory (TST) attempts to do justice to both 
the impact of the technological environment on the self and the poten-
tial of the self to impose a unique, singular form to itself. Applying the 
framework to three fields of technology (smart technological environ-
ments, brain imaging technologies and smart drugs), I have shown how 
the self is, respectively, increasingly becoming part of and being shaped 
by an outside technological infrastructure, how its “inside” world is re-
flected and explained by “outside” technologies and how it is shaped by 
outside technologies from the “inside,” though without rendering crit-
ical self-formation, that is, the formation of both a socially valued and 
singular self, impossible.
The proposed interactionist view of self-formation in a technological 
world is, as repeatedly said, programmatic and in need of further elab-
oration in different ways and directions. I stipulate two relevant routes 
for further research. First of all, the ingredients used to prepare TST 
could be, to use a food metaphor, mixed more thoroughly in order to 
find out to what extent they are mixable or not mixable, which could 
result in strengthening the different building blocks of the interactionist 
view of self-formation. There might be also ingredients that need to be 
added to the existing ingredients. I will mention five relevant matters in 
that respect: first, Peirce’s three categories of Firstness, Secondness and 
Thirdness have been related to three elements that are retrieved from 
Nietzsche’s notions of the will to power and his idea of the Übermensch, 
namely potentiality, struggle and organization. A more thorough elab-
oration of those relations is needed to establish to what extent these 
dimensions could complement one another, building a stronger basis for 
developing an interactionist view of world and self.
Second, Lacan’s triadic structure of Real Order, Imaginary Order and 
Symbolic Order seems to have similarities with both Nietzsche’s three el-
ements and Peirce’s three categories. Comparing those lists of categories 
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could shed further light on especially the relation between the individual 
and society and provide a more sophisticated account of what it entails 
to form a self that, on the one hand, is and remains influenced by and 
indebted to the technological world that it is increasingly shaped by, and, 
on the other hand, could appropriate those influences and “capitalize” 
them in its own unique, singular fashion.
Third, with regard to similarities between Nietzsche and Lacan, 
 examining particularly the relation between Lacan’s the Thing and 
 Nietzsche’s Übermensch, might prove fruitful (see also Phillips 2015). 
Especially the detaching and disorienting power of both figures is strik-
ing. By comparing them and examining how they could complement one 
another, it might be possible to gain a more nuanced view of the norma-
tive significance of both figures as well as of the importance of building 
buffers that enable a “void” in moral and cultural constellations.
Fourth, the notion of the “sublime” has a tradition of its own, poten-
tially related to monstrous, uncanny and extimate technology as well as 
to sublimation. Within that tradition, it is understood as something that 
exceeds the ordinary, which is also expressed aptly in the G erman word 
for the sublime, namely “das Erhabene” (the “exalted”). The sublime 
refers here to something that exceeds our very understanding, which 
sometimes is also associated with religious or transcendent experiences. 
Working out the different meanings of the “sublime” in relation to the 
proposed framework might produce very interesting results that en-
rich, among other things, what I have called the “esthetic” ideal of self- 
formation as well as TST (see also De Mul 2012).
Fifth, other views and concepts that have been mentioned or discussed 
in this book as well as views that have not been taken into account might 
be used to further elaborate, nuance, enrich and correct the developed 
framework. For example, Foucault’s notion of “subjectivation” and 
other relevant concepts like “ethical substance” and “telos” (see Fou-
cault 1984, 355) could complement and enrich (and possibly challenge) 
the proposed notion of technological appropriation and sublimation. 
TST is intended to contribute to opening up and drawing attention 
to a new strand of research in the philosophy of technology, namely 
a  philosophy of existential technology. In this study, much effort was 
devoted to elaborating how technologies in general, which traditionally 
are considered part of the “outside world,” increasingly influence and 
intrude in our “inside world,” blur the boundary between “inside” and 
“outside,” making our “inside” to a great extent also for us an “out-
side”; hence, making technologies existential. However, TST remains to 
a great extent “general” and, hence, the earned “large banknotes and 
bills,” to use a Husserlian expression (Husserl 1994, 5/56), need to be 
cashed out in “small change,” which comprises the second route for fur-
ther research. In other words, TST should contribute to a better under-
standing of how particular technologies influence and shape particular 
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existential phenomena, in traditional approaches often considered part 
of the human’s inner world. How do particular (AI-based) technologies, 
such as smart phones, brain imaging technologies, navigation technol-
ogies and surveillance technologies, affect and shape particular phe-
nomena like guilt, anxiety, hope, despair and especially desire? Turning 
large banknotes into small change requires a detailed and meticulous 
case-by-case examination and evaluation. TST could provide normative 
guidelines for how to deliberately and critically regulate those particular 
technologies and integrate them in our lives, imposing both a stable and 
a singular form to our existential moods. It goes without saying that the 
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